

MULTILEVEL ROLE PRESCRIPTIONS

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MULTILEVEL ROLE PRESCRIPTIONS

PORTUGAL, NATO AND THE CFSP

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Thinking is a conversation with imaginary audiences.

Randall Collins

Introduction

This study departs from an interest in international organisations and small states and examines them from a role analysis perspective. The end of the Cold War enabled the emergence of new prescriptive roles by international organisations and the incorporation of new roles by smaller member states. The study relates the impact of role prescriptions in the context of the foreign, security and defence dimensions of NATO and the EU's second pillar and Portugal's role incorporation in those policy domains. Role concepts are examined from the perspective to what extent international role prescriptions of two distinct international settings have an impact on the role concepts, on policy discourse and policy action of a small state, rather than at which decision-making level this impact occurs.

Theoretically, the study applies a role analysis approach to the domain of international organisations and policy behaviour of small states. Empirically, the research contributes to study policy behaviour in areas where international organisations enhance international activity driven by a logic of appropriateness.

In the last decade, the impact of international events on foreign and security policies pose empirical and theoretical challenges to academic research.

From the empirical point of view, it offers abundant ground for investigation. It allows connecting theoretical insights about international organisations' normative guidance with the changes occurred within the policy practices of member states. Recent research demonstrated that international organisations are not privileged stages of great powers' self-interested preferences, that the international norms conveyed do not always articulate or reflect the worldviews of great powers nor do international role prescriptions constitute forms of coercion over the behaviour of member states. The policy behaviour of small states within international settings has provided evidence of conformant behaviour, motivated by other reasons than the coercive action of major states, unfolding a policy behaviour guided by alternative frames to those of a logic of consequentiality and dependence.

Powerful binding elements connect small states to regional and international organisations. First the processes of identification between the beliefs conveyed internationally and those familiar to smaller members. Second the presence of broader institutional opportunities. Third the dissemination of comprehensive and normative inter-

national agendas, within which small states find resonance of their international identity.

The role concepts that shape the international activity of small states (e.g. the perceived place they occupy in the international system) are better attained within international organisations than outside them. In this study, the empirical test of conditions of international role prescriptions on Portuguese foreign and security policy permits to relate policy claims, statements and choices about foreign and security policy to theoretical insights in the forefront of academic debate about norm dissemination, willing compliance and adoption of a logic of appropriateness.

From the theoretical perspective of normative literature leads to this study a new analytical dimension on role analysis, which can and must be developed further with the help of empirical research. The present study seeks to meet this challenge by: departing from theoretical concepts and analysis of insights about role theory and sociological institutionalism to find empirical evidence of policy roles that shape appropriate standards of behaviour; to observe patterns of behaviour consonant with those standards and to examine the dominant policy discourse used in policy documents (official documents, speeches, policy guidelines and personal accounts).

Theoretically, the use of a role concept perspective enables detachment from classical analysis familiar to role theory, to observe and explain new phenomena outside the traditional limits of power politics and material conditionalities of external policy behaviour and policy action. It also overcomes the limits posed by a theoretical narrative based on international anarchy and by the paradigms centred on rational choice and national interest. The intersections between the domestic and the international and the lines between material and non-material conditionalities that account for behaviour and action have become blurred. In this context, addressing and solving problems pertaining to national and politically integrated foreign and security policies are not mutually excluding. Furthermore, policy assessments on *best arguments* versus *best fitted* international organisations do not have to result in a process of analytical selection of the best account about policy behaviour within international organisations opposing the value of arguments to the value of means.

A role analysis approach shows that international organisations and the regimes that may be constituted within them are not confined to facilitate cooperation, decrease costs of participation or facilitate access to information. They craft norms that change and strengthen the international identity of their member states, they frame

policy behaviour and persuade participants to act in conformity with a logic of appropriateness. Likewise, small states do not merely follow the course of international events initiated by major states. They act responsively, employing discursive strategies to justify compliance with appropriate international standards of behaviour and to counterbalance the formation of power hierarchies.

Events in the post-Cold War affected foreign policy situations in the Euro-Atlantic community, allowing NATO to claim a stronger political and normative dimension. In Europe, the process of European Political Cooperation (EPC) gave way to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with a new emphasis on security issues developing forms of regional and international cooperation, where consequential reasoning and self-interested preferences are not as visible as some wish to infer. Changes within international organisations offer to small member states a path to international participation and propitiate the adoption of policy roles consonant with their political culture and historical traditions of their foreign policy, in line with the valorative sets represented at the international level.

The non-coercive nature of the role prescriptions conveyed by NATO and CFSP found in the study, enable to analyse willing compliance and role incorporation in two traditional policy areas of state sovereignty, under conditions of ‘soft’ role enforcement mechanisms. In the study, willing compliance and concordance with role prescriptions were mirrored in policy behaviour, even when not immediately reflected in the formal instruments that framed policy action, constituting an irrefutable prove of prescriptive impact.

Recent contributions to a role approach produced developments in the field by examining policy behaviour with the help of role concepts, which explain continuity, adaptation and change in foreign and security policy. In this study, the influence of international organisations on small states is investigated across various stages of international prescription and national adaptation, covering a ten years period. To examine small states in the context of integrated foreign and security policies is, from a role analysis perspective, an unexplored realm to which this study hopes to make a contribution.

The first part of the study introduces the research goals and research questions (Chapter 1). They address the relation between international role prescriptions and the foreign and security policy behaviour of a small state. The *core goal* of this research regards the impact of international prescriptions by NATO and CFSP on national role

conceptions of one small state. The purpose is to explore new forms of conceptualising and empirically examine policy behaviour of small states in the multilateral context of international organisations.

Literature reviews on international organisations and small states will be conducted from a role concept perspective in order to benefit from cross-pollination of insights that lend analytical contributions to this research. Traditional and new perspectives on role theory as well as rationalist and sociological perspectives will be examined. The conceptualisation of foreign policy roles is drawn on role theory, while accounts of the prescriptive impact of international prescriptions and role incorporation are nested in sociological institutionalist views. The project connects both theoretical contributions and seeks to overcome the limitations found in the literature with the help of an empirical study.

The literature review on Role Theory evaluates traditional approaches based on a behaviourist tradition of foreign policy analysis, examines new scholarship and places NATO and CFSP within an analytical template of role analysis (Chapter 2). This is followed by a review of traditional insights in external behaviour driven by the logic of balance of power, hegemonic stability and domestic decision-making processes. From here the study evolves to the identification of three pitfalls in the literature. The *first pitfall* regards an overrated interest in superpowers and in the material conditions of power and military balance, dismissing small states and the non-material conditions of role prescriptions and policy behaviour. The *second pitfall* pertains to a concern of a wide body of literature with the domestic processes of decision-making, with little interest for the impact of transgovernmental policies in policy behaviour. The *third pitfall* relates to the lack of focus of state centric lines of inquiry on international organisations while prescriptive entities and socialising agencies. The chapter considers classical perspectives and suggests ways to overcome the pitfalls with the operationalisation of role concepts borrowed from role theory and approaches lent by sociological institutionalism in acknowledging to international organisations the ability to prescribe roles on a normative basis.

In order to answer the research question, a methodology based on a framework of analysis is developed in the first part of the study, designed to validate selected conditions of role prescription and role performance (Chapter 3). These conditions comprehend perception of the *international position* of the organisation, and *prominence*, *endurance* and *concordance* of the roles conveyed. These conditions are tested

for Portugal's external role incorporation and performance, based on *political rhetoric*, *policy planning* and *policy action* from a discourse perspective.

The *process tracing method* is used to analyse the roles, events and conditions that influenced the transformation of international role prescriptions into policy performance. The method of *content analysis* is conducted for various types of primary sources. The content analysis of primary sources allows to infer on discursive strategies and conceptualisations and to identify the conditions that frame roles and policy behaviour. These conditions add meaning to national policy choices and actions, and constitute a substantial part of public justification of policy choices. Matters of dissonance between the scripts constructed in academic literature and the narrative offered by primary sources were observed throughout the period under study. Although it is not the aim of the study to elaborate extensively on these matters, they are accounted for to the extent in which they pose problems of interpretation regarding roles prescribed and roles incorporated.

The reconstruction of the impact of international role prescriptions into small state role performance is based on the analysis of primary and secondary sources. The triangulation of sources stems from the analysis of NATO, CFSP and Portuguese main policy framing documents over a decade, which allowed tracing the official narratives about role prescription and role incorporation.

In the second part, the empirical study allows testing the theoretical insights addressed in Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 4 observes the impact of the transformations that occurred in the Euro-Atlantic context (e.g. institutional design of organisations) on the prescriptive ability of NATO and CFSP and on the international activity of small states. Chapter 5 and 6 analyse primary sources and issue specific secondary literature with a focus on the prescriptive role of NATO and CFSP. The chapters assess the specifics of their foreign and security dimensions, but also the aspects in which the two international sets converge and diverge as prescriptive entities. The chapters validate the conditions present in the framework of analysis proposed in Chapter 3 about international conditions of role prescription and national role incorporation.

These chapters account for significant context related elements that conditioned the prescription, incorporation and performance of new roles. In the case of NATO and CFSP prescriptive ability, reliant on non-rule based norms, is structured by the use of argumentative strategies which accompany change in member states

preferences; by the ability to support and undertake institutional adaptation and by achieving a situation of balance between goals and resources.

On the base of the theoretical framework and the empirical findings in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, Chapter 7 addresses the Portuguese case and focus on concrete behavioural and policy effects of role prescriptions. The elements identified as having a significant variation in the way roles are incorporated and performed are: the degree of integration and international socialisation, the argumentative strength of role prescriptions and the degree of national resonance of the issues addressed. The empirical study will show that international organisations ensure their prescriptive ability through a double argumentative and material conditionality and that small states incorporate the roles that enable their international identity, rather than simply accommodating the roles conveyed by major states. The present operationalisation considers the EU and NATO as multilevel contexts of role prescription to member states, in which small states benefit from broader conditions to enhance their external performance due to the fact that equal opportunities are shared by all member states.

In the case of Portugal, conformity through policy action with international prescriptions was not always preceded by formal role incorporation and institutional reform. Portugal's adaptation to NATO's new security tasks offers extensive evidence of it. That is, concordance did not reflect immediate administrative adaptation or legal implementation of prescriptions, but rather a transformation of perceptions on international identity and external behaviour.

The external relations of small states are better performed and legitimised within integrated political frameworks like NATO and the EU. Incorporation of role prescriptions can be a condition of successful external performance, as much as a positive identification between national role conceptions and international role prescriptions is a requirement for improved common action.

The concluding chapter elaborates on the impact of role prescriptions of international organisations on national role incorporation and the way in which the incorporation of new roles is consequently prompted by a logic of appropriateness. Further, it looks at the extent to which non-regulative aspects of role prescription lead to role incorporation, policy action and active international participation.

The theoretical insights and findings encountered through empirical research confirm that *non-rule base role prescriptions emanated from NATO and CFSP led to role incorporation* by Portugal and to changes in its international identity. The study

contributes to *theory building on foreign and security policy of small states* and shows that role theory can offer a novel approach to their study in integrated policy contexts, as diverse as NATO and CFSP. Role theory enables producing *interpretations about small states policy choices beyond the contending interests of major states, apart from observations about the strict regulative aspects of rule compliance and away from a pure logic of consequentiality on matters of preference formation*. The study overcomes concerns with formally incorporated set of laws, directives or other legal formulas as evidence of role prescription, which generate analytical constraints when explaining compliance with international role prescriptions. The policy documents and policy statements show that valorative role sets convey persuasive argumentation about appropriate behaviour beyond conceptions of national interest, enmity and survival. Role analysis offers resourceful examination tools to support empirically oriented research about willing compliance in foreign and security policy.

The empirical findings in the study allow drawing two main conclusions. Firstly, international organisations sustain prescriptive abilities through *normative* (i.e. valorative guidelines bind policy behaviour), *argumentative* (i.e. choices in foreign and security policy based on appropriateness, universality and policy positions that do not involve self-interested gains) and *material conditionalities* (i.e. availability of material resources and material incentives), which result from perceptions of adequacy and efficiency to address common preferences and solve common problems. Secondly, Portugal as a small state internalises and incorporates into policy behaviour the prescriptive roles that *enable its international identity*, based on perceptions of external *ethical responsibility* and *universal character of its foreign policy*, instead of merely accommodating the roles conveyed by major states or to abide by their coercive action, as frequently stated in literature.

The points of view expressed in this study are the author's own and should not be taken as an expression of any official line of thinking.

Part I – A Framework of Analysis

Chapter 1

Research Goals and Conceptual Boundaries

1.1 The Study of Foreign Policy Roles

The general research goal of this book is to analyse the impact of international role prescriptions on small states' foreign policy behaviour. The core goal is to study how role conceptions and policy behaviour, nationally defined on the domain of foreign and security policy, persist and change in contact with role prescriptions emanating from NATO and European Union's second pillar.¹ A case study about these two international settings and Portugal is conducted in order to find out how international role prescriptions have an impact on policy behaviour of a member state. This research relates the concept of international role prescriptions to the concept of role incorporation by smaller member states. The study covers the period between 1991 and 2001 when considerable international change occurred, enabling the expansion of international roles of organisations and enhancing external activity of smaller member states.

Conceptually, the study starts from a role theory approach to foreign policy behaviour, based on role concepts. It uses insights from sociological institutionalism to explain the conditions of prescription and incorporation of foreign and security roles, based on standards of appropriateness, beyond a strict regulative and utilitarian power base or material demand. Montgomery suggests that 'the logic of appropriateness presumes that roles simply contain rules of behaviour, we might generalize this scheme, allowing roles to contain either rules of behaviour or utility-maximization problems (...) nesting the logic of consequences within the logic of appropriateness.'²

The literature reviewed on role analysis does not offer a comprehensive theoretical approach to the core of this research. Traditional literature on role analysis fo-

¹ The notion of external relations will be used in this research to include foreign, security, and occasionally to refer to defence policy, whenever these three policy areas can be considered as a whole. When any of these policy areas will be addressed separately, I will specify which one is being considered. External relations is used in a comprising manner, comprehending the 'sum of official relations' in an international environment characterised by 'distinctive communities', without ignoring the need for 'the concept to encompass the fragmented nature of agency at the European (and transatlantic) level and the variety of forms of action', see Hill 2003, 3-4 and White 1999, 44. See also Carlsnaes 2004, 1.Brackets added.

² Montgomery 1998, 101. Brackets added.

cuses on policy roles from a perspective of influence and power of major states and individual decision-makers. The present study offers an alternative perspective in integrated foreign and security policy and explores these policy areas in the less common analytical context of international organisations and small states.

The present research suggests innovative ways to study international role prescriptions in relation to small states. This novelty is reflected in three aspects. Firstly by providing an alternative *conceptualisation* of roles in the domain of external relations. Secondly by *operationalising* a framework of analysis through an interdisciplinary approach to the study of foreign policy. Thirdly, by using *methodologies of process tracing* to investigate the conditions of role prescription and role incorporation based on *content analysis*, examining contending and non-contending features between the policy narratives of official sources and policy action.

In terms of *conceptualisation*, the analysis starts from concepts applied by traditional approaches in role theory (national role conceptions, role prescriptions and role incorporation) to the study of major states used to highlight international constraints to policy behaviour.³ The study goes beyond this limitation, assessing the impact of international role prescriptions not from a constraining, but rather from an enabling perspective. This means that it seeks to overcome views about the constraining effects to which small states are exposed in the international system, on grounds of territorial size, limited military and economic power and low international ranking when compared to other players. The conceptualisation places small states in the context of settings like NATO and the EU's second pillar, which offer the same rights and obligations with regard to position and behaviour in international affairs. This means that the international position of member states is levelled through membership and participation.

Traditional role theory (Chapter 2.1.1) does not address the impact of international organisations, since it is concerned with major states in the international domain and their domestic decision-making processes. The study suggests an alternative *operationalisation*, conciliating institutionalist claims on the enabling conditions of international organisations, with sociological institutionalist insights on why states comply with non-rule based prescriptive roles. In the context of this research, non-rule based means a top-down guidance that induces willing compliance among partici-

³ See Rosenau 1990, Le Preste 1997 and K. Holsti 2002.

pants, despite its limited or absent legally binding form and scarce or absent formal mechanisms of legal enforcement.

The study moves beyond the traditional concerns about formal compliance and legal implementation of prescriptions and highlights the normative and functional prescriptive conditionalities of international organisations.⁴ It shows the empirical value of comparing different aspects of small states in the context of two distinct international settings from which generalisations can be attempted.

Methodologically a qualitative approach was chosen, as explained in Chapter 3. The use of *content analysis* and *process tracing* focuses the analysis on substantive dimensions of policy statements (discourse) and policy practice (adaptation of policy behaviour and change in international activity).

The literature review shows that despite a renewed interest in the prescriptive role of international organisations and small states, contributions are not abundant.⁵ A large body of literature neglects bridging comparative perspectives on international role prescriptions (e.g. between international organisations) with country case studies, especially with regard to small states. Most studies that use a role analysis perspective are concerned with state actors and single cases. The literature that does not explicitly draw on a role framework, but which lends itself to a role prescriptive interpretation, frequently results in the analysis of the constraining effects of rule-based or utilitarian preferences on behaviour, but seldom combines both in conditions of international opportunity.

Most of the literature on foreign policy privileges self-help propositions and the domestic primacy of the process of decision-making, dismissing the various multi-lateral dimensions where role prescriptions occur. It ignores the multiple sites where national role conceptions are formed, the diversity of locations from where prescriptions emanate and the variety of actors involved (Chapter 2.2.2.).⁶ Additionally, approaches to international organisations focused on the material incentives to international participation (Chapter 2.2.3.), based on a cost-benefit reasoning and self-

⁴ Here 'normative' denotes a *proper* way (rule-based) to address external challenges, and 'functional' denotes an *efficient* (best best material capabilities) manner to solve problems.

⁵ For exceptions that seek to explain small states foreign policy in the larger international context, see Moon 1983; Elman 1995; Mouritzen 1996; Lebow 1997; Goetschel 1998 and 2000; Hey 2003; Karp 2004; Romsloe 2004 and Wivel 2005.

⁶ For examples see Brecher, Steinberg & Stein 1969; Axelrod 1976; Hermann & Hermann 1989; Hermann 1990; Farkas 1996; Allison & Zelikow 1999 and Chollet & Golgeier 2002.

For some exceptions to a domestic focus, see Gourevitch 1978; Walker 1987b; Putnam 1988; Almond 1989; Clarke and White 1989; Carlsnaes and Smith 1994; Waever 1994; Neack, Hey & Harvey 1995; Eliassen 1998 and White 1999.

interested bargaining. They are oblivious of the part played by norms and subjective understandings on the roles conveyed.⁷ Policy behaviour is also considered as guided by instrumental reasoning with the aim of maximising egoistic goals and role prescriptions pertaining to struggles between hegemonic powers in an anarchic system. Prescriptions are not treated as a result of the orientations of international organisations, but as reflections of major states preferences (Chapters 2.2.1.).

Other limitations were equally found in literature (especially in EU studies about Europeanisation) that analyses the prescriptive impact of European institutions and policies on member states, by the way in which it is confined to questions regarding how national administrations meet the technical challenges of regional integration.⁸ This literature is not comprehensive about the international and national conditions that affect prescriptions and interprets incorporation and performance of policy roles from a perspective of policy implementation centred on the EU only.

Insights on international role prescriptions and foreign policy behaviour based on the idea of unitary reasoning of decision-makers and the material incentives to the participation of actors are of less interest to the present study. Institutionalism offers a valuable contribution by positioning international organisations, as actors able to perform state functions or at least enabling roles that individual states cannot perform. It places international organisations at the same level as states, thus as having the capacity to prescribe roles to participants in the process of international cooperation. International organisations induce changes on the perceptions, beliefs and foreign roles of states, facilitating a more active participation in international affairs and enhancing international activity.

Sociological institutionalist perspectives, closer to the perspective this study conveys, although concerned with the normative impact of international organisations have also been scarce on empirical research about member states' external behaviour after roles have been incorporated (Chapter 2.2.3.).⁹ This study rather than strictly

⁷ On contributions about behaviour guided by instrumental cost-benefit reasoning, see Keohane 1989; Martin 1992c; Keohane & Martin 1995, 39-51; Neack, 1995, 215-228; Moravcsik 1997 and Keohane & Nye 2001.

For some contributions that go beyond the cost-effect focus, see Deutsch *et al.*, 1957; E. Haas 1990; P. Haas 1992b; Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 3-30 and Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998, 11-27.

⁸ For instance Smith 2000; Börzel & Risse 2000 and Radaelli 2000. For exceptions, see Torreblanca 2001 and Vaquer I Fanés 2001.

⁹ For theoretical approaches on the normative impact of international institutions, see Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; March & Olsen 1998 and Checkel 1999b. For studies empirically focused on the value of institutions as purposive and framing structures, see Slaughter & Mattli 1993; Duffield 1994; Katzenstein 1996:1-32; Legro 1997; Barnett & Finnemore 1999 especially 700, 707,709 and 711; Checkel 1999c; Schimmelfennig 2000, 2003; Dunne 2001 and Kelley 2004.

nested in the rational conditionalities of compliant behaviour or being solely wedded to a rule-based dimension, it looks for other prescriptive conditions and indicators that signal adaptation in policy behaviour. Benefiting from the advances of sociological institutionalism, the study blends the normative effects of international organisations with functional perspectives on how international prescriptions impact on the roles incorporated by one small state.¹⁰ This allows interpreting both role prescriptions and role incorporation as normatively guided, in the sense of what is appropriate and functionally driven regarding how best these policy roles can be fulfilled. Both dimensions guide policy behaviour and ensure compliance even when not bounded by rule-based mechanisms of enforcement.

1.2 Research Question

This study contributes to understand the conditions in which the impact of international role prescriptions occurs from the perspective of a small member state and answers the following question: *How do international role prescriptions impact on the external behaviour of a small state?*

In order to answer this question sub-questions are specified: *How are the prescriptive role sets of NATO and the EU/CFSP influenced by the security-related context?* (Chapter 4). *How does the institutional design of both international organisations affect role prescriptions?* (Chapters 5.1 and 6.1). *How do the indicators of role prescription impact across the four conditions of validation of prescriptions (international position, prominence, concordance and endurance) selected for this study?* *How do role prescriptions based on non-regulative aspects lead to prescriptive roles?* *These sub-questions are answered on the base of the analysis and interpretation of the narrative conveyed in the official sources of both NATO and EU/CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) /ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) (Chapter 2, Chapters 5.2 and 6.2).*

In the case of Portugal (Chapter 7) the impact of international role prescriptions is validated from the perspective of small states, answering the sub-questions: *How did the conditions of international role prescriptions, validated for NATO and the CFSP, affect Portugal's external behaviour? How is the impact of prescriptions*

¹⁰ For theoretical approaches on the impact of international institutions through the dissemination of norms of appropriateness, see March & Olsen 1989, 1998 and 2004; Finnemore 1996; Raymond 1997; Legro 1997; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Abbott & Duncan 1998; Barnett & Finnemore 1999, Payne 2001, Herrmann and Shannon 2001 and Gheciu 2005.

reflected in a small state's political rhetoric, policy planning and policy action? How do role prescriptions based on non-regulative aspects lead to role incorporation and policy action?

The present study tests two hypotheses. Firstly, to investigate the hypothesis that role prescriptions can be conveyed by international organisations and incorporated by member states in conditions of 'soft' enforcement or non-rule base.¹¹ Secondly, to test the validity of the theoretical framework specified in Chapter 2.

At the domestic level, states share national role conceptions conveyed through political speech to domestic audiences, as framing devices of international identity. Likewise, international organisations disseminate role prescriptions to their member states by making use of discursive strategies, convincing participants of the moral quality or legitimacy of their arguments and of the existence or need to build up material resources that enable the fulfilment of these roles. These rhetorical elements are both translated into prescriptive scripts within the EU and NATO and reflected in member states willingness to cooperate.

Content analysis of policy framing documents is used to trace the narratives and material conditions that reflect role incorporation, i.e. the process that evolves from role prescriptive policy statements to foreign policy actions under enabling international conditions (as described in Chapter 3). As Neumann suggests 'the linguistic turn and the turn to discourse analysis involved from the beginning a turn to practices. For IR this means the linguistic turn is not just a turn to narrative discourse and rhetoric, but how politics is actually affected. Practices are discursive.'¹² The prescriptive ability of NATO and the CFSP is examined through the impact of their international agenda, formal institutional design, and existent material and normative resources. Similarly, the analysis of adaptation of Portugal's external relations relies on content analysis of printed official sources (policy documents and statements) and secondary literature.

1.3 Conceptual Boundaries

This study traces the role dynamics established between international organisations and small states. The concept of *small state* or *smaller member state* is used as

¹¹ 'Soft' enforcement in this context means that member states may comply with prescriptions in the absence of directives or other regulative mechanisms. Compliance here results from voluntary adoption of role prescriptions or willing compliance, independently from formal rules and sanctions.

¹² Neumann 2002, 627-628.

an inclusive notion of authoritative actors (e.g. state representatives), with ability to accede to formal and informal mechanisms of policy formulation, decision-making and policy implementation, and who perceive, interpret and adopt roles prescribed internationally.¹³ The notion comprises those states that have a limited capability to influence the scope and focus of the international agenda, for which they find in international organisations a favourable policy environment. Traditional definitions of small states include aspects related with size (GNP, territory and population); international position (weak versus strong states) and negative international role (those studies that consider small states from the perspective of defiance e.g. rogue states or non-aligned states that were former colonies).¹⁴ State actors operate as role players, bound by a logic of appropriateness, based on evaluations of context and expectations related with the external situation in which they are embedded.¹⁵

The concept of *international organisation* encompasses the collective actors and the regimes comprehended and reflected by NATO and the CFSP.¹⁶ The understandings generated among participants are based on prescriptive roles (expected behaviour), norms (standards of behaviour related with rights and responsibilities) and formal sets of rules that prescribe and proscribe actions. International organisations produce routinised manners to address and solve collective problems.¹⁷ NATO and CFSP institutionalise security and foreign policy agreements, whose prescriptions are conveyed within the limited geographical scope of application of their founding Treaties. However, the prescriptions they address are intended to have a wider international impact. This is visible in the case of the common decisions agreed within CFSP, regarding for instance nuclear proliferation issues or through NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative and the creation of areas of stability in the far border. According to McCalla, regimes can expand beyond their initial purpose by refining the range of cooperation arrangements, by taking new tasks or by giving up on old goals.¹⁸

Most international organisations reflect regimes that fall into the conceptual boundaries set by Krasner, however, not all regimes need international organisations

¹³ On the notion of state as a 'conceptual creation', see Kratochwill & Ruggie 1986, 763-764.

¹⁴ For a review on definition of small state, see Fox 1965 and Rothstein 1969; Keohane 1969; Elman 1995, 171 and Hey 2003.

¹⁵ Tonra 2003, 739.

¹⁶ For a detailed account on the characterisation of NATO and the CFSP as institutionalised regimes, see McCalla 1996, 462-463; Goetschel 2000, 20 and Smith 2001, 94-99. Stacey and Rittberger define organisations as constituting collective actors and institutions as constituting rules, as opposed to actors. Institutions are held by organisational actors. See Stacey and Rittberger 2003, 860 and 861.

¹⁷ Cf. Kratochwill & Ruggie, 1986, 759 and 764.

¹⁸ McCalla 1996, 463.

to endure. Krasner argues that ‘Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.’¹⁹ The present study captures the prescriptive dimensions conveyed by NATO and CFSP, formally and informally, and examines the international and national expectations and the mechanisms, which enable them. This is achieved by considering expectations from the perspective of behavioural norms (or prescriptions) and institutionalised practices.

In the study international organisations are considered as framing arrangements that represent a ‘set of rules and practices that prescribe roles, constrain (and enable) activity, and shape the expectations of actors.’²⁰ In this context, international organisations comprise ‘collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate action.’²¹ By functioning as framing arrangements, international organisations connect roles with the policy situations within which they are undertaken. The connecting process between roles and policy situations involves an interpretation of the situation in term of rights and responsibilities. In this case roles are the result of behaviour conformant with the patterns that result from repeated interactions within international organisations, they regard not what the rule ‘says’, but what actually happens.

NATO and EU (as international organisations) work as collective bodies which operate in a unified manner and gather institutions that ‘operationalise norms, rules, principles and procedures that guide state behaviour.’²² Formal organisations comprehend ‘purposive institutions with explicit rules, specific assignments of roles to individuals and groups, and capacity for action.’²³ The behavioural guidance they offer and the expectations they generate (role prescriptions) produce simultaneously informal and implicit forms of appropriate behaviour (norms) and codified procedures (rules) which shape the way member states act in external terms.

¹⁹ Krasner 1982, 186.

²⁰ See Haas, Keohane & Levy 1993, 4-5. Brackets added. See also Keohane 1993, 3. Haas, Keohane and Levy use this definition in the context of regimes and stress the convenience of using the notion of institutions to cover both organizations and rules. See also Klabbers 2005.

²¹ See March & Olsen 1989, 160.

²² Kupchan & Kupchan 1991, 131. See also Kato 1996, 555 and Long 1997, 187. Stacey and Rittberger note that international institutions comprise ‘sets of rules which govern the interaction of political actors, i.e. guiding principles which both prescribe and proscribe behaviour and are set out in the form of prescriptions – either formally established or tacitly understood’. They continue by arguing that while ‘formal institutions are enforceable, informal institutions are intended and unintended patterns that accrue over time on the base of repeated interactions’ not legally bound. See Stacey and Rittberger 2003, 860-861 and 879 ft.9. Wessel features the EU as an organisation, considering the complexity of its institutional legal system and the legal and institutional practices of the institutions associated to it. See also Wessel 2004.

²³ Keohane 1988, 384 and footnote 2.

Roles are sets of ‘prescriptions defining what the behaviour of a position member should be.’²⁴ Roles convey significant ‘social meanings’ that lead actors to adopt certain behaviour in their relationships with other actors from which role-playing actors convey ‘narratives within which they perform’.²⁵ International role prescriptions are aggregated into expectations met by member states that presuppose role-playing according to the same set of rights and obligations involving complex sets of positions within and outside international organisations.²⁶ These roles are not static preferences informed by the most powerful member states, but sets of ‘behavioural repertoires’ that emerge from processes of socialisation developed within international organisations.²⁷

They define the limits of conformant behaviour with the position member states held within the organisation. Bretherton and Vogler observe ‘Roles, we believe, are socially constructed through the interaction of agency and structural factors and are, to varying extents, available to actors.’²⁸ This means that the roles international organisations prescribe and states incorporate and perform, result from international and domestic dynamics that contribute to their adaptation to new international and domestic conditions. As Chapter 2.1 will show, national role conceptions are not static elements, but dynamic ones. Roles are a ‘two-way process between structure and actor’, which involve a ‘notion of a structure within which roles operate’.²⁹ This implies that foreign policy behaviour does not exclusively reflect static self-interested choices, but rather mirrors the process of adaptation of actors to evolving international and domestic dynamics.

The process of adaptation of foreign policy reflects a ‘collective project of a society or of a dominant group at a given moment in time and in a given context’, which can be said to be the country’s *international identity*.³⁰ International identity in this study refers to the perception of place of a nation in international affairs and it comprehends a collective project of a society or group at a given time. International identity also shapes national role conceptions about external relations. The foreign and defence policy adopted is influenced by the way a country perceives its position

²⁴ Biddle and Thomas 1966, 29.

²⁵ Tonra 2003, 737.

²⁶ Bruce & Thomas 1966, 40-41.

²⁷ Biddle & Thomas 1966, 28-31.

²⁸ Bretherton & Vogler 2000, 32.

²⁹ Hollis & Smith 1986, 285.

³⁰ Cf. Torreblanca 2001, 20.

in the international and institutional environment in which it is embedded. The role conceptions generated within that collective project display the capacity to recognise familiar external behavioural frames, setting the explanation about role incorporation free from static interest-based accounts.

The behaviour that pertains to holding a specific international position is reflected in terms of the roles prescribed. In other words the roles which are expected, the roles which are incorporated, and the roles that resonate member states' national role concepts, understood as familiar and considered to be *good* and *appropriate* in the context of international relations. In the study *appropriate behaviour* reflects the internalisation of prescriptions of what is accepted as 'normal, right or good, without, or in spite of, calculation of consequences and expected utility', related with 'principles of conduct to justify and prescribe action in terms of something more than expected consequences'.³¹

The three main concepts borrowed from literature on Role Theory (role conception, role prescription and role incorporation/performance) enable to build a conceptual framework to distinguish the dynamics between national role conceptions and international role prescriptions (further elaborated in Chapter 2.1).

Foreign Policy roles	Role contents
Role conceptions (Holsti 1970)	Aspirational and normative orientations
Role prescriptions (Walker 1987 and Putnam 1988)	Expected policy behaviour
Role incorporation/role performance (Holsti 1987, and Aggestam 1999)	Actual foreign policy behaviour

Table 1 - Role concepts in foreign policy

The concept of *role conception* is understood as referring to national and institutional aspirations and preferences.³² These role conceptions are found in international treaties, in national constitutions and in the dominant (official) political discourse of states and international organisations. This type of aspirational roles is present in the rhetorical behaviour of actors.

³¹ March & Olsen 2004, 3.

³² See K. Holsti 1970, 238-239 and Rosenau 1987, 47-49.

The concept of *role prescription* describes the behaviour international organisations expect from their member states. The prescriptive roles referred to in this study result from a non-regulative, but norm conformant orientation. Role prescriptions are international policy orientations or guidelines that emanate from international organisations, both normative and functionally oriented. The study overcomes the discussion that dismisses the prescriptive role of international organisations and considers them as stages where states struggle to convey self-interested preferences, considering them as ‘sites’ not as ‘agents’ with prescriptive ability.³³ It also highlights a particular type of top-down prescriptive impact, which falls outside the boundaries of regulative power.³⁴

The concept of *role incorporation/role performance* encompasses the actual foreign policy behaviour regarding decisions and actions taken in the context of international organisations and the external behaviour of small states as member states.³⁵ Performance results from formal and informal role incorporation of role prescriptions. In this study role performance regards the reflective behaviour of actors as from the moment when international role prescriptions are incorporated into discourse, behaviour, policy guidelines or policy actions. This may be followed either by formal or informal role incorporation of prescriptions into domestic institutions, regulations and behaviour.

This mode of conceptualising external roles of small states and international organisations allows overcoming three limits. First, it goes beyond explanations nested in antagonistic notions of power (strong versus weak) and behaviour (consonant versus rebellious), since the study is concerned with non-coercive prescriptions and willing compliant behaviour. Further, it traces connections between roles prescribed and performed, following the narratives that are used to convey roles according to which actors perform.³⁶ Finally, it places international settings and small states in the policy domains of foreign and security policy, but outside the traditional contending theories of balance of power and hegemonic conditionality.

³³ On the notion of organisations as sites and agents, see Abbott & Snidal 1998, 3-32.

³⁴ For similar approaches see Tonra 2003 and Irondelle 2003, 208-226. In the study the terms soft enforcement, non-coercive, non-mandatory, non-regulatory and non-rule based are used to describe the same type of role prescriptions that is, those which are based on willing compliance.

³⁵ See Aggestam 1999, 15.

³⁶ Cf. Payne 2001, 37-61.

1.4 Operationalising Role Prescription and Role Incorporation

The perspective conveyed in the study does not aim at a generalisation about small states foreign policy behaviour encompassing any time and policy context. As Searing argues, the real value of an approach does not lie in achieving a single general theory, but rather ‘a series of quests for particular theories about particular problems involved in particular types of roles’.³⁷ The purpose of this study is not to test conceptual approaches *per se* nor to analyse empirical findings from a historiographic perspective, but to investigate the assumptions underlined in the research question with the help of empirical episodes, as presented in the second part of the study. These assumptions converge into two notions. On the one hand, international organisations prescribe roles that enable member states, in particular small states, to enhance their international activity. On the other, small states incorporate roles in their security and foreign policy due to other considerations than self-interested preferences.

In order to answer the research questions, two sets of variables for the framework of analysis are defined (Chapter 3). One for international role prescriptions based on the conditions favouring prescriptive ability (*international position of the organisation*, and *prominence, endurance and concordance* of the roles conveyed). The other set for the analysis of Portugal’s policy discourse and external behaviour, where these conditions are validated against the background of *political rhetoric, policy planning* and *policy action*.³⁸

With the aim to validate theoretical insights and empirical research, the study tests the possibility to bridge normative and functional approaches. It links views that stress normative guidance based on appropriateness, with functional perspectives based on best fitted organisation, supported on efficiency. It contributes to conclude on the possibility of persuasive prescriptive empowerment even when non-rule based prescriptions are conveyed. It investigates the enabling impact of international role prescriptions on small states external behaviour, based on norm-oriented prescriptions and willing compliance, even in the absence of formal role incorporation. The case study in the second part of this project starts from role prescriptions identified in policy framing documents of both NATO and the EU (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), to infer on

³⁷ Searing 1991, 1244.

³⁸ Similar dimensions are referred by Milliken when she uses discourse analysis considering the function of *representation, policy practice* and *play of practice*, see Milliken 1999, 237-248.

the incorporation of these prescriptions into a single country, Portugal (Chapter 7) in the context of those two international organisations.

The operationalisation of the conditions enabling role prescription and role incorporation allows analysing international organisations from an independent perspective from major states. The study does not aim at operationalising a way to analyse national sources of role conception, as seen in most of the traditional literature surveyed about role analysis.

The study focuses on international role prescriptions and the role of a small state in contexts of multi-level role prescription. The developments within CFSP and NATO offer empirical ground for testing how international conditions and discursive strategies prompt internal willingness of member states to adapt behaviour by other reasons than strict regulative conditionality. In particular for the EU second pillar, this perspective sets the analysis free from the regulative conditionalities imported from Communitarian policies of the first pillar, with which the CFSP tends to be generally compared in terms of prescriptive role. This uneven comparison results in limited conclusions that polarise the discussion between those who consider the CFSP as a mere declaratory domain, with weak binding force and those who see it as ground for strict intergovernmental state bargaining game. Its intergovernmental or supranational features are highlighted proportionally to which framework the CFSP is compared with: the EU's first pillar or NATO.

NATO's role has been confined by scholarship and policy oriented studies to the perspectives of dominant strategic culture, preferential interests of the hegemonic power and military might whenever explaining role prescription and role incorporation. Consequently the Alliance is denied autonomous purposive role and normative guidance despite the fact the 'NATO culture' is a sum of consensually defined roles, functions and practices. To my knowledge the term 'NATO culture' has not been object of academic interest nor clarification as compared with the term 'Europeanisation'. In this research, the reference to 'NATO culture' regards the set of principles, doctrines and procedures followed by all member states, which lead to harmonise concepts, policy positions and policy actions. Culture in this context is understood in the sense attributed by Legro as a set of collectively held prescriptions about the right way to think and act, reflecting conditions of 'organisational thinking and behaviour'

and constituting a ‘heuristic filter’ for perception and calculation.³⁹ Both international organisations provide symbolic and material frames within which member states reconstruct their own international identity, i.e. their own national conception of place in international affairs.

1.5. Scope and Relevance

Scope - The study highlights role prescriptions and role incorporation in less common policy domains of analysis, which match what Eckstein in another context called ‘least likely cases’ that is, those cases where international prescriptions are less likely to occur, since the considered policy domains are closer to state’s sovereign attributes, for which resilience to prescriptions and incorporation is expected to be higher.⁴⁰ The study attributes to both small states and international organisations the autonomous ability to pursue policy goals motivated by appropriate behaviour on how to achieve common purposes. As Bull notes, they can be seen as ‘independent political communities, which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent, common rule and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.’⁴¹ It is the recognition of common interests that bind participant states in the international society to a commonality of rights and obligations from which roles emerge.⁴²

Small states constitute interesting empirical cases of ‘collaborative politics’ as a strategy of adaptation and international participation.⁴³ Small states are in the forefront of concordant behaviour, not because they are small and dependent, but because they are adaptable and they see in the learning process inherent to adaptation an added value, not a limiting factor of external action.⁴⁴ As Katzenstein suggests elsewhere,

³⁹ See Legro 1997, 36. See also Hanf & Soetendorp 1998, 8; Vaquer I Fané 2001 and Aggestam 2004..

⁴⁰ See Eckstein 1975.

⁴¹ Bull and Watson made this statement in a different context. They seek to illustrate the conditions inherent to the formation of an international society of sovereign states, when agreement upon mutual respect for each others’ sovereign rights and common recognition of a self-preserving core of interests and institutions is reached. See Bull & Watson 1984 and Buzan 1993.

⁴² Bull 2002, 71.

⁴³ See Thorhallsson 2000, 6.

⁴⁴ This view is also confirmed by Olsen, Katzenstein and Deutsch. Olsen argues that small states perceive the dynamics of integration and the loss of direct control over their policies as being more familiar to them, as compared to major states, for which adaptation occurs more easily, see Olsen 1996, 275. Deutsch points to the ability of smaller states to construct and adhere to institutional mechanisms for the purpose of learning and adapting, see Deutsch 1966, 275. This view is also shared by Katzenstein who observes the openness of small states to generate the political space for domestic actors to learn and adapt, see Katzenstein 2003, 18. At the European level Wessels and Rometsch talk about degrees of europeanization (low, medium, high) to illustrate the process of adaptation of

reality 'is conceived substantively, not statistically' for which the part small states play in international affairs results more from the validity of their argumentation within international settings than from measurable criteria of greatness, power and other material capacities.⁴⁵

The robustness of institutional adaptation (e.g. legal implementation) is frequently considered the best evidence of formal incorporation of roles, but change in behaviour constitutes a more visible and practically oriented approach to study adaptation to role prescriptions, whether this emerges under the form of policy statements or policy actions. The insights based on role theory and sociological institutionalism are particularly useful in explaining how variations on the conditions of international role prescription may change national preferences and role incorporation, especially when combined with advantageous external options normatively driven and with favourable international contexts.

Relevance - The theoretical relevance of the approach conveyed in this research is twofold. Firstly, the study emphasises the relevance of context related conditions in the way international organisations succeed in prescribing roles to member states, despite the absence of 'robust compliance' or formal regulatory conditionality. Secondly, it operationalises these conditions from a dual standpoint informed by normative (appropriate way to address) and functional (efficient way to solve) roles incorporated in a situational manner, as contextual conditions of role prescription evolve. The manner through which states project their international identity, interpret prescriptions and mobilise resources 'depends upon their prevailing assumptions: about the appropriate structure of relations among units of an international order which they are prepared to recognise as legitimate, and about the appropriate role which they should play themselves within that order.'⁴⁶

The study contributes to overcome theoretical and empirical limitations. The first contribution relates to finding suitable analytical tools able to explain role prescriptions and role incorporation for the domains of foreign, security and defence policy, without being limited to the primacy of domestic propositions. For instance, most approaches on European integration that could help explaining permeability to inter-

national political institutions by means of active participation and convergence between national organization, procedures and behaviour, and the level of European decision-making, see Wessels & Rometsch 1996, 354-357.

⁴⁵ Katzenstein 2003,13. Deliberative approaches seek to explain how communicative skills can improve small states international position on the base of argumentative power, see Sjusen 2004, 11-15 and Romsloe 2004,4,7-8. See also Risse 2000, especially 2-7 and Müller 2004, especially 400-404.

⁴⁶ Wallace 2001,5.

national role prescriptions and account for role incorporation remain limited to the explanation of the dynamics of integration. These views emphasise the impact of political, economic, social and legal aspects of the first pillar into domestic policies. This limits their explanatory power regarding non-communitarised domains, like those observed in the EU's second pillar and unable the validation of role prescriptions that lack specific formal regulative impact in the legal sense.

The study underlines the importance of considering incorporation of roles, beyond the limited scope of policy directives and regulations and outside the specific domains of economical and social affairs. The use of role theory enables observing national claims and preferences about international identity based on perception and assimilation of norms and value-orientated prescriptions, which help to shape international identity, beyond coercion, power and force. The use of a sociological institutionalist perspective sets the research free from the formal aspects of political integration and enables analysing how international prescriptions and national role incorporation frame and are framed by standards of appropriateness, comprising prescriptions formally and tacitly incorporated. These frames can be as compelling as rule-based prescriptions due to their value oriented mobilising nature.

The second contribution emerges from the research topic itself and is related to the need to place it within the thin borders of political science and international relations. Foreign policy has been referred to 'as that area of politics which bridges the all-important boundary between the nation-state and its international environment (and) the boundary between two academic disciplines: the study of domestic government and politics, commonly called Political Science, and the largely separated study of international politics and diplomacy, commonly called International Relations'.⁴⁷ The 'international' and the 'domestic' are not understood as separate or mutually excluding levels, but as complementary domains of states external activity. As Rosenau suggests international political activity of states is bounded by the goals set by them and by the surrounding environment considered as a source of challenges and opportunities.⁴⁸ The present study can be placed within what Wæver considers to be 'the border that mediates two worlds' for which it is partially anchored within the scope of International Relations, partially on Political Science.⁴⁹ The dual application of role

⁴⁷ Wallace 1971, 7. Brackets added.

⁴⁸ Rosenau 1981, 2.

⁴⁹ Wæver 1994, 241.

analysis by political science and international relations raises challenges of conciliation of insights, useful in accounting for external behaviour pertaining to connections between the domestic and international domains. The first put the emphasis on the domestic sources of national role conceptions and on typologies of foreign policy behaviour, accounting for the reasoning behind domestic decision-making. The latter places the focus on role performance, explaining the dynamics of inter-state roles in the international system, putting the emphasis on the international sources of role prescriptions.

The use of role theory is particularly adequate in establishing this connection between the individual, the domestic and the international in what Walker called a comprehensive ‘vocabulary of images’ about policy behaviour.⁵⁰ Role theory is also inclusive of a perspective of agency and structure, without which foreign policy cannot be properly understood. Foreign policy is the product of courses of action based on choices and behaviour found in global structures and in the choices of individual policy-makers.⁵¹ The use of primary sources in the study enables to reconstruct this ‘vocabulary of images’ based on the analysis of the official narratives of international organisations, on national policy statements and on governmental documents.

The third contribution results from the analysis of the prescriptive roles that emerge within multi-level settings, like international organisations, which tend to be studied through the narrow lenses of traditional national foreign policy. For instance the positions depicted in literature that attribute a low degree of prescriptive power to CFSP/EDSP suffer from two misconceptions. Firstly that CFSP/EDSP aims at replacing the nation-state in its foreign, security and defence functions perceiving the emergence of a new identity in a power struggle context, between the EU and the member states. This view is aggravated by a misleading understanding that the final goal of CFSP/EDSP is full integration of national policies, rather than the creation of policy instruments aimed at generating common approaches, coordinating positions and jointly solving policy problems. Secondly these views tend to evaluate the performance of the EU in foreign, security and defence policy through the lens of conventional state foreign and defence policy or by comparison with NATO’s ability to solve security problems.⁵² The EU aims at a much more comprehensive agenda than

⁵⁰ Walker 1987c, 2.

⁵¹ Carlsnaes 1992, 245-270.

⁵² Cf. Tonra 2003 and Goetschel 2000.

NATO. It has a stronger normative and value-oriented focus, as compared with the Alliance which represents itself as a more functionally driven organisation.

The study attempts to operationalise the EU/CFSP/ESDP and NATO not through specific differences or uneven comparisons, but through those aspects they resemble. Among these, one may state that they both work as: role harmonisers, value inducers, framing sets in problem addressing and joint problem solving, makers of imagined communities, generators of voices of opportunity for small states and discourse legitimisers.

While the Alliance is an 'issue-specific' organisation committed to security and defence, the EU comprises a three-pillar structure of which only the second includes foreign policy, security and defence related issues. NATO speaks the language of sovereign states and uses integration of security and defence policy as a way to avoid re-nationalisation, without needing supranational decision making.⁵³ The EU talks the language of harmonisation, with the aim to improve coordination and to avoid nationalisation of foreign, security and defence policies having in its horizon some form of overall coordination over member states policies. In this study, changes in policy behaviour are explained by relating systemic and domestic elements that account for incorporation by small states of international prescriptions. The study suggests an explanation of international prescriptive impact on a small state's external behaviour, regarding particular policy issues, within selected international frameworks. Thus it contributes to develop the scope of perspectives about small states foreign and security policy behaviour in integrated political contexts.

⁵³ Cf. Duffield 1994-1995, 775. For a discussion about governance in 'multilevel' structures, see Wilde (2003).

Chapter 2

Role Analysis and the Study of External Policy Behaviour: The State of the Art and its Shortcomings

The chapter encompasses a comprehensive literature review on role analysis and addresses three aspects. The first distinguishes traditional and new perspectives on the application of role analysis to foreign policy behaviour and conceptualises NATO and CFSP from a perspective of role prescription (Chapter 2.1.1 to 2.1.3). The second places role analysis in the context of classical approaches to foreign policy, such as Political Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis, followed by the identification of three pitfalls (focus on major powers and exclusion of small states, unawareness of external impact on domestic decision-making and dismissive positioning towards the prescriptive power of international organisations) (Chapter 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) in these two traditional perspectives. The last part of the chapter analyses the prescriptive impact of regional organisations and suggests ways to overcome the three pitfalls (Chapter 2.2.3).

In the absence of consensus in literature able to explain the incorporation of role prescriptions into foreign policy behaviour, a conceptual framework based on an extensive literature review on role theory and sociological institutionalism is used in the study. Without denying the relevance of traditional literature, the finding of three pitfalls claimed for complementary insights that help to account for small states' role incorporation in the context of organisations. The insights referred are to be found in sociological institutionalism, helping to centre the analysis on actors other than major states (i.e. international organisations and small states) and to study role incorporation by other ways than coercion and material power, by focusing on aspects related with standards of appropriateness and rightfulness in the justification of foreign policy behaviour and policy action.

2.1 Role Analysis and the Study of Foreign Policy

The literature reviewed on role theory shows differences between research issues and methodologies in the literature published during and after the Cold War. Role theory has been traditionally used to study domestic decision-making in foreign

policy analysis and to examine role typologies in comparative foreign policy.¹ During the Cold War, variations in the application of role analysis followed the evolution of international events: the emergence of bipolarity and containment, the period of *détente* and the affirmation of dissidences towards the two main ideological blocs.² In the post Cold War period, most of the literature using a role analysis approach reflected two concerns. On the one hand, an interest in role conflicts which result from identity and ethnic clashes, whereas on the other hand the impact of European integration on member states national role conceptions and foreign policy behaviour was considered a primary concern.

The traditional approaches to role analysis regard the scientific work developed between 1950s and late 1980s. During the Cold War period the climate of political confrontation between the two superpowers led disciplines to focus on distinct aspects of role analysis. Political Science focused on the application of role analysis to the domestic decision-making process and to the role played by individual decision-makers. International Relations concentrated on power asymmetries and on the ideological dichotomy between East and West. The first generated a literature centred on the domestic level of decision-making and on typologies of roles played by national decision-makers. The second produced a literature focused on ideal state-types. The relative predictability of the Cold War environment reinforced the tendency to seek for continuities in national role conceptions, based on behavioural characteristics of great powers, which led to formulations about static behavioural types and about typologies of national role conceptions.

The approach adopted in the studies after late 1980s reflects a shift in research from traditional role typologies to an understanding of roles in international and integrated systems of external relations. These approaches integrate material and non-material elements in the explanation of role conceptions, role prescriptions and role incorporation. Elements of identity, political cultural, historical legacy, meaning, perception, cognition, institutional learning, norms, preferences and issue salience were added to explain *why* roles are chosen. The new inquiry more than bringing a conceptual refinement to role analysis, acknowledged role change as opposed to the claim,

¹ These two traditions are present in studies on comparative foreign policy by Rosenau 1966 and in decision-making studies with emphasis on the role of individual decision makers, as observed in the work Snyder, Bruck & Sapin 1962.

² The Cold War and the doctrine of containment limited research on role prescriptions to the two superpowers and their confronting ideologies.

made by early literature, on the static nature of national foreign policy roles. The consolidation of the process of European integration stimulated the inclusion in the study of role conceptions of new analytical elements such as policy coherence, conformity and consistency. These elements are not tested against a political/ideological background of two dominant actors, but rather by reference to non-state actors as international organisations and to the dynamics of regional integration.

Despite the post-Cold War developments, the specific domains of defence and security policy, as salient elements of states external relations, have not generated sufficient interest among recent literature on role analysis. Two reasons may account for this. The first reason pertains from the fact role analysis is wrongly considered to be a poor ground to posit academic findings against the background of the undergoing IR debates, for which it may be seen as having less academic appeal.³ The second reason is related to the fact role theory having only partially achieved a unified and coherent conceptual core, remains an analytical framework. As Searing notes ‘What is usually called ‘role theory’ are frameworks consisting of topics, concepts, and assumptions.’⁴

However, the study of role incorporation and role prescription in foreign policy captures the dynamics through which both agent and structure impact on each other, being both purposeful and shaped by organisational settings within which foreign policy takes place.⁵ The concept of role ‘is a two way process between structure and actor (...) Roles involve judgement and skill, but at the same time it involves a notion of a structure within which roles operate’.⁶ The study of foreign policy roles can help to bridge actors in foreign policy (states, international bureaucracies, state representatives and international organisations) with foreign policy structures (domestic, multi-level and international). Further, as Hudson and Vore suggest ‘National role conception is one of the few conceptual tools we have for the study of how society and culture serve as context for a nation’s foreign policy.’⁷

Role analysis, when applied to international role prescriptions and national role incorporation, blends roles and norms framed by institutional rules and shaped by individual preferences. It contributes to conciliate state-centric views and institutional

³ Cf. Wæver 1998b, 707, 709, and 711.

⁴ Searing 1991, 1243.

⁵ For a perspective on the problem of agent-structure, see Carlsnaes 1992, 245-270 and Wendt 1999, 139-190.

⁶ Hollis & Smith 1986, 285.

⁷ Hudson and Vore 1995, 226.

approaches in a context related manner.⁸ It envisages understanding foreign policy behaviour by conciliating approaches based on individual preferences, with approaches based on the prescriptions of international organisations. It bridges self-interested role choices, with notions of appropriate behaviour and the effects of international socialisation in explaining foreign policy behaviour.

The basic conceptual tools (role prescriptions, role incorporation and role conceptions) as it will be shown in the next two sections, account for conceptual consistency between classical and recent literature. Such consistency denies the lack of a coherent conceptual core. Among those concepts with contents commonly accepted in the fields of IR and Political Science are the concepts of national role conceptions, role incorporation/performance and role prescription. As referred *national role conceptions* are national aspirations or goals domestically defined and understood as actors' preferences.⁹ It reflects the way a state perceives its role and place in the international system shaping national conceptions on *international identity*. Role conceptions regard both aspirations and the perception decision-makers 'have of their state's role within the system' comprising the possibility of role perception variations 'with respect to different issue areas'.¹⁰ These role conceptions are implicit in the texts of treaties, in national constitutions and in the dominant political discourse of organisations and states. It can be said to reflect the actors' normative and rhetorical behaviour.

The concept of *role prescription* corresponds to the behaviour expected by organisations from member states and involves agreement on international role aspirations.¹¹ Whenever in conformity with the roles prescribed domestically by state representatives and internationally by other non-state actors it assumes the form of *role incorporation*. Role prescriptions inform notions of appropriateness that bind normative behaviour, which emanates from the *alter* and its viability depends on various degrees of national and international recognition. In the present study, role prescriptions are the international policy guidelines issued in the context of international organisations with a normative or functional orientation.

⁸ See Ostrom 1991; Pederson 1991 and Kato 1996.

⁹ Holsti 1987, 7 and Holsti 1970, 245-246.

¹⁰ Breuning 1995, 237.

¹¹ Holsti 1970, 244 and Walker 1987a, 84.

Holsti establishes a distinction between role performance and role prescription. The first 'refers to behaviour (decisions and actions) and can be kept analytically distinct from role prescriptions, which are the norms and expectations cultures, societies, institutions, or groups attach to particular positions'.¹² The concept of '*role performance*', encompasses the attitudes, decisions, and the actions governments take to implement *role conceptions* and the *role prescriptions* that emanate under varying circumstances from the external environment.¹³ Political action takes place within a *position* that is, a system of role prescriptions. From the roles assumed derives a set of attitudes, decisions and actions actors take to implement policies, which implicitly involve a form of action, known in role theory literature as *role performance*.¹⁴

Role incorporation or *role performance* relates to the actor's actual external behaviour and international activity.¹⁵ In political discourse role incorporation is frequently reflected in public justifications based on historical legacy, political culture, and international identity. When applied to external behaviour, it mirrors preferential alliances and can offer indication of change in international commitments. In the framework of this research, it means both beliefs and actions incorporated in policy behaviour within multilevel contexts. The concept of role performance represents the reflective behaviour of state actors, whenever role prescriptions are incorporated formally and informally into policy guidelines or policy behaviour.

The understanding in the present study about role concepts is as follows. National *role conceptions* generate roles with an intentional nature and regard national aspirations and perception of the roles and place to be attained in the international system. *Role prescriptions* derive from external expectations and norms that the *alter* (international organisations) project on the roles and positions occupied by the *self* (member states) affecting its behaviour. They provide normative (standards of appropriate behaviour or indication of how to address) and functional (utilitarian material resources or indication of how to solve) frames. Role prescriptions are influenced and influence the position of the role occupant in the domestic and international environment. *Role incorporation/performance* consists of a formal and informal 'materialisation' of roles incorporated through policy decisions and actions. Both role conceptions

¹² Holsti 1970, 239.

¹³ Holsti 1970, 240

¹⁴ Holsti 1987, 8.

¹⁵ Aggestam 1999, 15.

and role incorporation are affected by *role prescriptions* which emanate from the *alter*, by coercive or by willing compliance. This study is particularly interested in examining the latter.

The analysis that result from the operationalisation of these three concepts represents actors' willingness to incorporate role prescriptions adopted in political rhetoric, policy planning and policy action. It also accounts for how these roles evolve or persist in conditions of international socialisation. In politically integrated sets, like NATO and CFSP, national role conceptions although having a strong structural and aspirational nature, are expressed into coherent preferences and policy actions that evolve in conformity with parameters of appropriateness and utility.

National role conceptions, due to their aspirational nature, tend to have a more stable nature than role incorporation and role prescription. Role incorporation is more vulnerable to variations that may occur in the international scenario and in domestic policy. The present study examines the continuities and variations in role incorporation/performance, when in contact with international role prescriptions, which means it will be less focused on the national level of analysis or on the self-conceptions of policy makers.

There is an established propensity to assume that small states are particularly vulnerable to international contact due to their less prominent international rank or limited material resources. The point of view conveyed in this study is that small states can better defend their national interests and reduce the impact of what is presumed to be a vulnerability by exploring their ability to adapt to international changes. This means that the opportunities inherent to international role prescriptions are turned into policy adaptation when explored. Examples of external opportunities to increase status and foreign policy performance may vary from acquiring a better international position through intense international commitment within an international organisation, to the allocation of human and material resources at the service of collective actions, which will bring international prestige, enhancing the country's external position.

2.1.1 *Traditional Perspectives in Role Analysis*

Role theory has been a 'viable conceptual framework for the investigation of individual behaviour within an organisational setting' in the fields of sociology, social psychology, and foreign policy analysis.¹⁶ Role theory starts from the assumption that individuals are 'members of social positions' that hold 'expectations for their own behaviour and those of other persons'.¹⁷ A specific emphasis was given by sociologists to the discussion of 'changes in role-conceptions of individuals inside or (when) entering an organisational setting', which accounts for role change through contact with new institutional expectations.¹⁸ When transferred to the level of inter-state relations, contact with international organisations means holding a new international position, which grants member states new rights, shared responsibilities and improved access to common resources.

Among the several perspectives accounting for role conceptions in role analysis one may distinguish six main theoretical approaches: functional, symbolic interactionist, structural, organizational and cognitive theory.¹⁹

Functional role theory refers to the behaviour of individuals occupying social positions within a stable social system. Roles are 'conceived as shared, normative expectations that prescribe and explain' behaviour.²⁰ Functional theory highlights the relation between conformity inducement in participants and systems stability.

Symbolic interactionist role theory, which benefited from important contributions by the work of George Mead, emphasises the possibility of role evolution of individual actors by means of social interaction, through which actors apprehend and interpreted their own behaviour and the behaviour of others.²¹ Later approaches to change in roles and behaviour, related individual social commitment with the group, to the emergence of a new identity that facilitated change in social behaviour.²² This can be observed during processes of international socialisation, whenever behaviour of member states change as international contact develops. In late 1960s, K. Holsti used some of these themes in the context of inter-state relations seeking to establish a

¹⁶ Morris 1971, 395.

¹⁷ Biddle 1986, 67.

¹⁸ Morris 1971, 395.

¹⁹ Biddle 1986 and Campbell 1999.

²⁰ Biddle 1986, 70. For further reading see Parsons & Shils 1951.

²¹ Mead 1934.

²² Stryker & Serpe 1982, as quoted by Biddle (1986).

relation between the definitions of role conception by major powers, their capacity to impact on international affairs and to disseminate patterns of identity to other states. In this case, role variations were not a consequence of levelled common commitment with the group, which would stimulate the assumption of a new identity. Variation was the result of the outcomes of pre-defined roles, set by major powers that would determine the position states occupy in international system.

Structural role theory focused on the ‘*social structures* conceived as stable organisations of sets of persons (called *social positions* or *statuses*), who shared the same patterned behaviour (*roles*) that are directed towards other sets of persons in the structure’.²³ In this context issues like kinship, role sets and social networks assume a particular importance in the way roles were prescribed. These approaches were later applied to the study of the external behaviour of states in systemic studies.

Organizational role theory explored the role of formal organisations as social systems, with a task oriented nature and hierarchical form of organization. Roles in this context were identified with ‘social positions’, which generated ‘normative expectations’.²⁴ The contributions borrowed by IR from organisational role theory, resemble what structural realism considered, as the international hierarchical structure where states performed roles in conformity with the power position held in the system.

Cognitive role theory focused on the relation between role expectations and individual role playing, relating them to explain social conduct. Political scientists borrowed insights from cognitive role theory to explain the processes of role imitation transposed to the study of domestic bureaucracies.

The contributions of role theory to the analysis of foreign policy decision-making processes and to the external activity of states in the international system emerged under the form of conceptual analogies, which aimed at explaining how decision-makers framed foreign policy and how states behaved accordingly to their individual perceptions. State representatives and states were assumed to share, as individuals do, ‘personality’ types that conditioned responses to decision-making and shape external role performance. Such ‘personality’ features affected the perception

²³ Biddle 1986, 73.

²⁴ Biddle 1986, 74.

of state positions in the system and influenced the perception of others about the positions occupied by their counterparts.

States were thought to perform roles being looked upon in traditional literature on role analysis as the strict result of external expectations of major state actors. Biddle considered role incorporation/performance as the expectations built through two modes: norms and preferences. Transposing these two elements to the inter-state level allows highlighting the importance of internal and external constraints in explaining state behaviour. Preferences are considered by traditional literature as embedded in national settings (which exist independently from external interaction) and that are located at the aspirational level of national role conceptions.²⁵ Norms considered to be externally given, for instance by domestic or international organisations, implied a degree of compliance that enabled to predict the behaviour of states. Most of the traditional insights on foreign policy roles presented a static nature, which hardly accounted for the possibility of role variations conform to national preferences, the degree of role incorporation and the rights and responsibilities associated with new international roles.

Mead, Nadel and Parsons developed studies, which aimed at expanding the application of role analysis to foreign policy analysis and international relations.²⁶ These studies favoured the possibility to apply such analytical approach to the analysis of the behaviour of states in the context of international organisations by articulating status, role and position within an organisation and calling attention to the 'mechanisms of socialisation' that prepare the actors for several roles in which they were likely to be placed. Like individuals, states acquired a status, which conferred them a position in the international system from which specific roles, duties, and obligations derive. The roles performed and the positions occupied by actors were seen as varying according to material resources and capacities, international prestige, quality of diplomatic networks and degree of international socialisation.

Early role analysis literature also devoted attention to the effects of international socialisation on behaviour, accounting for changes in role conceptions of individuals when they moved into an organisational setting. In order to reduce dissonance, individuals tend to change attitudes or beliefs to make them more consistent with ex-

²⁵ For a detailed analysis on the pre-defined nature of preferences see Moravcsik 1997, 519.

²⁶ See Mead 1934 and Nadel 1957, 395

pected behaviour.²⁷ Similarly, states hold an external position and engage in processes of social interaction, which generate expectations about *appropriate behaviour*. This means that status is defined by the 'location of an actor in a system of social (political) relations', and by roles 'as the set of expectations applied to the incumbents of that particular status'.²⁸ This emphasises the normative nature of roles prescribed in the way they recommend what actors ought and are expected to do and outline the rules and routines that lead to *appropriate behaviour*.

Newcomb attempted to establish a conceptual distinction between role prescription and role behaviour (role incorporation/performance in the present study). He defines role prescription as the expectations (beliefs and cognitions) on what is considered to be an appropriate behaviour for a given status and role behaviour as the real conduct of the status holder.²⁹

Between 1950's and 1970's exploratory research applied role theory to Foreign Policy Analysis and to International Relations.³⁰ Harold and Margaret Sprout developed substantive work on the relation between decision-makers psychological and operational environments, stressing the impact of perception on decision-making and external behaviour.³¹ The research work developed by Ole Holsti, Axelrod and Jervis introduced innovative perspectives on the impact of cognitive variables on the definition of role conceptions and their influence on decision-making and policy behaviour. Holsti examined belief systems and their impact on national images of external role.³² Axelrod used cognitive maps to reconstruct the decision-making process in national foreign policy.³³ Jervis sought to explain foreign policy behaviour through the way perception and misperception influence actors' attitudes about the behaviour of others.³⁴ These contributions sought to analyse the processes of rational and perceptual approaches to foreign policy and how they influence foreign policy choices and exter-

²⁷ Festinger as quoted by Morris 1971, 406

²⁸ Morris 1971, 396-397 and 404.

²⁹ See Newcomb 1950 and Biddle 1986, 68-69. Biddle notes three different types of expectations: expectations as norms with a prescriptive nature, expectations as beliefs, which stresses their subjective nature and expectations as preferences identified with attitudes.

³⁰ For further reading see Sprout & Sprout 1957, 328; Hermann 1972, 58-79; Stassen 1972 and Hermann 1974.

³¹ Operational environment means the policy setting in which foreign policy decisions are taken, see Sprout & Sprout 1957, 328. See also Rosenau 1984 and Hermann & Hermann 1989. On what regards the relation between ideology, role behaviour of democracies and war see Weede 1984. For a perspective on the type of foreign policy behaviour pertaining to self perceptions about type and roles associated with them, see Neack 1995, 215-228.

³² See Holsti 1962.

³³ See Axelrod 1976.

³⁴ See Jervis 1976. For further accounts on the impact of cognitive variables on foreign policy behaviour, see George 1969 and Holsti 1976.

nal behaviour. Most research work focused on domestic decision-making with limited attention to the prescriptive effects of international organisations.

In late 1960s, important steps were made in relating domestic and international elite perceptions in international and national operational environments. The study of relevant factors and conditions, which constituted the environment in which foreign policy decision-making occurred, was the main goal of research. It also called the attention of researchers to the impact of context related matters on the outcomes of political decisions ‘filtered through the images of decision-makers’.³⁵

Brecher *et al.* distinguished three levels of foreign policy decision-making and role formulation: the *operational environment* comprising the analysis of the external environment focused on the hierarchical relationship among actors within the international system. The *internal environment* related to the national resources and capabilities. The *communication level* which regarded the transmission of information about the operational environment and the *psychological environment* comprising the attitudinal prism (ideology, historical legacy and personality predispositions) and elite images. This view proposed by Brecher and inspired on Almonds’ frame of *input-output analysis* remained concentrated on elite images on the base of which decision-makers acted according to a perceived reality. This approach privileged the domain of self-conceptions in foreign policy roles, in detriment of the opportunities and constraints of the external environment.

Kalevi Holsti and Walter contributed significantly to the application of role analysis to international relations, although closely related to the idea of self-conceptions of policymakers and to the notion of national interest. The term role conception concerns the ‘*ego’s* own conception of its position and functions, and the behaviour appropriate to them’.³⁶ Role conceptions were seen as the elite’s prescriptive definition of national position, function, and duties in the broader context of international affairs. Holsti’s approach reflected the concerns with superpowers’ foreign policies and their position in international affairs. This concern was also reflected on Walkers’ definition of national role conceptions as reflecting the perception of policy makers about the position nations held in the international system.³⁷ Holsti and Walker analysed the interplay between domestic and external environments with dif-

³⁵ Brecher, Steinberg and Stein 1969, 81.

³⁶ Holsti 1970, 246.

³⁷ Walker 1987a, 96.

ferent emphasis on what was *self*-conceived (by the nation-state) and what was prescribed by the *alter* (by the international system). This meant that roles involved a notion of hierarchy consistent with the position occupied in the international system.

Holsti and Walker's analytical concerns mirrored the realities of the Cold War period based on: the balance of power, antagonistic ideologies, war escalation and military alliances. Such realities generated a notion of national role in conformity with the prevailing international environment and foreign policy styles of major players. As a result, role analysis and foreign policy behaviour were articulated into role typologies depicting images such as *bloc leader*, *bloc follower* or *balancer*. The contents associated with these notions relates to the principle that there was a hierarchy in the position occupied by states in the international system, failing to explain how these positions changed and how they affected role variations. Studies which use typologies based on active-passive or powerful-weak dichotomies seldom escape to an oversimplification of reality nor do they explain contingent changes.³⁸

Recognition of normative role prescriptions by international organisations is acknowledged by Holsti who identifies the sources of role prescriptions as being nested in system-wide values, in general legal principles (such as the idea of sovereignty), in rules and expectations as expressed in the charters of international and regional organisations and 'less formal and implicit commitments and *understandings*'.³⁹ This broad source of role prescriptions comprised international, multilateral and national formal norms of conduct and also subjective understandings, which can be determinant in the way perceptions about prescriptions frame national role conceptions and guide role performance. On Chapter 7 the relevance of these *understandings* of symbolic practical gestures of international commitment by a small state is addressed.

The period of *détente* was followed by an intensification of regional conflicts and ideological dissidences, namely in Southeast Asia and Middle East affecting the notion of structural supremacy of superpowers.⁴⁰ These international events had a repercussion on the way role theory started to look into the part played by non-material

³⁸ Among realist scholars this determinism in the explanation of inter-states relations is particularly recurrent. As Morgenthau acknowledges the 'political phenomena can be reduced to one of the three basic types. A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power'. Internationally speaking three policies resulted from those three basic types: a policy of *status quo*, a policy of *imperialism* and a policy of *prestige*, which accounted for superpowers external behaviour. See Morgenthau 1967, 36.

³⁹ Holsti 1970, 246.

⁴⁰ Nunes 1996, 155.

or power related aspects on foreign policy roles. Studies on consistency between political discourse and foreign policy behaviour were added to the research 'agenda'.⁴¹

Holsti stressed the importance of non-material frames, such as rhetoric speech, in structuring external behaviour and obtained empirical evidence that linked rhetoric and external behaviour, finding that highly structured roles and articulated contents led to active international commitment.

These insights suggested that from national role conceptions passive and active roles could be inferred and consequently conclusions could be drawn about passive and active foreign policy behaviour. For each national role conception, a hierarchical typology was established based on a greater or lesser degree of international commitment and external activity.⁴² Superpowers persisted at the top of this hierarchy with higher levels of international participation. Holsti's study relating discourse with international activity showed that the position and number of roles of the country in the hierarchy changed, when compared to the roles claimed in political statements. However the number of roles stated was disproportioned when compared to real role taking, demonstrating a lack of congruence between rhetoric and foreign policy behaviour. Holsti did not explain the conditions under which the roles were selected and transformed into political behaviour. Walker made three important contributions to the study of role concepts. Firstly, he considered role conceptions to be more than a *perception of policymakers*. Secondly, he explored consistency and balance between national role conceptions expressed in political rhetoric and role enactment (actual foreign policy behaviour) between superpowers and third nations. Thirdly, he evaluated consistency under conditions of conflict that is, states choose the role 'for which the probable reward was the greater.'⁴³

Consistency between rhetoric and external behaviour is the result of capabilities and incentives and not a matter of accurate rhetorical formulation, as claimed by Holsti. More than stressing the relevance of national role conception accuracy, Walker called attention for the expectations and actions that might influence role selection and role enactment. Third nations tended to avoid conflict by adopting a foreign policy behaviour that favoured the principles of balance and congruence associ-

⁴¹ Holsti 1970, 253.

⁴² For a detailed description of national role conceptions contents and international activity, as well as the methodology used, see Holsti 1970, 256-309.

⁴³ Walker 1987a, 87.

ated with their relations with superpowers. This perspective did not comprehend analyses of policy behaviour within international organisations, where this balance is levelled through the rights and duties of membership. Walkers' empirical study on congruence between valences of role-conception and role-enactment showed that consistency between discourse and foreign policy act was a weak common feature, both in situations of normality and situations of conflict. Two possible reasons accounted for it. One pertained to the fact that role conceptions suffer adjustments to external influence, since an actor can have multiple role conceptions triggered in a context-related manner. The other resulted from the fact that role performance may not correspond to 'role conception rhetoric', but is rather the result of 'successful *altercasting*.'⁴⁴ Empirical evidence of this will be given in the case study about Portugal.

The evaluation of consistency between what states say and what they do is relevant to the present study. At the international level, multiple role taking occurs more frequently since actions operate in multilevel environments. The multiplicity of roles is likely to happen due to exposure to more than one dominant external environment and to *altercasting* as a consequence of the interdependency of policy decisions and actions in politically integrated settings, like the EU second pillar and NATO. *Altercasting*, rather than revealing states' inconsistencies between discourse and behaviour, it accounts for changes in foreign policy roles, based on willing coalescence with overlapping prescriptions.

In more recent research on role analysis, Wish organises national role concepts into three main categories: *role status* defined by the 'degree of influence a nation has in relation to its partners in cooperative ventures'; *motivational orientation* described as being oriented by individualistic and cooperative-competitive nature and *issue or substantive problems* area such as territory and defence, ideology, diplomacy, universal values and economic issues.⁴⁵

In Wish's analysis, *role status* emerged from national attributes, capabilities and motivation. International activity tends to be conformant to national perception of role status. Nations whose decision-makers *perceive* and *believe* that their countries

⁴⁴ Walker 1987a, 84. *Altercasting* involves a change in self-conceptions due to exposure to an external environment.

⁴⁵ Wish 1980, 536-537, 538, 540 and Wish 1987, 95. Wish sustains that national role conceptions are driven by international rather than by individualistic or domestic orientation. On what concerns issue or substantive problem area, Wish adopts Brecher *et al.*(1969) scheme of variables for role conception, which allowed to introduce elements beyond the traditional classification into economic, political, military or ideological values by adding universal value roles such as 'defender of the peace'.

have larger influence and that they perform leadership roles are more likely to be internationally active. Perception and not rhetorical formulation set the difference between an active and less active participation. As far as *motivational orientation* (which opposed hostile to cooperative behaviour) is concerned, Wish concludes that *competitively motivated roles* driven by territorial and ideological orientation are likely to generate a more aggressive behaviour and active external participation. Likewise, political motivations driven by universal values tend to produce less hostile behaviour, although not necessarily less internationally active.⁴⁶ The case study about Portugal developed in Chapter 7 offers substantial evidence of committed external behaviour based on a foreign policy oriented to universal values. With regard to *issues* and *substantive problems*, policy-makers who envisioned their countries as dominant in specific policy domains, especially in the economical dimension, are more inclined to allocate resources to their foreign policies. Wish examined the impact of perception on the way state actors position themselves internationally and how these perceptions shape external behaviour.⁴⁷

In sum, traditional role analysis by sharing a preferential focus on the role major powers occupy in the international system tends to analyse other states' foreign policy through the narrow lenses of major states role prescriptions and international dissemination of dominant national role conceptions by superpowers. Furthermore, it ignores the role portrayed by non-state actors, such as international organisations, and their prescriptive ability towards member states in the way they frame, integrate, level and facilitate foreign policy roles. Traditional studies offer little theoretical or empirical evidence able to connect international and domestic prescriptive environments, being confined to the analysis of national decision-making processes, based on individual perceptions of decision-makers, power position of nations and material constraints. Their attempts to add a discourse frame to role analysis fell into the same limitations of prior research by trying to prove that nations with better ability to articulate national role conceptions, from a discourse point of view, were the ones to register a higher degree of international activity. These perspectives remain limited to the study of major powers, with larger institutional resources and broader international bureaucracies able to convey role concepts about international position to other actors.

⁴⁶ See Wish 1980, 538-539. For further reading on motivations and external behaviour see also Morse 1970.

⁴⁷ See Wish 1980, 550

2.1.2 Contemporary Themes in Role Analysis

The end of the Cold War enabled state actors and organisations, like NATO and the EU, to reform their institutions and reformulate their bases of understanding among member states, adapting them to new international role prescriptions. Recent research on role analysis reflects changes found in the individual, societal and in the international domain. The state, although remaining an important unit of analysis, is not the exclusive one and non-state actors were brought into the analysis of role conceptions, incorporation and prescription. Contemporary views are not merely focused on hierarchic distribution of resources and material/military capacities as framing elements of role conceptions, but also on identities, meanings, learning and common understandings. As the present study shows, these subjective elements are important frames for the definition of foreign policy roles and policy behaviour and work as crucial elements in the explanation of external role claims.

The use of discourse analysis of political statements, to look for variations in policy behaviour and the focus on consistency between rhetoric and foreign policy behaviour occupies an important place in contemporary research on role analysis. The methodologies adopted by this new literature rely on comparative country studies or policy issue case studies.

Although making use of classical role typology, recent studies use role analysis to account for change in national identity and role claims in the post-Cold War, as well as to explain modification in role concepts due to European integration. Recent role analysis relating culture and institutions has been developed to explain segments of countries' foreign policies, notably on what concerns foreign aid. The study of role conflict in contending foreign policies, applied to regional conflicts in the Middle East, and institutional role conflict and regional instability occupy a substantive part of contemporary role analysis. It is also been applied to track the origins and evolution of national identities in regional conflicts, whether one refers to inter-state conflicts or to identity conflicts in accounting for intra-state conflicts.

These approaches to role analysis relate to an entirely different set of themes, as compared to prior research (e.g. change, political integration, motivation and behaviour in foreign policy, roles as collective representations, roles as salient elements of identity and culture, and roles as framing elements of historical narratives). The

study of *change* in role conceptions and international identity is based on discourse analysis in order to trace national role conceptions reflected in political statements. This approach provides indications about adaptation to new international responsibilities and to how they are incorporated in domestic policy rhetoric. Le Preste defined national roles as reflecting ‘a claim on the international system, a recognition by international actors, and a conception of national identity.’⁴⁸ Roles are related with the ability to intervene. Le Preste acknowledges role change as a positive sign of adaptation of national foreign policies, not an indication of policy inconsistency or national vulnerability. As the empirical study in Chapter 7 shows, role adaptation was consistent with Portugal’s necessity and willingness to correspond to new international expectations, reflecting adjustments in foreign policy performance consonant with incorporation of new policy roles. Adaptation is an enabling strategy for international activity, rather than the consequence of accommodation to external constraints.

Le Preste calls attention to subjective rather than purely material elements in the formulation and definition of national role conceptions. Despite this consideration, he does not exclude the interference of rational elements regarding evaluation of repositioning in the international system ‘since roles define new hierarchies, behaviour may remain essentially rational’.⁴⁹ He makes a distinction between *ascribed roles* imposed by the society and *achieved roles* chosen by the actor. Both sources are responsible for *prescriptions* seen as norms that derive from self-image, from the expectations of the international system and from *beliefs* that reflect ‘subjective probabilities about other actor’s demands...translated into *preferences*’.⁵⁰ One may conclude that exogenous expectations, but also self-perceptions of decision-makers about international environment that is, about the perceptions shared about expectations and the status occupied by the actor, affect national role conceptions. National role conceptions evolve from self-conceptions deep-rooted in the way a society perceives itself and how it is represented and projected in the world. In this view national responses to systemic change depend more on the states’ perception of which positive and enabling elements of international activity are at stake, than from a simple search for power.

Studies relating role conceptions and identity call attention to the issue of role taking as a result of willing compliance with the dynamics found within transgovern-

⁴⁸ Le Preste 1997, 4-5.

⁴⁹ Le Preste 1997, 6.

⁵⁰ Le Preste 1997, 7.

mental institutions and domestic politics.⁵¹ As Aggestam observes ‘politics of identity refer to a particular set of ideas about political community that policy-makers draw on to mobilise a sense of cohesion and solidarity in order to legitimate the general thrust of foreign policy.’⁵² In the present study, the analysis of behaviour of a small state, within prescriptive sets like the EU second pillar and NATO, led to conclude in that direction. Not all role-taking results from coercive role prescriptions. A substantial part of behaviour in foreign and security policy relies on how well the sense of community of values is incorporated, how well the process of international socialisation is established and how member states perceive organisations as enabling and improving international activity.

Political integration is likely to urge commonality in role prescriptions and role performance as a result of integration, socialisation, and participation of member states in regional activity and common goals. In this context, to incorporate roles deriving from the formal organisations states integrate, affect and modify how the foreign policy operational environment is interpreted.⁵³ Changes in the predominant idea of the place occupied by a state are likely to have significant implications on its external behaviour. They may lead to modified ‘systems of meaning’ that although pertaining from international organisations, have a global scope, in particular when embedded with core universal values.⁵⁴

State representatives and national communities of experts portray themselves as guardians of national role conceptions about international identity. As Adler and Haas note, epistemic communities influence the identification of national interests, frame the context in which ideas are interpreted, affect the choice of appropriate norms and institutions to solve problems and enhance policy coordination.⁵⁵ Literature refers to evidence that, after political integration, states experience a tendency to incorporate the common values conveyed by international organisations.⁵⁶

Intergovernmental views about decision-making within the EU’s second pillar allege for a tendency for national interests to prevail over communitarian ones. But the intergovernmental mode of governance, observed in the EU second pillar and

⁵¹ Aggestam 1999, 22-23. See also Hyde-Price 2004, 109-111.

⁵² Aggestam 2004, 84.

⁵³ See Aggestam 1999, 23.

⁵⁴ Cf. Adler 1997, 253.

⁵⁵ Adler and Haas 1992, 377, 375 and 379.

⁵⁶ Aggestam 1999, 7.

NATO also offers evidence of two features essential to a common baseline of role conceptions among member states that is, consensus reaching and conformity. This enables the formation of agreements, which generate and are generated by shared expectations about the roles held by various member states, facilitating conformity with the patterns of behaviour understood as appropriate.⁵⁷

Evolution in role statements reflects both a logic of usefulness or rightfulness in a given 'situational context and time'.⁵⁸ Formal and informal incorporation of prescriptive roles is likely to occur whenever national constructions about international identity find resonance within international organisations. The empirical study developed shows that informal identification between national role conceptions and the representations contained in international role prescriptions are more relevant for role incorporation than the formal and legally binding role prescriptions.

Other approaches to role analysis do not agree with the notion that national role conceptions result exclusively from interests or ideologies of political elites.⁵⁹ National roles are described as *collective representations*, as 'views and understandings regarding the proper role and purpose of one's own state as a social collectively in the international arena. Collective representations are products of history, memory, and socialization, and not the mere result of individual perceptions of national decision-makers.⁶⁰ National role conceptions are considered to be 'historical creations' that 'appear, develop and become dominant during one time period.'⁶¹ Krotz considers national role conceptions as being three folded: prescriptive, proscriptive and inductive of process and style of policy decision-making. This means that national role conceptions are attributed both an inclusive and exclusive function to define what constitutes behaviour and what is ruled out from it. They are *intersubjective products* of historical legacy, collective memory and socialisation that characterise external behaviour and international activity.

Variations between rhetoric and foreign policy behaviour provide important clues on differences between *motivation* and *behaviour* in explaining role incorporation and policy performance. In a comparative case study, Breuning argues that the rhetoric involving decisions, for instance on foreign aid is framed by a discourse con-

⁵⁷ See Biddle 1986, 76 and 78.

⁵⁸ Aggestam 1999, 17.

⁵⁹ Krotz 2000, 3.

⁶⁰ Krotz 2000, 4.

⁶¹ Krotz 2000, 5.

noted with ‘good will’, while foreign aid policy action is driven by national interest and ‘self-help’.⁶² Breuning isolated indicators for motivation and behaviour, evaluating to which extent rhetoric is reflected in foreign aid expenditures.⁶³ The study concluded on differences in the way similar rhetoric within a national community results in differences in aid expenditures and policy behaviour.

Identity and *culture* offer important sources of explanation for actors’ patterns of thought and action, although they are hardly ever examined in the context of foreign and security policy within multilevel settings.⁶⁴ Culture and identity help framing national role conceptions, creating openness or resilience to incorporate new prescriptions. Herrmann *et al.* developed an approach based on cognitive schemata to explain how external relations are perceived through the images of *enemy* and *threat* and how strategic choices in external policy derive from cognitive and affective aspects about constructed images. These images are filtered by affective bonds that work as ‘central judgements’ about friends and foes shaping the way actors perceive others.⁶⁵ Constraints and opportunities are also seen, as motivational sources for policy action and perception on the relative power of actors, as a determinant of the options considered available. Herrmann *et al.* departed from the assumption that major states project similar strategic choices accounting for the presence of similar international roles. However within international organisations these projections tend to be levelled through institutions, which function as control devices of unilateral decision-making within and outside the organisation.

Recurrent themes in national political discourse and the use of *historical narratives* to frame them constitute strong binding elements in the way meanings are reproduced in role prescriptions, role incorporation and foreign policy action. When an actor stresses through discourse its importance as an ally, its state representatives tend to underline the country’s status position. References to the country’s position of ‘founding member’ of an organisation or ‘faithful ally’ of a major state are voiced domestically and internationally, in order to perpetuate specific national role conceptions, to justify the maintenance or change of foreign policy roles and to define a certain type of international rank from which result rights and responsibilities. These ref-

⁶² Breuning 1995, 235.

⁶³ Breuning 1995, 240-242.

⁶⁴ See Banerjee 1997 and Banerjee 1991.

⁶⁵ Herrmann 1997, 408 e 407.

erences in policy discourse contribute to generate internal consensus about continuity and adaptation of role conceptions. Internationally speaking, they offer a frame within which actors operate oriented by commonality of roles with other members, which share similar foreign policy representations.

Sociological contributions to role analysis are important by the way their insights go beyond the constraining effects of international settings, by calling attention to organisations as enabling sources of new preference formation and change of member states international identity.⁶⁶ The roles performed within international or regional settings tend to generate predictable attitudes and encourage new behaviour based on precedence. As Barnett explains, when states adopt particular roles, they limit their behaviour in a foreseeable manner and generate expectations conducive to stability of the regional setting in which they are embedded.⁶⁷

Like Barnett's, the view sustained in the present research shares the idea that roles largely derive from the international context and evolve through processes of socialisation and learning among state representatives and communities of experts, which contribute to inform national foreign policy in larger multilevel contexts of political cooperation.⁶⁸ National role conceptions and international role prescriptions are a product of *role position* and *role preference*. The first is associated with compelling and formal institutions and the later with informal institutions connoted with the leader's interpretation of the role and the meanings inherent to it.⁶⁹ Adaptation in external behaviour combines legitimacy about expectations with consequences that derived from non-conformity with them and the actors' traditional position about legitimacy and sanction.⁷⁰ In the context of this research, compliance is considered a manifestation of willingness of role holders to cooperate and adapt to new strategies of participation, rather than a reaction to international constraints.

Some scholars have used cognitive or societal tools to explain knowledge formation and its impact on how images about roles and identities are constructed. Schema theory examines how 'knowledge about a given actor is organised' and how

⁶⁶ For further reading see Keohane 1989 and Wendt 1992. Individuals define their roles in relation to a determined social context, so do states in the international context, understood as a socialising space.

⁶⁷ Barnett 1993, 272.

⁶⁸ For further reading on the effects of socialisation and the role of communities of experts, see Haas 1992. See also Checkel 2005: 810-812.

⁶⁹ Barnett 1993, 275 and 277.

⁷⁰ Cf. Blackman 1970, 318.

‘it influences the selection, interpretation and memory of information pertaining to the actor in question’.⁷¹

New approaches to role analysis look to role themes through the dynamics of integration in the international context and their impact on policy choices, role change, identity formation and adaptation of policy discourse, rather than through the part national interest, national security, hierarchic position and power related processes play in role formation, subtracting role analysis to the traditional logic of hierarchic inter-state relations.

In sum, in recent approaches to role analysis non-state actors and subjective elements were brought into the study of role conceptions, role incorporation and role prescription. These views dismiss hierarchic distributions of power and material/military capacities as framing elements of role conceptions, and they retain the analytical utility of identity, meaning, learning and common understandings. The value of applying new role analysis to international prescriptions, national role incorporation and policy performance is three folded. Firstly, it is a frame of analysis for political phenomenon not strictly applied to the study of state actors and domestic policies. Instead it focuses on the analysis of non-state actors and on the external behaviour pertaining to the dynamics of politically integrated regional and international participation. Secondly, it allows explaining variations in policies based on persuasion and cooperation, which is particularly suitable to the study of small states and regional organisations. Thirdly, it permits to focus on positive role variations based on enabling international conditions of role prescription beneficial to small states, rather than limiting itself to examine the impact of constraining elements.

2.1.3 NATO and CFSP through a Role Analysis Perspective

It is not the purpose of this section to provide an exhaustive account of the main developments in literature on European foreign and security policy and NATO, but only to highlight those aspects that can help detangling the conditions under which role prescriptions can be observed in these two specific settings. How can insights about NATO and CFSP prescriptive roles be used from a role analysis perspective?

⁷¹ Herrmann 1997, 406.

Literature frequently attributes NATO's prescriptive role in the post-Cold War to its military functions regarding external threats, to the persistence of predominant interests of a hegemonic power, to its power-based bargaining and to the strategic dependence from member states in the system.⁷² Likewise most of the debate about CFSP rests between rationalist approaches regarding: the part self-interested preferences play in political cooperation, the emphasis on the regulative aspects of rule injunctions in explaining prescriptive conditionality and compliance, and the larger debate between intergovernmental and supranational options placing CFSP in a regulative and power related context.⁷³

NATO has fostered a specific interest of traditional approaches to the study of its material dimension, its organizational aspects and military might.⁷⁴ Traditional views attribute to the Alliance, instrumental reasons to prescribe roles shaped and disseminated by a hegemonic state and stress NATO's functional roles in solving security problems through the military might of the United States.⁷⁵ These traditional assumptions do not offer a satisfactory account of changes in prescriptive roles of the Alliance in the post-Cold War period nor do they explain why allies continue to colligate, after the purpose for which NATO was created had disappeared.⁷⁶ Despite the diverse nature of this literature one dimension seemed to have captured little interest from scholarship that is, NATO's implicit normative and functional dimensions from a role prescription perspective.⁷⁷

In the literature about European foreign policy the status of the CFSP is a contending issue. The EU second pillar is considered a stage for inter-state struggle among major players; its foreign and security dimensions are seen as debilitated by the projection of self-interested national foreign policy agendas and its capacity to solve problems is limited by the existence of the so called goals-capabilities gap.⁷⁸

⁷² See Ikenberry 1998-1999; Art 1996 and Mearsheimer 1990.

⁷³ For a view on specific concern with bargaining and national preferences, see Moravcsik 1998. On the regulative impact of the EU on member states foreign and security policy, see Wessel 1999; Smith 2000; Radaelli 2000; Vaquer I Fanés 2001 and Wessel 2004. On the debate supranational versus intergovernmental options, see Wagner 2003, Koenig-Archibugi 2004a and Koenig-Archibugi 2004b. On the prevailing preferences of national actors within CFSP, see Hill 1996 and Gordon 1997/1998.

⁷⁴ The contributions in scientific journals that are oriented to policy-making like *Survival*, *Adelphi Papers*, *The Washington Quarterly*, *Chaillot Papers* and *Foreign Affairs* emphasise this material dimensions.

⁷⁵ See Ikenberry 1998-1999, 48.

⁷⁶ For an exception see Wallander 2000, 723-731 and Walt 1997, 166 and 168-170.

⁷⁷ Normative here is understood in the sense of dissemination of appropriate standards of behaviour implicit in the principles and guidelines contained in the Alliance doctrine, in the Washington Treaty and in rules of engagement which inform its functional dimension.

⁷⁸ Cf. Hill 1998 and Ginsberg 1999.

In this study, it is argued that in the post-Cold War the ability to prescribe roles to member states depends from: the capacity to adapt to evolving international scenarios, to balance prescriptive roles with the means to implement them and to convey a normative agenda that matches problem addressing with convincing guiding principles of appropriateness and rightful standards of behaviour.

Generally speaking, the notion of role prescription, defined earlier in this chapter, regarding international expectations and observance of standards of appropriate behaviour (towards rights and responsibilities within international settings), finds resonance in the more recent approaches to NATO and CFSP prescriptive dimensions. These contributions, despite the fact they do not address both international settings from a role analysis perspective lend important insights to understand them from this dimension, focusing on in *which conditions* prescriptive roles can be observed, rather than 'whose' prescriptive roles matter. Roles are the result of a valorative assessment of context and expectations involved in foreign policy behaviour, where perception of meaning and understanding precede action. These perspectives move further ahead from the convolutions of inter-governmental bargaining and state preferences.

Let us first focus on how this is reflected in literature about NATO. Recent empirical contributions came to prove the value of considering member states compliance with transatlantic prescriptions, not from a perspective of power enforcement or coercion, but from the perspective of enabling prescriptions based on common culture and language. Culture and language shape communicative practices, through which the Alliance prescribes consensually (with the help of dense socialisation, less emphasis on enmity, stronger normative agenda and organisational adaptation to new military and non-military functions), levelling member states voice and concerns within it.⁷⁹ As McCalla observes NATO 'shares norms and procedures beyond mutual defence', which places it in a distinct realm from other traditional alliances, based on strict power relations, enabling a role prescriptive dimension that considers normative incentives beyond shared strategic responsibilities.⁸⁰ This moves the analysis away from assumptions about self-interested bargaining and from notions of hegemonic

⁷⁹ See Duffield 1992, 836-837; Weber 1992, 649-650; Duffield 1994-1995, 770,774-775; Risse-Kappen 1995, 4-5 and 21-24; McCalla 1996; Bailes 1996, 31 and 28; Walt 1997; McCalla 1998, 105-106; Leggold 1998a and Frederking 2003, 363. Although most of the empirical research in Risse's book regards the Cold War period, it offers rich evidence sustaining institutionalist arguments that highlight the role of norms (understood as standards of appropriate behaviour) and communicative action explaining how NATO and the European allies influenced American foreign policy.

⁸⁰ McCalla 1996, 462.

prescriptive position of one single power with privileged strategic position and access to military assets within NATO. Not only new approaches to NATO lend alternative contributions to a role prescriptive dimension, but they also open a new analytical path to understand how small states incorporate roles for reasons beyond the traditional hegemonic coercion and strategic dependence, disconfirming arguments about the limited influence of small allies.⁸¹

Novel approaches based on international organisations, as sites of representation, bounded by perception of community of shared values, meanings and interests, projected within and outside the traditional strategic limits, view the Alliance as an imagined community. This imagined community perspective offers a legitimate narrative based on interpretations alternative to a logic of balance of power, overcoming the idea that international organisations are vehicles of the interests of hegemonic states and that small states are followers of normative principles set by major players.⁸² As Williams suggests, international organisations produce ‘discursive legitimisation’ of security practices opening the way to their transformation.⁸³ Actors responsible for legitimating roles and policy issues depend on external, contextual and social categories, to hold a position (and a role associated to it) from which an act can be taken and conveyed as appropriate.⁸⁴

Security matters are also the focus of researchers interested in a communicative action perspective, through the examination of how arguments evolve within NATO and how motives are voiced, in order to convince others about their validity.⁸⁵ This view enabled overcoming the limits of traditional rule-based perspectives, through which securitised issues are solved and claims, based on strategic interaction between major states, are surmounted. The analysis of strategic discourse is anchored on the evidence of legitimacy and quality of argumentative skills. Legitimacy and the value of arguments do not necessarily pertain to formal regulation nor do they result from criteria of greatness and might, but from specific prescriptive abilities to validate claims about best norms (best standards of behaviour) and other aggregative elements of identity. As Williams and Neumann observe, the ‘narrative construction of identity can be linked to a theory of action, via the concept of roles and what institutional

⁸¹ Cf. Lebow 1997. See also Keohane 1969 and Keohane 1971.

⁸² For a perspective on discourse and representation politics, see Klein 1990, 313-314 and 319-322; Williams & Neumann 2000 and Williams 2003, 511-513.

⁸³ Williams 2003, 512.

⁸⁴ Williams 2003, 514.

⁸⁵ Williams 2003, 522.

theorists have termed a ‘logic of appropriateness’.⁸⁶ In the context of this scholarship, the Alliance emerged in the post-Cold War as a vast empirical field of observation enabling the reconstruction of a transatlantic narrative of identity, less contending, less fragmented by ideological preference and less based on enmity. The Alliance acted as a ‘symbolic marker, a rhetorical touchstone’ by which security goals were to be met based on ‘shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes’.⁸⁷ Prescriptive roles in security became identified with dissemination of cultural and civilisational principles, not with contention and strategic might. The commitment of NATO authorities in revitalising the power of discourse, not only transformed the role of the organisation as identity constructor (through language and social practices), but also altered the portrayal of conditions of security, positioning itself as a unique actor within these new contexts, conceived as the ‘military and material expression of a value-based civilisational structure’.⁸⁸ Bradley suggests that the Alliance, already during the Cold War, did not derive its strength from the plausibility of a direct confrontation and deterrence posture, but rather from the ‘content of the distinctly modern forms of political identity which has championed’ and disseminated through a ‘transnational infrastructure of rule’ accepted within the Alliance as appropriate and rightful.⁸⁹

As the case study about Portugal will show, these perspectives also offer a satisfactory account of small allies’ behaviour in the post-Cold War. Small allies perceive the Alliance as a rightful prescriptive structure that draw the legitimacy of its strategic discourse from value-based formulas of appropriate behaviour and acted as political coordinator of a broader security community. The Alliance was much more than a coercive instrument of military enforcement. This enabled small transatlantic allies to embrace a European security and defence option perceived as a non-contending and non-competing project.

The way through which the literature addresses the complex dynamics of role prescriptions, forged within the foreign and security dimension of EU policy, comes also in different labels. Due to this diversity, the approaches referred are the ones that lend analytical contributions to a role prescription dimension of CFSP. Recent literature on the EU second pillar, in those aspects that contribute to a role prescription per-

⁸⁶ Williams & Neumann 2000, 363.

⁸⁷ Williams & Neumann 2000, 366, 368-369.

⁸⁸ Williams & Neumann 2000, 371.

⁸⁹ Klein 1990, 318 and 314.

spective, has been evolving from the analysis on the contending national preferences of member states and from concerns with institutionalisation and transposition of legal aspects of the first pillar. Other European policy domains like the CFSP are highlighted as having a specific nature within the EU, bestowing broad empirical ground to substantiate the forefront of debate about international organisations ability to prescribe roles and change behaviour.⁹⁰ CFSP uniqueness derives from the fact of not being a fix '*forum* within which state/actors' interests are bargained, but an *environment* in which CFSP evolves and within which the interest/identity of actors/policy-makers develop and change' that is, the CFSP is a process in the making.⁹¹ As Smith notes, CFSP is not directed by supranational organizations, does not involve bargaining over policy preferences, it is not dominated by major states within the EU and decisions taken within the second pillar do not reflect 'lowest common denominator' preferences, upon which all are likely to agree due to the low salience of the agreement.⁹² Being decentralised and comprehensive, it is not led by a single centre of gravity, it developed its own 'culture of cooperation' prescribing expected 'standards of behaviour' and embedding member states into shared understandings and a common language' without the need of supranational governance or rule-based conditionality.⁹³

Others address the distinguish character of the EU's external identity in terms of actorness. This does not mean that 'legal personality and actorness in behavioural terms' have to correspond, being that the first validates the strength of the second.⁹⁴ In this non-corresponded order lays the uniqueness of the prescriptive ability of CFSP, its distinct agenda and narrative, humanistically and value guided, which grant CFSP specific appeal to address contending policy issues (e.g. arms proliferation, personal landmines, nuclear proliferation and human rights among others) and act prescriptively, even in the presence of a 'soft' legal personality.⁹⁵

The particularities of Europeanisation are also captured by Ginsberg, by defining it as 'the process by which CFSP, and EPC before it, moved closer to EC norms, policies and habits without EPC/CFSP becoming supranationalised (...) as EPC hab-

⁹⁰ Cf. Keeler's overview about the most recurrent academic themes writing about the EU, Keeler 2005, 571.

⁹¹ Tonra 2003, 739. Emphasis added. See also Sjursen 1999.

⁹² Smith 2004a, 96-97.

⁹³ Smith 2004a, 105.

⁹⁴ See Bretherton & Vogler 2000, 18.

⁹⁵ Bretherton and Vogler argue that actorness is 'constructed through the interplay of internal political factors and the perceptions and expectations of outsiders', see Bretherton & Vogler 2000, 1.

its and procedures of political cooperation became institutionalised into a corporate body of European values and norms, they eventually cause member states to change their attitudes and preferences'.⁹⁶ The substantive role (normative purpose), legal setting (weak enforcing mechanisms) and functional limits (diplomatic actor with embryonic defence capabilities), frequently suggested in literature as constraints to CFSP, are in fact rich domains of empirical research conducive to findings close to a sociological institutionalist dimension. Looking into 'constraints' as qualities, inherent to a process in the making, it enables to explore prescriptive roles through a norm informed perspective and to highlight the value of persuasion through communication, within a CFSP framework. The contributions referred emphasise the relevance of *communicative action* in invoking appropriate behaviour and convincing others of the goodness of the arguments. This perspective values the role of persuasion, in achieving compliance of member states as observed in the second pillar.⁹⁷ Argumentation is a binding way to convey norms and add meaning to collective action, inducing change in policy practices and policy adaptation.

This literature is particularly suitable to explain the way small states engage in strategies of adaptation that value normative and communicative aspects of policy-making.⁹⁸ Whenever role prescriptions convey a *logic of appropriateness* that resonates national role conceptions, appropriate foreign policy behaviour is likely to prevail over a *logic of consequences* based on relative power position towards other member states and traditional allies.⁹⁹ For this reason scholarship that focuses on contending aspects of CFSP from a major players' power perspective is of limited use to explain the external behaviour of small states. Smaller members, without dismissing power relations, see in the integrated prescriptive dimensions of CFSP an advantage to participate and influence, by pursuing what Ginsberg calls a 'politics of scale'.¹⁰⁰ This means by sharing the risks of collective decision-making and action, smaller member states acquire specific international weight, as compared to their individual position (Chapter 7). By engaging in a 'politics of scale' small member states earn

⁹⁶ Ginsberg 2001, 37-38. Brackets added.

⁹⁷ For contributions that value communication as a form of compromise among the parts and appropriateness as a guiding principle in explaining goals and practices of international organizations and member states, see Glarbo 1999, 639-640 and 646-648; Risse 2000, 20-21 and 26-28; Schimmelfennig 2001, 62-66 and 58-59; Sjørnsen 2004 and Müller 2004, 401-404. On the value of non-coercive means in informing norm incorporation, see Surel 2000; Payne 2001; Laffan 2001, 716 and 714-717 and Tonra 2003.

⁹⁸ Romsloe 2004, 7-8.

⁹⁹ See Holsti, 30-57.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Ginsberg 1989.

positive recognition from other members, commit themselves to an active external participation, benefit from distribution and allocation of resources and enjoy less domestic resistance to external policy choices, consensually decided and use argumentation skills at a higher level of decision-making. The prescriptive impact of CFSP/ESDP on the policies of small states are non-contending, since they are observed as an opportunity not as something that they have to make a choice for, in detriment of other international arrangements.¹⁰¹

Other contributions focus on the Europeanisation of foreign policy and they look to the formal impact of collective decision-making and European legal structure into the domestic policy of member states.¹⁰² These views are concerned with mechanisms of compliance and transposition, and implementation is frequently based on the analysis of regulatory conditionality emanating from European law. In the domain of CFSP, the observation of this formal conditionality is less tangible or has been gradual, reason for which it is frequently pointed by scholarly and policy oriented studies as a weak case of role prescription.¹⁰³

As Radaelli accounts, ‘the values, norms and discourses prevalent in member states’ highlight the non-regulative impact of the EU second pillar through the creation of ‘norms, policies and habits’ that shape individual beliefs on the legitimacy of role prescriptions.¹⁰⁴ Role prescriptions shape the legitimacy and appropriateness of the actions pursued by a community of states both internationally and domestically.¹⁰⁵

Based on the analysis of primary sources the present study captures *conditions under which* the prescriptive role of CFSP can be observed, rather than *what these conditions ought* to be, in the face of what has been achieved in the EU’s first pillar. In the second part of the study various observations about the limited relevance of regulative conditionality of CFSP (Chapter 6) were found with impact on the national discourse of a small member state, as well as evidence of compliant behaviour in the presence of soft mechanisms of enforcement or willing compliance.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Tonra 1997, 14.

¹⁰² Wessels & Rometsch 1996, Börzel & Risse 2000 and Radaelli 2000.

¹⁰³ See Gordon 1997/1998; Smith 2003, 566-569 and Hill 2004, 145-154. These approaches are focused on the limitative prescriptive aspects of CFSP and ESDP departing from uneven degree of institutional and functional development and matters of competition between European and transatlantic security structures. Ginsberg offers an interesting contribution that dismisses the competitive nature between CFSP and NATO based on sophistication and improvement of mechanisms of foreign policy cooperation. See Ginsberg 1997b. This non-contending view is also observed in the empirical part of the present study.

¹⁰⁴ Radaelli 2000, 12 and Ginsberg 2001, 37-38.

¹⁰⁵ See Reus-Smit 1997, 558.

Other perspectives see the CFSP as having a prescriptive role in defining security orders (by leading member states to comply with specific regimes e.g. non-proliferation) within and outside the ‘closer border’ of the Union and in securitising issues (as seen in the provisions that emanate from CFSP joint actions and common decisions) to be addressed within it.¹⁰⁶

The CFSP benefited from the deepening of the process of European integration, in the sense attributed by Deutsch of existent ‘conditions and processes of long-range or permanent peace’, which derived from understandings about normative order and attainment of political, social and economic stability.¹⁰⁷ The CFSP and ESDP do not address traditional security and military threats nor do they aim at solving security problems exclusively through military means. CFSP actors re-securitised the second pillar agenda rooting it in a ‘discursive action’, above concerns with power conditions and strategic interaction within the security environment.¹⁰⁸

The EU second pillar due to its intergovernmental dimension enables all member states to shape the agenda, in particularly whenever holding relevant prescriptive positions within the decision-making structure (e.g. when chairing the rotating Presidency). In the EU second pillar, agents such as the Presidency convey prescriptive roles that contribute to address and solve collective security concerns beyond national interests (e.g. adoption of specific topics in the CFSP agenda, like ban on personal landmines or non-proliferation are good examples).¹⁰⁹ The consensual position of member states to eliminate these threats does not result from self-interested gains, but from recognition of appropriateness of the underlining norms of behaviour.

In sum, some of the insights referred to interpret roles and policy developments within NATO and CFSP ignoring the benefits of inter-disciplinary theoretical approach and empirical research. Most of these contributions are based on theoretical assumptions that lack an empirical background of evidence based on the analysis of primary sources, which could better substantiate the assumptions made. The relevance with which research issues are addressed is sometimes inconsistent with the development of real policy events. This is confirmed by the policy documents used in the empirical case in this study (e.g. excessive focus on the contending aspects of national preferences within CFSP; belief in the predominant prescriptions of an hegemonic

¹⁰⁶ See Wæver 1996 and Wæver 1998a.. See also Rosamond 2000, 169-171.

¹⁰⁷ Deutsch 1957, 3.

¹⁰⁸ Rosamond 2000, 171.

¹⁰⁹ Buzan Wæver and Wilde 1998, 29.

power within NATO and frequent attempts to find or deny the observation of prescriptive roles by looking at the strict impact of regulative aspects on compliant behaviour).

To consider NATO and the EU's second pillar from a role prescriptive dimension enables overcoming concerns with inter-state power struggle and bargaining among major players. Normative appeal or normative incentives and communicative practices offer distinct approaches to role analysis in the context of security and foreign policy. NATO and CFSP can be regarded as representative and prescriptive sites to member states policy behaviour. Starting from the assumption that they function as imagined security communities, it allows the reconstruction of narratives beyond the logic of balance of power or material reward by hegemonic member states. Role prescriptions in the transatlantic and European contexts are enforced through the persuasive effect of their legitimacy and quality of argumentative skills used in conveying prescriptions. The dissemination of a culture of cooperation helped building standards of behaviour, embedding member states into shared understandings, which turn them more permeable to willing compliance. The official discourse within the two international settings highlights agendas and narratives guided by mobilising humanistic concerns about foreign and security policy. Their role prescriptions can frequently be placed above concerns with power conditions and strategic interaction as reflected in traditional realist literature.

The empirical research, on the second part of the study benefits from those analytical developments achieved in literature, that address and help explaining a prescriptive approach by using normative dimensions based on discourse about appropriateness and non-rule based injunctions. These contributions allow advancements about agency and structure related with the location of prescriptive roles, moving away from questions about *which relevant actors* and *domestic sites of decision-making* shape the process of foreign policy behaviour, *to examine the conditions* under which prescriptive roles influence and are influenced, beyond a strict consequential conditionality and regulative prescriptive order.

2.2 Role Analysis in the Context of Rationalist and Sociological Institutional Perspectives¹¹⁰

The chapter considers traditional lines of inquiry, such as political realism and foreign policy analysis and seeks to overcome three pitfalls found in this literature. The first pitfall regards the dominant interest of political realism on great powers as main framing entities of inter-state relations and unitary role prescribers. The second relates to the exclusive focus of foreign policy analysis on the domestic process of foreign policy decision-making and policy formulation. The third concerns the scarcity of studies acknowledging to international organisations prescriptive roles in the domain of foreign, security, and defence policy. Each of the pitfalls has constraining effects on the analysis of smaller member states behaviour in politically integrated contexts, such as NATO and the EU, from a perspective of role analysis. Political realism by its focus on national interest and international security could offer an analytical background to the analysis of role conceptions and prescriptions in the international security context. Likewise, foreign policy analysis by placing the focus on domestic processes of decision-making could help explaining the national dynamics that shape preferences and induce new external roles. The fact that the first places its unit of analysis at the structure level and the second at the individual level of decision-making generates a failure to bridge essential elements in explaining the impact of role prescriptions on small states external behaviour.

Realist assumptions consider states as self-interested and homogeneous units, acting in an anarchic international environment through power and national interest. The scepticism of rationalist approaches about the ‘robustness of international institutions’, especially those related to international security, derives from their selective analysis of major states as main actors in the international system.¹¹¹

The Cold War environment produced specific lines of inquiry that contributed to reinforce approaches that used superpowers as a single case and their foreign policies as a unitary source of international prescriptions.¹¹² Traditional role analysis fol-

¹¹⁰ In this research, rationalist traditions comprehend the literature that emphasises self-interested/instrumental motivations as the main driving elements of state actors’ preferences. Sociological perspectives are those that consider socially constructed norms, values, beliefs, roles and practices as elements that provide normative frames or behavioural standards of appropriate conduct, followed by state and non-state actors. For a discussion about rational and perceptual elements in international politics, see Mercer 2005, 79-89.

¹¹¹ Katzenstein, Keohane & Krasner 1998, 671.

¹¹² For further reading see East, Salmore & Hermann 1978 and Brecher, Steinberg & Stein 1969.

lowed along these lines of inquiry focusing on the domestic processes of decision making of major actors.¹¹³

Role analysis provided what Walker refers to as, a comprehensive ‘vocabulary of images’ about foreign policy behaviour from the national level of analysis, to the individual and up to the systemic one.¹¹⁴ Despite the fact that decision-makers world-views are influenced by the ‘location of states within the structure’, most academic contributions prove short in clarifying how the structure affects state behaviour and how systems constrain and enable incorporation of new roles in foreign policy.¹¹⁵

It is crucial to distinguish traditional analytical perspectives on foreign policy, such as realism, from other research agendas that bring additional insights to understand role conception and in particular role incorporation.¹¹⁶ Insights drawn from sociological institutionalism, in particular with regard to international socialisation and normative behaviour are discussed in this chapter as alternative contributions to the explanation of one small state’s external behaviour in policy domains traditionally addressed by realism. By doing so, the present study borrows analytical tools that set the study of role incorporation free from its traditional anchorage to domestic considerations and analyses role prescription and role incorporation in other contexts than the one of international anarchy and domestic decision-making. The study overcomes the limits of foreign policy analysis and political realism centred on the unitary role prescriptive effects of dominant policy practices of great powers and on the dissemination of their worldviews.

The present study examines empirical evidence from which novel insights about how a logic of appropriateness (underlining international role prescriptions) and willing compliance shape national role incorporation and policy action. Three pitfalls in traditional literature on foreign policy are addressed, with a particular attention to the third pitfall, since it is the most relevant for the explanation of changes in the behaviour of small states within international settings.

¹¹³ The data sets used in this literature are based on episodes or events such as major negotiations, crises and conflicts of direct interest to superpowers.

¹¹⁴ Walker 1987c, 2.

¹¹⁵ Tversky & Kahneman 1981 quoted by Breuning 1995, 237.

¹¹⁶ The choice in the present study of realism and neo-realism as possible perspectives about traditional foreign policy is related with its particular interest with the dimension of security and defence and therefore with the way states conceptualize external policy goals in these domains.

2.2.1 The First Pitfall: Through a Great Powers' Perspective

The realist paradigm is centred on the monopoly of superpowers position in international affairs and their prescriptive guidance to other actors in the system. States are the main actors and power and security the baselines for external behaviour. The external behaviour described is that of major states, acting as definers of rules that bind the behaviour of the remaining actors in the system.¹¹⁷ International position suggests a hierarchical and constraining order ruled by major states, rather than by the enabling conditions offered by integration in larger political units than the state, such as international organisations. The first pitfall derives also from the assumptions in literature that the more the behaviour of states on the base resembles the behaviour of major states on the top, the better positioned they become in the international system.

Realism produced an enduring discourse, about the best 'way to secure peace, stability, and justice in human society'.¹¹⁸ As Gilpin suggests, realism is about how states can maximise their own interests, self-help, and utility.¹¹⁹ It focuses on the maximisation of interest and utility and on the effectiveness of self-interested relations of cooperation and conflict under conditions of anarchy, dismissing other actors and processes of international cooperation.

In international anarchy, states follow an international conduct prescribed by great powers. Their role prescriptions define who is entitled to take part in prescriptions and how. In these prescriptive attempts, power and security have the primacy. The effectiveness of such prescription is ignited by the power position of the prescriber, by its material/military capacities and by the way it is able to convince or coerce allies about the benefits of engaging in competition. Elements like the value of norms and arguments are dismissed.

Traditional Anglo-Saxon literature on foreign and security policy generated approaches that are likely to support reactive external policies, while the output of 'European epistemology' as argued by Jørgenson's points to a more normative response of continental foreign policy towards international affairs.¹²⁰ This is largely

¹¹⁷ Cf. Waltz 1993, 45.

¹¹⁸ Katzenstein, Keohane & Krasner 1998, 671. Cf. de Wilde (2004).

¹¹⁹ Gilpin 1984, 290. Realism is not about a general normative orientation above state level, as found in literature about international organisations, but rather about an order that emanates from the state itself. Realism does not sustain any anarchy, but an anarchy that does not recognise an authority above the state.

¹²⁰ Knud Eric Jørgenson provides an interesting view on the influence of national political, cultural and institutional contexts on epistemological developments of international relations theory establishing differences between

reflected on the case studies examined in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Realism confirms the beliefs of American elites about the international environment outside America. During the Cold War, the United States occupied a central prescriptive position in the Western world, on how the principles of democracy, sovereignty, self-determination, cooperation, security and justice should be attained and kept. The resilient behaviour towards a European security option found in the case study about Portugal, for early 1990s, in particular on what concerns the communities of experts within the Ministry of Defence and constitutes evidence of this predominance. The sustainability of this logic of the Cold War and the predominance among decision-makers of world views based on American supremacy persisted among most Atlantic allies, much after the order that gave birth to it ceased to exist.

Realist analyses are centred on rational choice and decision-making based on cost-benefit evaluations, which are not adequate to the investigation of new situations in foreign policy, namely CFSP where direct cost/benefit relation is not evident.

Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis literature tend to conclude that state representatives and experts respond to dominant frames of foreign, security and defence policy on the base of prior experience, dominant institutional discourse, and context related political developments.¹²¹ The work of Snyder, Bruck, Sapin and Janis emphasised the processes of foreign policy decision making among small groups and bureaucratic politics showing that the '*specifics* of nations lead to differences in foreign policy choice/behaviour' introducing analytical elements alternative to the deterministic effects of the international structure proposed by realism.¹²²

The fundamental self-definition of 'we' as opposed to 'them' is based in traditional perspectives of foreign policy on cognition and images about friends and foes, on the basis of which alliances are established through opposing differentiations between security communities.¹²³ Realism considers perception of enmity as having a crucial part in the way foreign policy roles are conceived and performed on the base of international affinities and solidarity. Decision-makers have internalised deeply these dichotomies from which foreign policy roles emerged.

European and American epistemological developments in IR and the way they influence decisions on foreign policy, see Jørgensen 2000, 13. See also Waever 1998b.

¹²¹ For an overview see Hudson & Vore 1995, 210. See also Rosati, Hagan and Sampson 1994a,b, 3-21, 138-163 and 216 and Neack, Hey & Harvey 1995, 3-11, 49-70, 99-115, 117-143 and 215-227.

¹²² See Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1963 and Janis 1982. See also Hermann 1978.

¹²³ This differentiation occurs through the externalisation and verbalisation of what Carl Schmitt called the 'dichotomy between friends and enemies'. See Schmitt 1932 quoted by Brown 2001, 72.

CFSP/ESDP escape to this dichotomised logic. Despite having foreign relations and security and defence as the main goal, the EU second pillar did not emerge on the base on enmity, but from the desire to ensure future unity and deeper integration of member states within the European project. The emergence of a new identity like CFSP poses a different 'situation' of foreign and security policy, which did not result from an imagined image of enmity, as in the case of NATO ¹²⁴

The global scale of international changes after the Cold War period had repercussions both on decision-makers' world views and on academic perspectives on international affairs in general and foreign policy in particular. The superpowers' withdrawal from their traditional areas of influence created the opportunity for new state and non-state actors to emerge and intervene in the international scenario. This scenario was clearly distinct from the one of bipolarity, on which the realist tradition bases its contributions.

The first pitfall found in realist tradition also pertains to its emphasis on great powers as 'global actors', on the assumption that major states hold unitary roles and share the same rational base in conveying their preferences in an international environment, where no authority above sovereign states is recognised.¹²⁵ Rationalist approaches stress the ability of major players to influence and alter role conceptions of other states in their own interest, by the way they can influence the agenda setting, even in integrated political and security systems. The structure of international relations determines the behaviour and perception of decision-makers, emphasising the importance of the struggle for power and survival, as a determinant motive in the adoption of *successful practices* by states, in order to ensure a favourable place in an anarchical system. From a realist perspective internalisation of norms follow the principle of states' expectation to maximise national interests within the structure, rather than the willing compliance with principles of political order. As Ashley notes 'Waltz grants this structure a life of its own independent of the parts, the state-as-actor; and shows in countless ways how this structure limits and disposes action on the part of

¹²⁴ For further reading about enmity and its impact on the constitution of security policies, see Kaldor 1998. See also Huysmans 1998 and Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998.

¹²⁵ The 'global actors' expression is draw from Boyd & Hopple 1987.

states such that, on balance, the structure is reproduced and actors are drawn into conformity with its requisites.’¹²⁶

Structural realism does not entirely rule out the importance of international organisations as sources of prescriptive behaviour, but it regards them as a reflection of major players’ self-interests, rather than autonomous purposive entities. However, structural realists assert that in a multi-polar arrangement, international organisations may contribute to define norms and codes that govern interstate relations. In this context, international organisations contribute to consolidate an international order based on authority, legitimacy and socialisation.¹²⁷ Nevertheless structural realism is cautious about recognising prescriptive roles to international organisations and in admitting that small states have their own conceptions and autonomous role performance in foreign and security policy.¹²⁸

The external behaviour of smaller state actors is considered merely responsive to an order previously set by major players. When scholars refer to small states ‘systemic rather than domestic factors are accorded causal primacy’ and small state behaviour is viewed ‘as a result of either the international distribution of power or the balance of threat’.¹²⁹

In realist perspectives small states have no independent life apart from the political and economic arrangements of leading states.¹³⁰ Great powers are represented as having long-term global interests and sustain foreign, security, and defence policies through dominant goals. They are seen as influential and dominant regardless the policy area considered. Due to their power and capacities they shape the agenda of international organisations, limiting their role prescriptions and persuading others to accept their self-interested preferences. They determine the distinction between behaviour that is consonant with international order and defiant behaviour.

Rationalist perspectives fail to identify organisations as internationally integrated political *forums* with actor qualities. Although even realist hard-liners acknowledge the ability of organisations, like NATO, to act as promoters of international stability and cooperation, they do not recognise them as having strong prescrip-

¹²⁶ Ashley 1984, 255. Ashley’s criticism to realist scholarship was counter argued by Robert Gilpin. See Gilpin 1984.

¹²⁷ Schweller & Priess 1997, 22.

¹²⁸ Cf. Schweller & Priess 1997, 3.

¹²⁹ Elman 1995, 172 and 173. See also Waltz 1979 and Macridis 1992.

¹³⁰ Rosenau 1969 and Rosenau 1981, 103-104.

tive capacities.¹³¹ Their efficiency, as international stabilisers and security providers, is not seen as the result of common goals or incorporated institutional practices through processes of international socialisation, but rather as the result of the self-interests of hegemonic states. Since in this view, international organisations are a mere reflection of great powers' politics, international organisations cannot act autonomously and are not representative of common goals.

It will not be entirely fair to generalise the lack of interest by realist tradition about international organisations as role prescribers. Schweller and Priess recaptured the classical realist tradition that although emphasising power and material capabilities does not ignore: the relevance of integrated policy-making processes, of the perception of domestic elites and the notion of identity in the formation of role conceptions.¹³² The realist tradition acknowledges the limited impact of international organisations on state behaviour and their inability to work as stabilisers and promoters of change of states' preferences. Realism stresses that organisations reflect great powers interests and the 'core elements of American political ideology'.¹³³ Mearsheimer departs from theories of international relations that consider organisations as a core concept to refute the possibility of change in state behaviour due to international socialisation, thus ignoring the part organisations play in shaping and changing national role conceptions. In his view, international organisations 'basically reflect distributions of power in the world. They are based on the self-interested calculations of great powers, and they do not have independent effects on state behaviour.'¹³⁴ Mearsheimer recognises to international organisations the ability to prescribe and proscribe role behaviours to states, but 'institutions are not a form of world government. States themselves must choose to obey the rules they created.'¹³⁵ This means that in the first pitfall, international organisations do not independently change state behaviour nor do they represent a higher form of authority than the state.

¹³¹ See Mearsheimer 1990 and Mearsheimer 1994/95. For reactions see Wendt 1995 and Keohane & Martin 1995. The first criticism regards the lack of fundament about the conditions under which realist assumptions may be valid. The second underlines the social dimension of the international structure.

¹³² Schweller and Priess 1997.

¹³³ Mearsheimer 1994/95, 47. Mearsheimer's article illustrates the first pitfall of realism identified in this study regarding the excessive focus on great powers interests and views on international politics. Furthermore, Mearsheimer final illustration of America rejection of realism remained limited to contingent examples of selective isolationism of American foreign policy, rather than to structural characteristics of American external policy behaviour. See also Mearsheimer 1994/95, 49, 7, 13 and 14.

¹³⁴ Mearsheimer 1994/95, 7.

¹³⁵ Mearsheimer 1994/95, 9.

In rationalist approaches, role prescription and role performance in the study of foreign policy are anchored in the axiom of an international anarchic structure. As Waltz suggests 'the basic structure of international politics continues to be anarchic. Each state fends for itself with or without the cooperation of others (...) most of the decisions to act abroad were made without much prior consultation with other countries. Waltz argues with an artificial determinism when claiming that: "Who pays the piper calls the tune. Decisions are made collectively only among near-equals.'¹³⁶ National interest takes precedence over common interests and norms of behaviour deriving from international organisations, which shows the little salience given to their prescriptive effects.

The actors are hierarchically organised in relative power positions where actors' behaviour reflects the place occupied in the hierarchy. The ability to prescribe roles in the international system is related to the competitive position occupied by the hegemonic states, not to the ability to initiate cooperation in a way that enables states to follow standards of appropriate behaviour, achieve external policy goals, share the benefits and costs of decision-making and policy implementation.

Realism acknowledges the ability of major players to prescribe and proscribe roles. The hegemonic states define for small states the limits of expected, acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. But realism does not explain how this occurs and how and in which circumstance role incorporation by smaller states takes place. Realism is unable to explain role incorporation for other reasons than the distribution of power and states' international position. Realism departs from the assumption that all states seek the same goals, but attributes to great powers a particular ability in defining which foreign policy roles other states will perform, on the basis of preferences exogenously given.¹³⁷ The international structure reproduces the policy goals of the major states denying to national foreign policies independent role conceptions from those perceived and projected by hegemonic states.

Even international socialisation, which plays a crucial role in role prescription, does not escape to this deterministic influence of major powers in the setting of an international order, 'Elites in secondary states buy into and internalise norms that are articulated by the hegemon, and therefore pursue policies consistent with the he-

¹³⁶ Waltz 1993, 59 and 72.

¹³⁷ Wohlforth 1994-1995, 126.

gemon's notion of international order'.¹³⁸ By determining international order, the hegemonic powers homogenise the shape of contents and boundaries of what are the acceptable parameters of conduct for *secondary states*' international roles. As Waltz sees it 'Socialisation brings members of a group into conformity with its norms. (...) The first way in which structures work their effects is through a process of socialisation that limits and moulds behaviour. Socialisation encourages similarities of attributes and behaviour' to the extent it fits into a notion of 'appropriateness' defined by major players.¹³⁹ Waltz recognizes the value of international socialisation in the reproduction or imitation of patterns of behaviour by states, without conferring to organisations a particular role in offering the institutional setting where this socialisation occurs on a systematic way, informing foreign policy roles and policy practices.

Changes in actors' roles and preferences in the post Cold War and the impact of change on prescribed and performed roles are poorly understood by neo-realism, since it dismisses the combined effects of systemic and domestic impact on states external relations.¹⁴⁰ NATO process of adaptation is understood as a way to ensure and to fulfil new formulation of common interest conveyed by hegemonic states. However, Waltz concedes that 'the freedom of choice of any state is limited by the actions of all the others' they are both the result of statesmen's choices and a product of external events.¹⁴¹ Two elements are worth noting. Firstly, changes in states and organisations external roles cannot be explained by the sole impact of systemic factors. Secondly, international organisations are cooperative and enabling settings, rather than constraining arrangements.

Additionally, authors positioned in the traditional spectrum of foreign policy, like Rosenau, Holsti and Rothstein consider small states from a perspective of rebellious behaviour towards superpowers rather than from the perspective of well-established allies.¹⁴² The international obligations and rights of small states reflected the behaviour allowed by the prescriptive orientations of great powers. The role typology established by Holsti also points to a concept of hierarchy in the international system, where major powers occupy the leading position. All the external roles listed by Holsti, presuppose positions defined in relation to the major states *status* in the

¹³⁸ Ikenberry & Kupchan 1990, 283.

¹³⁹ Waltz 1979, 75-76.

¹⁴⁰ See Waltz 1993, 50.

¹⁴¹ Waltz 1959, 204 and 209.

¹⁴² Rothstein 1966, 402; Rosenau 1981; Holsti 1987 and Holsti 1995, 10.

system. In his role typology states are internationally ranked by reference to the roles assumed by great powers, reflecting alignment or dissidence e.g. 'bastion of revolution-liberator', 'regional leader', 'regional protector', 'mediator', 'integrator' or 'faithful ally'.¹⁴³

Katzenstein points to the overemphasis on material assumptions, as the main cause of neorealism difficulty in explaining changes that occur outside the material dimension of power and capabilities.¹⁴⁴ As the case studies will show, the emergence of new foreign policy situation like that posed by European CFSP, based on intense foreign political cooperation, within which immediate self-interested gains are not observable and cooperation in the field of security based on military and non-military means, underlines the significance of these aspects outside the material dimension of power politics.

In sum, role prescriptions and role incorporation cannot be resumed to realist views about great powers position and their political scripts based on: the constraints of international anarchy, on the strength of the norms articulated by major states, on their taken for granted ability to socialise other states into their own preferences and on the unitary propensity of state actors to compete for power distributions. The emergence after the Cold War of new situations of foreign policy, like CFSP and the strengthening of the normative focus of NATO, made realism unable to explain preferences by other mean than power and national interest. In particular in the case of CFSP, foreign and security policy lay at a level that overcomes the realist and neo-realist contending images of enmity, against which national interests are preserved. Realist assumptions focused on structural position in the anarchical states system, power of coercion and on states competitive search for relative power capabilities, find no reflection on states behaviour manifested within NATO and EU second pillar. Persuasive role prescriptions that emanate from these organisations, based on external standards of appropriate behaviour are voluntarily complied with by member states. Competition is the motivational force in foreign and security policy. Order rather than anarchy is the ordering principle. Stability, predictability and properness in addressing and solving international problems are the base line of role prescriptions not power, security dilemma and survival.

¹⁴³ Holsti 1970, 255.

¹⁴⁴ Katzenstein 1996.

2.2.2 *The Second Pitfall: Foreign Policy and the Inner Workings of the State*

The second pitfall of foreign policy literature regards the excessive concern with the domestic processes of decision-making of state representatives of major states, which ignore the prescriptive effects of international organisations on states' external behaviour.¹⁴⁵ Scholarship concerned with foreign policy analysis assumes states external decision-making and formulation, as isolated from foreign policy roles that emanate from non-state actors. Such approaches have consequences in the way national role conceptions and foreign policy behaviour is understood. Framed by the domestic environment and guided by national interest, national role conceptions in traditional Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) are limited to internal formulations about national interests and preferences, which resulted in traditional state typologies, as present in Holsti's work on role conceptions and Rosenau's definition of ideal nation-type.¹⁴⁶ Most references to the effects of international structure are associated with major powers, whose foreign policy prescriptions determine the hierarchy and categorisation used to define the position of the remaining states in the international system. As Hagan suggests, foreign policy is influenced by 'domestic political patterns of at least the major powers'.¹⁴⁷ When a state is classified as 'faithful ally', it is in reference to an alliance of states lead by a major ally. If a state is classified as 'regional leader', its condition as leading state it is only valid by reference to other state units in the region. A state designated as 'anti-imperialist agent' can only assume such function if there is a counter part, understood as an empire lead by a hegemonic state. Therefore, the taxonomy used in Foreign Policy Analysis to explain role conceptions implies a relation of hierarchic power. This categorization falls short in the clarification of the relation between actor and structure, and between national foreign policy roles and international environment. It does not account for the analysis of the changing nature of these role conceptions nor how and in which circumstances new roles prevail over traditional ones.

In Foreign Policy Analysis the study of states' preferences presuppose a rational choice model. As Carlsnaes observes the goal is not to explain *actual* behav-

¹⁴⁵ Cf. White 1999, 38. For overview on European foreign policy (EFP) and the contributions of FPA, see White 1999, 43-53. See also White 2004, 16-24 and Hudson 2005, 3. This section addresses traditional Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) in particular the type of literature produced in the United States that shares a similar structuralist approach to realism.

¹⁴⁶ Holsti 1970 and Rosenau 1984. Both contributions stress the value of domestic influence in the definition of national roles and in the characterisation of national types of foreign policy.

¹⁴⁷ For further reading on the influence of domestic accounts in the study of foreign policy, see Hagan 1995, 117.

our, but to provide tools for analysing the strategic choices *theoretically* available to individual actors.¹⁴⁸ The prescriptive roles result from perceptions of national decision-makers, whether one considers the ‘bureaucratic and organisational elements’ referred by Allison, the ‘environmental factors of decision-making’ studied by H. and M. Sprout or Brecher *et al.* study about the components of ‘operational and psychological environment’ in decision-making.¹⁴⁹

Each of these approaches privileges the effects of national socialisation among decision-makers and national bureaucracies dismissing the effects of international socialisation on role conceptions. The domestic environment where decision-makers operate acquires a determinant responsibility for the behaviour of actors and for the formation of role concepts.

In traditional Foreign Policy Analysis, domestic politics is viewed as a clash of various interests within the institutional environment of national governments.¹⁵⁰ Much attention has been given to ‘the identity of the policy-making unit and the (domestic) characteristics of the process’, to the profile of the decision-maker, to domestic public pressures by specific groups or by the public opinion.¹⁵¹ Putnam introduced an important element of articulation between the domestic and international realms through a ‘two level game’ approach. In a ‘two-level game’ leaders and bureaucracies balance domestic interests with international pressures in the outlining of national foreign policy options.¹⁵² Gourevitch gave further contributions by focusing on an international cause-domestic effects connection.¹⁵³ Domestic groups pressure governments to adopt policies favourable to them, while governments associate themselves with these groups to enhance their national positions. Internationally speaking, governments maximize their capacity to meet domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences on foreign policy.¹⁵⁴ The international arena emerges as a level where roles and goals domestically conceived are fulfilled by governments.

Most of the contributions reflect a unitary state-centric concern, frequently focused on major states. As Putnam observes, any two-level theory of international ne-

¹⁴⁸ Carlsnaes 1992, 251.

¹⁴⁹ See Sprout & Sprout 1957, 328 and Brecher *et al.* 1969, 81 and Allison & Zelikow 1999. See also Farrands 1989, 84-108.

¹⁵⁰ Hagan 1995, 122.

¹⁵¹ White 1989, 15.

¹⁵² Putnam 1988.

¹⁵³ See Gourevitch 1978.

¹⁵⁴ Putnam 1988, 434.

gotiation must be rooted in a theory of domestic politics about the power and preferences of the major actors.¹⁵⁵ The indicators he provides in the analysis of determinant 'win-sets' reflect the way governments prefer to create policy options rather than changing the preferences of their constituents.¹⁵⁶ Evidence of this was found on the case study about Portugal. The discourse on foreign policy addressed to domestic audiences (centred on a traditional national project based on bilateralism and special relations with former colonies) consonant with national preferences, was frequently dysfunctional when compared to policy behaviour conducted at the multilateral level. Despite the fact that governments seek to satisfy the preferences of their constituents, it does not necessarily mean that external behaviour always results in adjustments to policy frames familiar to domestic audiences.

Recent scholarship on foreign policy analysis moved away from single case approaches about foreign policy decision-making based on major states and questioned the idea that decision-makers act in a unitary and rational way.¹⁵⁷ This provides two important insights to the present study. The first regards the fact that cognitive elements like images and perceptions matter in the construction of foreign policies roles. The second results from the idea that image and perception bring into the study of national role conceptions and role incorporation, subjective elements crucial to understand role incorporation by other means than a logic of utility and rationality. The case study on Chapter 7 shows how perceptual and valorative elements weighted strongly on the decision of Portugal to contribute with a military contingent to the stabilisation force in the Balkans, in spite of the fact that there were no direct material gains resultant from participation. The denial of a strict rational focus to foreign policy decision-making helps to dismiss the position that roles are static entities, considering them as evolutionary units in the political life of state and non-state actors.

Keohane and Nye reflected on how international behaviour and foreign policy were related to the way in which different domestic political settings responded to international arrangements, translated into specific choices about roles and distinct foreign policy strategies.¹⁵⁸ The existence of multiple channels of international contact among nations expands the range of policy instruments available and limits govern-

¹⁵⁵ Putnam 1988, 442.

¹⁵⁶ For a more detailed account on these indicators, see Putnam 1988, 442, 449, 451, 456 and 458.

¹⁵⁷ Herrman *et al.* 1997.

¹⁵⁸ Gilpin 1981 and Keohane & Nye 2001.

mental control over foreign relations, blurring the distinction between those roles, which are domestically informed, and those which are internationally prescribed.¹⁵⁹ From a role incorporation/performance perspective, interdependence of policy decisions permits to examine variations in national role conceptions, in the degree of role incorporation and to explain why these variations result from international contact. The international developments regarding which frames matter, for instance for security policy (e.g. evolving from a focus on military aspects of crisis management to civilian aspects of humanitarian crisis), help redefining the normative boundaries of national justification and change policy practices previously accepted, due to incorporation of notions of appropriate behaviour.¹⁶⁰

Like any other policy area national foreign, security and defence policy guidelines cannot remain alienated from the processes of evolution and change within the organisations of which states are members. These developments do not necessarily result from major states preferences, but from the dynamics of regional integration. These dynamics level member states' opportunities to participate in the shaping and development of integrated policies, in which diverse actors are engaged.¹⁶¹ This international environment is in itself varied, comprising identities, beliefs, preferences and discourses, which are inter-related within multilevel institutional contexts.

As Hill suggests, there is no significant reason why the perspective and the analytical techniques associated with Foreign Policy Analysis cannot be transferred from the state to other significant international actors.¹⁶² Non-state actors like NATO or the CFSP can be analysed through a perspective of governance, rather than through a dimension of hierarchically positioned governments. White claims that there is no significant damage in replacing state by actor and government by governance.¹⁶³ This solves two recurrent problems in foreign policy analysis: to overcome the insistence of traditional literature on state actors as primary units of analysis and to avoid the dominant focus on domestic policy, as the main source of national role conceptions and national foreign policy. The present study without dismissing the relevance of states representatives or the relevance of the domestic level, as defining locus of for-

¹⁵⁹ Keohane & Nye 2001, 276 and 21.

¹⁶⁰ See Keohane & Nye 2001, 284.

¹⁶¹ Cf. White 2004, 29.

¹⁶² The line of argument is outlined in Hill 1974.

¹⁶³ White 1999, 42.

eign policy roles, it allows to emphasise the importance of governance beyond the national government in security and foreign policy issues.

The state remains an important element of reference for domestic audiences and a constant actor in the context of foreign and security policies, both nationally and internationally. States are member units of organisations and state representatives are the signatory agents of international legal instruments. They conduct processes of international negotiations, represent the nation-state at summit level and they personify the ultimate national entity with legitimacy to declare war and peace, for which it remains a crucial actor.

The present study does not ignore the constitutive part that domestic agents' play in the formation of role conception and role performance, but examines foreign policy roles in the context of integrated foreign, security and defence policy. In this context, the domestic setting is placed at the same level as other sources of role prescription which take part, if not in the definition, at least in the framing of foreign policy role incorporation and role performance. The idea that the domestic environment is the sole focal point of external roles and the main inducer of role incorporation is refuted. An analytical view that strictly considers elements of the domestic environment (government, national bureaucracies, pressure groups and public opinion) as the major determinants of role conception and external behaviour is oblivious of the diversity of international *forums* that shape role concepts and the multiple integrated decision-making mechanisms, which bind national foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Analysis applied to the study of role prescriptions and role incorporation seems limited to a perspective of internal capabilities and constraints. The weak emphasis of Foreign Policy Analysis on the dynamics of regional integration poses two analytical problems for the study of security and defence dimensions of external relations. Firstly, its little reference to the external environment impedes comprehensive accounts about the multilateral features of those two policy domains. Secondly, role concepts associated with national preferences are frequently confronted with multiple foreign interests present in regional and international organisations. Ignoring such diversity means to pursue a less efficient external role performance, condemned to a weak foreign policy.

Role taking is not a simple reactive governmental activity to external events or to bilateral relations, but rather an interdependent process where states influence and are influenced by institutional contexts at the international level.

In sum, the second pitfall stresses the excessive focus of Foreign Policy Analysis on the domestic process of role concepts formation. In traditional Foreign Policy Analysis, the analysis and explanation of role conceptions and foreign policy behaviour is nested in the national environment, from which various limits result. First, it attributes a primary responsibility to the domestic environment, where rational decision-makers are assumed to behave unitarily and in possession of all information about the policy-framing environment. Second, it confines role conceptions to an interpretation of static and hierarchical foreign policy behaviour, regardless the diversity of domestic and regional organisations and institutions, and the presence of state and non-state actors with a saying in foreign policy. Foreign policy roles in traditional views seem to be determined by strategic choices nationally defined and unchangeable in the long term, rather than accounting for their variations. Third, like political realism, Foreign Policy Analysis and Comparative Foreign Policy fail to avoid the great powers narrative. The decision-making processes described and case studies analysed in literature are those of major states, based on the material capacities of its bureaucracies, on the image decision-makers have of the external environment and on the dimension and quality of their communities of policy experts. Fourth, foreign policy behaviour and national role conceptions are commonly explained as a reaction to constraints, rather than a response to opportunities endogenous and exogenously given.

2.2.3 The Third Pitfall:

International Organisations Unrecognised Role Prescribers Overcoming the Limits

As observed in the previous chapters, state centric lines of inquiry dismiss the prescriptive role of international organisations and their ability to suggest, change and enable role concepts, also in the field of foreign, security and defence. In this chapter a third pitfall is addressed with two purposes.

First, to highlight the importance of organisations when one analyses small states foreign behaviour and to overcome the scripts of the first and second pitfalls

(great powers as the main prescribers of policy behaviour and that prescriptions only occur on the base of formal role incorporation by national decision-makers). This means that an important part of the connective tissue of foreign and security policy is dismissed that is, international organisations are ‘crucial centres of interaction and decision-making’ and that they provide opportunities for smaller states to change and adapt their international identity.¹⁶⁴

The second aim is to acknowledge the role of international organisations on the incorporation of international role prescriptions and their effects on the policy behaviour of small states. In order to accomplish this purpose, I focus on the value of international socialisation and norm incorporation induced by international organisations, moving beyond concerns with hegemonic states’ coercion or the influence of other authoritative actors (e.g. in the case of the EU, the European Court of Justice).¹⁶⁵

The view conveyed in this study is that international socialisation and norm embeddement can be considered as pre-conditions of role prescription, to the extent they facilitate roles and they play an important part in improving states receptiveness to external prescriptions. Societal and non-regulative aspects of role prescriptions help shaping small states’ role concepts and foreign policy role performance. International organisations play an important role in adding and interpreting meaning, in conveying commonality of goals, voicing common concerns, developing consensual positions about policy issues and coordinating actions among member states.

Cross-pollination of various insights about international organisations lend contributes to a role analysis approach despite the broad scope of questions addressed in the literature as follows.¹⁶⁶ How do international organisations contribute to solve problems, to overcome transaction costs of information exchange and to monitor behaviour?¹⁶⁷ These perspectives, recognisable in neo-liberal institutionalism, concede to international organisations enabling functions oriented to material problem solving

¹⁶⁴ Goetschel 2000.

¹⁶⁵ See Smith 2004b, 118. Schimmelfennig defines international socialisation as ‘a process that is directed toward a state’s internalisation of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalised in its international environment’, this definition presupposes an intersubjective knowledge of guiding principles of conduct, the interiorisation of a system of norms and the voluntary adherence to a system of international practices by state representatives and national communities of experts, see Schimmelfennig 2000, 111.

¹⁶⁶ A multiple approach is required in the absence of a comprehensive body of literature able to explain role prescription, role incorporation and role performance. These perspectives do not necessarily reflect a theoretical embeddement of this study into the various scholarships outlined.

¹⁶⁷ On a neo-liberal institutionalist perspective, see Keohane 1988; Keohane 1989 and Martin 2001.

(e.g. to reduce costs in the “transaction” of security goods; to increment information distribution; to solve distributional conflicts for instance about strategic burden sharing; to induce compliance; to minimise bargaining costs; to stimulate convergence and to ensure monitoring of decision-making and policy implementation). Likewise non-material aspects are considered (e.g. to generate the conditions of institutional learning; add meaning to policy issues; promote socialisation; embed values among participants and convey appropriate behaviour).

How do organisations generate rules that define, constrain, enable and produce expectations about behavioural roles?¹⁶⁸ These perspectives rely on the diffusion of norms and codes to govern relations between participants and generate patterned forms of behaviour. Institutional approaches to regimes attribute to international organisations a ‘power of their own’ in the way they ‘socialize their members into compliant behaviour.’¹⁶⁹ Prescriptive roles, according to regime literature, convey ways to address and solve problems of cooperation and collective management based on an agreed-upon set of rules.

How do organisations create the conditions of institutional learning and lead to the formation of imagined communities, connecting concerns and preferences, interpreting meaning and disseminating conformant behaviour, helping to maintain conditions that guide international behaviour?¹⁷⁰ A non-state centric literature based on the formation of imagined communities and epistemic communities within international organisations highlights the role of experts as knowledge/value transmitters. It also addresses the relevance of security communities as frames of identity that bind participants to similar policy behaviour. In this case, role prescriptions are not based on specific regulative aspects, but based on the incorporation of norms and rules that result from the development of processes of socialisation, shared symbolic meanings and adoption of common rhetorical strategies.

A last body of contributions regards those insights that highlight how institutions are not strictly guided by member states cost-benefit calculations, but rather out of considerations about appropriateness, as seen in sociological institutionalist approaches.¹⁷¹ International socialisation ritualises conduct around frames of goodness

¹⁶⁸ On literature on regime theory that stresses these aspects, see Hasenclever *et al.* 1996 and Müller 1997.

¹⁶⁹ Müller 1997, 362.

¹⁷⁰ See Karl Deutsch *et al.* 1957; Haas 1992 and Adler 1997.

¹⁷¹ On the specific domain of sociological institutionalism March & Olsen 1989, 117-158 and 159-172; March & Olsen 1998 and March & Olsen 2004.

and rightfulness. In this approaches actors 'internalise prescriptions of what is socially defined as normal, true, right, good, without, or in spite of, calculation of consequences and expected utility.'¹⁷²

As referred in Chapter 1, international organisations comprise formal and informal 'sets of rules and practices that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain (enable) activity and shape the expectations of actors.'¹⁷³ This definition contains two important elements. First, it recognises the existence of international roles with prescriptive impact. Second, it acknowledges the construction of expectations about the behaviour of states under conditions of norm acceptance. Keohane, Haas and Levy's definition comprises both categories: norm incorporation (on the base of precedence of rules and imitation of practices) and expectation effects (about constraining, enabling and shaping) of international organisations on member states behaviour. The comprehensive scope of this definition meets the concept of international role prescriptions suggested earlier, regarding the policy behaviour international organisations expect from member states. It also contributes to understand the conditions of role prescription to be validated by the present study: *international position*, *prominence*, *endurance* and *concordance* of the roles prescribed.

Two limits can be found in rationalist approaches. Firstly, the assumption that international organisations do not possess authoritative qualities of an actor similar to those attributed to the state. Secondly, the understanding that international organisations reflect self-interested competing interests of major states, thus the conditions of learning, imitation and international contact propitiated do not shape prescriptions nor influence member states behaviour. Various contributions illustrate these assumptions.

Rationalist approaches reduce role prescriptions to a 'particular expression of capability' led by member states.¹⁷⁴ Empirical and historical evidence allows refuting the idea that international organisations play a modest prescriptive role in international relations. The international role that the CFSP and in particular NATO have been portraying since their foundation, meets the criteria of *specificity*, *durability* and *concordance*, which strengthen their normative and prescriptive influence and ex-

¹⁷² March & Olsen 2004, 3.

¹⁷³ Haas, Keohane & Levy 1993, 4-5. See also Peters 1999.

¹⁷⁴ Waltz 1979, 88.

plains their persistence in a post Cold War scenario.¹⁷⁵ Traditional scholarship, due to its state centric view, tends to dismiss international role prescriptions, despite the fact that organisations like EU and NATO would not have ensured a lasting peace in Europe, if incorporation of roles and acceptance of policies and practices had not occurred. The roles prescribed by international organisations are more representative and embedded with legitimacy, than unilateral roles conveyed by major states. The development of in-group identities explains the persistence of international organisations (notably of their foreign and security dimensions), as well as their capacity to frame standards of international behaviour.

Bull's notion of international society unfolds the presence of 'habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals' not necessarily considered as specific patterns of behaviour that emerge within formal organisations.¹⁷⁶ States in the international society are bound by 'common understandings, rules, norms, and mutual expectations' among constituent parts, as opposed to the idea of an anarchic and decentralised structure. Common beliefs and shared understandings influence the behaviour of states. In this view organisations neither subtract states from their central role in fulfilling political functions in the international society nor do they occupy the place of central authority within it, since it is the principle of mutual recognition of sovereignty that perpetuates order. In this perspective pluralism and solidarity are driving forces of state behaviour in the international society.¹⁷⁷ Norms and shared understandings that constitute the international society mitigate international anarchy through the principle of sovereignty that lays above the states self-interested preferences, although concurring to them.¹⁷⁸

In the neo-liberal institutionalist tradition, international organisations are purposive entities, which define the parameters of expected behaviour and aim at specific prescriptive courses. As Keohane suggests international organisations comprise durable complexes of rules and norms that prescribe behavioural roles to actors, constrain international activity and shape expectations.¹⁷⁹ International organisations, being purposive entities, convey roles to participants consonant with 'prescribed hierarchies and capacity for purposive action.'¹⁸⁰ These prescriptive qualities must be durable,

¹⁷⁵ See Legro 1997, 33-35.

¹⁷⁶ Bull 2002, 71.

¹⁷⁷ Dunne 1998, 11.

¹⁷⁸ See Wendt 1994, 388.

¹⁷⁹ Keohane 1988, 384.

¹⁸⁰ Keohane 1988, 384.

reciprocal and routinised through practices, adopted among member states in order to become institutionalised.¹⁸¹

Neo-liberal institutionalism emphasises the prescriptive role of formal and informal international institutions and underlines the relevance of international organisations in solving problems of collective action.

In this context, regime theory attempts to explain cooperation in specific issue-areas of international politics. Although not always associated with international organisations, regimes have prescriptive impact over the behaviour of participants.¹⁸² They allow understanding some of the processes implicit to role prescriptions and role performance by the way they aggregate concerns and propose forms to *address* common problems.¹⁸³ The participants in the regime give a special relevance to compliance with norms and rules. The notion advanced by Krasner that regimes can provide incentives for states other than the acceptance of cooperative policies imposed by hegemonic powers, points to the relevance of international organisations in helping states to overcome problems of cooperation.¹⁸⁴

Institutionalist literature underlines the utilitarian reasons that lead member states to comply with norms and rules which also 'evolve in response to their (states) interests and ideas and the ideas and interests of their leaders'.¹⁸⁵ The prescriptive effects of international organisations on states behaviour are regarded as the result of the adequacy of mechanisms attributed to them by member states. As Martin observes 'states create institutions in response to standard collective-action dilemmas and when states delegate to these institutions adequate monitoring capabilities to allow for effective enforcement through which institutions generate convergent effects'.¹⁸⁶ This perspective finds in external conditions (high and low externalities to state behaviour) and in institutional mechanisms (effective versus ineffective monitoring mechanisms)

¹⁸¹ Keohane 1988, 386.

¹⁸² Haggard & Simmons 1987, 495-496.

¹⁸³ Approaches to international regime theory privilege different aspects involved in the emergence and endurance of regimes. *Behavioural approaches* believe that observable convergent behaviour on specific issue-areas increases the likelihood of regime formation, on this see Young 1989, 13 and Jervis 1982, 360-362. *Cognitive approaches* emphasise intersubjective meaning, common understanding and consensual knowledge on norms that 'guide, inspired, rationalise and justify behaviour', on this aspect see Kratochwill & Ruggie 1986, 759, 766-767. *Formal approaches* attribute to regimes formal constraining effects related with explicit rules agreed by actors and reflected in treaties or other normative instruments, see Keohane 1993, 26-29.

¹⁸⁴ Krasner 1982, 499.

¹⁸⁵ Keohane 1989, 5.

¹⁸⁶ Martin 2001, 24.

the explanation to the intended or unintended effects of international role prescriptions on state behaviour.

Conversely, intergovernmental perspectives concentrate on the policy preferences of states. Advancements in the study of integrated decision-making and policy implementation mechanisms reflect states choices on how to pursue self-interested preferences, rather than to enhance prescriptive formulas leading to compliance with international roles.¹⁸⁷ Intergovernmental views sustain that key national actors, motivated by policy goals nationally conceived, initiate negotiations within international organisations. Larger member states influence decision-making and agree among themselves on policy goals. This perspective is dismissive of the binding and levelling effects of international organisations role prescriptions on member states, notably through the presence of equal rights and responsibilities. The influence of national leaders and availability of power resources play a crucial role in intergovernmental bargains.¹⁸⁸ National interest is the driving element in the interstate bargaining game. International organisations are entities that strengthen national governments positions, since they allow controlling transnational actors, not only because they monitor and harmonise policy behaviour. Intergovernmental views, by calling attention to national preferences, provide accounts regarding the conditions under which role prescriptions are more likely to be incorporated. This limits the analysis to prevailing preferences of member states, ignoring that incorporation may occur through resonance of familiar normative frames and the part international organisations take in enabling such frames.

Scholarship that addresses the role the *communities of experts* in constructing policy preferences and changing foreign and security policy behaviour, also highlights specific dimensions of international role prescriptions. This literature, although not primarily concerned with the prescriptive nature of international organisations, emphasises the role-played by ‘knowledge elites’ in incorporating and disseminating normative and technical formulas with repercussion on the external behaviour of actors.¹⁸⁹ The notion of knowledge diffusion behind the logic of epistemic communities facilitates the reconstruction of how domestic preferences shape and are shaped by international contact. These communities contribute to frame preferences and are in-

¹⁸⁷ Moravcsik 1997, 519.

¹⁸⁸ Moravcsik 1991, 25-27.

¹⁸⁹ Epistemic communities are aggregative entities composed by experts, which help binding states preferences and shaping roles through networks of experts, see Haas 1992, 7.

fluenced by the transnational contact with other epistemic communities. The communities of experts 'consolidate bureaucratic power within national and international secretariats' blurring the distance between what is nationally and internationally prescribed, facilitating role incorporation by member states and influencing adaptation of new role prescriptions. International organisations facilitate the organisational and social platforms where these communities converge, where they develop specific levels of expertise, they influence policy coordination and interpret the adoption of new policy roles.¹⁹⁰ They are a 'cognitive authority' in the sense that they work as interpreters of specific policy issues and the roles associated with them, filtering their degree of relevance in domestic and international contexts. The part they play in interpreting the roles suggested in the framework of organisations cannot not be dismissed.

Haas observes the relevant function that the diffusion of ideas and new information play in policy coordination.¹⁹¹ He recognises that in the pursuit of new national role conceptions states, through their epistemic communities, can learn and alter their initial preferences. 'The greater the extent to which epistemic communities are mobilized and are able to gain influence in their respective nation-states, the greater is the likelihood that these nation-states will in turn exert power on behalf of the values and practices promoted by the epistemic community and will thus help in their international institutionalisation.'¹⁹² These approaches emphasise how groups of experts can influence and promote convergence of states' interests and behaviour through international networks of experts.

The diffusion of information and institutional learning conveyed in this view, offers important elements to the explanation of role change within e.g. ministries or ministerial cabinets. International socialisation produces forms of collective learning traceable in the way political innovation and information selection, diffusion and persistence occurs. Changes in state preferences and variations in the willingness to engage in more active international roles result also from high patterns of socialisation among communities of experts. Haas and Adler argue that socialisation and learning, generated among epistemic communities, have an enabling effect in the diffusion of behavioural change.¹⁹³ International organisations work as organisational and discursive platforms where communities of experts identify, filter and interpret international

¹⁹⁰ Haas 1992, 4.

¹⁹¹ Haas 1992,4. See also Mango 1988.

¹⁹² Adler & Haas 1992, 371 and 372. See also Corbey 1995, 268, 282 and 284 and Adler 1997.

¹⁹³ Adler & Haas 1992, 378.

roles.¹⁹⁴ These epistemic communities are embedded in the institutional fabric of international organisations within which they incorporate new frames, ‘define interests and set policy standards’.¹⁹⁵

International organisations enable framing policies by providing the formal social setting where policies emerge, evolve and can be justified. They help communities of experts to ‘define’ interests by generating practices of consultation and negotiation. They contribute to establish standards of behaviour by diffusing principles and developing sanctioning mechanisms. The literature on communities of experts brings its best contribution to understand international role prescriptions by analysing the role experts play in enhancing the domestic conditions of role incorporation.

Research affiliated with sociological approaches focuses on the relevance of institutional constructions that shape normative motivation and help changing identity and preferences. The state remains an important unit of analysis, but intersubjective structures, rather than material ones, constitute the framework where units perceive and perform roles in the international system. From this literature, analytical tools are borrowed to allow operationalising the process of role incorporation of international prescriptions into national foreign policy, by identifying the conditions that account for the incorporation of prescriptions into policy behaviour.

International organisations are relevant players due to their symbolic and representational function, assuming a crucial role in the formation of international identity of member states.¹⁹⁶ Constructivist views are interested not in what international organisations *do*, but in what they *represent*. The value of institutional norms and the discourse associated with it produces specific intersubjective meanings that influence behaviour. Barnett and Finnemore sustain that international organisations create actors, define responsibilities and authority among them, and specify the work these actors should do, giving it meaning and normative value.¹⁹⁷ They are a source of collective identification among participant states helping them to select commonalities and

¹⁹⁴ Finnemore and Sikkink use the notion of organisational platform in a different manner, when explaining that successful norms depend of two elements: norm entrepreneurs who construct cognitive frames within which new perceptions of appropriateness and interest are formed and organisational platforms where these entrepreneurs act to promote norms. It is my understanding that if one thinks in terms of epistemic communities these two elements have to be present. Norm entrepreneurs can be experts that mobilise support around specific policy issues and have a specific knowledge about them. Organizational platforms are the base from which they operate for instance, a particular scientific, political, legal or institutional community. For further reading, see Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 896, 899.

¹⁹⁵ Adler & Haas 1992, 375.

¹⁹⁶ Wendt & Duvall 1989, 60.

¹⁹⁷ Barnett & Finnemore 1999, 700. See also Kratochwill & Ruggie 1986, 763-769.

to change interests and identities based on newly perceived roles.¹⁹⁸ Identity changes in conformity with an overlapped perception between positive identification of commonalities, generated within international organisations and filtered through national preferences. As Wendt argues, ideas and institutions provide the situational context where state interests are redefined by reference to new conditions.¹⁹⁹ As Wendt suggests, states do not carry a fix portfolio of interests independently of their social context. International organisations work as ‘shared mental models’ that stimulate socialisation among actors.²⁰⁰ They craft codified sets of rules and norms that work as having ‘motivational force’ through which institutions ‘come to confront individuals as more or less coercive social facts’, they are function of what actors collectively ‘know’.²⁰¹

States’ behaviour adjusts to perceived political and social settings that generate conditions for the internalisation of new identities and consequently create the conditions for the adoption of new foreign policy roles, namely those pertaining to the dynamics of regional integration. Changes in perception lead to variations in the way the identity of the *Self* and of the *Other* are understood and represented. In constructivist approaches, like the one proposed by Wendt institutions are based on shared ideas and these ‘ideas constitute the roles or terms of individuality’ which distinguish actors from others.²⁰² Roles in foreign policy are seen as collective representations and ‘structural positions’, not as beliefs of decision-makers and elites as considered in rationalist views.²⁰³ In their representational and positional categories, roles define the place actors occupy in the international structure and clarify representational frames about the Other seen as enemy, as a competitive partner or as a friend.

The system pressures states to internalise these representations into their identities and preferences. Identities as the basis of preferences are neither static nor exogenously given, but socially dependent qualities that is, they are framed by a context of relations with other actors. Social roles are never created in a vacuum, but formed in relation to others. It is within an international institutional setting that an actor

¹⁹⁸ See Wendt 1994, 385-387 and 388-391. For a contribution on the relation between identity and security, see Williams 1998. On discourses of identity, see Weldes 2003, 18-19.

¹⁹⁹ Wendt 1999, 93.

²⁰⁰ Wendt 1999, 96.

²⁰¹ Wendt 1992, 399.

²⁰² Wendt 1999, 255.

²⁰³ Wendt 1999, 258.

comes to occupy a specific role, in what Barnett calls *position roles* because they are related to specific contexts less anchored in the preferences of actors.²⁰⁴

If the external environment changes in a way that affects the definition of ones' identity, constructed by reference to the identity of the Other, then uncertainty about interests may arise and the interpretation of identity may change. Wendt illustrates this with the effects of the end of the Cold War on international organisations. This is particularly true for those organisations constructed around an identity of enmity like NATO. However, it is not only the perception of ones' identity that changes, but also the meaning and discourse associated with it. Political crises often generate conceptual crises and 'conceptual crises require a cognitive reordering' in which metaphors play a crucial function.²⁰⁵ Metaphors are discursive devices that reflect changes in the subjective world of decision-makers about the roles portrayed within international frames.

In the aftermath of the Cold War not only the identity of NATO changed, but also the identity of its core enemy. Political discontinuities brought by the end of bipolarity, generated changes in role prescriptive scripts in Western Europe. The collapse of consensus about identity transforms ideas within institutional settings about the Self and Other, hence disrupting the perpetuation mechanisms of self-help systems. In situations of international uncertainty and strategic void, international organisations work as referent points for member states identity, to the extent to which they are able to interpret security environments and produce common understandings about them. Institutions function at the international level as *organizational platforms* that provide 'collective meanings' to participants.²⁰⁶

Internalisation of representations and positions of enmity, rivalry and friendship have an aggregative effect over what is similar, hence crucial to the identity formation and continuity and change of international role prescriptions. Wendt regards constructions about the Self and the Other as referring to those three different logics: the Hobbesian, the Lockean and the Kantian.²⁰⁷ In the first, the reference to roles pertaining to international identity results from perception of the Other as enemy. In the second construction, the implications for foreign policy roles derive from the assump-

²⁰⁴ Barnett 1993, 277.

²⁰⁵ Chilton 1996, 115. See also Shimko 1995, 71-84 and Buzan, Wæver & Wilde 1998, 163-193.

²⁰⁶ Wendt 1992, 407.

²⁰⁷ Chafetz also used these constructions in his study about Russia's foreign policy by using them as frames of beliefs held by political groups regarding construction of policy representations, see Chafetz 1996-1997, 675-676 and 679-687.

tion that the Other is a rival urging to competition and cooperation among participants in the policy process. In the third construction, the Other is a friend and friendship presses for the observation of behavioural rules leading to 'imagined communities' of interests. NATO is a compelling example of how a discourse pertaining to an identity based on enmity and roles based on negative perception of the *alter*, evolved to a discourse based on a wide-spread 'imagine community' beyond its traditional geography and on partnership and cooperative role prescriptions.

Overcoming the Third Pitfall

Policy cooperation motivated by solidarity and community (as observed within CFSP) generates an environment favourable to altruistic foreign policies, where empathy prevails over self-interested and instrumental policies. The commonality of understandings and shared values among actors creates a predisposition to socialise and to aggregate themselves into communities of values.²⁰⁸ Security communities are 'mutual aid societies' based on shared identities, values and meanings that express long-term interests based on sets of duties and responsibilities with a mutual prescriptive function.²⁰⁹ These features inherent to a security community, approach the definition from organisations like NATO and the EU to the capacity to generate commonality of perceptions and understandings about what the Other is.

In the context of security policy, positive categorising of the *alter* (recognised as partner, not enemy) is incorporated through discursive practices that inform cooperative expectations about behaviour, within international environments where actors interact. This facilitates the internalisation of new perceptions and stimulates the repetition, imitation and perpetuation of appropriate behaviour. Declaratory diplomacy constitutes an important discursive instrument of dissemination of values and imitation of policy practices, as it can be observed in the instruments of CFSP policy (e.g. on how common positions presuppose agreement on a policy issue, but also a specific argumentation informed by values).

An argumentation based on valorative assessments is likely to give the incentive to smaller member states to incorporate new roles. Foreign policy roles driven by ethical conditionality, like roles connoted with universal responsibility in defence of human rights or with the judgement of crimes against humanity, are frequently sup-

²⁰⁸ See Deutsch, *et al.* 1957, 5 and Adler & Barnett 1998, 4.

²⁰⁹ Adler & Barnett 1998, 30-31.

ported by smaller states. As Vandenbosh observes, small states reveal a particular interest in ‘developing international law, the establishment of international courts, and the promotion of instruments and institutions of peaceful change.’²¹⁰ These roles, supported by an international discourse of ethic responsibility, can prevail even when not backed up by major states, particularly when shared by a wide group of small states internationally active. The incorporation of roles prescribed internationally involves a qualitative assessment and not a strict consequential evaluation of coercive power, as it may be inferred from the work of Finnemore and Sikkink, and Ikenberry and Kupchan.²¹¹ It is related to political willingness, not necessarily to strict political interest that is, normative and ethical reasons may surmount reasons of instrumental interest.

Normative literature considers incorporation of prescriptions from a legal and non-legal perspective, to explain why and when states incorporate international role prescriptions into their foreign policy behaviour. This is particularly important to the validation of the four conditions of *international position*, *prominence*, *endurance* and *concordance* in relation to the roles prescribed internationally. Traditional state centric lines of inquiry ignore the part international socialisation plays in creating conditions of reciprocity, transparency and commonality of external behaviour, making the environment permeable to role prescriptions. International socialisation can be considered from a perspective of *social learning* as followed in European Studies or from the perspective of *politics of protest* and *mobilisation* as followed by constructivists.²¹² According to Checkel, the social learning perspectives consider socialisation as a form of intense international contact within international institutions, choosing smaller units such as the European Commission, Council of Ministers or international bureaucracies as objects of study. At this level persuasion and argumentation play a relevant role. The perspective of *politics of protest* and *mobilisation*, considers socialisation from a normative perspective departing from larger units (NGOs, international and regional organisations and advocacy networks) considering the way they diffuse norms to states and agents within them.²¹³ These perspectives view socialisation from a perspective of diffusion of appropriate behaviour independent of the

²¹⁰ Vandenbosh 1964, 304.

²¹¹ See Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 906-909 and Ikenberry & Kupchan 1990, 285 -287 and 290-292. Also Cochran 1999, 246-280.

²¹² Checkel 1999a.

²¹³ For further reading, see Checkel 1999a, 19.

power positions held by actors.²¹⁴ In the context of the present study, this dimension is more valuable than analysing whether policy behaviour and incorporation of role prescriptions are the result of a rational choice, as seen in rationalist approaches.

The investigation of the prescriptive effects of international organisations on state behaviour, from a role prescription perspective, contributes to a better understanding of the various effects of socialisation on policy behaviour. The agents of international socialisation (state representatives and international bureaucracies) are not the only ones to increment international socialization. The formal institutional design of international organisations stimulates opportunities for intense international contact.²¹⁵ Occasions for intense socialisation are generalised by the presence of permanent national representations within international organisations, by the frequency of meetings, by the regularity of contacts among national representatives present at the various committees and working groups and by simultaneous representation of national delegations in different meetings.

Security organisations are good examples of socialisation due to their dependency of ‘cooperation, transparency and confidence-building’.²¹⁶ They enable the emergence of an ideational and material setting generating interdependent conditions of international contact from which security organisations are dependent. Role prescriptions are better conveyed in integrated institutional environments, closely connected through rights and responsibilities aggregated into a larger structure. This structure is characterised by division of labour among participants, as observed in NATO and the CFSP. The international strength of integrated foreign and security policy relies on cultures of socialisation, since they perpetuate internal cohesion, level perceptions about the Other, enhance internal stability and ensure reciprocity in maintaining integrity against external challenges.

A role prescription approach can help to understand the conditions under which socialisation produce competitive-self-interested motivations and cooperative-altruistic preferences. Socialisation offers an important source of explanation on what regards change in foreign policy roles, without relying exclusively on normative or instrumental views on policy behaviour. The empirical study in the second part of the present research illustrates the possibility of this coexistence. March and Olsen con-

²¹⁴ On what concerns international socialisation, see Shimmelfenning 2000, 12. See also Johnston 2001 and Searing 1986.

²¹⁵ On the impact of membership on foreign policy socialisation, see Manners & Whitman 2000.

²¹⁶ Johnston 2001, 509. See also Gheciu 2005.

sider that the ‘logic of consequences’ and the ‘logic of appropriateness’ should not be seen as irreconcilable positions. The relationship between *calculated consequences* and *followed rules* is often subtle.²¹⁷ In reality, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between roles prescribed and performed on the base of strict self-help and those oriented by exclusive normative conformity. Both often blend foreign policies.

Socialisation is the process by which actors ‘learn to internalise new norms and rules in order to become members of (international) society (...). Actors are socialized into new norms and rules of appropriateness through processes of persuasion and social learning and redefine their interests and identities accordingly’.²¹⁸ This view on socialisation allows considering adaptation of roles in the larger context of international settings. Socialisation is a process that creates preferential conditions for membership in a group, where the ‘intersubjective understandings of the society become taken for granted’ in virtue of a *pro-norm behaviour* shared among a group which features or aims at some form of identification.²¹⁹ Socialisation is not only a process of assimilation of beliefs, but also of practices incorporated within the actor’s own system of values and beliefs, and behaviour.²²⁰ A role theory perspective allows connecting the beliefs held by a society with those conveyed within international organisations. A positive perception of the benefits associated with the adoption of new roles and practices results in changes in international identity and in external role performance. Actors in highly socialised international environments tend to reproduce and diffuse specific patterns of social order, reflecting the institutionalised beliefs and practices found in these institutional environments.

Considering socialisation from a perspective of role conceptions and role prescription contributes to overcome some of the limits underlined in this study for the second and third pitfalls, surmounting the notions that self-conceptions of policymakers are determinant in shaping behaviour and that states international position and material resources determine the degree of socialisation in which actors are involved. International socialisation through the lenses of role analysis is crucial to explain the conditions under which states incorporate the roles prescribed by organisations. Their own specificity in goal orientation and formal decision-making structures facilitate

²¹⁷ March & Olsen 1998, 943-969, p.952. See also Checkel 1998 and Checkel 1999b.

²¹⁸ Checkel 1999b, 87. Brackets in the original.

²¹⁹ Johnston 2001, 494.

²²⁰ This allows calling attention to the dynamic and adaptive nature of role conceptions, rather than to focus on their static character in response to political changes that may occur in the actor’s domestic or international environment.

institutional learning, since international organisations generate environments where confidence building, transparency and information exchange play a fundamental part. It is important to explore change in foreign policy roles without losing sight of the long-term effects of international socialisation on role prescriptions. A special attention to the circumstances in which role change occurs provides insights into the dynamic nature of role conceptions and external policy behaviour.

The role prescriptions present in official policy guidelines reflect the consensual incorporation of ideas, images and social realities.²²¹ Keohane refers to institutions endurance and persistence as a reflection of how they are perceived by actors in the system, ‘constructed institutions vary historically and across issues in nature (with respect to the policies they incorporate) and in strength (in terms of the degree to which their rules are clearly specified and routinely obeyed)’.²²²

Socialisation plays an important part in the incorporation of prescribed roles by disseminating behaviour and embedding actors in similar positions within international organisations. Internalisation of roles does not only derive from a taken for granted quality, but also from routinisation and ‘ritualised behaviour’ that confirms the understandings held domestically or internationally by actors involved in foreign policy making.²²³ States, once integrated in an international environment, adopt mimetic behaviour. Coercive external constraints that compel to imitation may even be absent. Intended motivations to adopt roles in conditions of confidence building, transparency, information availability and knowledge make this mimesis appealing rather than constraining.

In politically integrated and highly socialised structures, like NATO and the EU, participants are all bound to the same rules. Small states perceive international environments as equalitarian political settings. This improves small states chances to take part in the international agenda and to contribute actively in the context of international decision-making structures. Politically integrated institutions homogenise patterns of prescribed and expected behaviour reducing the impact of uncertainty.²²⁴ This characteristic is important for smaller member states since the political costs of

²²¹ They also comprehend aspects such as: interplay between cognition and emotion; personal relations and trust and political speech as motivational elements in policy making. See Chollet & Goldgeier 2002, 165-175. See also Hermann *et al.* 1997, 403-433.

²²² Keohane 1989, 2.

²²³ Barnett & Finnemore 1999, 718. See also Smith 2004b, 241.

²²⁴ International organisations promote flows of information, enhance the ability of governments to monitor others’ compliance and to ensure the continuity of conditions of solidarity and of international agreement, see Keohane 1989, 2.

external participation are higher. International socialisation creates the conditions for small states 'to rely more on the institutional fabric of international society and less on individual national means'.²²⁵

Participation and willingness to incorporate roles increase to the extent to which the institutional environment is an open and information-rich environment.²²⁶ Willingness to incorporate international role prescriptions is also related with a combination of several institutional characteristics: diversity of member states (degree of representativeness of participant countries), institutional design (access to information, type of voting methods, instruments of policy implementation and participation in decision-making bodies), resources availability and perception of international legitimacy. Variations in any of these elements may result in variations in the ability to persuade and influence, as the empirical study will show.

As Johnston suggests, 'Treating institutions as social environments means positing that different social environments vary in terms of their persuasiveness and social influence, for which some may be better succeeded as social environments than others.'²²⁷ International socialisation presupposes not one, but several multilevels of political belonging, where actors are expected to carry out roles in conformity with prescriptions socially informed.

There is a wide spread tendency, when analysing small states within organisations, to focus on the constraining elements of external performance (lack of opportunities, misperception or miscalculation of political chances and limited resources), than on the enabling opportunities offered. Analysing how international institutions role prescriptions are incorporated and how they affect small states role performance contribute to overcome reductionist explanations about the foreign policy behaviour of small states. International organisations provide to small states the means to overcome their reputation of less prominent actors in the international context, by making available institutional resources and political opportunities to participate actively in the international agenda.

²²⁵ Wendt 1992, 414 - 415.

²²⁶ Keohane 1989, 64.

²²⁷ Johnston 2001, 494.

The availability and richness of information, although seen as intrinsic qualities of organisations and regimes, may also depend on the formal and informal position occupied by member states within the organisation. For instance, when a state holds the European Union or OSCE Presidencies, when a state is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council or when the Secretary General of NATO belongs to a country that privileges transatlantic ties in its foreign policy, it is likely that position matters in the way information is formally and informally made available and accessible.

In sum, traditional state-centric approaches to foreign policy are not interested in alternative sources of role prescription (like international organisations) in the explanation of foreign policy behaviour nor do they explore the connection between these prescriptions and role incorporation/role performance in domestic foreign policy. The position of prescriptive entity is denied to organisations and their capacity to formulate and prescribe roles to member states is not acknowledged. States are the exclusive role holders in foreign policy and they intervene in international settings according to their relative power positions. The level of inquiry on role prescription stays limited to the predominance of superpowers in international politics and their interplay with the remaining components of international system. In rationalist approaches to foreign policy role prescription and role performance are anchored in two axioms. The first is the axiom of international *anarchic structure*, in which prescriptive ability is not related to the ability to initiate cooperation, but to the competitive position occupied by hegemonic states. The second axiom is related to states' *self-interested preferences* denying to other actors purposive autonomy in defining, framing and prescribing roles.

The chapter highlights distinct theoretical contributions to understand the impact of international role prescriptions and the conditionalities of role incorporation on member states. Normative approaches were reviewed in order to highlight the relevance of considerations outside the limited boundaries of national interest; away from the strict domestic focus of national role conceptions and beyond strict concerns with incorporation of regulative aspects of international role prescriptions. These considerations include: the impact of dense international socialisation on national role conception; change in states perception of policy preference; presence of incentives that predispose actors to pro-norm behaviour based on appropriateness; and willing adherence to non-regulative prescriptions that resonate normative understandings (conveyed through discourse, rules and practices), about foreign policy behaviour within international organisations.

NATO and CFSP are good examples of socialisation due to their dependency and that of their member states on commonality of views, regional cooperation, transparency and confidence building. Member states are socialised into new roles by means of persuasion on the goodness and rightfulness of role taking, not on the base of conditionalities related with material gains. Socialisation and learning enable a

willing adherence that leads to the redefinition of prior national role conceptions. Socialisation, being a process of assimilation of beliefs, connects in a role analysis perspective, the beliefs of a nation and the beliefs inherent to the roles conveyed internationally. International settings disseminate their roles through routines and ritualised conduct that lead states to adopt similar positions and behaviour. Since routines are observed by all member states, they generate a type of levelled participation particularly appealing and favourable to small states. International organisations are perceived as equalitarian political environments where roles are equally conveyed to participants on the base of rights and responsibilities. International organisations, due to their enabling conditions, propitiate the study of small states role incorporation from the perspective of opportunities, overcoming reductionist explanations centred on the constraining effects of the international structure.

2.3 Conclusions

The chapter emphasised distinct theoretical contributions to understand the impact of role prescriptions of international organisations on the foreign and security policy behaviour of small states. Various lines of inquiry offered fruitful theoretical ground to the study of role prescriptions and role incorporation, in particular sociological institutionalism. Most of them provided strong explicative cases about external behaviour, but none offered comprehensive insights able to explain how international role prescriptions impact on national role conceptions and role incorporation.

The contributions featured on the three pitfalls evolve from accounts about the material conditions of role prescription, based on the coercive power of major states that socialise others into their own preferences, to less material conditions of role prescription based on willing compliance and on a non-regulative base, guided by appropriateness (Annex I). The first pitfall addresses the centrality of the anarchic structure of the international system and the position of superpowers in the way prescriptions are imposed. The second pitfall highlights the role played by national decision-makers and communities of experts in defining role concepts. The third pitfall discusses some of the limits of institutionalist views and attempts to overcome them by recognising purposive action to international organisations as role prescribers.

Rational views focus on interest, power, capabilities and position as conditionalities to explain role prescriptions by hegemonic states, while sociological approaches call attention to meaning, identity formation, tacit understandings and appropriate behaviour disseminated through international socialisation.

As the literature reviewed led to conclude, role analysis allows overcoming explanations nested in antagonistic notions of power (strong versus weak, and major states versus small states), behaviour (consonant versus rebellious) external options (constraints versus opportunities) and surmounts the problem of material versus non-material conditions of role prescriptions. A role analysis perspective bridges states preferences and international prescriptions, linking agent and structure in the explanation of foreign policy behaviour, focused on a diversity of actors and institutional environments highlighting the enabling effects of external opportunities. Role analysis enables focusing on smaller states, setting the analysis about foreign and security policy free from major states and contending capabilities. The present study, with the help of sociological institutionalist views, underlines the value of international settings like CFSP and NATO in prescribing roles and generating external opportunities to member states, in particular to smaller members. International organisations are fundamental in the way they produce frames of identity alternative to national ones and define commonly what is appropriate, developing joint responsibilities and enhancing small states international participation.

In the discussion about the *first* and *second pitfalls* two limits were analysed: the centrism of Realist scholarship on hegemonic powers and the excessive focus of Foreign Policy Analysis on the domestic process of foreign policy decision-making. In the *third pitfall* the unrecognised purposive role of international organisations in traditional rationalist scholarship was stressed and ways were suggested about how to overcome the previous pitfalls, considering the enabling conditions of role prescriptions within international organisations which may account for role incorporation by small states.

From a role analysis perspective, the *first pitfall* anchored role prescriptions and role performance to international anarchy. The international structure is hierarchically organised in state-types whose role behaviour reflects the place occupied in the hierarchy, based on ability to prescribe and proscribe roles. The excessive concern of the first pitfall with great powers and their prescriptive impact led it to ignore other

actors (e.g. international organisations and small states) and alternative forms to convey international roles (e.g. use of persuasion to convey norms and standards of appropriate behaviour). Focused on the perpetuation of power politics, traditional inquiry ignores roles incorporated from a perspective of adaptation and change. Great powers are represented as influential and dominant regardless the policy issue and institutional setting considered, while small states are regarded as merely responsive to an external order imposed on them. Organisations prescriptive ability is not considered the result of common values, shared institutional practices and agreed-upon rights and responsibilities, but as instrumentalisations of hegemonic states. The hegemonic states define toward *secondary states*, the limits of expected, acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.

Structural realism, in its reluctance to articulate systemic and domestic conditions and to explain change, fails to provide a convincing account of adaptation of new policy roles and in predicting external policy behaviour.

A study on foreign policy role prescription and role performance in international settings sets the analysis free from the limits of perspectives centred in major powers' rivalry. It provides new insights about change and continuity in small states national role conceptions through incorporation of new roles in discourse and policy action. By detaching from an exclusive interest in the analysis of the domestic processes of foreign policy decision-making, it is possible to capture meaningful change in states' external behaviour, when in contact with integrated decision-making structures like those observed in NATO and CFSP. These changes do not necessarily result from systemic pressure, but from the strength of the arguments that frame role prescriptions and from the resonance they generate among member states own role concepts.

The adaptation of national role conceptions leads to the study of alternative international prescriptive frames, outside the contending interests of major states and above the regulative aspects of norm binding elements. This allows deflecting from a perspective based on prescriptions of major players, in order to analyse how small states incorporate foreign policy roles into their national policy guidelines by means of opportunity and normative reasoning. This goal can be reached by investigating how small states opt for pro-norm behaviour in order to participate in the international discourse, to take part in the international agenda and to get involved in new forms of multilateralism.

The *second pitfall* stressed the excessive focus of traditional inquiry about Foreign Policy Analysis on the domestic processes of policy formulation and on the individual behaviour of national decision-makers and bureaucracies. This scholarship disregards the effects of international organisations on the formulation of foreign policy roles, agenda setting and role implementation.

Decision-makers are assumed to behave unitarily and in possession of all information about the environment that frames policies. Several limitative aspects result from this traditional line of inquiry, if one wishes to apply it to the study of role prescription and role performance. First, it confines national role conceptions to an interpretation of static role concepts and hierarchical policy behaviour, departing from unitary methods of analysis, regardless the specificity of the domestic set and the organisations integrated by states. The broad categories within which prescriptive roles are organised do not reflect the behavioural diversity of foreign policy landscape. Second, the predominance of Anglo-Saxon research in the field produced a scholarship that aimed at explaining Anglo-Saxon scripts on role typologies, foreign policy behaviour, and models of decision-making. Third, like political realism, FPA and Comparative Foreign Policy explain great powers concerns framed by the hierarchic position of states in the international system, by their material capacities and perceptions of individual decision-makers about the position of countries in the international system. Fourth, the foreign policy behaviour described in this literature is determined by strategic and static choices nationally defined, without accounting for variations that result from domestic adaptation to international role prescriptions. Fifth, national role conceptions and policy behaviour are commonly explained as a reaction to constraints, rather than a response to external opportunities.

This literature addresses aspects and subjects of foreign policy without recurring to a comprehensive perspective that connects national beliefs with international frames nor does it explain how they inform the roles incorporated and the roles performed.

The alternative view suggested in the study overcomes the idea that domestic environment is the sole focal point of foreign, security and defence policy. The idea is to provide an analytical framework based on observable conditions of international role prescriptions about the impact on smaller states' role conceptions and explain role incorporation and role performance.

The *third pitfall* regarded the little interest given by state centric lines of inquiry to organisations as socialisation agencies. Various ways to overcome it were referred. Socialisation is crucial to explain how international prescriptions are diffused and how incorporation of roles occurs within organisations through institutional rules, codes of language, discourses and subjective meanings with impact on national role conceptions, behaviour and policy action.

International organisations induce specific institutional cultures, norms, and routines internalised by member states representatives. These are generated and evolve in environments of international socialisation, where a generalisation of norms of appropriate conduct produce patterns of expected behaviour, which facilitate role prescriptions, accepted as beneficial by member states. This has an impact on the national definition of role concepts in foreign, security and defence policy. State preferences are frequently reflected in political role statements generated in environments of international socialisation, which shape the image decision-makers have about the international political and social context in which they are embedded. These images projected externally and filtered internally, guide choices about which roles to incorporate, originating policy behaviour consistent with them.

The analytical opportunities offered by the study of organisations and the findings encountered in literature enable to chart four sets of elements relevant to the present study. Firstly, the importance of considering the existence of multilevel sets of political belonging and decision-making, which enhance or constraint national role performance. In international affairs, actors integrate several organisations, each with its own agenda, legal framework, material capabilities, and ability to prescribe roles to member states. This multiple institutional belonging may cause conflicts of interest, limiting the international role of some states or on the contrary may contribute to provide opportunities of international participation. Secondly, it underlines the value of putting in evidence a segment of international life above the state that is, occupied by organisations like the EU and NATO, where prescriptive features can be observed. Thirdly, it highlights the prescriptive appeal of organisations to their member states, in the field of foreign, security and defence policy. In this aspect, they are as important as states, in the way they are able to generate and aggregate representations conveyed to member states. Also in those domains, organisations have the capacity to homogenise prescriptions, represent preferences and influence expected behaviour,

persuading member states to comply voluntarily with norms. Fourthly, to explore the relation between socialisation and role performance finding out if a high level of political integration and international socialisation corresponds to a high level of demand for expected foreign policy behaviour and an enhanced willingness to incorporate new roles.

Under conditions of dense socialisation, role conceptions may change to correspond to appropriate behaviour, as a form of integration in the international society and a strategy of participation in the international agenda. Role conceptions result from a combination of preferences informed by national will and by role prescriptions and expectations generated at the international level. They derive from the related effects of political culture, tradition and identity constructions about foreign, security and defence policy formulations. They are an amalgamation of appropriate and consequential choice compatible with preferences, understandings, and perceptions and with the behaviour internationally agreed-upon. Role analysis connects and mutually reconciles agent and structure, linking national conceptions with international prescriptive environments and connecting the beliefs of a society with those conveyed within international settings. The complexity pertaining to the relations between role prescriptions and role incorporation makes cross-pollination of theoretical insights a crucial strategy to understand change and adaptation of policy roles and behaviour in international settings.

Chapter 3

Case Study

3.1 Case Study Framework

The case study methodology is based on content analysis of policy statements alongside examination of policy behaviour and policy action.¹ It does not follow a strict chronological account of processes and events, but rather ‘analytical episodes’ focused on observation of empirical implications of international role prescriptions and role incorporation. These ‘episodes’ disregard aspects not relevant for testing observation of international role prescriptions and role incorporation.

The growing complexity of integrated policy coordination and policy implementation of foreign policies within organisations tightened the connection between foreign policy roles conceived and performed in the national and international domain.² Similarly, the enunciation of prescriptive provisions with impact on the foreign policy behaviour is not an exclusive competence of domestic institutions. This is mostly relevant for small states, since it is in the context of international organisations that small states may find enhanced opportunities to improve their international profile. A case study on the foreign policy roles of a small state, in the context of international organisations, is particularly suited to analyse the conditions of incorporation of role prescriptions.³ The first part of the case study (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) regards international role prescriptions. The second part addresses Portugal’s (Chapter 7) role incorporation and role performance.

The process of role incorporation departs from the analysis of the roles prescribed within the foreign and security dimensions of two organisations, to interpret how these roles are integrated into policy guidelines and policy behaviour of a small state. That is, how international role prescriptions and national role conceptions are incorporated into policy actions or role performance, through normative and non-rule based dimensions.

¹ Content analysis refers to looking ‘upon statements and signs as raw material to be summarized in order to bring out the impact of content upon audience’, see Lasswell 1941, quoted by Titscher *et al.* 2003, 57.

² See Hocking 2002.

³ Politically integrated international structures are those international organisations where member states reach agreements within common decision-making bodies that is, in the name of member states it issues policy guidelines politically binding.

A framework of analysis was built to follow sequences of events and policy arguments found in primary sources that account for role prescriptions and policy behaviour, as described further ahead in this chapter.

In this research *process tracing* and *content analysis* are used to analyse international and national foreign policy framing documents benefiting from a triangulated research strategy in the interpretation of data. Similarly, the triangulation of various sources (founding policy documents, official documents, and policy statements issued by state representatives) enables testing consistency among the data collected. A qualitative method of analysis was considered more suitable to this study.⁴

3.1.1 Case Selection

Case selection in case studies leads the critics of this methodology to the question of selection bias and validity. Random selection in qualitative research is not an adequate technique and does not seem to solve the problem of biased selection, especially when there are only a small number of observations.⁵ The present case selection is intentional and directly related to the research questions proposed, as van Evera suggests, researchers should select the cases that ‘best serve the purpose of their inquiry’.⁶

Two requisites of validity are referred by literature on case studies selection: the criteria of case selection and purpose of research should meet in order to optimise the results, and some variation on the dependent variable should be allowed. In order to ensure variation, two organisations (NATO and EU) where role prescriptions (independent variable) occur, were selected and their impact on role incorporation (dependent variable) of one small state is analysed in those two contexts. Despite the fact the adaptation of role concepts of one small state is being considered, this occurs in a broader international context showing variation in adaptation.⁷

⁴ Role theorists that use quantitative methods opt for coding variables. In order to obtain indicators of role conceptions coders are given coding questions and texts that contain statements about foreign policy roles. This procedure lasts for several training sessions. With no prior consultation among coders, they are asked to improve the content of the questions addressed in order to decrease ambiguity in meaning. After several sessions, an intercoder reliability of at least 80% is achieved, after which the coding process of role concepts is initiated. The coding of variables is based on content analysis of political statements. This method requires more than one researcher and validation relies heavily on the agreements achieved among coders trained by a leading researcher. On the application of quantitative methodologies to role analysis, see Brecher *et al.* 1969, 88-93; Wish 1980, 535-549 and Breuning 2003, 233-236. For an overview on qualitative approaches based on content analysis, see Barnett 1993; Chafetz 1996-1997; Aggestam 1999 and Krotz 2002.

⁵ King, Keohane & Verba 1994, 129 and Maoz 2005.

⁶ Evera 1997, pp.77-78 and 88.

⁷ Herrmann 2003, 124.

Being aware of the criticism that ‘case-study results cannot be generalized to other cases’, in particular in a single case choice, two distinct international organisations were chosen and are analysed in parallel with one small state for a ten years period (1991-2001).⁸ Using factors time and institutional specificity one is likely to encounter three types of variations: one *temporal*, one *national* and one *international*. The *temporal* variation refers to national and international events that alter the course of policy roles. The *national* variation concerns changes in domestic policy, especially among governmental elites, changes of government in power and variations in the perception of domestic audiences in favour or against specific external policy issues. The *international* variation is about change in international organisation’s roles, goals, composition, and competencies of their decision-making bodies, membership of new members, relations with other organisations, and international events. Any of these three large categories of variation offers strong explicative cases. This study is interested in the first and last. The explanations with origin in the national environment will not be excluded since they may contribute to clarify contextual variations in foreign policy actions. However, national policymaking and domestic audiences are not sufficient to explain variations in the way roles are incorporated.

The case selection enables to obtain empirical evidence supporting the research questions. The study shows that the behavioural scripts conveyed by international organisations allow to small states the use of discursive tools, which resonate familiar frames facilitating the adoption of new roles.⁹

Small states’ foreign, security and defence roles in international institutional contexts are not a recurrent theme in the literature, for which to conduct a case study exploring these dimensions contributes to fill the gap. By focusing on smaller member states, this study will contribute to call attention to a category of state actors overlooked in the context of empirical research.¹⁰ The use of a role concept framework will guide a comprehensive interpretation of foreign policy behaviour across time, throughout two different international settings and two policy contexts. As Carlsnaes explains ‘As long as the agency-structure issue remains unresolved, the foreign policy analyst is unable to address a crucial aspect of empirical reality itself; that the policies of states are a consequence of, and can hence only be fully explained with reference

⁸ Evera 1997, 53.

⁹ See Barnett 1993, 273, Nugent 1994, 434 and Wessels 1998.

¹⁰ For a position corroborating this view, see Hey 2003, 8.

to, a dynamic process in which both agents and structures causally condition each other over time'¹¹

Not only reasons of scant theoretical and empirical interest about small states foreign policy in the context of security organisations justify the case selection. The authors' own professional experience at the Ministry of Defence since 1989, offers the opportunity to eyewitness events and policy processes that constitute evidence of role prescriptions and role incorporation in Portuguese foreign, security and defence policy.¹² The work as a national delegate of the National Defence Policy Directorate (1989-1995) in the framework of expert groups and meetings of NATO and the WEU, explain the interest in analysing Portugal's foreign policy in the context of both organisations. Although this study fully observes the confidentiality of documental sources, for which only open sources are used, the working experience allowed matching academic insight with practical experience, raising the overall validity of this case study.

3.1.2 Process-Tracing and Discourse Analysis

A single case study is conducted using qualitative analysis. The process tracing method is mostly valuable to analyse the 'chain of events' and conditions by which international prescriptions are reflected in national foreign policy role incorporation and performance.¹³ The *process tracing* approach should not be confined to the investigation and explanation of 'decision making process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes', as suggested by Scott.¹⁴ With this in mind, the present case study adapts process tracing to the analysis of the roles, events and conditions that influence the transformation of international prescriptions into small states' foreign policy outcomes through a positive empirical testing approach.

In order to avoid the danger of focusing exclusively on a series of 'significant episodes of interest' as argued by King, Keohane and Verba and prevent bias, a

¹¹ See Carlsnaes 1992, 256.

¹² Since 1994, the author works at the Research Department of the National Defence Institute (Lisbon), a think tank dedicated to the study and debate of national and international defence and security issues.

¹³ Process tracing is defined by Stephen van Evera as an exploration of a 'chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes. The cause-effect link that connects independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the investigator looks for observable evidence of each step', see Evera 1997, 64 and 70.

¹⁴ Scott 1995, 65. See also King, Keohane & Verba 1994, 226-228. For an example of a single case using process tracing to validate international organisations impact on a state's decision-making, see Martin 1992. The process tracing method is particularly valuable to analyse the chain of events and conditions by which international role prescriptions are reflected in national foreign policy role incorporation/performance.

framework of analysis was designed (Table 2).¹⁵ The framework operationalises indicators of role prescription and role incorporation identifying the conditions in which foreign policy roles are likely to be incorporated into national policy guidelines.

The conditions chosen address the dimensions of role prescriptions of interest to this research, relating the impact of international prescriptions with the conditions that enable prescription by international organisations and that are likely to influence small states' foreign policy behaviour.¹⁶ These clusters of conditions help tracing variations in both independent and dependent variable, since in the real world changes are likely to occur in both, rather than solely on the dependent variable.

The criteria outlined in the first horizontal row specifies conditions of role prescription. The second row refers to the indicators, which frame prescriptions and shape role incorporation.¹⁷ These indicators regard perception of *international position* of the international organisation and the *prominence*, *endurance* and *concordance* of the roles prescribed.

	International position	Prominence	Endurance	Concordance
Indicators	Problem-solving and mobilisation strength	International socialisation Appropriateness Consequentiality	Routinization of policy practices Imitation of behaviour	Formal and informal incorporation of role prescriptions

Table 2 - Conditions of role prescription

International position regards the perception of place organisations occupy that is, how strongly they are perceived as effective problem addressers and problem-solvers. It is also related to capacity to mobilise member states around common purposes through normative and functional appeal by generating commonality of views around foreign, security and defence issues. An international organisation with a high

¹⁵ King, Keohane & Verba 1994, 133.

¹⁶ Bennett & George 1997, 14. Bennett and George define process tracing as distinct from historical narrative 'A process-tracing explanation differs from historical narrative, as it requires concerting a purely historical account that implies or asserts a causal sequence into an analytical explanation couched in theoretical variables that have been identified in the research design', see Bennett & George 1997, 6.

¹⁷ This framework draws on the work of Legro, Finnemore & Sikkink, Payne, Raymond, and March & Olsen. On the criteria of prominence and endurance, see Legro 1997. On norm prominence see Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink 1998, 906-909. On concordance see also Payne 2001 and Raymond 1997. On prominence see March & Olsen 1998. This framework draws on the work of scholars, which are interested in studying roles from a normative perspective, privileging non rule-based compliance.

international profile (e.g. recognised as being efficient and basing its agenda on internationally legitimate frames of policy conduct) is likely to influence national foreign policies of member states and to induce changes in member states' external relations. Matters of political trust, broad legitimacy to mandate and implement policies, and operational reliability weigh strongly on how organisations are perceived by member states as having a high international profile.

Prominence is related to both the substance of the roles and the international social environment in which they are prescribed to member states. As Stacey and Rittberger note 'norm prominence constitutes a key condition for affecting actor behaviour and outcomes'.¹⁸ Attempts to enhance prominence of the roles conveyed are frequently supported by discursive strategies highlighting the appropriateness or consequentiality of the role disclosed, based on goodness or utility.

Endurance of role prescriptions regards persistence across time, which varies according to institutional embedment based on routinisation of policy practices and imitation of policy behaviour. The endurance of a role prescribed may vary according to the level at which foreign policy prescriptions are generated, for instance if the decision-making process of an international organisation comprises an equalitarian representation of member states; if this process is an enabling or rather an obstructing decision-making mechanism; or if the ability of the various decision-making bodies varies in their capacity to prescribe roles and consequently to implement policies.

The contents of the roles prescribed are also relevant in the validation of endurance, since routinisation and imitation may vary from non-legally binding policy declarations to legally enforcing policy provisions. However, this condition is not limited to formal incorporation of roles into national law nor suggests automatic administrative impact. Here substantive and behavioural elements play a crucial role in the reproduction of roles, through conveyance of discourse and meaning through policy statements and actual policy action.

Concordance is related to the degree of formal and informal incorporation of the roles prescribed. In both cases it reflects the adoption of practical gestures of international commitment of a small member state. Concordance does not always give way to new institutions or to a new legal base. As Smith suggests 'the lack of robust compliance mechanisms in EPC/CSFP does not undermine the validity of the general

¹⁸ Stacey & Rittberger 2003, 866. Norm are not understood as rules, but as a standards of appropriate behaviour, see 880, ft.17.

rule to cooperate on foreign policy whenever possible'.¹⁹ Evidence of concordance frequently involves changes in discourse reflecting denser embedment in organisations and public expressions of affinity between the roles prescribed and the roles member states perceive as being their own conceptions of international role (e.g. a role prescription oriented to external humanitarian relief aid is likely to resonate national conceptions that show a preference for roles with ethical and universal dimension). For instance, an international role that reflects national role conceptions about the place of a nation in international affairs is more likely to be domestically incorporated than when such concordance does not exist. Likewise, roles prescriptions that enable national role conceptions as ally, regional mediator, donor or protector are likely to encounter larger resonance among national political and military elites of smaller member states.

The second horizontal row in Table 2 evolves from the first one and it regards the indicators of *international position* of organisations and the *prominence*, *endurance* and *concordance* of the roles prescribed. It is expected that these indicators contribute to evaluate the prescriptive profile of international organisations and that enable the examination of incorporation of international prescriptions by international organisations.'

As far as the indicator *problem-solving* and *mobilisation strength is concerned*, it considers the ability of organisations to face international challenges on the basis of which member states reiterate their commitment to the roles prescribed. Both the condition of problem-solving and mobilisation strength are indicators of recognition of the international stand of organisations in terms of argumentative ability to 'securitize' an issue, maintain adequate resources to attain goals and ensure international legitimacy.

The ability to generate *international socialisation* and embed member states into concerns of *appropriateness* and *consequentiality* are strong indicators of prominence of the prescriptive role of organisations. The denser the social-network within the organisation is, the stronger will be the impact of the roles prescribed and the influence in altering 'mutual typifications' member states have of each other.²⁰ The study concluded by Barnett, on the destabilising effects of overlapping international institutions on the behaviour of states in the Arab Middle East is a good example of

¹⁹ Smith 2004 a, 123.

²⁰ Glarbo 1999, 640.

weak regional socialisation and fragile ability of regional organisations to induce concerns of appropriateness or consequentiality among participants.²¹ NATO and the EU are, on the other hand, good examples of dense socialisation and inducement of change in member states behaviour. As Walt observes ‘Modern alliances are more than a mechanical combination of independent national assets; they are also social institutions that involve extensive interactions between the member-states.’²² Foreign policy roles are learnt from other states and from member states of international organisations.²³ In this study, *appropriateness* and *consequentiality* are related to ability to convey normative frames that shape behaviour.²⁴ Highly socialised environments impel participants to adopt appropriate foreign policy behaviour since expectations about other participants’ behaviour are benign and foreseeable.

Routinisation of policy procedures and policy practices confer endurance to the roles prescribed by organisations and indicate acceptance and incorporation of the roles prescribed. Routinisation is also tightly related to imitation of external behaviour among participants, which facilitates the prescriptive role of international organisations and gives incentive to the incorporation of roles.

The last indicator refers to *formal* and *informal incorporation* of role prescriptions. Formal and informal incorporation is sometimes associated with degree of institutionalisation.²⁵ Concordance between the roles prescribed by organisations and the external roles member-states set for themselves is better observed in situations when high institutionalisation among participants exists. In the context of this study formal and informal incorporation of roles is observed in the domain of discourse, policy planning and international behaviour of a small state.²⁶

²¹ See Barnett 1993.

²² Walt 1997, 157.

²³ Barnett 1993, 276.

²⁴ As referred, *appropriateness* means acceptance of a policy option based on what is ‘normal, right or good, without, or in spite of, calculation of consequences and expected utility’. It reflects ‘principles of conduct to justify and prescribe action in terms of something more than expected consequences’. See March & Olsen 2004, 3.

²⁵ Other authors consider institutionalisation from a different perspective. Hansen distinguishes three dimensions: ‘*commonality*: the degree to which expectations about appropriate behaviour and understandings about how to interpret action are shared by participants in the system; *specificity*: the degree to which these expectations are clearly specified in the form of rules; *autonomy*: the extent to which the institution can alter its own rules rather than relying on outside agents to do so, see Hansen 1996, 28. Additionally, to McCalla institutionalisation regards the degree to which ‘norms and practices are formalize within a particular structure and process’, see McCalla 1996, 462. Scott and Meyer define it as ‘the process by which a given set of units and a pattern of activities come to be normatively and cognitively held in place and practically taken for granted as lawful’, see Scott & Meyer 1994, 10.

²⁶ Institutionalisation acquires an ultimate form when formalised under text treaties ratified by member states. Ratification of treaties reflects concordance with rules and roles prescribed at a higher level than the national one.

Various reasons justify the application of the same framework of analysis on conditions of international role prescription to NATO and the EU. These derive from the fact that both are characterised by broad similar features in the domain of foreign, security and defence policy. They seek to solve jointly international challenges with their member states, they induce a logic of community perceived as unitary, they give incentives to internalisation of policy guidelines generated by consensus, they harmonise preferences, increment compliance and level procedures and policy behaviour facilitating collective action.

The four conditions of international role prescription are validated in the Portuguese case by examining how they affect *national political rhetoric*, *policy planning* and *policy action*. In this case, discourse analysis of national policy statements help to find evidence of political rhetoric reflecting *national role conceptions* represented as general ideational notions about the international position occupied by a small state. National role conceptions are ‘embedded in domestic and international institutions’ and are affected by both.²⁷ As Holsti suggests, national role conceptions are expressed in actions that foreign policy elites consider to be appropriate to their state and they imply roles the state should perform in the international system.²⁸ Policy statements reflect perceptions of international role and place that may influence the willingness of small states to portray specific foreign policy roles. As Aggestam suggests ‘actors do not passively act according to a script but are actively involved in categorising themselves. They may often act with reference to a specific role, which provide them with an action orientation.’²⁹

Effects of role prescription are traced in *policy planning* in a closely related manner with observation of the indicators pertaining to endurance and concordance. The impact of prescriptions on policy planning is better traceable in a context of formal role incorporation, than in an informal one. As the case study shows, if an organisation is able to prescribe enduring roles, based on long lasting policy practices and imitation of behaviour, then immediate adaptation of policy planning to new prescriptions may not be needed, since policy behaviour follows long established practices and habits. In this case political rhetoric and policy behaviour may be ahead of formal incorporation of roles.

²⁷ Barnett 1993, 276.

²⁸ Holsti 1970, 245-246.

²⁹ Aggestam 1999, 16.

The impact of role prescriptions on *policy action* is associated with national perceptions about international position and prominence. Matters of efficiency in problem solving at a higher level, in what Jørgensen calls ‘elevating policy-making’, weight more on the allocation of national resources to fulfil international prescriptions than considerations of cost-benefit and self-interested utility. Likewise, matters of appropriateness (e.g. which prescriptions provide the most familiar value-oriented conditionality) embedded through dense socialisation may bound decisions to act, mainly when actual behaviour is guided by strong valorative reasoning.

If one considers discourse analysis as a research methodology based on the assumption that language is meaning, then discourse analysis contributes to explain how dispositions that are commonly seen as the result of an instrumental logic may be considered from a logic of appropriateness, even when it presupposes a type of *strategic action* oriented to produce effects.³⁰ Language produces categorisations of justification in the way prescriptive roles and policy choices are conveyed and adopted, it ‘constrains the choices of agents’ in the sense it guides and fundamentals policy options and behaviour.³¹

It is not the aim of this case study to analyse how individual domestic preferences are aggregated into collective choices, in the context of NATO and EU/CFSP. The aim is rather to infer on the conditions of conveyance of international role prescriptions to small member states, the way in which they are incorporated into national foreign policy guidelines and later reflected in external behaviour. Although recognising the analytical interest in tracing how domestic preferences, expressed in different international contexts, may affect the foreign policy choices of small states that is not the focus of this study. It is acknowledged that diverse preferences are aggregated into policy choices, and that policy outcomes are understood as a blend of international conditionalities and national affinity with international prescriptions. This moves the analysis of small states foreign policy behaviour away from the constraints of power distributions, since organisations bind all member states to the same obligations and rights.³²

³⁰ See Fairclough 2003, 214.

³¹ Larsen 2004, 64.

³² Evans 1992.

In last part of the study, an effort to isolate conditions of international role prescription and small states' role incorporation is attempted in order to produce possible generalisations on small states' foreign and security policy behaviour.

3.2 Sources and Data Collection

Starting from the idea that 'practices are discursive', substantive policy texts are analysed across time regarding the international organisations considered and the state selected.³³ The analysis of policy documents and the policy decisions reported are important elements of evaluation of conditions of role prescription and role incorporation. The analysis reflects a qualitative and narrative interpretation drawn from a large number of primary sources and secondary literature. The texts selected were identified as part of the 'official discourse' with the aim to analyse their admonitory purpose through the role prescriptions contained in them.³⁴ These policy texts are not limited to declaratory diplomacy, since they are programmatic policy documents they offer empirical evidence of role prescriptions. Policy statements portray well the subjective perceptions, attitudes and beliefs of international bureaucracies and national state representatives. Further, they are a source of information about what kind of worldviews role holders and role deliverers have and on the basis of which roles are defined and behavioural guidelines are accepted. Policy documents reflect the discourse reproduced by what Williams refers to as 'legitimate speakers' that is, those who have the capacity to produce 'legitimate speech' and to convey 'authoritative declarations'.³⁵

To ensure triangulation of sources, with the aim of corroborating the data gathered, the analysis of all primary sources (e.g. documents and official statements) is supported by empirical literature and complementary secondary sources. Among these complementary sources, it was selected data made publicly available by the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to international organisations and think tanks. Yearly assessments by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), *Military Balance* were consulted for an evaluation of European military capabilities and international activity of member states.

³³ See Neumann 2002, 628. Policy makers have expectations and assume responsibilities that are reflected in statements and role conceptions self prescribed and ascribed by others.

³⁴ On the value of hard primary sources to case studies such as (government documents, multiple oral stories and reliable reconstructions of confidential decision-making), see Caporaso 1997.

³⁵ Williams 1997, 289.

The content analysis is conducted on two categories of international and national policy framing documents (Chapter 5, 6 and 7). A chronological criteria and a substantive content criteria are used in the selection of primary sources, in order to ensure that similar types of policy documents are selected for the EU and NATO between 1991 and 2001.

The first category stems from selection and analysis of sources documenting institutional evolution and their effect on the prescriptive quality of the EU second pillar and NATO. The conclusions will be supported by the analysis of different types of policy documents for a ten years period, during which role prescriptions and role incorporation variation are likely to be found.

Sixty nine NATO primary sources were selected with various levels of enforcement of prescriptive roles: North Atlantic Treaty; NATO's Strategic Concepts; Ministerial Declarations and Communiqués produced within the North Atlantic Council, Defence Planning Committee, Nuclear Planning Group and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council were analysed in depth, as well as key speeches of NATO's Secretary General. A similar criteria was adopted for the EU and WEU. Forty seven primary sources were selected: EU text treaties from Maastricht to EU Treaty as modified by the Treaty of Nice (in those aspects with incidence on foreign, security and defence issues), amendments to the Treaties on European Union, (whenever these amendments had implications in the domain of foreign, security and defence), Presidency Conclusions, WEU Ministerial Communiqués, WEU Council of Ministers declarations, annual reports of the Assembly of WEU, national proposals to the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) and IGC task force reports and bilateral joint declarations issued during the course of EU summits for the period under study.³⁶

The documents regarding the EU second pillar and NATO were organised in a way to identify role conceptions and role prescriptions. Firstly, the texts of the EU Treaty (Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice versions) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty, London Declaration and Strategic Concepts) are analysed seeking for normative aspirations identified with international role conceptions. These types of documents al-

³⁶ The European Council and the Presidency are the main agents of CFSP, having the last discretionary choice about the policy issues to be addressed. For this reason the study privileges the analysis of documents issued in the framework of these EU organs.

The Western European Union (WEU) was reactivated in late 1980s as the defence and security arm of the European Union. In 1998 the St. Malo Summit set in motion the process of integration of WEU functions into the EU. In 2000, the EU took over WEU's crisis management and conflict prevention tasks. In July 2001 a new vehicle of collective defence and an umbrella for the Western European Armaments Group was established within the EU. For this reason WEU policy documents were included on the set of policy guidelines to be analysed.

lowed looking for perception of international position for both international organisations. Secondly, additional prescriptive sources are analysed, comprehending the Conclusions of the EU Presidencies and Ministerial Declarations in order to validate the conditions of role prescription of NATO and EU, analysing how foreign and security concerns are expressed and how role prescriptions are influenced by them.

The second category of primary sources regards the data analysed and interpreted in Chapter 7, which refers to national policy guidelines based on content analysis. Portuguese policy role claims in the European and transatlantic context of foreign and security policy are examined side by side with role prescriptions. Substantive primary sources, namely ministers' views, speeches, written public accounts and global framing national documents, namely the *Grandes Opções do Plano* (Grand Options Plan-GOP) are used to infer on endurance and concordance of role prescriptions, from which evidence about adaptation of national role conceptions and international identity are inferred.³⁷ Informal adaptation is concluded from political statements, press accounts and actual policy behaviour.

Two types of national normative codes and policy guidelines for Portuguese foreign, security and defence policy are also analysed. On the one hand, long term programmatic policy guidelines, such as the Grand Options Plans (equivalent to the Dutch *Regeringsverklaring/Troonrede/Rijksbegroting*), were used to draw conclusions on national role prescriptions for foreign and security policy and validate incorporation of the four conditions of role prescription. On the other hand, policy documents with a performative orientation, such as the National Defence Strategic Concept (equivalent to the Dutch *Defensienota/ Najaarsbrief*) provide evidence to infer on national role incorporation and role performance regarding definition of foreign, security and defence goals in the international context.

The closed nature of state's defence policy and the classified character of the sources that could have provided additional evidence of adaptation to NATO's role

³⁷ The *Grandes Opções do Plano* (GOP) are comprehensive policy guidelines presented by the government in the fulfilment of constitutional provisions. These guidelines are legally binding, regarding internal and external policy conduct and orient the intervention of the various ministries in their areas of competence. They are 'discursive laws' of which part regards the 'lines of strategic orientation in the spheres of foreign policy, defence policy and Armed Forces', see Morais *et al.* 2000, 108. Due to their comprehensive nature in time and substance and their inter-ministerial scope, they were selected as empirical evidence for the validation of the conditions of role prescription, in particular for *concordance*. The programmatic and structuring nature of the GOP offers strong evidence of willing national incorporation of role prescriptions. They require ratification by the Parliament. The yearly Plan Options are preceded by quarterly Medium Term Plan Options. The sources used regard the Plan Options presented for each year under study. The GOP are ratified by the Parliament in December of the year prior to their implementation, with the exception of the GOP of 1996 ratified by the Parliament in March 1996, due to a change in government.

prescriptions posed problems of availability of sources. Therefore these limitations were overcome by relying on printed official sources and written personal accounts of officials, diplomats and military with responsibilities for the period covered by this study, as well as by using secondary literature.³⁸

³⁸As a public official at the Ministry of Defence (National Defence Institute), the author is informed on the contents of these documents. Conditionality about the use and citation of contents was strictly observed.

Part II – The Empirical Study

Chapter 4

The Atlantic and European Context of Role Prescriptions

This chapter explains how context related aspects (e.g. features of the political and security environment, scope of issues covered, non-regulative nature of prescriptions and relations with other organisations) influenced NATO and CFSP prescriptive role sets for the period covered in this study. In the case of NATO, perception of military power and the part played by the United States have less impact on the roles externally conveyed to member states than it is commonly assumed. Similarly, the repercussion of material rewards, rule-based prescriptions and national based preferences, familiar to the EU first pillar, did not work as a base line for prescriptive roles within CFSP/EDSP. Whenever relevant, the chapter also addresses small states in these prescriptive contexts. The chapter answers the sub-question: *How are the prescriptive role sets of NATO and the CFSP influenced by the security-related context?*

4.1 NATO's Prescriptive Opportunities in the Transatlantic Context

Three misconceptions are commonly accepted when looking for evidence of prescriptive roles. First that role prescriptions reflect the enforcing effects of material power and military might. Second that role prescriptions derive from formal rule based prescriptions. Third that they manifest the ability of major states to impose their preferences to other member states. However, the primary sources analysed for the period comprised in this study allow dismissing these misconceptions. The sources provided clear evidence of NATO's prescriptive role beyond the limitations above mentioned.

The presence of *military might* is not the only source of prescriptive power of security and defence organisations like NATO nor is defence its sole domain of role prescription. As Alyson observes 'The Alliance has, in effect, a security and foreign policy, which stretches well beyond the mere diplomatic expression of its defence identity'.¹ The agreements among member states about 'tacit understandings', 'infor-

¹ Bailes 1996, 35 and 31.

mal sources of norms' and compliance with the 'spirit of unwritten agreements' also shape the prescriptive role of the Alliance.² This means that there is a dimension of role prescription beyond the formal guarantees and material assets given by security and defence organisations to its member states. This prescriptive dimension is tightly related with the ability of international organisations to renew the representation of preferences, to preserve core tasks, to maintain the sense of community and to ensure effective mechanisms of collective action. This dissuades member states from refraining to incorporate new roles prescribed to them in a way that can hinder the cohesiveness of the organisation. In this context habit and trust play a fundamental part in the way security threats are met and the coalescence of member states is guaranteed through the willingness to take risks in preserving what is considered to be 'right'.³

Similarly, transatlantic *compliance* among member states *did not press for immediate formal incorporation of role prescriptions* for which incorporation can be said to be guided by 'tacit understandings' and 'spirit of unwritten agreements', not necessarily by the presence of formal sanctioning mechanisms and enforcement instruments. The established idea that the pledge of material pay-offs binds conformant behaviour is not entirely accurate. The association between material reward and conformity with role prescriptions does not account comprehensively for the incorporation of role prescriptions and compliant behaviour by member states, as the Portuguese case study will show. Member states can act in a conformant way without the direct perspective of a material compensation, which underlines the idea that policy behaviour can be driven by means of identification with the community values and the principles it represents, not necessarily by self-interested motivations.

Prescriptions are *not always a product of the preferences of hegemonic states*. NATO being composed of institutions and open polities has, what Ikenberry in another context calls 'constitutional characteristics' that is, a structure that constrains power and facilitates voices of opportunity.⁴ The analysis of NATO primary sources provides substantive evidence of attempts of the Alliance to retain prescriptive ability by representing itself as an adaptable organisation able to respond to security threats (manifestation of constraining power) and also a forum of discussion and consultation

² Raymond 1997, 225, 221 and 232. See also Risse-Kappen 1995, 212 and 6.

³ See Hoffman 2002, 378 pp. 375-401. Aaron M. Hoffman develops a notion of trust from the perspective of 'the willingness to take risks on the behavior of others based on the belief that potential trustees will *do what is right*.' Hoffman 2002, 375.

⁴ Ikenberry 1998-1999, 45.

where member states concerns can be heard (offer of equal opportunities of participation and access to common defence goods). Glarbo notes that after the Cold War ‘diplomacies had begun to interact on a regular basis within NATO, thus also facilitating an institutionalisation of democratic norms and the development of a collective identity which is necessary for explaining the later persistence of this institution.’⁵ The proscriptive and prescriptive roles of the Alliance were based on the capacity to generate identification of its member states with the *international position* NATO holds by providing security guarantees to member states.

The context of international security in the post-Cold War facilitated the emergence of alternative prescriptive roles from military missions to operations-other-than-war (e.g. human relief, drug eradication or disaster relief) reflected in new security tasks, but also new mobilising arguments in the way security roles are prescribed (preventive security, pre-emptive military action and crisis response). New role prescriptions not only claimed for a new military response, but also for a new discourse inclusive of valorative arguments and broader functional specialisation among member states.⁶

As from 1990s one witnesses an ‘argumentative turn’ in the way foreign and security policy issues are addressed by international organisations and by national governments and domestic audiences.⁷ The securitisation of new issues and the reconceptualisation of security practices were vital steps in ensuring the prescriptive role of the Alliance based on a ‘new legitimate strategic discourse’.⁸ Klein argues that NATO’s strength derived from the political identity it championed in Western Europe overlapping the security needs of its allies with the projection of security tasks outside traditional boundaries. More than creating new functions, NATO embraced the only function that gave it military supremacy in the post-Cold War transatlantic context. NATO by assuming new prescriptive roles empowered its authoritative ability to identify the referent objects of security and the actions to pursue against military threats.⁹

The legitimisation of newly securitized issues also played a crucial role in the way NATO’s role prescriptions were enforced. The Alliance by abiding the sanction-

⁵ Glarbo 1999, 639.

⁶ See Krahnemann 2003, 9.

⁷ On the notion of argumentative turn see Schön & Rein 1994.

⁸ See Klein 1990, 321 and 319.

⁹ On securitization see Buzan, Wæver & Wilde 1998, 21-47 and Wæver 1995. See also Williams 2003, 513.

ing power of the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) resolutions and mandates safeguards the legitimacy of its collective response in crisis management and crisis response. This legitimisation also enabled the Alliance to prescribe new roles based on arguments of appropriate behaviour. As Goldgeier and McFaul argue, security organisations like states do not bandwagon, 'around a power pole but around shared set of liberal beliefs, institutions, and practices', which are conform with lawful and rightful frames of policy behaviour.¹⁰

NATO's policy documents and statements conveyed role prescriptions using a discursive strategy based on the invocation of humanitarian concerns and the preservation of fundamental rights and freedoms. These constitute powerful incentives to the engagement of member states in collective initiatives, in order to preserve these core values and the rights inherent to them. NATO's policy statements by framing salient policy issues (e.g. the enlargement process) with values and moral arguments (e.g. dissemination of liberal-democratic norms) blended security practices with appropriate behaviour favourable and favoured by smaller allies, less prone to the adoption of contending external positions.

This appropriate conditionality is in conformity with the national role conceptions of smaller member states about foreign policy. It is favourable to small states because it 'gives meaning', provides them place and helps defining roles to their domestic audiences in unpredictable security environments.¹¹ NATO's reviewed prescriptive roles resonate small states conceptions of rightfulness, meaningful to their own national role concepts. As de Vries explains, small states 'may not be as concerned with policies like "divide and rule"', because they are not in a position to control changes and developments.¹² Moon acknowledges to small states a more far-reaching and flexible external behaviour as compared to major states.¹³ Appropriate prescriptions enable obtaining higher pay-offs in the domestic and international spheres, safeguarding the performance of new roles in international security with a broader guarantee of national support. Policy actions bound by a conditionality of appropriate behaviour driven by normative arguments raise less opposition from member states' political parties, national bureaucracies, and public opinions.

¹⁰ See Goldgeier & McFaul 1992, 480.

¹¹ March & Olsen 2004, 5.

¹² Vries 1988, 45.

¹³ Moon 1983, 320.

The Alliance by broadening its security functions not only preserved its defensive role in the post-Cold War, but also offered new forms to address security and defence issues consonant with legitimate collective response to threats. This broadened scope of functions also facilitates the participation of smaller member states in a wider variety of security and defence tasks, more in line with their own conceptions of external role, with their material capabilities and national expertise.

The prescriptive power of NATO derives from its capacity to adapt, to bind, and to expand, with direct impact on the formulation of new role prescriptions.¹⁴ The erosion of traditional East-West threats is frequently pointed in literature as a source of erosion of prescriptive power of organisations, such as NATO.¹⁵ The Alliance's military structure had to adapt its functions and capacity to respond to less monolithic, static and predictable threat scenarios. For smaller allies this meant an evolution from occasional use of strategic position in situations of confrontation between superpowers, to a levelled participation in multilateral security tasks.

Table 3 summarises the security context and the new security functions of the Alliance, displaying striking differences on the security roles performed, nature of threats, force structures, military purpose, allocation of resources, and level of coordination with other organisations, as well as modes of regional coordination.

The end of bipolarity opened alternative security paths outside the direct line of confrontation between superpowers and allowed the emergence of new security roles, in which small states could participate more independently from the position they occupied in the context of hegemonic interests of contending superpowers. The equation behind hegemonic stability was more restrictive about who participates in collective action, than are the constructions behind the notion of security community based on evolutionary identities, values and meanings.¹⁶ During the Cold War the security environment placed smaller member states in a situation of strategic dependence and limited access to security goods. The security context after the Cold War granted smaller states a larger participation and increased the dependence of major states towards smaller members expertise in new security environments (in particular outside Europe).¹⁷ The advantages in incorporating role prescriptions by smaller

¹⁴ Cf. McCalla 1996, 457.

¹⁵ Mearsheimer 1990 and 1994/95.

¹⁶ Adler & Barnett 1998, 31, 30 and 49.

¹⁷ See Risse-Kappen 1995, 22. The control by smaller member states of 'issue-specific resources' needed by the alliance leader or the international organisation as a whole, confers them a special place in the fulfilment of pre-

member states resulted in the possibility to justify the legitimacy of their policy actions with the participation in broad coalitions of willing nations under the auspices of a United Nations mandate.¹⁸ The participation of small allies after the Cold War increased not due to the fact that it served the security interests of one dominant power, but because small states were able to find a balance between the new role prescriptions offered by NATO and their own place in collective security and in the transatlantic security community.

NATO during Cold War	NATO post-Cold War
Hegemonic stability Collective defence Deterrence, forward defence and flexible response Defence and security within Washington Treaty Low coordination with other organisations Monopoly of military assets by member states No commitment of forces under Art.5	Security community Collective security Peacekeeping, conflict resolution and crisis response Defence and security missions in out-of-area High coordination with other organisations Outsourcing of security and defence assets Invocation and force commitment under Art.5

Table 3 - NATO's security functions¹⁹

The appearance of diffuse threats shaped the security equation through which NATO reconfigured its role prescriptions. Smaller member states were more rapid to adapt to new security contingencies than major states, which meant that they are more receptive to new international prescriptions. As McCalla points out, major states like the United States show a resilient behaviour towards changes in the strategic scenario of the post-Cold War.²⁰ Its might depend on superior military power, but it is also shaped by representations of enmity on the basis of which military might is constructed and conveyed to others.²¹ Sudden changes in these representational configurations lead to the engagement in new missions from preventive diplomacy to crisis

scriptive roles. Small states although limited in the individual use of this type of resources, they can become key players on what regards their collective use.

¹⁸ Cf. Keohane 1971, 172. The mandatory requirement of a UN mandate to sanction military intervention is a strong indicator of change in the way security organisations are convinced to operate within appropriate and lawful frames.

¹⁹ In the context of this table 'security outsourcing' constitutes a new functional role, suggested after the London Declaration in 1990, that consists in making available NATO's military resources, command and control structure and strategic mobility assets to other organisations, such as OSCE, UN and WEU/EU. See also Lepgold 1998b, 70-72.

²⁰ McCalla 1998, 105, 110 and 112. See also Duffield 1992.

²¹ Ikenberry & Kupchan 1990.

response, which do not necessarily reflect pressing interests of the hegemonic powers. This again allows disconfirming the idea that the interests of hegemonic states drive the Alliance prescriptive power, in particular in the face of difficulties in introducing adjustments to their own military administrations, as it is the case of the United States.

In early 1990s, security organizations focused on the imperative to adapt to collective security and to enhance inter-organizational coordination. The permeability and interdependence between national and international security led to a situation in which the roles prescribed in one international organisation are to be complementary and conformant with the roles prescribed in the context of other organisations. This generates similarity in the roles conveyed improving the level of inter-organizational coordination, in the context of which NATO takes the lead, in the military aspects of security and defence.

In sum, the range of role prescriptions of NATO remained focused on the functional aspects of role prescription (humanitarian relief, conflict resolution, peace-keeping, war on terrorism and crisis response), blended at the discourse level with concerns that emphasised normative aspects of security (human rights, respect for democratic values and democratic control of the armed forces) which added legitimacy to policy actions. NATO's role prescriptions in the post Cold War, despite presupposing the existence of a material base of military power, were also maintained on the base of appropriate behaviour guided by best arguments in the way prescriptions are conveyed. This means that not only material capabilities and military might enable prescriptive roles. A change in persuasive arguments, generally accepted by member states about rights and responsibilities, worked as powerful prescriptions and a stable frame of behaviour for traditional and new allies.

4.2 An Emergent European Prescriptive Set

Distinct observations can be made regarding the prescriptive roles conveyed within CFSP, on the basis of the strong normative focus of its agenda in the post-Cold War and on the discursive aspects involving its relation with external actors (namely NATO) during its process of consolidation.²² These normative and relational aspects refer to different locations within which the EU consolidated its prescriptive role.

²² Most literature concerning the period prior to the institutionalisation of CFSP concentrates on the negative aspects of European cooperation. This literature finds resonance both in intergovernmental and constructivist approaches that emphasise the resilient (e.g. intergovernmental views that value the blocking role of member states

The normative context in which prescriptions occur is most relevant to the success of prescriptions to be conveyed to member states. The post-Cold War introduced an element of normative guidance in foreign and security policy, which characterised the European political environment, in particular within integrated organisations like the EU. As Galtung observes, changes in ‘the state’s most general political surroundings leads to changed behaviour on the part of the states’ governments and so does on the part of international organisations.²³ Knudsen suggests that state action, especially foreign policy, is the result of multiple contexts from ‘the individual decision-maker to the bureaucratic context and from governments as actors to an environment external to states’ where organisations frame expectations about policy behaviour.²⁴ This means that a wide range of actors and contexts inform the way role prescriptions are endorsed. The EU member states perceived themselves not solely as self-interested actors striving for the supremacy of their own preferences, but also as representatives of a community of normative and behavioural prescriptions. CFSP reflects little the technicalities of problem solving that can be observed in the EU first and third pillar. CFSP helped to build a political community of member states in which shared ethical concerns are an important foundation of governance.²⁵ In the case of the CFSP security dimension, participants perceive themselves as a security community whose persistence results from internal reaction to fragmentation. Integration in the field of security ‘gains a grammatical form that brings it closer to a security logic’ from which member states are dependent to voice rights and responsibilities and fulfil roles that are not able to convey on an individual base.²⁶ The consolidation of the CFSP normative prescriptive roles inherited from European Political Cooperation helped to limit the dangers posed by the various ‘typifications’ represented by national diplomacies that hindered commonality of views on foreign policy.²⁷

representatives to enhance institutionalisation of political cooperation) or negative (e.g. constructivist approaches that perceive national interest and low socialisation as the main obstacles to further institutionalisation of EPC) impact of European states preferences before and during the EPC period. See for instance Moravcsik 1997; Moravcsik 1998; Glarbo 1999 and Smith 2004a. These contributions do not show a particular concern with the evolving security environment of the Cold War and its ‘contextual effect’ on states behaviour. Contextual reasoning should be taken into consideration, since foreign and security policy results from a relation with the *Other*, therefore with the actors, processes and events that exist and occur independently from each state’s self-preferences. For an exception that considers the dimension of EU external relations and actorness from a context related manner, see Bretherton & Vogler 2000, 15-45, 169-247 and 80-108.

²³ Galtung 1969 quoted by Knudsen 1994, 203.

²⁴ Knudsen 1994, 204.

²⁵ See Schimmelfennig 2001.

²⁶ Wæver 1998a, 90.

²⁷ Glarbo uses the image of ‘typifications’ to refer to ‘ideal typical charts of reality, which are held as integral, not only to a diplomatic agent’s way of viewing the international system and its elements, but also more broadly to any social agent’s method of grasping social reality’. See Glarbo 1999, 639. The Alliance was not preceded by a de-

As compared to NATO, two conditionalities were absent at the time when CFSP was created. Firstly, there was no urgent reason for a top-down transposition and implementation of foreign and security policy provisions, as it has been the case for the directives issued in the EU's first pillar. Secondly, there were no pressing external circumstances, at least in the field of security urging for a common European security policy. The first drew a prescriptive context prone to willing compliance to incorporate role prescriptions in the absence of enforcing mechanisms. The last resulted in the harmonisation of policy positions in the absence of pressing threats. The scenario in which CFSP emerged, favoured from an early stage the dissemination of policy behaviour based on 'common symbolic content' guided by an agenda centred on appropriateness of policy conduct.²⁸ The early CFSP did not intend to respond to military contingent threats of the post-Cold War, but to a moral and ethical impel ignited during the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which bonded member states' external positions. This experience perpetuated a CFSP security dimension characterised by specific concerns with good governance, ethnic and racial issues, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, eradication of land mines and preservation of minority rights and individual freedoms.

The CFSP evolved with a specific diplomatic, civil and humanitarian focus distinct from NATO. The CFSP agenda, with a strong ethical core, allowed it to develop comprehensive European positions regarding policy topics placed above the self-interest of member-states. The ability to project this agenda within and outside the EU increased the prospect of a positive mobilising effect on common political and diplomatic action. From an early stage and contrary to NATO, the EU/CFSP committed itself to the idea of constructing a 'civic statehood' embedded with European values, which distinguished it from other entities as a 'Community of values'.²⁹ This subtracted it from the classical problems of division of strategic work and from the contentions between major and smaller states. The CFSP normative core is inclusive and benign, attracting small states for its enabling opportunities and driving major states by the necessity to avoid marginalisation. As Wivel explains, the question of Europe's future division of labour was no longer a 'question of dividing the tasks of international society between great powers and small powers', but rather a matter of delegat-

fence arrangement from which experience could have been drawn, while the CFSP benefited from the maturation of EPC, in the context of which bilateral diplomacy, not multilateral diplomacy, had been the common practice.

²⁸ See Glarbo 1999, 642.

²⁹ Laffan 2001, 714 and 721.

ing prescriptive ‘power from states to institutions’.³⁰ This levelled the position of member states on the basis of openness to compliance with valorative goals, rather than material power to influence prescriptions. The CFSP found, in its inner ability to level concerns around a broad normative agenda, the basis of its own prescriptive uniqueness. By emphasising the principles of ‘civic statehood’ and ‘community values’ the EU/CFSP was not only able to propagate its role as an international organisation, but also to stress its distinctive prescriptive role.³¹

The notion of civil power generated favourable conditions for the EU to gradually evolve from a regulatory structure in economic and social affairs to a coordinating entity in foreign and security policy. The EU regulatory dimension relied strongly on its normative strength, but its normative strength did not always derive from a strong regulative dimension. As Laffan points out ‘Legitimacy derived mainly from the rule of law is insufficient as the Union spreads ...and becomes a more salient social construction for Europe’s states and societies’, based on common understandings on how best to address specific foreign policy topics.³² The case of Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and later of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are two policy domains in which role prescription and role incorporation lays beyond formal legal provisions.

The outer circle of European foreign and security policy by being presented to member states, as an extension of the economic, social and civil core of the EU is understood as having an inclusive and non-contending nature different from earlier European defence projects, stimulating the willing compliance of member states.

The context of institutional development of CFSP/ESDP progressed in concentric circles from political agreement on principles and common concerns (not interests) to the finding of mechanisms that helped to implement its foreign, security and defence policy dimensions. The foreign and security dimension of CFSP evolved from a succession of projects with limited agreement, to a sequence of political declarations and treaty texts ratified by national parliaments. This concentricity undermined the logic of state sovereignty and balance of power, because it appealed to normative aspects of policy issues that remained above the self-interest of member states and beyond the power struggles of European major states. As Romsloe notes ‘the actors are open to

³⁰ Wivel 2005, 397.

³¹ See Wessel 1999, 27-33.

³² Laffan 2001, 723.

be convinced by the better argument, while power hierarchies recede into the background'.³³ The decision-making context of CFSP developed from institutional cooperation to policy coordination, providing equal access to the parts involved in the process of policy harmonisation. Further, it strengthened itself not on the basis of contending clashes of power with an external entity, but because it emerged as a 'civilian model' and a 'normative power of ideational nature' characterised by common principles.³⁴ It reflected an attempt to project a form of 'normative globalisation rather than EU-specific values', which was broader in essence than the limits of its geographical area of application or membership.³⁵

The compliance with normative conditionality exercised by the EU in the domain of CFSP was reinforced through its process of intergovernmental cooperation, which enabled member states to participate in common decision-making and to adopt this type of soft conditionality due to their direct commitment to common policy behaviour under a EU label. This means that rather than being a point of weakness or an instrument for states to impose their national preferences, the intergovernmental nature of CFSP facilitates participation, observes equality through consensus voting method and encourages institutional development, each time the EU treaties are revised. The instruments of joint actions, common positions and enhanced cooperation within CFSP, follow a double normative/functional reasoning. On the one hand, the CSFP normative focus is less likely to generate the disagreement of member states preserving their preferences and limiting the systematic use of procedural resistance to decision-making.³⁶ On the other hand, the official record shows that the EU second pillar displays a high level of consistency between the goals set, the compliant behaviour of member states and the allocation of resources to implement those goals.

The discursive context in which CFSP/ESDP emerged and in which evolves is characterised by a tendency to compare these policy dimensions with the achievements of other organisations in the same domains or with the traditional realm of national foreign policy. Occasionally this undermined the recognition of a specific prescriptive role of CFSP in collective security, as frequently found in literature and to a lesser extent in some of the policy documents analysed. Neither the CFSP aimed at

³³ Ramsloe 2004, 8. See also Keohane 1969, 294.

³⁴ Manners 2000, 29.

³⁵ Smith, K. 2003, 21.

³⁶ On a different view that sees in the intergovernmental mode of CFSP a limitation to the EU ability to solve problems of collective action in the domain of foreign and security policy, see Hoffman 2000 and Gordon 1997-1998.

addressing or solving collective defence problems nor should the output of policies in the second pillar be compared with national foreign policy activity. Literature ignores that NATO and the EU emerged in distinct contextual conditions and generated different prescriptive role sets, which frame contrasting prescriptions. NATO is an organisation whose structure and resources is entirely dedicated to collective defence, benefiting from a unified political and military structure. The CFSP/ESDP are policy dimensions within pillarised and integrated, policies whose institutions cross more than one area of responsibility and whose resources are shared by other communitarian institutions.

The European Economic Community (EEC) emerged around the idea of unity of interests, centralisation of institutions, strong regulative power and full compliance of member states. Although this sequence applied modestly to CFSP, three circumstances prove the prescriptive and binding function of the EU second pillar. Firstly, there is evident role incorporation of prescriptions concerning member states' foreign and security policy within the second pillar, due to the growing number of external policy issues that generate common positions and joint actions. Secondly, domestic demands within the EU foreign policy domain are weak since 'issue-specific lobbying in this area... is virtually non-existent compared to that which takes place in Community affairs, where transnational actors regularly participate in the rule making process'.³⁷ Thirdly material 'inducing incentives' within CFSP are discouraged for which there are no significant instrumental reasons to comply, offering a good example of willing compliance.³⁸

In sum, the context which shaped CFSP/ESDP have to be considered from a normative and discursive dimension defining the first the essence of European role prescriptions and the second a distinctive way to voice them. The CFSP responded to the need to develop an international identity for foreign, security and defence policy, based on normative prescriptions and appropriateness of foreign policy behaviour, projecting itself as a stabilising and value referent entity not as a pole of distributive material power.

³⁷ Smith 2004a, 96. For a discussion on the conceptual limits of Europeanisation when it comes to find causal links between European integration and actual change of states foreign policy see Vaquer I Fanés 2001.

³⁸ Smith 2004a, 96.

4.3 Conclusions

Misconceptions about the scope and object of NATO reviewed roles and CFSP/ESDP prescriptions led to misleading conclusions. In the case of NATO, by dismissing its normative focus; in the case of CFSP, by overemphasising the limits of its material ability to enforce prescriptions.

Starting from different contextual conditions and prescriptive role sets both seek to solve and address foreign, security and defence concerns of its member states in different ways. In the case of NATO, the fact traditional member states are consolidated democracies, the fact they observe international lawful behaviour and ensure the democratic control of its armed forces led literature to focus on the Alliance functional efficiency from the perspective of traditional allies. It is externally that NATO best projects its normative repertoire as a result of relaxation of military tensions, emergent new security threats and new applicant members. The CFSP/ESDP role prescriptions on its hand, did not seek to respond to military threats, but to cooperation and the potential dangerous of unlawful behaviour. The context in which it emerged is a political context of policy cooperation that evolved to policy coordination, through harmonisation of policy preferences on foreign, security and defence policy. The CFSP contributes to give the EU an international identity with a common voice on external affairs, projecting itself as a value inducer for member and non-member states, based on the representation of moral and ethical impels with which participants felt identified with.

The EU/CFSP by affirming itself as a ‘community of values’, created inner conditions of uniqueness and feasibility based on a normative repertoire strengthened by the political authority recognised to the EU. Similarly, NATO in the post-Cold War did not draw its prescriptive power from exclusive reliance on the strength of one hegemonic power. In the post-Cold War, states relied more on the distribution of responsibilities among international organisations and their institutions, than on the distribution of power between those who were fitted to prescribe and those who were passively socialise into their prescriptions.

Neither NATO nor CFSP/ESDP coerces member states into regulative observation of role prescriptions. They did not aim at compulsory change in states preferences, but at finding common prescriptive ground among diverse political and military traditions of member states, transforming behaviour and policy practices through

non-regulatory agreements, in the sense they did not lead to legal changes in states national security and defence policies at least until 1999 with the enlargement process. The prescriptive roles of NATO and the CFSP were however distinct in the way problems were to be solved. NATO benefiting from a long tradition of intra-alliance cooperation drew its prescriptive strength from effective coordination of views and distribution of material resources. CFSP conveyed soft ways to prescribe common external conduct, based on arguments of appropriateness and rightfulness. Their prescriptive power met in the way foreign and security policy concerns benefited from forms of willing compliance shared among member states.

The comprehensive and representative nature of policy concerns of member states placed role prescriptions above a logic of state sovereign interests, based on national interest and power struggles. This was especially important in the case of CFSP/ESDP. The civilian focus of CFSP on crisis response undermined the possibility of member states to draw attention to their own national preferences and dissolved major states hypothetical aspirations to shape the agenda.

The normative profile of policy agendas and the non-military aspects of security are more inclusive of small states, by the way they overlap their traditional security identity, they are closer to their material resources and capabilities and to their issue-specific expertise. The prescriptive roles result from fitted approaches to *which* policy behaviour member states ought to adopt, not from the individual military might and political strength of member states.

Chapter 5

NATO Between Functional Role Concepts and New Prescriptive Boundaries

This chapter starts from the observation that international role prescriptions are a contending issue in international relations scholarship, for which it should not be taken for granted that prescriptive power occurs under random circumstances.¹ As such it deserves to be considered under the light of contextual aspects related to normative, discursive and relational contexts, as explained in Chapter 4. Two aspects significant to infer on role prescriptions and the enabling conditionalities under which small states incorporate them will be addressed. Firstly, specific characteristics that result from NATO's institutional design are considered as accounting for the impact of formal and informal institutional conditions on prescriptive roles. Secondly, empirical episodes are drawn from primary sources to validate the conditions of *international position*, *prominence*, *endurance* and *concordance* by using the indicators described in Chapter 3 in order to identify in which conditions prescriptions are more likely to occur.

The chapter answers the sub-questions: *How does the institutional design of both organisations affect role prescriptions?* (Chapters 5.1. and 6.1) *How do the indicators of role prescription impact across the four conditions of validation of prescriptions (international position, prominence, concordance and endurance) selected for this study?* *How do role prescriptions based on non-regulative aspects lead to prescriptive roles?* These questions are answered on the basis of the analysis and interpretation of the narrative conveyed in the official sources issued by the Alliance (North Atlantic Treaty, ministerial declarations, speeches and communiqués).

5.1 Institutional Design of the Alliance – An Enabling Element in Role Prescriptions

Contrary to the EU in the early 1990s, which lacked a consolidated institutional framework to support its common foreign and security dimensions since that had not been its initial purpose, NATO benefited from a long last tested political and

¹ For an overview about NATO as purposive and framing structures, see Weber 1992; Duffield 1994 and McCalla 1996.

military frame.² The institutional design drawn from literature and primary sources is consistent with the conditions suggested in Table 2 (Chapter 3) regarding *international position* of the organisation and the *prominence*, *endurance* and *concordance* of the roles prescribed. Table 4 summarizes how NATO's institutional design and reviewed role prescriptions resulted in stable role prescriptions to member states, in a new security environment. While the EU/CFSP was dependent from significant developments in its institutional format (development of representative organs, mechanisms for policy implementation, definition of goals and resources), NATO draw its prescriptive power from its institutional constancy, which enabled stable prescriptions. The volatile nature of the surrounding security environment and the changes in the portfolio of threats faced by the Alliance had little impact on its institutional design, as compared to the consequences observed for its missions and force structure. The fact that the Alliance's adaptation was discreet proves the adequacy of its initial institutional design in meeting new role prescriptions and its ability to adjust to the evolving security scenario.

Institutional design	NATO behaviour	Conditions of role prescription
Clear division of strategic labour among member states	Decentralisation	<i>International position</i> (shared intra-alliance responsibility in attaining security goals)
Coordination and cooperation	Conveyance of appropriate behaviour	<i>Prominence</i> (dense socialisation, appropriateness and external projection of consequentiality)
Intergovernmental decision-making	Low intra-Alliance competition and high transparency	<i>Endurance</i> (high level of routinisation, strong imitation of policy behaviour)
Balance between goals and material and institutional resources	Credibility	<i>Concordance</i> (balance between goals and institutionalisation of procedures)

Table 4 - NATO's institutional design

The first column refers to the characteristics of the organisation's institutional design that are relevant for role prescription.³ The second column features the type of

² On the importance of institutional experience, see March & Olsen 1998, 966.

³ On institutional design, see Olsen 1997; Goodin 1999 and McKay 2000.

policy behaviour that results from NATO's institutional design. The third column depicts the set of four conditions considered in this study to enable role prescription.

The first row demonstrates how a clear division of strategic labour among member states and separate regional command structure help maintaining decentralise strategic functions, within the Alliance, enabling it to ensure its *international position*.⁴ This was achieved by safeguarding prescriptive roles that preserved interdependence on the basis of which NATO was created. This means that a change in one dimension of prescription affects the whole prescriptive building from which member states positions are dependent with impact on the efficiency of NATO. Division of strategic work is based on interdependent security and defence tasks, which bound member states to a core of role prescriptions. This feature, regarding distributive responsibilities, provides a coherent and stable institutional design that allows NATO to keep a strong international position and endured ability to prescribe roles to its members.⁵ Similarly, NATO's transformation involved rearticulating the identity and position of the Alliance, without affecting its purpose or its international role. Increasingly, NATO became portrayed not as a conventional alliance dependent on the existence of the Soviet threat, but as an organisation whose identity and history is understood 'as one of cultural or even civilizational commonality centred around the shared democratic foundations of its members'.⁶ This added political and social features to its military core, which reinforce NATO's normative repertoire and enhance even further its ability to mobilise and aggregate member states preferences on security and defence matters.

The second row illustrates how the Alliance retains internal prescriptive power on foreign policy and security through consensual decision-making, cooperation and coordination around a normative regime. From an early stage NATO has emerged as a community of values based on normative beliefs that distinguished Western democracies.⁷ The regime established within NATO aimed at preserving the integrity of the security community it helped to build, based on values, sense of community and consequent prescriptions of appropriateness conveyed to member states. Coordination implies harmonisation of policy procedures, based on procedural norms (about a specific way to conduct behaviour) and harmonisation of behaviour based on normative

⁴ See Duffield 1992.

⁵ Cf. March & Olsen 2004, 8.

⁶ Williams & Neumann 2000, 367. See also Siverson & Emmons 1991.

⁷ See Deutsch *et al.* 1957, 5-6.

beliefs (about what is right) consolidated across time through dense socialisation. This generated cumulative expectations about behaviour, based on appropriate conduct and prediction of policy behaviour among member states.

For the period considered in this study NATO continued to bind its members together on the basis of shared principles and foreseeable expectations associated with prescriptive roles that are not drawn from the imposition of a regulative order to member states, but rather attain on the base of consensus, equal participation and highly developed socialisation within the various decision-making bodies and among member states. This strengthened the sense of community and preserved the meaning acknowledged to transatlantic institutions in virtue of their capacity to promote inner appropriate behaviour, ensuring ‘dependable expectations of “peaceful change”’ among member states and offering guarantees of containment of external consequent behaviour.⁸

The third row suggests features of NATO’s long tested capacity to solve security problems based on intergovernmental decision-making reliant on low competition among member states and high degree of transparency. This determined the development of a policy behaviour bound by transparency and dependent on strong routinisation of policy practices and military procedures.⁹ Intergovernmental decision-making and unanimity voting methods are the rule among the various decision-making bodies and NATO working groups. This mode of policy coordination is inclusive of all participants and based on systematic consultation prone to transparency and limitative of attempts of the leading nation to coercively impose prescriptions, since open cooperation and consensus are essential conditions to allow coordination. As Risse suggests, coordination, non-hierarchic consultation and specific concerns with consensus building limited the use of coercion in the process of cooperation.¹⁰ This provided the incentive to develop habitual practices among member states and volunteer compliance with role prescriptions. Additionally, this intergovernmental dimension associated with consensus building and unanimity voting allowed member states holding a high degree of freedom on how to make available ‘issue-specific resources’ needed by the organisation to the fulfilment of roles prescribed collectively.¹¹

⁸ Risse-Kappen, 1995, 30.

⁹ See Glaser 1993, 7 and 11; McCalla 1996, 457, 458 and 467 and Lepgold 1998b, 60.

¹⁰ See Risse-Kappen 1995, 36-37. In his study Risse provides abundant empirical evidence about normative conditions of prescription within NATO and limitation in the use of coercive power by the U.S. in pressing for compliant behaviour, on this point see pp.22-24 and 42-104.

¹¹ See Jönssen 1981, 255-257.

The intergovernmental design of the organisation contributed to the low level of rivalry among NATO political and military organs regarding collective action, since the final word on collective action fell into the domain of sovereign states under the coordination of the North Atlantic Council. The permanence of the rule ‘one-country, one-vote’ within the North Atlantic Council, Defence Committee and Military Committee remained as one of the procedures that ensures long term agreements among allies, given the fact participation happened on an equalitarian base and member states are invited to ‘codetermine policies’ through intense consultation.¹² NATO’s direct method of representation contributed to mitigate divergent views observed in policy documents, between the North Atlantic Council and the Political Committee, and the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group.¹³ Despite the presence of specific policy and strategic preferences among these bodies (Council, the Political Committee, the Defence Committee and Nuclear Planning Group) there is a low degree of competition among them, as compared to what can be observed among the EU’s decision-making bodies.¹⁴

To small states this safeguarded not only the possibility to avoid the formation of directories by major states, but also gave them the opportunity to participate in decision-making on an equal basis in the domain of new security and defence tasks.

Transparency of routines favoured a condition of ‘strategic restraint’ upon member states that worked as a powerful connecting element ‘locking states into ongoing and predictable courses of action’ based on highly developed schemes of routinisation of policy and military practices.¹⁵ Likewise, intensification of coordination and cooperation with other organisations and former opponents reflects the idea that contention was replaced by cooperation.

The routine of acting together within the Alliance is cumulative in terms of endured prescriptive roles in two ways. First, because it focused on the enlargement

¹² Risse-Kappen 1995, 34. See also Weber 1992, 649 and 651. Weber considers the extension of the rule one-country, one-vote as a strong indicator of multilateralism and nations’ representation within the Alliance.

¹³ On the point of distinct divergent preferences see for instance North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 17-18 December 1990, Paragraph 4; North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991, Paragraph 3 and North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 19 December 1991, Press Communiqué M-NAC-2(91)110, Paragraph 11 and 12.

¹⁴ In the case of NATO low competition does not mean intra-Alliance full agreement on policy positions. The question is not a matter of competition for power within the organisation, but observation of different discourses that can be traced in the policy documents of the North Atlantic Council, Political Committee and Defense Planning Committee. It is not a competition about power positions, as it can be observed in the EU, but divergent views about security tasks. For a contribution on competition over naming and framing policies and therefore over its contents and competences, see also Schön & Rein 1995 and Jachtenfuchs 1996.

¹⁵ Ikenberry 1998-1999, 45.

process and on new out-of-area missions from an advantageous position of high routinisation of policies and operational procedures. Second, because a high level of routinisation is an essential condition of efficiency and imitation of behaviour is a guarantee that policy action will be conformant with the expectations inherent to the roles prescribed.

The fourth row highlights how the Alliance maintained a coherent balance between policy goals, institutional devices for policy formulation and aggregation of preferences and material resources available to the implementation of goals, which ensure a credible strategic position in the context of security and defence organisations. NATO's prescriptive power match what March and Olsen, in another context, consider to be a source of institutional stability by combining the material 'resources that enable actions' organisational, financial and staff capabilities, and 'structures of meaning' that explain, legitimise and justify behaviour, and frame roles, identity and common purpose.¹⁶ As March and Olsen suggest 'the development of competences at the service of existing institutions and objectives is primarily a stabilizing force. But it also creates foundations for new institutions and new objectives' since 'by transforming capabilities, therefore, competences transforms agendas and goals.'¹⁷ That is, it transforms the base of departure for concordant behaviour. In the case of NATO this occurred without hindering its ability to represent member states preferences. The stability of the Washington Treaty, not subjected to periodical revisions, is an indicator of suitability of the institutional design of NATO and an incentive to constancy in concordance between formal role prescriptions and willing compliance by member states, not obliged to incorporate into their own legal instruments, the provisions adopted in ministerial declarations and strategic guidelines.

Concordant behaviour occurs even without immediate incorporation of role prescriptions, largely due to the high level of routinisation and long lasting tradition of joint work. Willing compliance was not necessarily preceded by formal incorporation of roles, which facilitated the observation of concordant behaviour independently from legal incorporation of the roles conveyed. NATO's ministerial declarations reiterate, twice a year, the fulfilment of past goals and define new sets of role prescriptions giving them continuity and consequently retaining the conditions favourable to concordance. This systematic renew of commitments constitute a form of 'non-legally

¹⁶ Cf. March & Olsen 1989, 162 and 165.

¹⁷ March & Olsen 1998, 966.

binding recommendations' that improve coordination, generate equilibrium and that act as a form of 'constitutionalisation' of protective roles.¹⁸ This affected the behaviour of states in the way concordance functions as a mechanism of self-perpetuation of the Alliance's stability and of fulfilment of external roles, which otherwise could not be taken forward by member states.

5.1.1 Conclusions

In the case of NATO, the impact of the institutional design on prescriptive roles results from a combination between the belief in the strength and persistence of the Atlantic security community and the presence of institutional mechanisms that developed highly elaborated forms of joint work. Its integrated command and control structure operates in a prescriptive way by providing guidance, monitoring activities and engaging member states into prescriptive sets, which confer to NATO a distinguished international position. The decentralisation of strategic responsibilities results in burden sharing based on levelled participation of member states. This presupposes the development of a common strategic culture and strategic language essential to bind NATO members to a transatlantic security community.

Member states are called to participate through mechanisms of coordination and cooperation strongly embedded in normative beliefs, which distinguished lawful from unlawfulness behaviour, and convey appropriate roles and procedural norms that ensure the integrity of the regime the Alliance helped to form.

The Alliance's intergovernmental decision-making structure through non-hierarchical participation, consensus building and systematic consultation generates habitual practices of joint work, which strengthened its prescriptive power. Routinisation of political practices and military procedures favour predictability of courses of behaviour, inducing imitation of behaviour among allies. Similarly, it facilitates the implementation of reviewed security tasks in out-of-area, dependent on routinised military doctrine, common assets and conduct procedures, without being hostage of long processes of institutional adaptation, like the CFSP. This enables the perpetuation of the Alliance functions in collective defence.

The chapter shows that concordant behaviour based on formal incorporation and enforcement mechanisms, is not always a condition of role prescription. In the

¹⁸ Abbott & Snidal 1998, 15 and 10.

case of the Alliance, concordant behaviour does not result from coercion, but as in the case CFSP, is a consequence of normative beliefs and prescriptive role sets that represent and aggregate security and defence concerns of member states. Additionally, NATO prescriptive roles based on non-legally binding recommendations, created conditions of self-perpetuation resulting from the balance between what was prescribed and the resources mobilised to fulfil role prescriptions.

5.2 Validation of Conditions of Role Prescription

The observation of stability in the conditions of *international position, prominence, endurance* and *concordance* of the roles conveyed by the Alliance constitute an important evidence of preservation of prescriptive role in the post-Cold War. Both in the domain of principles and practices, NATO experienced an argumentative turn, based on a stronger political approach to security and defence matters. This was largely achieved through complementary approaches to traditional military functions with three purposes. Firstly, to enable the Alliance to keep its predominant international position regarding allies in the Euro-Atlantic region, by showing its ability to adapt, integrate and perform a large spectrum of security functions. Secondly, to show its competitiveness towards other organisations (e.g. OSCE, UN and EU) in the fulfilment of security tasks, by emphasising its broad representativeness, political influence, military might and willingness to outsource its military power. Thirdly, to be able to offer security guarantees to new members whose major domestic concerns were derived from political, social and economical instability.

5.2.1 International Position

In the post-Cold War period the Alliance preserved its *international position* due to the fact that it was able to renew its ability to act in a ‘constitutive way’ that is, to define *which* roles mattered in the new security environment and to mobilise member states around sets of prescriptive roles.¹⁹ This meant that NATO simultaneously define and voice prescriptions under the form of new functional roles (preventive diplomacy, peaceful conflict resolution, sufficiency of military resources and operations-other-than-war) and normative roles (respect for human rights, dissemination of

¹⁹ Cf. Raymond 1997, 214. On the distinction between constitutive, constraining and enabling order cf. Schweller and Priess 1997, 3. On the constitutive nature of norms cf. Schimmelfennig 2003, 6-7; Schimmelfennig 2000, 111, 114 and 121 and Risse 2000, 2-3.

democratic values and individual freedoms and democratic control of the armed forces). The first convey a way to solve security problems, while the second imply a manner to address them. By recasting its role, the Alliance maintained the international recognition of its prescriptions within the security community that helped to create. Originated by regional insecurity in the post-Cold War period, the Alliance called upon itself societal and political dynamics, based on new normative representations fundamental to its prescriptive role in a new security environment.²⁰

It managed to retain both the ability to address security problems and to solve them, as NATO's Secretary General refers this meant a 'shift from a geographical understanding of security to a functional approach' moving from territoriality and ideology to meaning and purpose.²¹

In early 1990s most security organisations pursued prescriptive roles freed from the contentious environment of the Cold War. Challenges beyond the traditional military scope (masses of refugees, religious and ethnic persecution and natural catastrophes), rather than threats, became part of the discursive core of organisations like NATO.²² This emphasises two new necessities distinct from the preceding period: the need for security organisations to adapt to the challenges of non-military aspects of security and a lesser concern with defining *who* the enemy is, but rather *what* the problem is. This posed a crucial question about the way security prescriptions are to be addressed in the NATO context in order to maintain their mobilising effect.²³

The Alliance through principles and practices represented itself as a constraining entity able to proscribe behaviour, in the sense it defined the limits of unacceptable behaviour such as: arms escalation, military aggression, occupation of foreign territories and disregard for international law. During NATO's Summer meeting of Heads of State and Government in 1990, the Alliance positioned itself as post-Cold War referent *security community* with a new functional profile by moving away from *forward defence* towards a reduced forward presence and modified *flexible response* reflecting a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.²⁴

²⁰ Duffield 1994, 369-388.

²¹ Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop (2004) *Remarks by NATO Secretary General at the Clingendael Institute*, 29 October, [http:// www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041029a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041029a.htm) (Acceded 9/11/2004). Although this statement dates from 2004 it reflects a continued concern of the Alliance since early 1990s.

²² See North Atlantic Council, *NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe*, Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991, Press Communiqué M-1 (91) 44, Paragraph 1.

²³ See North Atlantic Council, *NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe*, Paragraph 22.

²⁴ Williams & Neumann 2000, 361 and North Atlantic Council, *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance*, London, 5-6 July 1990, Paragraph 2, 14 and 20.

The Alliance's capacity to solve and address security problems was also reflected in its relations with other organisations, notably on what respected functional distribution of tasks, giving the Alliance the primacy in ensuring 'effective defence' leaving to other organisations the tasks of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention.²⁵ The Alliance is to remain an 'essential forum for consultation among its members' and the main provider of the 'military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of the Allies'.²⁶ The institutionalisation of various competing initiatives in the field of security had consequences not only for the way the Alliance represented itself, but also for the articulation between functional and normative roles to be prescribed.²⁷ The concern with the competing roles of other organisations was accompanied by reserves about the Alliance's future integrity and main prescriptive roles. NATO's policy documents in the early 1990s addressed a recurrent appeal to intra-Alliance unity and intensification of intra-Alliance coordination and consultation, in response to an emergent European defence identity. This may lead to conclude that full compliance of member states with the Alliance provisions was then uncertain, which could hinder the integrity and purpose of the organisation, especially in the event of emergent alternative foreign and security initiatives drew from WEU, EU and OSCE. Therefore the idea of divisibility of political responsibility, policy formulation, and shared strategic work with other organisations is considered in policy documents with reserve, since it could introduce an element of disturbance in the Alliance prescriptive power. This concern was mirrored in member states positions about the prescriptive centrality of the Alliance, in particular among those with maritime traditions of defence policy like Portugal, United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Denmark.

The use of normative arguments to justify new security roles was accompanied by important functional changes in NATO's military doctrine, as it can be observed in the *Alliance's Strategic Concept*, by representing itself as a security organisation that addressed a broader scope of political, societal and military concerns.²⁸

²⁵ North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 17-18 December 1990, Paragraph 7.

²⁶ North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991, Paragraph 2.

²⁷ For examples of functional role prescriptions see North Atlantic Council, *London Declaration*, Paragraphs 5, 6, 8 and 14 and for examples of normative role prescriptions see North Atlantic Council, *London Declaration* Paragraph 2 and North Atlantic Council, *NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe*, Paragraph 1.

²⁸ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government, Part II Alliance Objectives and security functions – The purpose of the Alliance* Rome, 8 November 1991, Paragraph 15 and North Atlantic Council, *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, Rome, 7-8 November 1991, Paragraph 2.

The Alliance represented itself as having preserved its legitimacy and functional ability to ensure its international position in the Euro-Atlantic region. The reviewed *Strategic Concept* reiterated NATO's *position* based on its uniqueness and efficiency recurrently used in comparisons with other emergent security initiatives. The scope of its membership and level of military forces made NATO entirely suitable to perform the core security functions defined by the new Strategic Concept.²⁹

NATO's policy documents became centred in three overall prescriptions: to *expand* security functions, to *control* the emergence of alternative security dimensions of other organisations in Europe, and to *bind* member states, especially the United States, to transatlantic security and defence responsibilities. From a role prescription perspective, the security debate within the Alliance throughout 1992 and 1994 aimed at: projecting the Alliance out-of-area, offering a limited support towards the development of WEU and a future EU defence policy, and urging the United States to remain engaged in transatlantic security.

The Gulf War and the outbreak of hostilities in former Yugoslavia confronted the Alliance with two potential limits to its prescriptive role. Firstly the future role of the United States within the Alliance and secondly the future scope of relations with the security dimensions of other organisations (EU, WEU and OSCE). This did not mean that the Alliance had lost its appeal as a prescriptive frame, but that the territorial limits of the Washington Treaty provisions impose limits to NATO's adaptation beyond the boundaries of that geography. This was mostly evident in those situations where *ad hoc* military coalitions were formed, using national forces, which were also answerable to NATO, in a way that could hinder the integrity and authority of the Alliance.

After the approval of the new Strategic Concept, the Alliance ensured its international position not necessarily due to the fact that the United States took the lead in the process of adaptation and military reform of NATO. The Alliance centrality persisted due to the adherence of member states to the adoption of new normative and functional roles. The emergence of conflicts out of the Washington Treaty's area offers an opportunity to foster diverse contributions regarding preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, through the institutionalisation of new modalities of cooperation with other organisations and international agencies. This is the case with the activa-

²⁹ See North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Part II – Alliance Objectives and security functions- The fundamental tasks of the Alliance*, Paragraphs 20 and 21.

tion of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, with the WEU participation in the arms embargo to former Yugoslavia and with the EU diplomatic efforts to mediate the conflict in the Balkans. These windows of opportunity also opened to smaller states like Portugal, new forms of participation in international security and facilitated the use of particular skills of mediation in conflict resolution.³⁰

The Alliance by adding a political and societal dimension to its traditional military functions showed ability to adapt on the basis of dissemination of new values and functions, which were familiar to European allies and potential applicant countries, but also welcomed in the eyes of its domestic audiences. This shows that NATO's international position did not rely only on its military strength, but also on valorative and normative arguments as part of a broader strategic discourse intended to add legitimacy to the Alliance initiatives in a new security context. These arguments were difficult to refute, without questioning the fundamentals of the Western liberal system itself. Successful representations of the Alliance's legitimacy together with the ability to adapt to alternative security functions are essential tools to a stable *international position*.

The political dimension of NATO role prescriptions is also portrayed in the policy documents, as reinforcing and mobilising the role of European allies in the context of other security organisations, like the WEU and the OSCE regarding preventive diplomacy, peaceful conflict resolution and nation building. NATO by emphasising its political dimension improved the consistency and concordance of member states policies in the domain of non-military aspects of security.

However, the issue of competing security frames between NATO and other international organisations raises questions about the ability of the Alliance to mobilise member states. On the one hand, NATO claims for enhanced cooperation and improved division of strategic labour, which involve cooperation with other organisations. On the other, this fosters within the Alliance the fear for a multiplication of security providers leading to competition among transatlantic (NATO), global (ONU), pan-European (OSCE) and European (EU and WEU) security organisations.

Most NATO allies feared a disengagement of the United States from European security, due to reductions in its military presence in Europe, the progressive shift of

³⁰ The process of self-determination of East Timor, regarding Indonesia, is a good example of special use by Portugal of mediating skills within international organisations, in the way it drew the attention and mobilise the resources of the international community to the situation in Timor.

its interests to Asia and Pacific and a preferential choice for unilateral military intervention in the pursue of American national interests and national security.³¹ The question of competitiveness between NATO and other security organisations was frequently triggered by the United States and Washington's unilateral vision on how to conduct its foreign policy within multilateral institutions, which collided with the new profile of multilateral missions. More than a matter of weakening the normative and functional strength of the roles security organisations could perform the occasional strained relation between European allies and the U.S. reflected the clash between the normative and functional adaptation of the Alliance versus the dysfunctional position of American military bureaucracy regarding new security tasks. As McCalla suggests 'Current American military strategies, and the force structures to support them, reflect the Cold War's legacy. The U.S. continues to be well prepared to deal with traditional military threats to interests and allies, but it is less well prepared politically and militarily to deal with contingencies that involve low-intensity conflict'.³² The American notion of a security system based on 'minilateralist' cooperation conflicts with the new security setting of the post-Cold War based on multilateralism, broader normative roles and specialised functional tasks.³³

NATO authorities were not only able to capture the substance of what was at stake in terms of challenges to security, but they also benefited from a long experience in engaging in missions that matched the new type of functional roles in demand (preventive diplomacy, confidence building measures, observation of cease-fire, deployment of interposition forces and protection of minorities and human rights among others).³⁴ The international position of NATO depended on its military and political reform driven by obvious needs to adjust to the new security environment and to deal with the developments brought into European security after Maastricht.³⁵ The resilience to an autonomous European defence is particularly voiced by the United States and the United Kingdom, to whom the preservation of the operational coherence among transatlantic allies is crucial to the maintenance of their own competences in the division of strategic labour. The presence of various eligible security organisations

³¹ North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Oslo, 4 June 1992, Paragraph 5 .

³² McCalla 1998, 105-106.

³³ See Kahler 1992, 682 and 686. Kahler discusses evidence of minilateral collaboration adopted by hegemonic states within multilateral institutions and the policy strategies pursued based on bilateral agreements among member states and the hegemonic power. See also Christiansen & Snyder 1990.

³⁴ For a perspective that supports this view, see Brenner 1998, 3.

³⁵ See NATO Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, *Ministerial Communiqué*, Brussels, 27 May 1992, Paragraph 6.

posed a problem of political support to European-NATO members regarding European initiatives conveyed in political speech as an issue that could pose problems of loyalty regarding the Alliance. The resilient position of the United States affected the perceptions of maritime allies like Portugal and limited its early attempts to engage in a European security and defence policy project.

The official record shows that the enlargement process together with NATO's military reform worked as positive validations of NATO's international position. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) fulfilled the task of creating a representation of utility for the Alliance not based on confrontation and exclusion, but rather on cooperation and partnership. The Alliance may have not needed Central & Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 'to increase its power' as Schimmelfennig argues, but it needed PfP to perpetuate itself, while envisaging internal reform.³⁶

The development of partnership initiatives between the Alliance and CEECs and the outbreak of war in former Yugoslavia reaffirmed NATO's capacity to adjust its mission and structure to new security challenges. The deterioration of the situation in former Yugoslavia, the threat of conflict spill-over and denunciation of practice of 'ethnic cleansing' led the Alliance to invoke both moral and strategic concerns regarding the conflict.³⁷ These concerns resonated on small states like Portugal, with traditionally neutral foreign policies and an external posture prone to international activity based on arguments of universal responsibility. As the case study on Portugal shows the invocation of normative motives of the type described above to justify military intervention, facilitated and even stimulated the participation of the country in new military missions.

The way the enlargement process was engineered provided a base of tacit understandings (democratic values, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil control of the armed forces) and socialised the CEECs into a new military doctrine and new policy practices. To the Alliance it propitiated the development of alternative functional solutions and offered the opportunity to disseminate new functional roles outside the traditional area of application of the Treaty of Washington.³⁸

³⁶ Schimmelfennig 2003, 44.

³⁷ See North Atlantic Council, *Statement on Former Yugoslavia*, M-NAC-2(92)108, Brussels, 17 December 1992, Paragraph 2 and 10.

³⁸ On NATO's conceptual view on peacekeeping, see North Atlantic Cooperation Council, *Report to Ministers by NACC Ad Hoc Group on Coordination in Peacekeeping, Part I: Conceptual Approaches*, M-NACC-1(93)40, Brussels, 11 June 1993.

The declarations that resulted from the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 1994 show important empirical evidence about changes in the role prescriptions of the Alliance, which evolved from a normative focus in early post-Cold War, to traditional functional roles, as from mid 1990s.³⁹ This turn to a functional focus derived from three circumstances. Firstly, the political consolidation of the process of military cooperation with CEECs through the PfP. Secondly, the recognition that the European Security and Defence Policy was an option difficult to contest on grounds of European inability to fulfil security tasks or on the effects of its disintegrative impact on the Alliance. Thirdly, the fact that deterritorialisation of threats and diversification of security challenges urged for reforms in the military structure and force planning of the Alliance, for which a new force concept was created under the designation of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). These three circumstances solved practical problems for smaller member states, facilitating participation in European security and defence initiatives and enabling them to take part in a new scope of expeditionary missions familiar to countries with colonial traditions and pluricontinental foreign policies.

The Alliance ensured its prescriptive power and indispensability as security provider by seeking, in out-of-area operations and in the outsourcing of its military capabilities to other organisations, a way to ensure the visibility of its international role. In particular the endorsement of new force concepts demonstrated the ability of the Alliance to adapt, bind, and expand. Collective defence and functional adaptation were the strongest driving motives to maintain the cohesion and international appeal of the organisation, although the international position of NATO balanced between what Brenner calls the ‘rhetorical declarations’ and ‘operative assumptions’, which scaled security from dissemination of demo-liberal values to humanitarian relief and crisis response.⁴⁰ The presence of deterritorialised and diffuse threats presses for functional prescriptions that relied on deployable and readily available forces, supported by CJTF embedded in NATO’s new command and control structure based on multinational and multi-service concepts.⁴¹ The implementation of a reformed command and control structured, combined with new NATO Force Goals brought the Alliance

³⁹ See North Atlantic Council, *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, Press Communiqué M-1(94)3.

⁴⁰ Brenner 1998, 293.

⁴¹ See North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 11 June 1998, M-NAC-D-1(98)71, Paragraph 13 and 14.

back to its initial hard security purpose. These hard security missions were more difficult to fulfil by smaller member states like Portugal, which may explain their growing interest and commitment to European non-military missions in peacekeeping.

In late 1990s, NATO kept a relatively stable *international position* in the face of deterritorialised threats and conflict proliferation, by representing itself as the best fitted defence and security organisation to deal with the military aspects of security. This claim frequently stated in the official record depicts what Payne refers to as 'resonant claims or better arguments', whenever comparisons between the Alliance and other organisations were involved.⁴² NATO documents display a struggle of arguments for and against ESDI based on the efficiency of the security tasks performed and in comparison with which NATO's advantageous position is underlined. As referred to earlier, NATO opposition to ESDI decreased after 1999 under the inevitability of circumstances that took place within the EU after the decisions put forward in Saint Malo, regarding a European defence. The divisive interpretative frame about ESDI was forged more by states' preferences (France and the United States), than by widespread contending views among allies. As Ness and Brechin argue 'questions about the performance of international organizations can be solved only by careful examination of what they are charged to do, and the extent to which their charges impose conflicting organizational demands upon them' not by pure contending positions on what they can do.⁴³ The accounts traced in NATO policy documents, unfold a mixture of divisive and conciliatory arguments about the idea of ESDI reflected on European member states positions in the European context.⁴⁴ These divisive lines are also observed over the discussions about functional coordination and institutionalisation of relations between EU and NATO. On the one hand, the Alliance made available forces drawn from its own force system and pressed Europe to assume further responsibilities on matters with implication in the security and defence of Europe. On the other, the various attempts to institutionalise contacts between NATO and the EU concerning the operational implications of a European defence revealed difficulties in ensuring the establishment of permanent arrangements of consultation and coopera-

⁴² Payne 2001, 41.

⁴³ Ness & Brechin 1988, 266.

⁴⁴ North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, Brussels, 5 December 2000, Press Communiqué M-NAC-D-2(2000)114, Paragraph 22 and North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Budapest, 29 May 2001, Press Release M-NAC-1(2001)77, Paragraph 39, 45, 46, 47 and 49.

tion.⁴⁵ In late 1990s, a change in perception based on mutual reinforcement and commonality of strategic interests between Europe and the Alliance, solved two problems, which revert in favour of the Alliance international position. First, it solved matters of coordination that resulted from availability of NATO assets and capabilities to EU-led operations in the context of combined joint task forces. Second, it weakened the divisive lines between maritime allies (for instance Great-Britain, Netherlands, Portugal and Turkey) and continental allies (for instance Germany, France and Spain). A conciliatory frame, which pointed to proper role specialisation and division of strategic labour, as conveyed by the force concepts approved by NATO and from which the EU could also benefit for the fulfilment of the Petersberg missions, enhanced interoperability and widespread responsibilities for Europeans in the field of security and defence.⁴⁶

The arguments of conciliatory nature, about complementarity between NATO and EU/CFSP/EDSP were more frequent in policy documents than the divisive ones. A conciliatory perspective on the impact of ESDI on NATO's role prescriptions overcame the simplistic arguments opposing Atlanticist to Europeanist views. The divisive views that emerged in the official discourse resulted more from the existence of limited military resources and defence budget constraints, than from the type of missions and operational procedures conveyed.

In sum, the sustainability of the international position of the Alliance was the result of a normative turn in the post-Cold War combined with persistence of material capabilities to solve security problems. The process of adaptation of role prescriptions of the Alliance resulted from a coalescent perpetuation of conditions of *trust*, ability to *mobilise* member states towards security challenges and existent *material* conditions to ensure stability and protect member states' interests. NATO evolved from a 'site' of collective defence to become an 'agent' of cooperative security, a role through which the Alliance cooperated and articulated its activities with other international organisations, in the pursuit of security goals and fulfilment of tasks.⁴⁷ This transformation did not result from the national preferences of member states, but from

⁴⁵ Cf. North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Florence 24 May 2000, M-NAC-1(2000)52, Paragraph 27, 30 and 24 and Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 5 December 2000, Press Communiqué M-DPC/NPG-2(2000)115, Paragraph 5.

⁴⁶ The Petersberg missions approved within the WEU in 1992, included peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and crisis management.

⁴⁷ Abbott & Snidal 1998, 7. See also Gheciu 2005, 975-979.

the contingent challenges of the external security environment. On the balance between what the Alliance was *charged to do* and *what it did* and on the articulation between means available and security goals resided its most constant manifestations of international position.

5.2.2 Prominence

In the early post-Cold War period, NATO's official record shows a particular focus on norms and values as discretionary elements of prominence of the roles prescribed based on liberal beliefs, institutions, and practices.⁴⁸ The recognition of *prominence* of the roles prescribed by the Alliance result from endogenous and exogenous changes in the transatlantic strategic scenario. The Alliance sought for a new place and purpose as the threat for which it was initially created disappeared. The security discourse evolved in distinct ways. European allies, freed from the weight of direct conventional and nuclear confrontation between superpowers, started using the language of 'global governance', 'stability projection' and 'security challenges', rather than the language of 'Western free world', 'containment' and 'Soviet threat'. The United States persisted in talking the language of 'threats', 'burden sharing', 'national interest' and 'US leadership' more in line with its traditional strategic interests.⁴⁹ NATO sought to balance its traditional military might with its role of political coordinator and value disseminator. The prior ideological and military antagonism was replaced by successful attempts to forge comprehensive initiatives (PfP and CJTF), leading to forms of cooperation encompassing a new range of normative roles based on political and societal concerns, rather than strict military competition and power.⁵⁰

From the discourse point of view, the Alliance endorsed a message that pointed in the direction of intensive cooperation, stressing the arguments about its growing political profile and interlocking function with other international organisations. Not all NATO decision-making bodies shared this view. The policy documents drafted under the responsibility of the Defence Planning Committee reflect reservation in privileging the Alliance's political and societal functions beyond its traditional

⁴⁸ Goldgeier & McFaul 1992, 480.

⁴⁹ See Everts 2001, 322.

⁵⁰ North Atlantic Council, *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, Brussels, 29-30 May 1989, Paragraph 8, 11, 24, 25 and 27.

military focus.⁵¹ While the documents issued by the North Atlantic Council acknowledged the Alliance's growing political profile and support for 'political pluralism, free flow of information, and cooperative action in dealing with common problems', beyond the traditional military portfolio of the Alliance.⁵²

The *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation* agreed in November 1991, depicts a change in NATO's 'rhetorical action' consistent with the changes in the security environment earlier referred.⁵³ The strategic use of a new argumentation on security, based on de-territorialisation of threat was followed by a new representation of the Alliance's role in regional security centred on the consequences of social instability and ethnic and territorial disputes.⁵⁴ The focus on military security was replaced by a 'cultural and civilisational' focus as depicted in the policy documents in early 1990s.⁵⁵ This shift to normative arguments was accompanied by important functional changes in NATO's military doctrine, as it was observed in the Alliance's Strategic Concept by representing itself as a security organisation which addressed simultaneously to political, societal and military problems.⁵⁶

The condition of prominence was observed through a generalisation in NATO's policy documents of new beliefs (especially after 9/11 the aim is no longer to contain communism, but to fight terrorism and proliferation), informed by a generalisation of norms and by a general trend to complement military with non-military functions. The expansion of security functions beyond Article 5 meant that prescriptions about norm conformant behaviour were extended beyond NATO's traditional boundaries. The concerns expressed in NATO policy documents, towards the war in the Balkans, reiterated the consistency of arguments about values on the basis of which preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution were to occur. The assumption of new roles involved a strategic turn from planning large-scale military operations designed to meet military and ideological threats of the Cold War (where small allies

⁵¹ Defence Planning Committee, *Final Communiqué*, Brussels, 11 December 1992, Paragraph 4 and 6.

⁵² North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Comprehensive Concept*, Brussels, 29-30 May 1989, Paragraph 13 and Defence Planning Committee, *Final Communiqué*, Brussels, 22-23 May 1990, Paragraph 5, 10, 9 and 6. These documents regarded the adoption of measures concerning the revision of NATO's military strategy, the temporary adoption of a new Force Goal package and the reassessment of political demands on NATO's common funding issues.

⁵³ The expression rhetorical action is borrowed from Schimmelfennig and refers to the 'strategic use and exchange of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one's preferences', see Schimmelfennig 2003, 5.

⁵⁴ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* 1991, Paragraph 9.

⁵⁵ Williams & Neumann 2000, 368.

⁵⁶ North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Part II – Alliance Objectives and security functions – The purpose of the Alliance*, Paragraph 15 and North Atlantic Council, *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, Rome, 7-8 November 1991, Paragraph 2.

were compelled to participate), towards political negotiation, preventive diplomacy, crisis response and peaceful conflict resolution, where small allies became free to decide whether or not to take part. The way the Alliance is able to represent its normative role in defence of political pluralism and accountability of military to civil authorities and to engage in new functional roles, under the broad descriptive label of peacekeeping, provides binding opportunities of socialisation among participants and internalisation of the new roles conveyed by the Alliance. As Gheciu points out, NATO has been addressing instability also through confidence building processes that shape and change member states identities around norms understood as source of peace and progress.⁵⁷ Trust building occurs largely due to the development of processes of socialisation that induct and spread new norms and rules throughout the Atlantic security community. Socialisation plays in this sense a fundamental role in two ways. Firstly, in the identification of the threats and risks the Alliance is to meet to balance power asymmetries. Secondly, socialisation induces normalisation and internalisation of new behaviour based on prescribed norms and rules. These prescriptions considered as appropriate and rightful are incorporated into policy behaviour. Well developed socialisation facilitates the strengthening of a frame of representation, of organisation and of international projection of identities (new identities in the case of Eastern European Countries) and preferences of member states.

In the case of the Alliance, the condition of *prominence* was largely ensured by concerted actions among NATO decision-making organs to keep traditional member states bonded to transatlantic security and to socialise potential newcomers into NATO normative culture and functional procedures. The focus on normative roles was particularly addressed to Eastern European countries with the aim to create a common approach and to extend political conditionalities to the East. These were conveyed through processes of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues, which enhanced the level of socialisation between the Alliance officials and civilian and military representatives of those countries. Socialisation worked as a vehicle of adaptation of CEEC's domestic policies through gradual observation of democratic principles, individual freedom and democratic control of the armed forces. These changes occurred without significant material incentives given by NATO to applicant countries other than limited security guarantees and modernisation of their

⁵⁷ See Gheciu 2005, 975. See also Risse-Kapen 1995 and Wallander 2000.

armed forces. This evidence reflects a positive perception about the prominence of the roles prescribed by the Alliance, which induced a willing acceptance of principles and military functions by new members.

Rivalry and competition with former Warsaw Pact countries was replaced by a discourse based on cooperation and institutionalisation of relations between NATO and potential candidate members. This was attained through collective representations of security and formal agreements between cooperation partners, which enhanced socialisation through the PfP programme. A strategic turn was observed among NATO officials use of discursive strategies, which comprised arguments normatively driven to bind old and new allies and appeals to the value of democracy, internal stability, and accountability. By representing itself as an indispensable forum of socialisation between East and West, the Alliance perpetuated its security functions perceived as benign and inclusive in times of political uncertainty. Membership was simultaneously a matter of 'identity as it is one of security', which made most potential candidates willing to share the future burdens of collective security.⁵⁸ These normative roles together with functional ones stressed the value of 'positive interdependence' by cooperating with CEECs on security matters, by providing them with assistance in case of threat and by drawing on the CEECs military resources for peacekeeping missions, without explicitly broadening mutual defence guarantees.⁵⁹ NATO's consultative organs, education and training programmes were tailored to generate common approaches to security and to propagate appropriate behaviour consonant with NATO's membership. The observation of a stronger conditionality of appropriate behaviour (democratic values and democratic control of the armed forces) is an indispensable condition for the accession of new members, as compared to NATO's founding moment, when such conditionalities were more or less absent. Policy behaviour not compliant with this conditionality results in exclusion from cooperation initiatives and future integration initiatives.

The initiatives related with CJTF and the recognition of ESDP also helped to consolidate NATO's *prominence*. The concept of CJTF contributed to overcome problems of intra-Alliance loyalty for those NATO members, like Portugal, who were also WEU members. The endorsement of the concept of CJTF facilitated a change in the official discourse of NATO from implicit warnings about the consequences of

⁵⁸ Lepgold 1998b, 63. Brackets added.

⁵⁹ Schimmelfennig 2003, 47 and 50.

WEU competing with NATO for the same security functions, to a functional solution based on the creation of a concept of *separable*, but *not separated* forces that could be also made available to EU/WEU. The creation of institutional and practical conditions through the availability of military resources and command and control structures, improved the level of contact between NATO and the WEU enhancing the political and military relations between them, without hindering NATO's central position as the main forum for discussion of European security and defence matters.

The normative tone of the Alliance based on a unifying appeal to member states preferences, was less evident during late 1990s and early 2000. The operationalisation of CJTF concept, the development of a European defence policy and the outbreak of war in Kosovo decentred the organisations' priorities to matters of consequentiality resultant from re-distribution of security goods among member states. The events of September 2001 aggravated this functional trend and focused priorities on the material consequences of terrorism and arms proliferation. The invocation, for the first time in the history of the Alliance, of responsibilities of collective mutual defence inherent to Article 5, was followed by a drift of American diplomacy and defence from multilateralism and collective defence to 'minilateralism' and coalitions of the willing.⁶⁰

In sum, for the period under study the conditionality about appropriate behaviour not only worked as a requisite for NATO's membership, but also as a legitimising tool for military intervention. With regard to traditional member states, the recognition of NATO's prominence, the finding of technical solutions enabling Euro-Atlantic cooperation and enhanced socialisation between NATO and European institutions, facilitated overcoming issues that posed problems of loyalty to NATO European member states, notably in their approaches to EDSP. New security functions generated new forms of role prescription based on alternative structures of meaning to explain, justify and legitimise NATO's new military and non-military tasks. NATO's prominence evolved from concerns with territoriality and ideology to concerns with meaning and purpose regarding the political and societal dimensions of security and defence. Observation of norms and rules became discretionary elements of prominence. NATO's official discourse evolved from rivalry and competition to partnership, cooperation and policy coordination with former enemies. Partnership initiatives

⁶⁰ Kahler 1992, 82-686. See also Hodge 2005, 83.

enhanced the perception of NATO's prominence in the Euro-Atlantic context perpetuating its security functions and enabling the coordinating role of the Alliance with other security organisations (WEU and UN).

5.2.3 *Endurance*

The condition of *endurance* is affected by the suppression of a large-scale threat, which led NATO to focus on the need for a military reform characterised by broader concepts of multinational and inter-services forces, continued harmonised policies and broader common operational procedures. The policy documents showed that three new situations affected the endurance of the roles prescribed. First, the idea that security and defence required enhanced cooperation and coordination of strategic work with other international organisations namely UN, WEU and OSCE. Second, NATO overcame its announced obsolescence by representing itself as being able to execute alternative security functions in out-of-area and by undertaking security roles with a political and societal focus, bilaterally with new members and multilaterally with other international organisations. NATO's military reform called for better interoperability among member states and a rapid upgrade of military assets and capabilities. Third, the new conditions under which endured prescriptive roles were to occur implied a new legal frame and alternative routinisation of force employment.

Any of these new situations posed challenges to NATO's routinisation of security functions and internalisation of new procedures and military doctrine. Bailes refers to the processes of deepening and widening of the Alliance as being distinct from those of the EU, 'deepening cannot be interpreted in the EU sense of continued progress towards unified institutions, policies and unitary standards'.⁶¹ The same applies to endurance in the transatlantic context that is; it should not be interpreted as deriving from role prescriptions that aim at harmonising rule-based policies, but rather as a frame of routinisation and imitation of behavioural roles. Endured roles are replicated through perception of low cost/high benefit of interdependent security, reciprocity of defence guarantees, tradition of joint problem solving, thick socialisation and dense interoperability.

Observation of the condition of endurance is particularly strong in the analysis of NATO's relations with other organisations, since coordination depends on how

⁶¹ Bailes 1996, 28.

well routinised and disseminated are policy practices. Enhanced coordination and co-operation with other organisations served the purpose to reserve the Alliance advantages in coordinating multilateral activity and to ensure the lead in the future enlargement process. In a changing strategic scenario, it was crucial to the Alliance to present itself as being in command of its own process of adaptation. The *Rome Declaration* was clear in stressing NATO's prescriptive role, as an agent of change, rather than being a product of it and in ensuring its functional role as a lasting source of stable security to its members.

The references in policy documents to the operational relations between WEU and NATO illustrate concerns with avoiding any duplication or separation of assets and capabilities from the Alliance, in support of WEU-led operations outside the political scrutiny of the Atlantic Council.⁶² This involved a 'transference' of NATO doctrine to other organisations and in various cases, a replication of NATO's policy procedures and force concepts namely by the WEU. During the war in the Balkans, the joint led NATO/WEU arms embargo in the Adriatic provides empirical evidence of routinisation of military procedures between the two organisations. Likewise, enhanced socialisation between experts of the two organisations can be observed due to the prior experience of joint operations in the Danube region and the transference of the WEU Council and Secretariat to Brussels in 1993. This helped the two organisations to harmonise principles and practices and to better coordinate their activities. This reduced the initial negative impact of a European security and defence identity, enabling routinisation of policy practices and imitation of procedures within European security institutions based on exchange of information, open communication and access to NATO's military assets and capabilities.

This was also facilitated by the institutionalisation of direct contacts between the European Council and the North Atlantic Council, by the harmonisation of meetings and a better clarification of the security tasks that each one was to undertake.⁶³ The agreement on modalities of cooperation between EU/WEU and NATO, on the availability of NATO's assets and capabilities under which WEU-led operations could

⁶² North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 17 December 1992, Paragraph 11, 12 and 9.

⁶³ In March 1995 the North Atlantic Council and the Council of WEU held their first joint meeting at NATO headquarters. On the benefits of joint work, see also Jopp 1994, 18-40 and Gebhard 1994, 7-19.

be conducted, strengthened inter-organisational routinisation and imitation of behaviour among member states and endured NATO roles, as it will be explain next.⁶⁴

The simultaneous harmonisation of transatlantic and European initiatives leading to stability and enhanced security and defence such as: NATO's South-East Europe Initiative, the EU Stability Pact for South-East Europe, NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the EU Headline Goal had mutually reinforcing functions, both at the political and operational level.⁶⁵ After the events of September 2001 the articulation between the DCI and operationalisation of the Headline Goal was emphasised and used as a mobilising factor and a priority on the global war on terrorism.⁶⁶ The Alliance by endorsing the DCI project provided an 'interpretative frame' about the technological and political conditions under which defence and warfare should be conducted.⁶⁷ The DCI being a material manifestation of power by the Alliance sought through the dissemination of images of readiness, deployability and multinationality to convey assurances to member states about NATO's efficiency in meeting new threats.

Likewise, in the context of CJTF, the agreement on: the conditions of access and identification of assets and capabilities to be made available to EU-led operations; the definition of terms of reference for the DSACEUR and the establishment of a European NATO command for CJTF, implied improvements on the degree of routinisation of operational rules and procedures. The harmonisation of European and transatlantic security agendas and the synchronisation of meetings between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU Political and Security Committee, and between NATO's Ministerial Meetings and the country holding the EU Presidency constituted

⁶⁴See North Atlantic Council, *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, Press Communiqué M-1(94)3, Paragraph 6 and 8; North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Berlin, 3 June 1996, Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(96)63, Paragraphs 6 and 7; North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Luxembourg, 28 May 1998, M-NAC(98)59, Paragraph 9 and North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Sintra, 29 May 1997, Press Release M-NAC-1(97)65, Paragraph 8.

⁶⁵ See North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session*, Brussels, 5 December 2000, Press Communiqué M-NAC-D-2(2000)114, Paragraph 14; North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Budapest, 29 May 2001, Press Release M-NAC-1(2001)77, Paragraph 34 and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, *Chairman's Summary*, Florence, 25 May 2000, Press Release M-EAPC(2000)54, Paragraph 8. On the DCI see *Defence Capabilities Initiative*, Press Release NAC-S(99)69, Paragraph 4 and 5. See also Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), NATO Fact Sheet, 2 December 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9912-hq/fs-dci99.htm> (Acceded 02/03/2005). The DCI was launched with the aim to overcome the capabilities gap between Europe and the United States in the domain of strategic transport, air-to-air refuelling, precision guided munitions and harmonisation of defence planning processes.

⁶⁶ North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 6 December 2001, Press Release M-NAC-2(2001)158, Paragraphs 13 and 14. See also *Statement on combating terrorism: Adapting the Alliance's Defence Capabilities*, Press Release(2001)173, Paragraph 2.

⁶⁷ See Payne 2001, 39. Payne considers the use of interpretative frames as a form of 'social power' that can be seen as distinct from material power resources.

evidence of routinisation of working procedures within NATO and the EU/CFSP/ESDP. Despite formal institutionalisation of routines and adoption of similar policy practices, NATO's military expertise and capital of material resources accounts for its predominant role in succeeding in disseminating its own security practices to other organisations with regard to political and military cooperation and coordination of military activities.

The availability of NATO's forces to other organisations in the framework of CJTF was also responsible for a thicker routinisation of procedural mechanisms, between organisations and for a better knowledge of NATO's doctrines, decision-making bodies and military structures. Organisations, like the UN and WEU, borrowed various NATO operational concepts, in the outline of their security guidelines due to NATO's long tested routinisation, successful level of incorporation among member states and wide generalisation in their application.

From an intra-alliance perspective, prescriptive roles were affected by changes in the way routinisation of procedures occurred. The new command structure for Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic and the approval of new NATO Force Goal responded to the demands for more selective force engagement and flexible force augmentation. This had implications on intra-allied cooperation on what concerned joint and combined division of strategic work. This joint and combined focus followed the reduction of NATO's conventional forces, in response to the configuration of new challenges in out-of-area posed by ethnic rivalry, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. This had an impact on the type of functional roles prescribed, with an emphasis on the routinisation and imitation of procedural aspects of flexibility, mobility, deployability and interoperability of forces, as compared to the prevailing concept of large-scale stand-by-forces of the Cold War. This was beneficial to smaller member states unable to draw large military contingents.

The engagement in new military missions, namely in the context of peace-support and crisis response, raised important questions regarding appropriate role prescriptions in military policy related with the definition of new codes of conduct and rules of engagement to be observed by military forces. The explicit need for a UN mandate to sanction military intervention, the issue of consent among the parts in conflict before NATO can undertake an intervention and the imposition of new limits in

the use of military force poses new conditionalities to the implementation of NATO-led peacekeeping operations.

As Dessler notes 'NATO cannot be reduced to activities carried out in its name, such as military exercises and meetings of foreign ministers. It consists also of relatively enduring rules and norms that these actions draw upon, reproduce, and transform.'⁶⁸ The dissemination of NATO's tasks, routines and procedures among a community of former enemies changed the behaviour of those involved in cooperative initiatives within and outside the Alliance. This accounts for its continued ability to integrate diverse strategic cultures and disseminate security and defence practices to a wider group of applicant countries. By doing so, it conveyed distinct roles from those that resulted from former relations of enmity with the member countries of the Warsaw Pact. Likewise and as already observed for the precedent period, the training and education programmes in the framework of PfP accelerated the incorporation of NATO's culture by new applicant countries. Empirical evidence of this is found in the recognition by NATO's Defence Ministers of the positive contribution of the CEECs to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, as a result from prior routinisation of security tasks within the PfP programme.

In sum, the presence of a high degree of endurance of routinised roles and imitated behaviour had a crucial impact on the perceptions of efficiency of the roles conveyed by the Alliance to member states and candidate members. A long tested internal routinisation of security practices and developed similarities in behaviour among NATO's founding members set the base for dissemination of policy practices and procedures to applicant members and other organisations. This was also reproduced in policy guidelines that result in cooperation initiatives between NATO and other international organisations leading to harmonisation of policy agendas and synchronisation of meetings. Improved routinisation of roles, policies and procedures are indispensable to the perpetuation of security functions based on flexible, mobile and deployable force concepts. As the primary sources show, a more comprehensive legal framework bound new policy and military practices. This constitutes evidence of a new concern with appropriateness and legitimacy in the face of demands for enhanced accountability and efficiency of security and defence organisations.

⁶⁸ Dessler 1989, 462.

5.2.4 *Concordance*

Contrary to the EU/CFSP/ESDP, the institutionalisation of doctrine and new military procedures did not require changes in the Treaty of Washington. Diffusion of role prescriptions took the simple form of ministerial guidelines, policy declarations and additional protocols, which facilitated both intra-Alliance and member states domestic policy implementation. Constancy in concordance between NATO's role prescriptions and member states behaviour did not result exclusively from efficiency of the roles prescribed, but from understandings which derived from long membership leading to willing and informal concordance. However, NATO's military reform was consequential to concordance of member states military administrations and structures with NATO role prescriptions. Concordance with the Alliance role prescriptions resulted from recognition by allies of NATO's internal legitimacy, which enables acceptance of 'authoritative' policy pronouncements by the Alliance and facilitated implementation of policy actions by member states.⁶⁹ Positive perception and familiarity are crucial on how international role prescriptions are considered as lawful and as appropriate. Preference formation leading to concordance with international prescriptions stems from particular 'constructed representation of the relationship between self and other' which lays on the base of role incorporation.⁷⁰ Reliability on material capabilities are important to the implementation of decisions and actions by member states, but identification with prescriptions and the mode of consultation, accountability and legitimacy that characterises an international organisation are not less important to a successful concordance with international role prescriptions.

Concordance between the roles prescribed by the Alliance and the policy planning and action of member states is related with developments that occurred in the routinisation of new practices and incorporation of procedures. In this case, concordance does not result exclusively in unified institutions or policies, but also in harmonised procedures of policy implementation. The London Declaration by putting the emphasis on smaller, highly mobile, flexible, multinational, multifunctional military units defined the limits within which adaptation of national armed forces of its member states should occur. The various processes of professionalisation of national armed forces, after the end of the Cold War, were a response not only to the various national perspectives on the future model of armed forces, but also a response to a

⁶⁹ See Williams 1997.

⁷⁰ Frederking 2003, 365.

need to level and improve interoperability within the Alliance. To a certain extent, one can refer to a new 'nato-isation' of national armed forces, in the sense that NATO's military reform pressed member states to introduce changes and adjust to new security missions performed by the Alliance.

The observation of changes in the condition of concordance after the approval of the new Strategic Concept in 1991 was less significant than expected. Further research would be needed in order to evaluate, whether member states adaptation was discreet because prior routinisation of military doctrine was sufficient to lead the organisation into adaptation or because member states showed resilient behaviour towards the costs of adaptation. Contrary to the EU, the institutional format of the Alliance kept constancy, with the exception of the institutionalisation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), with no significant impact on traditional member states participation in the Alliance.

Concordance with the roles prescribed was intensified with the implementation of initiatives resultant from CJTF and PfP. The engagement in out-of-area operations pressed member states to adapt their defence policy doctrines and procedures to NATO new functions. The completion of the CJTF concept urged for national adaptation of allied military forces to more flexible, mobile and long-term sustainable forces. This implied a higher and more adequate level of military readiness, for which national procedures concordant with those prescribed by NATO were essential. This process of adaptation is in itself evidence of concordance between the roles prescribed and institutionalised and those performed by member states.

Enhanced concordance was gradually observed between 1994 and 1998, as a result of improved institutionalisation of cooperation initiatives, in particular within the NACC framework. Cooperation among transatlantic institutions improved coordination of political and military viewpoints between NATO and new applicant countries and NATO and other security organisations. The coordination and harmonisation of dates of ministerial meetings and meetings of the Councils of NATO and WEU introduced forms of formal synchronisation of policy initiatives intended to enhance consistency, harmonise working agendas and avoid duplication. Such initiatives improved the position of European countries that were simultaneously WEU and NATO members, facilitating the incorporation at the domestic level of the new roles entrusted by NATO. This is particularly significant for those European NATO-members with a traditional continental posture and more resilient public opinions towards a

transatlantic defence project (e.g. Spain) by the way it facilitated incorporation of new roles.

The condition of concordance is also observed in policy guidelines addressing the enlargement process, through the implementation of the Membership Action Plan (MAP). The MAP included specific guidelines to future member states behaviour and policies enhancing concordant behaviour with the Alliance orientations. Membership became more selective as compared to the early years of the Cold War when strategic location was one of the main criteria of accession to NATO. Among traditional European member states, the process of concordance was not limited to national adaptation that resulted from NATO's military reform, but also from the ongoing process of implementation of the Headline Goal. The coordination of military activities and closer relationship between the two organisations was enhanced by gradual concordance with international prescriptions in both *forums* and from the various evolving role conceptions of member states about security and defence.

The provisions forwarded by the Strategic Concept of 1999 evolved from conflict prevention and crises management, to non-Article 5 crisis response operations. With the approval of the new Strategic Concept, the Alliance broadened its security functions highlighting the need for a higher degree of specialisation of security roles.⁷¹ The specialisation involving new NATO missions meant that lack of concordance would lead to functional exclusion of those members, unwilling or unable to meet the new criteria of deployability, mobility and sustainability of capabilities involving new operational demands.

In the case of NATO, concordance is both a substantive and a technical issue. On the one hand concordance depends on the developments occurred in the security identity of member states about threats. On the other it is related with material adaptation (in assets, capabilities and missions) of national armed forces to NATO's overall strategy and its new integrated military structure.

In sum, concordance was found in the policy documents in three forms: within the Alliance, among member states national defence policies and among new applicant countries. In the study, concordance within the Alliance is observed through the implementation of NATO's military reform and internal process of adaptation to new

⁷¹ See *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington, 23-24 April 1999, NAC-S(99)65, Paragraphs 12, 14, 59 and 41.

security tasks. Formal concordance between NATO policy guidelines and member states national defence policies is not always a necessary condition for concordant behaviour to occur. This means that concordance may not always result in national incorporation of international role prescriptions into formal rules. Member states frequently adopt policy behaviour and engage in policy action, under NATO auspices, without having formally upgraded their national strategic policy guidelines. The Portuguese case (Chapter 7) will provide further evidence of this. In the case of applicant members concordance is reflected in changes in applicants' ideas and images of security, in policy behaviour and in procedural aspects of security and defence policy.

5.3 Conclusions

In early 1990s, NATO searched for new role prescriptions for which there were lacking immediate appropriate normative frames. The suppression of the Soviet threat posed challenges to the Alliance's military purpose, pressing for new 'securitized' issues, with an emphasis on military and non-military aspects of security with a societal focus. Despite the fact the purpose for which NATO was created disappeared, the Alliance preserved its position of key security provider and main forum for discussion of transatlantic security and defence issues. The use of normative arguments by NATO authorities (good governance, democracy, human rights) sought to reinforce support to new security functions (from preventive diplomacy to crisis response), and to ensure mobilisation of domestic audiences of member states in its favour.

Dissemination of role prescriptions with incidence on motives of appropriateness bounded older members and mobilise Eastern European countries, based on the idea of construction of a broader security community based on shared beliefs and valorative sets. Normative roles were associated with political and societal conditionalities based on the observation of democracy, respect for minority's rights, democratic control of the armed forces and defensive posture of military instruments. Internally, the focus on normative roles served the purpose of reinforcing the perpetuation of political bonds within the Euro-Atlantic context, essential to the efficiency of collective military response. Consequentiality did not result from ideological differences or from potential military response to deviant behaviour. Instead it was the result of

fear of potential marginalization of traditional members from new military tasks and exclusion of applicant countries from future integration.

During the period covered in this study, the official record shows that arguments about the strength of normative and functional prescriptions are invoked contingently. Whenever there was a need to bind together member states or to underpin the ‘securitizing’ role of the Alliance regarding new challenges (e.g. to contain conflict escalation and to address intra-state conflict by non-military means) normative roles were preferentially invoked. Whenever the objective was to limit the success of other security organisations, the appeal to functional roles that emphasised the efficiency of the Alliance performance was frequently used in policy documents. This argumentation was strengthened by references to NATO’s unity of command and control structures and by the supremacy of integrated use of assets and capabilities.

At the end of 1990s, the stabilisation of the strategic environment due to the consolidation of relations with CEECs countries and the replacement of the Soviet threat by the threat of terrorism, arms proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, together with the full operationalisation of new force concepts decreased the emphasis on ideational and normative elements of role prescription. The identification of new security challenges located out-of-area facilitated the return to instrumental association for strategic reasons, with a stronger functional focus. For the period studied, it was observed that in times of uncertainty, the Alliance tended to prescribe roles normatively specific, while in times of identifiable threats the roles prescribed tended to be functionally driven. This impinged on how the condition of prominence affected the roles prescribed by NATO authorities and how fast concordant behaviour was widespread among member states.

The introduction of CJTF and the requirement of higher interoperability of military forces, as a result of military reform, was an essential criterion of efficiency with selective effects on who were the fittest members to contribute to specific security functions. This accentuated the functional incorporation of role prescriptions by member states.

In general terms, the roles prescribed illustrated a combination of normative claims about the benefits and desirability of common appropriate behaviour and functional efficiency of collective response to threats. The Alliance, by appealing to commonality of behaviour and by ensuring accessibility to security goods, consolidated its legitimacy to undertake specific functional roles. This improved cohesion not strictly

by means of military power, but by making use of discursive strategies based on lawful order.

While normative roles were used to justify NATO's continuity that is, to enable it to keep on defining *which* issues were important, functional roles defined security and defence policy in terms of *how* these issues should be collectively solved by member states.

Security organisations present material solutions to specific problems, but they make use of a normative logic to justify the use of military means. The emphasis by NATO on a functional logic was facilitated by two motives. Firstly by the legitimacy and authority it embodies based on the consensual positions it endorsed. Secondly because it possesses the material means, technical expertise and privileged access to information, which most member states, on an individual base, do not have. Security organisations like NATO due to their representativeness, legal base and material capital can, better than states, call upon themselves the legitimacy and competence to prescribe and perform roles to ensure international stability. Changes in transatlantic security led to the emergence of a new language to interpret roles and justify policy actions. This language conveyed ideas about appropriateness of prescriptions concerning how threats were to be met. One may say that normative reasoning, although contingently used by the Alliance, constituted a legitimising filter to justify the recurrence to functional solutions from collective defence, to peacekeeping and crisis response.

Chapter 6

The Empowerment of CFSP's Prescriptive Roles

The prescriptive role of CFSP/ESDP has particular features, distinct from the regulative and legally binding prescriptions found in the EU first and third pillar. As Smith suggests 'the lack of robust compliance mechanisms in EPC/CSFP does not undermine the validity of the general rule to cooperate on foreign policy whenever possible'.¹ Likewise, the recognition of a prescriptively binding dimension does not presuppose the existence of 'robust compliance', since it can happen on the basis of consensual and willing compliance.² The prescriptive conditionality of CFSP benefited from self-enforcing prescriptive mechanisms that resulted from its pro-norm focus, conciliatory nature and dissemination of referent behaviour, with which 'actors believe to share some level of identification'.³ Concordant behaviour contributed to strengthen the normative building that member states themselves helped to construct and compliance with prescriptions resulted from identification with what roles *represent* or *mean*, not from coercive power or instrumental conditionalities. As Smith characterises it, European foreign policy has been evolving through a process of continuous framing and reframing oriented to the definition of foreign policy issues and adequate institutional setting.⁴ Consequently to the singular prescriptive role of CFSP, one can add its characteristic of process-in-the-making for which its institutional design for instance, cannot be said to have reached a final stage of institutional maturation.

The chapter analyses the conditions under which the prescriptive role of the EU second pillar is likely to emerge, in the domain of CFSP/ESDP and answers three sub-questions. Firstly, how the institutional design set forward for the EU second pillar affected CFSP role prescriptions. Secondly, examines the set of conditions and indicators detailed in Chapter 3 to monitor the conditions in which the CFSP is likely to act prescriptively in the domain of foreign and security policy. Thirdly, assesses how role prescriptions can result from non-regulative aspects. The second question is an-

¹ Smith 2004a, 123.

² The programme of the European Commission of 1991 states that the Community's internal policies would not take precedence over member states foreign policies, see European Commission, *Programme of the Commission for 1991*, Doc/91/1, 23 January 1991, Paragraph 30.

³ Johnston 2001, 494.

⁴ M. Smith 2003, 559.

swered with the help of empirical episodes, selected from the narrative drawn from official primary sources and secondary literature. The analysis of the official record traces the empowerment of the prescriptive roles for the second pillar, from its creation with the Treaty of Maastricht, to the moment of denser institutionalisation of the CFSP with the Treaty of Amsterdam and the stage of early operationalisation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with the EU Treaty.

6.1 The Impact of the EU Institutional Design on CFSP's Role Prescriptions

The history of institutionalisation of CFSP has been object of detailed accounts in literature.⁵ This section will broadly focus on the significant institutional developments regarding the instruments of foreign and security policy (*common positions, joint actions, common strategies and enhanced cooperation*) and their impact on the EU prescriptive role in those areas. These procedural orientations constitute part of CFSP codification of substantive norms of behaviour, which contributed to their internalisation by member states.

Between 1991 and 2001 the evolution of the institutional setting for the CFSP responded to internal pressures for a more active presence in international affairs. As Smith suggests, 'institutional reforms of EU foreign policy...reflected endogenous, path-dependent processes' that is, developments in the first pillar pressed for further developments intra and across pillars.⁶ The role prescriptive sets suggested within the CFSP, worked as representational and interpretative platforms for the construction of a common dimension of European foreign and security, based on valorative core of principles. This occurred despite its slow progress in identifying which areas of cooperation could be enhanced, which policy issues ought to be dealt with priority, and in which international events Europe could be asked to participate collectively. Furthermore the CFSP was drawn separately from European defence cooperation, which limited the development of this dimension.⁷ The intra-pillar complexity pressed for a double commitment from national administrations that is, member states had to combine the 'regulative aspects of legitimacy' within the EU first pillar, with a 'normative

⁵ For a comprehensive examination see Regelsberger *et al.* 1997; Holland 1997; Nuttall 2000, 37-60 and 176-238 and Forster & Wallace 2000. On the specificity of working methods of CFSP working groups, see Council for the European Commission – General Secretariat 1998.

⁶ Smith, 2004b, 176.

⁷ See K. Smith 2003, 41.

conception of legitimacy’ and soft compliance mechanisms of the second pillar.⁸ This added problems of coordination and consistency to the already complex institutional framework of the EU, which resulted more from the complexities of division of labour between agents of decision-making and from the variety of conceptions on the future international role of the EU, than from the weak binding mechanisms of CFSP.⁹

Table 5 that follows illustrates how the complexity of CFSP institutional framework affected international role prescriptions.

CFSP institutional design	CFSP behaviour	Conditions enabling role prescriptions
From unclear division of labour and multi-centred external representation of CFSP (High Representative, Presidency and Commission) to specificity of representative entities	Variable use of declaratory policy, joint actions, common positions and common strategies	International position (based on a normative authority to address foreign, security and defence issues)
Gradual intensification of policy coordination and cooperation	Tensions resulting from misperceptions about the role of CFSP/ESDP	Prominence (limited socialisation contingently dispersed between EU and WEU)
Intergovernmental design for 2nd Pillar coexists with supranational design of 1st and 3rd.pillar	Increasing participation and routinisation of procedures as institutional enhancement occurred	Endurance (incremental routinisation)
Regulative tradition of 1st Pillar applies weakly. Tendency to make use of ‘soft law’ enforcement mechanisms	Circumstantial credibility dependent on task assignment	Concordance (progressive institutionalisation of decision-making and implementation procedures)

Table 5 - Institutional design for the EU second pillar¹⁰

⁸ See Laffan 2001, 723.

⁹ Specific views about what the Union should be, for instance: preference for a EU focused on regional problem solving (the United Kingdom preference); a Union that envisaged a ‘place in the world’ (the French view) or a Union that could implement at a higher level what member states could not attain individually giving them, through participation, the opportunity of ‘leadership in equality’ (the small states approach), where some of the views shared by member states, see Smith, 2004, 244.

¹⁰ The elements comprised in this table reflect the institutional design dated 2001.

Despite the limitations frequently pointed out from the institutional and operational point of view, the CFSP followed a discreet evolutionary path from general orientations on foreign policy behaviour, to concertation of policies and convergence of views and policy actions. Its specific institutional design reflects the nature and the complexity of the 'co-operation problem at stake'.¹¹

The first row shows how the CFSP started from a weak division of labour and an external representation shared with other actors in the first pillar (e.g. Commissioner for External Relations) to gradual institutionalisation of representative entities, political organs and military bodies and institutional mechanisms of policy implementation. These were essential features to the international position of CFSP, to its external representation and to the conciliation of various institutional voices.

The international position of CFSP as role prescriber was conditioned by the propensity to compete between the two main actors charged with representation and implementation of CFSP, the Commission and the EU Presidency and later between the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations, which triggered problems of policy articulation and definition of competences which hindered CFSP international role.¹² Problems related with financing of EU external relations also hampered the external visibility of CFSP, since administrative expenditures were supported by the EC budget, whereas the operational expenditures were drawn from member state contributions, without any specific guidance on how governments should allocate resources.¹³ The sources of financing and implementation of joint actions were divided between the Presidency (responsible for the implementation of CFSP agenda) and the Commission (responsible for budgetary implementation). This situation was later modified by the Treaty of Amsterdam by proposing the EC budget as the main source for CFSP funding. Unification of external representation for CFSP was also a sign of institutional stability and a step further to political integration.¹⁴

¹¹ See Hasenclever *et al.* 1997, 48.

¹² Bretherton & Vogler 2000, 185. See also Allen 2001, 45-48.

During the process of ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht and Amsterdam it was possible to observe tensions between instances regarding the right to propose common positions, initiate joint actions and to control of financial aspects of actions related with the implementation of CFSP. However, in the case of the CFSP, decisions on common foreign policy crossed policy pillars and depended on the intervention of multiple organs for which the emergence of competition among decision making bodies was more likely to occur. See also Morth 2005, 173.

¹³ The imprecise nature of CFSP financing procedures and its divided sources hampered a more rapid adoption of joint actions in response to international crises. For a detailed account on the financial aspects of CFSP, see Monar 1997.

¹⁴ Göhler 1996, 8.

The EU/CFSP international position departed from a normative core of its role prescriptive set and from its symbolic value, rather than from its technical security functions. As Göhler notes, political institutions have a ‘ritual representation, without specific (instrumental) purposes’ although they affect ‘mutual obligations between members of a group’.¹⁵ The Treaty on European Union set the idea of a CFSP and in particular of a common defence policy and a common defence as long-term goals, not as an immediate objective. The CFSP normative core was reflected on its ‘milieu goals’, more prone to address the civil aspects of conflict resolution and crisis management than to the responsibilities of collective defence.¹⁶ Therefore the balance between goals and actions was consistent, which allows to disconfirm the arguments frequently used to impair the EU’s security and defence dimension, based on the existence of a goals-capabilities gap.¹⁷

In order to pursue its foreign policy goals, CFSP gradually evolved from declarations and *démarches* to the agreement on *common positions* and *joint actions* (Treaty of Maastricht), *common strategies* (Treaty of Amsterdam) and *enhanced cooperation* (EU Treaty modified by the Treaty of Nice).¹⁸ It evolved from guidance and desirable conformity of national policies, to the observation of strict discipline by member states and vertical consistency between members’ policies and the Union’s policy recommendations.

The second row highlights various elements of socio-institutional sophistication, which strengthened CFSP prominence evolving from disperse representation and scarce institutional fabric to the finding of CFSP implementation instruments, whose scope and object were consistent with the second pillar normative way to address foreign, security and defence problems. The resonance and affinity generated by the CFSP normative focus facilitated intensification of policy coordination and cooperation based on a broad valorative and non-contending agenda enhancing the status of prominence of the second pillar.¹⁹ The Treaty of Maastricht defined a set of general objectives based on the safeguard of common values, preservation and strengthening of international security, promotion of international cooperation and consolidation of

¹⁵ Göhler 1996, 6.

¹⁶ On milieu goals see K. Smith 2003, 16. Milieu goals have a general and non-confrontational nature and display a preference for the use of economic, cultural and political instruments rather than military ones.

¹⁷ On the gap expectation-capabilities, see Hill 2001.

¹⁸ Enhanced cooperation does not include matters with military and defence implications, see *EU Treaty*, Article 27b.

¹⁹ See Marcussen *et al.* 1999, 618; Christiansen *et al.* 1999, 539; Glarbo 1999, 646-647; M. Smith 2003, 566-569; Krahnmann 2003, 17-18; Smith 2004b, 117-208 and Koenig-Archibugi 2004a, 147-150.

democracy and rule of law.²⁰ These goals created a base of agreement among member states, drawn the political limits of what was perceived as rightful, at the time when CFSP was institutionalised, and generated the functional means to pursue those goals.

If there was agreement on the scope of the CFSP agenda, its purpose was frequently misperceived, creating tensions within the EU and with other security organisations, such as NATO, which affected the second pillar prominence. Within the Union, the reserve towards anything that would resemble a supranational orientation was refused by those countries, which wished to preserve the national orientation of their foreign, and security policies. As far as relations with other organisations (NATO above all) were concerned, the reference to the CFSP as related with a ‘European identity’ rather than a European coordinated policy and to ESDP as being associated with ‘European security and defence identities’, rather than ‘European policies’ was commonly used in transatlantic circles and among European-NATO member states, as a form to underline CFSP weakly institutionalisation.²¹

The development of a general basis of agreement and institutional conditions to attain common decision-making improved the level of socialisation among participants helping to gradually dismiss these misconceptions.²² The permanence of decision-making bodies, an increase in the frequency of meetings, gradual clarification of the competences and actors involved in decision-making and the consolidation of substantive CFSP areas of political intervention contributed to enhanced socialisation. The focus on a logic of appropriateness, which characterised most of the policy issues addressed in common positions and joint actions, facilitated internalisation of foreign policy behaviour asserted as commonly beneficial and adequate. These developments were contingently affected by the various agents involved in CFSP, by the circumstantial climate of competition among the EU Presidency, the European Parliament and Commission, and the mistrust between Political Committee and COREPER, which appeared to have obstructed a higher level of socialisation.²³

The third row stresses the coexistence of an intergovernmental mode of decision making with a ‘supranational’ orientation, which created different modes of

²⁰ *EU Treaty* Article 11, former Article J.1. ...The Treaty of Maastricht was agreed in December 1991, signed in February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993.

²¹ See Wæver 1996, 124-125.

²² The Treaty of Amsterdam created a High Representative for CFSP, a Policy Planning and a Early Warning Unit within the Council General Secretariat. The WEU's Secretariat was moved from London to Brussels and a permanent Planning Cell, a Situation Centre and a Satellite Centre for WEU were established. In 1999, during the Helsinki European Council, it was created a Military Committee and a Military Staff.

²³ See Bretherton & Vogler 2000, 181.

routinisation of policy practices. The dual persistence of intergovernmental features (decision making by unanimity, constructive abstention and invocation of ‘reasons of national policy’ to impede qualified majority voting), together with features that could imply ‘supranational decision-making’ (qualified majority voting and ‘opt in’ clause (later enhanced cooperation) for states who wished to participate in CFSP actions), are central characteristics of the institutional design for CFSP.²⁴ In the case of CFSP, routinisation was incremental, followed by gradual institutional developments and according to the salience of the policy issues addressed. The learning-by-doing process of the CFSP, its consensual decision-making and policy implementation, the presence of circumvention clauses (constructive abstention and possibility to invoke reasons of national policy), as well as its normative focus enabled the internalisation and imitation of behaviour by member states. The implementation of policy issues in the second pillar (with the exception of the defence aspects) and considering its reflection on common positions and joint actions, shows a good record of success, in particular for those initiatives where financial considerations are not at stake. This good record was not affected by the various institutional reforms, since provisions regarding further implementation of the CFSP were followed by agreements on circumvention clauses. This opened various ways for member states to participate, therefore to cooperate even with a low level of regulative mechanisms of rule enforcement.

The decision-making mode and consensual voting for the EU second pillar produced institutional conditions of interdependence among member states, in particular with regard to the existence of agreements prior to actions, being decisions preceded by understandings on the principles underlying actions. Normative compliance preceded functional or operational commitment involving the agreement of member states on a EU specific approach to CFSP areas.

The fourth row calls attention to the non-regulative aspects of CFSP/ESDP that made concordance pertaining to the ‘spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’ leading to variations in concordance resultant from the relation between degree of credibility acknowledge to CFSP initiatives and task assignment. Member states were expected to ‘refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations’.²⁵ These obligations are mandatory even without specific provisions leading to coercive en-

²⁴ See Wagner 2003, 578-579.

²⁵ *EU Treaty* Article 11, former Article J.1.

forcement.²⁶ The texts on common positions and joint actions are legal texts, although compliance of national policies with the dispositions contained in common positions was left to member states.

The rules inherent to CFSP could be regulative in the sense that they established policy precedence, even when placed outside the scrutiny of the European Court of Justice.²⁷ In the case of joint actions, member states were committed ‘in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity’, since these involved operational actions by the EU.²⁸ Member states were caught into what Schimmelfennig calls ‘rhetorical entrapment’.²⁹ The introduction of the procedure of *constructive abstention* and the possibility to invoke reasons of national interest balanced provisions regarding *qualified majority voting* and safeguarded the intergovernmental orientation of CFSP.³⁰ The CFSP is a ‘highly institutionalised and complex process of consultation and cooperation between Member State governments’ not a policy whose implementation depends on transposition of laws.³¹ The responsibility to ‘inform and consult’ on matters of foreign and security policy is in itself a prescription regarding foreign policy behaviour of member states. If a member state fails to consult others, before a decision on foreign policy is taken, it is likely to suffer loss of credibility and trust from its counterparts, weakening its bargaining power within CFSP.

A normative rather than regulative force bind concordance. Norms within CFSP are spontaneously adopted on a willing base, through which they acquire what Smith observes as ‘some measure of legitimacy’, resulting from a change from ‘an instrumental regulatory conception of institutions to a more deontological view’ by framing standards of ‘behaviour in terms of duties, or moral purpose.’³² The CFSP official record showed a total of 286 common positions and joint actions agreed between 1991 and 2001 with substantive guidance about ‘behaviour obligations’.³³

²⁶ See Smith, 2004b, 185.

²⁷ Tonra 2003,741. It is the responsibility of the Council to ensure that the obligations of support and solidarity under CFSP are complied with, see *EU Treaty* Article 2, former Article B. Once the Council decided on the first draft of common positions and joint actions the text is circulated to member states for their consideration and later submitted to the Council for adoption via the Political Committee and Coreper to be published by the Secretariat in the *Official Journal of the EC Legislation*. Although the Commission can propose common positions and joint actions, most of the proposals are initiated by the Presidency or member states showing how the Commission is not the main force in the CFSP. See K. Smith 2003, 38.

²⁸ See *EU Treaty* Article 14 and Article 15, former Article J.4. and Article J.5.

²⁹ Schimmelfennig 2001, 47-80.

³⁰ *EU Treaty* Article 7.2, Article 7.3 and Article 7.4, respectively former former Article F.1.2, Article F.1.3 and Article F.1.4. The use of QMV occurs only after an initial decision for CFSP action has been taken unanimously.

³¹ Bretherton & Vogler 2000, 169.

³² See Smith 2004b, 118-119.

³³ See Smith 2004b, 117-121.

These common positions and joint actions were supported under comprehensive normative umbrellas such as: human rights, rule of law, right to self-determination, good governance, appropriate handling of sensitive security issues (e.g. land mines, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical, biological and toxic weapons). The common positions agreed for this period, comprised broad restrictions on economic and financial relations with contending parties in regional conflicts, ban of arms export to these areas and security-related issues regarding production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons, respect for human rights, democracy, rule of law, and good governance.³⁴ Likewise, the joint actions agreed for the same period, although having a functional purpose entailed a reasoning, which can be said to be conformant with a global normative agenda. Various actions directed to extra-European territories and broad security issues were addressed such as: humanitarian aid, ban on anti-personnel landmines, establishment of assistance programmes to counter terrorist activities and promotion of transparency on nuclear-related export controls.

6.1.1 Conclusions

The initial strains generated among the various CFSP agents created problems of intra-institutional competition and representation, which affected the EU's second pillar effectiveness and reputation as role prescriber, within and outside its borders. Limited coordination, problems of policy consistency and of visibility of the EU as an international actor are consequences of a complex and pillarised decision-making structure, not a problem of lack of substantive focus of CFSP. The clearer definition of CFSP goals and the growing availability of institutional and material assets, through the various revisions of the text treaties, enabled CFSP a better international position. The CFSP is both an institution-building process and a process aimed at framing policy behaviour. Its prescriptive role, being less evident in regulative terms than what can be found for the first pillar, relied strongly on the ability of the CFSP

³⁴ Council of the European Union, *Common Positions* 94/779/CFSP of 28 November 1994, *OJ L* 313, 6 December 1994, p.1; 95/150/CFSP of 28 April 1995, *OJ L* 099, 29 April 1995, p.2; 96/184/CFSP of 26 February 1996, *OJ L* 058, 7 March 1996, p.1; 96/508/CFSP of 9 August 1996, *OJ L* 212, 21 August 1996, p. 1 and 01/375/CFSP of 14 May 2001, *OJ L* 132, 15 May 2001, p.7 *European Foreign Policy Bulletin Online* <http://www.iue.it/EFPB/Welcome.html> (Acceded 14/05/2001). Council of the European Union *Joint Actions* 94/276/CFSP of 19 April 1994, *OJ L* 119, 7 May 1994, p.1; 96/588/CFSP of 1 October 1996, *OJ L* 260, 12 October 1996, p. 1; 97/288/CFSP of 29 April 1997, *OJ L* 120, 12 May 1997, p. 1; 98/623/CFSP of 3 November 1998, *OJ L* 297, 6 November 1998, p.1; 98/627/CFSP of 9 November 1999, *OJ L* 300, 11 November 1998, p. 1; 99/346/CFSP of 17 May 1999, *OJ L* 133, 28 May 1999, p.3; 00/297/CFSP of 13 April 2000, *OJ L* 097, 19 April 2000, p.4 and 01/748/CFSP of 29 October 2001, *OJ L* 286, 30 October 2001, p.2 *European Foreign Policy Bulletin Online*, <http://www.iue.it/EFPB/Welcome.html> (Acceded 14/05/2001).

agenda to represent a broad scope of external policy concerns, generate common meanings and supply behavioural standards about what is being valued. The CFSP drew its prescriptive power from its normative and valorative core and consequent identification of member states with comprehensive valorative prescriptions. The prescriptive strength of the CFSP rested on the sustainability of a diverse scope of common positions and national preferences, and from a normative structure in which prescriptions were publicly embedded.

The goal-set for CFSP is conformant with the actions taken in the context of foreign and security policy. The CFSP task dependency (e.g. successfully regarding the democratisation and social and economic development of South Africa, less successfully in mobilising support and coordinating positions regarding the Balkans) generated misperceptions about the prescriptive roles the CFSP/ESDP were to play. The security dimension of CFSP aimed at the civil aspects of crisis management and conflict resolution. It did not involve responsibilities of collective defence nor did it embody a dimension based on confrontational military goals. Agreement of the roles prescribed was the result of persuasion and reputation of the negotiators, not a consequence of regulative enforcement.

The prescriptive force of the EU second pillar proceeded from the affinities generated among member states and their subsequent resonance on national policies. Affinity and resonance are stimulated by consensual policy positions, willing compliance with policy guidance and observation of compliant behaviour about the common positions and joint actions to be adopted.³⁵ This accounts for the successful record of adherence in particular regarding those policy issues that could be brought under broad normative umbrellas comprising good governance, human rights, arms control, and rule of law. Mutual solidarity and common understandings framed national preferences in a mobilising mode of appropriate behaviour.

Likewise, the endurance of the roles prescribed benefited from progressive routinisation and internalisation facilitated by consensual decision-making, by the presence of circumvention mechanisms safeguarding national preferences on sensitive matters and by the normative substance of common and joint positions. A gradual clarification of competencies and the definition of the actors involved in the process

³⁵ *EU Treaty* Article 11.2, Article 23.1 and Article 23.2, respectively former Articles J.1.2 and J.13.1 and J.13.2.

balanced the hindering effects of previous inter-pillar competition and unclear division of work.

The CFSP instruments functioned as ‘legal’ texts in the sense that they generated policy precedence in foreign policy behaviour. This quality of precedence was reinforced by the obligation of member states to inform and consult before acting, ensuring concordance with a general orientation in the absence of regulated obligations. If member states fail to conform their foreign and security policies according to these parameters, they risk a costly loss of credibility and the trust of other member states.

The foreign and security policy dimensions of the CFSP prescriptive role relied strongly on persuasive rather than coercive mechanisms, and normative rather than instrumental substance of the CFSP agenda. The cases of successful role prescriptions in its foreign dimension are observed, when common positions are perceived by member states as reflecting understandings about Europe as an ethical community of values. Similarly, its security and defence dimension mobilises greater support in those cases where roles conveyed are predominantly oriented to civilian tasks, enabling the use of political, diplomatic and economic instruments.

Being embedded within the roles prescribed presupposes existence of policy precedence across time, binding obligations and duties conformant with the value set conveyed and their internalisation through denser socialisation.

6.2 Validation of Conditions of the CFSP’s Role Prescription

The period addressed in this study offers interesting evidence of European prescriptive ability to integrate and to advance the dimensions of foreign, security and defence policy, as well as to mobilise member states towards common views in these domains. The close proximity of foreign and security policy to traditional state’s sovereign attributes made the idea of a common European security and defence difficult to conceive. However, the CFSP/ESDP prescriptions based on willing compliance in foreign, security and defence domain generated a degree of consensus among member states that allowed moving from a foreign dimension to the implementation of a security and defence capacity focused on non-military and military aspects.

6.2.1 *International Position*

Various arguments are commonly referred to in literature to explain the weak prescriptive role of the EU in the context of CFSP/ESDP: its proximity to the national core elements of state sovereignty (external relations, territorial security and defence), the unbalance between its goal set, the resources made available and the limited institutional means of coordination. In the primary sources analysed none of these motives appeared to have weakened the EU prescriptive role in the domains considered. The history of CFSP until the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam was not a fast track to full integration of European foreign and security policy. The period between 1991 and 1996 featured a preparatory path to attain commonality of views on foreign and security policy issues, to reach broad agreements on aggregative principles and to outline the scope of policies to be addressed. Not to establish a supranational, regulative or operational security entity in the military sense.

From the policy documents analysed two reasons can be inferred why the EU's *international position* in foreign and security policy was limited. On the one hand the CFSP went through a long process of institutional adaptation since the Maastricht Treaty characterised by various Treaty reforms. On the other, the EU/CFSP sought to export a liberal identity, with a global reach (good governance, rule of law, human rights, protection of minority rights, disarmament and arms control, while keeping its functional focus limited to regional non-military actions and to the use of economic instruments to coerce behaviour. CFSP evolved from a cooperation project to a policy with its own institutions, instruments and resources. Those countries with integrationist perspectives, favoured an overarching prescriptive entity and decision-making procedures favourable to their individual role in the context of integrated policies for the second pillar. Those member states that supported an intergovernmental view encouraged the adoption of a model based on co-decision.³⁶ This created misperceptions among member states that hampered the CFSP international prescriptive role, since discussions among member states reflected more their own fears, than the limits of CFSP.

³⁶ From a procedural perspective, the integrationist and intergovernmental traditions display what Ginsberg distinguishes between a tradition of foreign policy, based on the *acquis communautaire* where 'supranational law, common institutions and the use of qualified majority voting' prevail; and a tradition of foreign policy based on the *acquis politique* based on 'preservation of legitimacy rooted in the national interest, expertise drawn from member states's Foreign Ministries and decision making by consensus or unanimity', see Ginsberg 1997b, 15.

The programme of the Commission in 1992, concerning the strengthening of the Community's international role, was clearly oriented towards a functional specification of instruments and structures that would enable a new international role for the Union.³⁷ The reasoning behind this proposal was based on normative beliefs and instrumental considerations about the polarising effect of the EU over neighbouring countries, leading to imitation of foreign policy behaviour based on prescriptions that emanated from the EU to member states. For the period considered in this study, the EU/CFSP international position relied on a combined use of valorative, economic and financial incentives in order to induce compliant behaviour with its external prescriptions (e.g. towards South Africa and the policy of apartheid).

During the Portuguese Presidency, in the second half of 1992, the approval by the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the likely development of CFSP, identified the policy areas open to joint action and defined the topical and regional scope of these prescriptions.³⁸ This placed the CFSP at the level of an integrated policy, rather than of a policy project, setting the conditions to reach agreements on the horizontal domains of CFSP and the competences comprising joint actions to be taken by the Union. The joint actions were to have broad prescriptive focus comprehending: strengthening democratic principles and institutions; respect for human and minorities rights; creation of political and economic frameworks of regional cooperation; prevention and peaceful settlement of conflicts; humanitarian relief and cooperation on fight against arms proliferation and terrorism.³⁹ Common interests based on geographical proximity, political and economic stability, and existent threats to European security interests determined these horizontal domains. The proposal also specified the issues which fell into the security dimension of CFSP that could be object of joint actions: disarmament and arms control; nuclear proliferation issues, control of transference of military technology and arms export. The nature of the issues addressed and the success of CFSP in aggregating common positions around some of these issues (e.g. nuclear proliferation) improved perceptions on the mobilising effect of the

³⁷ European Commission, *From the Single Act to Maastricht and Beyond: The Means to Match Our Ambitions, Part II Maastricht: New Ambitions*, Doc./92/2, 11th February 1992.

³⁸ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions, II-External Relations, 3-Report to the European Council in Lisbon, on the Likely Development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with a View to Identifying Areas Open to Joint Action vis-à-vis Particular Countries or Groups of Countries*, Doc./92/3, Lisbon 27th June 1992.

³⁹ The first common position adopted by the EU dates from 22 November 1993 and regarded reduction of economic relations with Libya, see 93/614/CFSP. The first joint action was approved on 6 December 1993 concerning support to the transition towards a democratic and multi-racial South Africa, see 93/687/CFSP.

EU second pillar.⁴⁰ This proves the resonance of the dynamics of integration, but also the way the EU represented the valorative concerns of member states and the way the EU Presidencies addressed particular security concerns of member states and those of applicant countries.

The EU intervention in the Balkans showed consistency between normative pledges and policy actions based on aid programmes, and recovery and rehabilitation tasks, for which the EU was particularly well suited. The take over of post-conflict tasks such as: humanitarian assistance, recovery and reconstruction of political administrations, recuperation of legal frameworks and material infrastructures add significance to the international position of the CFSP.⁴¹ The EU limitations regarding military engagement in former Yugoslavia resulted from lack of prior experience in conflict resolution, from the characteristics of the conflict itself, from the limited immediate availability of military resources and from the process of institutional adaptation of CFSP.⁴² This generated misperceptions about the international role that the EU/CFSP could take in the Balkans. In 1996 the contribution of the *High Level Group of Experts for CFSP* to the Intergovernmental Conference sought to conciliate the specific nature of CFSP with the particularities of military response, signalling availability to contribute with military assets and capabilities and indicating political willingness to cooperate with NATO.⁴³ The necessity for a comprehensive concept of European security, the development of operational capabilities, the growth of European cooperation in the field of armaments and improved relations between the EU and the WEU were crucial developments to a stronger international role.⁴⁴ Among the proposals conveyed by the Messina Group was the appointment by the European Council of a High Representative for the CFSP. The matter of external representation

⁴⁰ That was the case for the CFSP common positions and actions regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Stability Pact in Central and Eastern Europe and the contributions to democracy and economic development in South Africa, see Smith 2004b, 194-198. The CFSP also recorded cases of success with reference to the arms embargo against former Yugoslavia, participation in the electoral process in Bosnia Herzegovina and the administration of the city of Mostar in association with WEU.

⁴¹ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992, Paragraphs 2,3, 5 and 6.

⁴² In the context of larger cooperation efforts undertaken by the international community, the EU allocated a total of ECU 80 million to finance the EU Administration task in 1995. For a more detailed account about the EU involvement in conflict prevention and conflict resolution see Rummel 1997, 105-119 and K. Smith 2003, 146-170. For a view that accounts for the limited intervention of the EU in the Balkans, see Kintis 1997, 166.

⁴³ See Groupe d'experts à haut niveau sur la PESC, Premier rapport, *La politique de sécurité de l'Europe à l'horizon 2000: les voies et moyens d'une véritable crédibilité*, Bruxelles, 19 Décembre 1994.

⁴⁴ See Intergovernmental Conference Reflection Group, Reflection Group's Report, *Part III- Giving the Union greater capacity for external action*, Messina, 2 June 1995 and WEU Council of Ministers, *Madrid Declaration, European Security: a Common concept of the 27 WEU countries*, WEU Contribution to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference 1996, Madrid, 14 November 1995. During the WEU Portuguese Presidency it was agreed a preliminary study during the WEU Council of Ministers, *Lisbon Declaration, Common Reflection on the New European Security Conditions*, Lisbon, 15 May 1995.

was an essential requisite of projection of international position, adding coherence to the external political and economic dimensions, enhancing coordination and strengthening the EU external action.

The opening statements of the Treaty of Amsterdam reaffirmed two important aims with direct implications on the international position of CFSP: ‘to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence’ and ‘to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice’ bordering the provisions foreseen for the third pillar.⁴⁵ The Treaty of Amsterdam came to solve problems of inter-pillar consistency, of external representation for CFSP and consolidation of permanent decision-making bodies. The foreign and security domains, addressed by Article C gave the Council and the Commission specific responsibilities in ensuring the consistency and the implementation of external relations and on the development of policies, which allowed a better operationalisation of policy goals.⁴⁶ Enhanced consistency added strength to prescriptive roles in the domain of CFSP. Similarly, the Article 18 sought to solve the problems posed by the diversity of representational positions within the EU. The new Treaty advanced a system of representation shared among the Presidency, entrusted with the representation of the EU ‘in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy’; the High Representative for the CFSP, also the Secretary-General of the Council, responsible for the ‘formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions’ and the Commission fully associated to the tasks of representation and implementation.⁴⁷ By giving the Presidency representation powers, the Union Treaty gave to each member state chairing the Presidency a unique opportunity to influence the course of the CFSP agenda.⁴⁸ Various agents of decision-making were brought together in functions of representation and policy implementation combining the supranational tonus and the weight of the Commission’s legal per-

⁴⁵ The Treaty of Amsterdam was agreed on 17 June 1997, signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999.

⁴⁶ *EU Treaty* Article 3, former Article C.

⁴⁷ *EU Treaty* Article 18, former Article J.8. See also Allen 2001. On the complexities and lack of clarity in the use of troika model on what concerns representation, see Cameron 2001, 60-61.

⁴⁸ However, the presence of the Presidency in the conclusion of international agreements had been little successful in those cases when representatives of the Commission were absent. These accounts for the external role attributed to the Commission as the main voice in the EU external relations. The model of multi-representation that resulted from the Treaty of Amsterdam comprising national representatives, Commission officials, the EU Presidency and occasionally EU special representatives did not reach the goal of attaining a single international voice for the EU. See Smith, 2004b, 216.

sonality (e.g. through the Commissioner for External Relations), the national and intergovernmental preferences of the Presidency, the High Representative for the CFSP and the expertise of EU officials.⁴⁹ This had a negative impact on the visibility of the CFSP seen internally as a stage of clashes between decision-making bodies and experts, and externally as a fragmented entity without a centralised decision-making core and a single external representative.

From the operational point of view various steps paved the way to a possible European defence policy: the Lisbon Declaration on a *Common Reflection on the New European Security Conditions*, the WEU contribution on *European Security: a Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries*, the possibility to integrate WEU into the EU and a specific reference in Article J.7.1 of the Treaty of Amsterdam regarding a 'progressive' rather 'eventual' common defence policy, they all added visibility to the EU defence dimension whose absence was perceived as hindering the CFSP international position.⁵⁰

The Joint Declaration issued at the St. Malo Summit weakened the divisive lines that separated European and transatlantic allies on the emergence of a European security and defence policy. The final declaration suggested the scope, the legal frame, the institutional setting and the military assets and capabilities required to build an autonomous capacity 'backed up by credible military forces' and a security and defence commitment that would preserve the obligations set out in the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Brussels Treaty.⁵¹ The decisions approved during the *Cologne European Council* in June 1999, the *Helsinki European Council* in December 1999, the *Lisbon Extraordinary European Council* in March 2000, the *Feira European Council* in June 2000 and the *Nice European Council* in December 2000 all converged in the same direction: providing Europe a military dimension. The

⁴⁹ The tasks attributed to the High Representative for the CFSP and the Commissioner of External Relations also enclosed some potential for generating competing views. The CFSP troika encompassed a complex set of relations where the 'EU Presidency still represents member states (intergovernmentalism), the Commission speaks for the European institutions (supranationalism)' and the High Representative for CFSP and the External Relations Commissioner divide the political and economic dimensions of CFSP. See Smith 2004b, 230.

⁵⁰ *EU Treaty* Article 17.1, former Article 7.1. See also WEU Council of Ministers, *Lisbon Declaration, Common Reflection on the New European Security Conditions* Lisbon, 15 May 1995; WEU Council of Ministers, *Madrid Declaration, European Security: a Common concept of the 27 WEU countries*, Madrid, 14 November 1995 and WEU Council of Ministers, *Declaration on Western European Union, A-WEU Relations with the European Union*, Maastricht, 9-10 December 1991. See also WEU Council of Ministers, *Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn, 19 June 1992, *Part II- On Strengthening WEU's Operational Role*, Paragraph 4. The Petersberg tasks included humanitarian and rescue tasks, combat forces in crisis management and peacekeeping.

⁵¹ Joint Declaration by the British and French Government, *British-French Summit*, Saint Malo, 3-4 December 1998. This initiative was preceded by a Franco-German Summit on 1 December 1998, which set bilateral arrangements regarding European cooperation, see *Final Declaration* by the French and German Government, Franco-German Summit, Potsdam, 1 December 1998.

Treaty of Nice specified the obligations inherent to CFSP/ESDP adding to the principle of flexibility, a set of rules concerning enhanced cooperation and reinforcement of the competences of the former Political and Security Committee, emphasising the security component of CFSP.⁵² The decisions with implications for the development of a common European policy on security and defence would be taken in the framework of CFSP giving to the future European Defence Security Policy (EDSP) an integrated dimension, rather than propitiating the edification of a separate pillar for defence issues.⁵³ In terms of political and strategic control, the member states agreed on the creation of specific CFSP bodies supported by the *EU Military Committee* (national military representatives) and the *EU Military Staff* (Situation Centre) working in close collaboration with the experts the *Political and Security Committee* (political and military experts) acting as a permanent body in Brussels. These institutional developments allowed creating an integrated community of experts that helped to inform the future defence dimension of ESDP.

The implementation phase of ESDP was mainly procedural from the point of view of military action. Any fundamental changes to be introduced to national defence policy were left to member states' willing coalescence. This voluntary response constituted a strong driving motive to member states to comply with the EU prescriptions, since it facilitated responses from national administrations without raising domestic opposition to integrated initiatives for security and defence.

Another argument commonly used to hamper the EU/CFSP international position in the security and defence results from a misconception regarding Europe's ambition in replacing NATO. The official record analysed showed little evidence of such ambition. As defined in Nice, the EU was to generate military and civilian crisis response tools in a comprehensive manner comprising, promotion of political stability, build up of a early warning cell, conflict prevention, crisis management skills and post-conflict reconstruction tasks. None of these tasks collided with NATO's collective defence mission.⁵⁴ The proceedings from the Laeken European Council also dis-

⁵² The military dimension of WEU was integrated into the EU and it was conceded that cooperation in the domain of European armaments and defence industries was to be initiated. See Assembly of WEU, *Organising security in Europe-political aspects*, Doc.1509, 26 January 1996, at.10.

⁵³ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Cologne 3-4 June 1999, *Annex III-Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence*.

⁵⁴ See European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999, *Annex IV-Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence and on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union*.

confirmed the idea that the EU aimed at a strict and competing military role.⁵⁵ The military capabilities envisaged by the EU, namely those of force protection, intelligence, command and control and strategic mobility were also essential to the fulfilment of civilian crisis management tasks. The EU did not seek to replace NATO, and national positions in favour of one or other organisation were largely drawn from finding which organisation was most efficient, in terms of best-fitted resources and which was most appropriate, in terms of suggesting the most convincing argument and presenting the most legitimate solution to a specific security problem.⁵⁶ Humanitarian relief, electoral and human rights monitoring, support to local administrations and legal rehabilitation and post conflict reconstruction were likely to become the core of CFSP external tasks.

An indication of change of perception regarding the condition of *international position* was found in specific references in the Treaty of the European Union regarding asserting the EU identity and creating a ‘coherent force’ that would allow the EU to actively participate in international security. Adherence to the idea of a common security and defence policy was generated by a sense of trust and cooperation facilitated by open communication and political will, which helped to overcome initial resistance to a European defence policy. The conciliation of diverse foreign and defence policy preferences, traditions, and national constraints (e.g. constitutional limitation in the case of Germany, transatlantic defence traditions in the case of Portugal and the United Kingdom and preference for neutrality in the case of Nordic countries), kept the CFSP and ESDP based on conciliation of preferences and agreements, rather than on formal and mandatory incorporation of policy provisions. Various elements point in this direction: maintenance of decision-making by consensus; voluntary adaptation of national defence policies to the developments resultant from the institutionalisation of a ESDP; location of political choice at the national level with regard to national attribution of military forces to EU-led operations and observation of the priorities and commitments assumed by member states, in the context of other organisations. In this case, voluntary adherence was the most evident feature of positive perception of CFSP/ESDP among member states. The fact EU member states with atypical positions (i.e. Germany, Portugal and Finland) towards ESDP, initiated some of the most

⁵⁵ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Laeken 14-15 December 2001, *Annex II-Declaration on the Operational Capability of the Common Foreign and Security Policy*. See also WEU Council of Ministers, *Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations*, Luxembourg, 22-23 November 1999.

⁵⁶ See Sjursen 2004, 16-18 and Sjursen 2003.

important contributions to this dimension, proves the prescriptive appeal within the EU second pillar.

De Schoutheete de Tervant featured the process of European integration as evolving from a community of information, to a community of views and finally to a community of action.⁵⁷ The CFSP followed the same path from an initiative for information exchange and consultation, to a forum of policy implementation. Both CFSP and ESDP developed on the basis of gradual institutionalisation, accumulation of expertise, internalisation of behaviour and collective response to external challenges. It was outside the limited realms of national deliberation and inter-party bargaining about integrated security and defence that the legitimisation of CFSP/ESDP decisions and actions took place. The creation of CFSP permanent decision-making bodies enabled the formation of a base of expertise which gave the incentive to further socialisation, internalisation and compliance with role prescriptions.

In sum, a positive view on the EU/CFSP international position can be drawn from its ability to mobilise member states support, not on the basis of regulative role prescriptions, but on the basis of willing and informal compliance. The creation of a single CFSP representative and of institutional mechanisms to formulate policy positions and operationalise policy actions constituted an essential condition of international projection. In the case of the CFSP/ESDP, appropriate problem addressing was supported by forms of problem-solving compatible with the Union's political and valorative core in the second pillar. The focus of policy documents on preventive diplomacy and civilian and post-conflict tasks was consonant with the mobilising effect of EU in problem-addressing, both for small and major member states. An indication of strengthening of international position was found in specific references in the Treaty of the European Union to assert an international identity and create a 'coherent force' that would allow the EU, not only to voice, but also to actively participate in international affairs.

6.2.2 Prominence

On what concerns the condition of *prominence*, the early stages of CFSP evolved to a normative focus on the policy issues open to joint actions intended to generate policy precedence and to disseminate appropriate behaviour among member

⁵⁷ See Tervarent 1986.

states.⁵⁸ The EU conveyed to applicant countries values and norms in the field of foreign and security policy, which member states could not reject without hindering the normative foundations of the Union itself. As Payne suggests, norm entrepreneurs commonly use material levers and act strategically to achieve desired ends that is, they seek by using a normatively driven language to create resonance of ‘shared ethical traditions’, which bind both member states and the applicant countries to the same political purposes.⁵⁹

The EU involvement in former Yugoslavia is a good illustration of prominence based on appropriateness. The EU made use of its political strength, diplomatic prominence and economic weight in helping to end hostilities and to support negotiations for a peaceful settlement in the region. The focus on the civilian and humanitarian aspects of conflict resolution and peace settlement constitutes evidence of consistency between normative goals (support for conflict resolution by non-military means) and non-coercive material means (e.g. diplomatic *démarches*, financial aid and humanitarian relief). The documents analysed, issued in the context of the European Council and EU Presidencies reflected such focus. The concerns voiced through the European Council reiterated the normative agenda of the EU towards the conflict: end of hostilities through negotiated peace; refusal to accept territorial claims from the parts involved in the conflict; support to a constitutional settlement based on ‘mutual recognition of the multi-ethnic character of Bosnia-Herzegovina’.⁶⁰

The fact that the EU second pillar was able to generate commonality of positions among member states and applicant members regarding contending issues, like nuclear proliferation, also illustrates an attained position of prominence from EU authorities. The Corfu European Council set the guidelines for the adoption of a joint action concerning the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in preparation for the NPT conference, which took place in 1995. The EU successfully generated commonality of positions by presenting a procedural framework strongly

⁵⁸ Similarly initiatives such as the enlargement process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership involved a functional conditionality based on broad normative frames, which worked as conditional backgrounds for appropriate policy action. The enlargement process offers evidence of a focus on appropriateness. However, the specification of criteria of accession to applicant countries underlined both a functional and a normative reasoning. The modernisation of national economies, transition to a market economy and compliance with the political, economic and monetary aims of the Union were considered side by side with the criteria of stability of institutions, respect for democracy, rule of law and human rights, protection of minorities and democratic control of the armed forces. See European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, *Annex II-Cooperation with the Associated Countries Geared to the Objective of Membership*.

⁵⁹ Payne 2001, 54 and 38.

⁶⁰ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992, *Annex D-Declaration on the Former Yugoslavia*, Paragraph 2 and 3.

embedded in universal principles regarding general acceptance and compliance by the parties to the NPT.⁶¹ In the specific domain of CFSP the full commitment of associated countries to the Union's *démarches* and joint actions, related with unconditional and unlimited application of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and support for joint actions on anti-personnel mines, constitutes strong evidence of a case of successful role prescription, based on the prominence of the roles sustained and on the EU reputation as political actor. The EU was not only able to persuade new members to adopt core community values regarding sensitive security issues like arms control, but it also prescribed foreign policy behaviour, by inducing the agreement of member and applicant states on the unconditional and unlimited validity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.⁶² The agreement was even supported by the United Kingdom and France, the only EU member states that could have opposed to the initiative in order to protect their status of nuclear powers.

The observation of the condition of *prominence* in the primary sources shows that prescriptions of *appropriate* behaviour does not rule out the possibility to make use of *consequential* behaviour, based on economic power and political status, by denying or delaying access to the EU membership or by imposing sanctions to its own members. The material incentives provided by the EU, in return for compliance with its *acquis politique*, did not have the same consequential impact on the compliant behaviour of all applicant countries. The behaviour of applicant countries reflects however important signs of prescriptive impact. Their record of normative compliance improved substantially in the face of financial and aid development incentives as part of the EU pre-accession strategy. This was the case of Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, which faced situations of strategic void and weak participation in international organisations. Membership to EU was an opportunity to signal their own political maturity towards a new set of role prescriptions. In this cases compliance with the EU role prescriptions functioned as an incentive to further integration in an inclusive framework of mutual rights and responsibilities.

The consequential dimension of ESDP was limited by the European-NATO members' focus on transatlantic relations and the American resistance to cooperate

⁶¹ See European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Corfu, 24-25 June 1994, *Part II Common and Foreign Security Policy*, L. *Guidelines For a Joint Action on the Preparation of the 1995 Conference of The Parties to The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*.

⁶² Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council, Part B, 19 June 1995, *Implementation of The Strategy in the First Half of 1995, VIII.CFSP*. Appended to the *Cannes European Council*, 26-27 June 1995.

with Europe in the field of armaments and defence industries. This limited the possibility of a ESDP supported by military might and favoured those arguments that stressed the existence of a goals-capabilities gap.⁶³ However, as from mid 1990s, the EU achieved a high level of agreement on the imposition of various sanctions considered as consequential (ban to Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) carriers over EU territory, freezing of funds and assets of FRY and Serbian government and end of flow of funds and weapons), which allowed to perceive its consequential dimension by other means than military power.⁶⁴

The condition of prominence based on dissemination of frames of appropriate behaviour presented findings, consistent with the notion of the EU representing through CFSP an ‘ethical community’, with a low confrontational posture, strongly embedded in the norms of international law, combining best practices and adequate means to solve security problems at a level beyond the strict technical one. The civilian focus of CFSP in crisis management also underlined this base of appropriateness through the institutionalisation of organs such as the Committee for Civilian Aspects for Crisis Management and programmes like the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, which reinforced the EU/CFSP agenda on human rights, strengthened by the decision to draw a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union with the goal to identify basic procedural rights guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.⁶⁵ The European Council was particularly active in conveying a discourse underlining the normative role of the EU by stating the ‘European Community’s moral obligation’ to avoid the perpetration of crimes against humanity and to safeguard ‘fundamental European values’.⁶⁶ This not only stressed the normative focus of the Union, but also called the attention to the inclusion of procedural rights in the Treaty’s text, giving it a mandatory essence. The EU by defining itself as an ‘ethical community’ strengthened its normative agenda beyond a strict technical dimension of common problem-solving, giving it a specific dimension on how to address security and defence issues.⁶⁷ The edification of ESDP itself was conformant with the EU’s low confrontational posture drawn from

⁶³ See Camps 1972, 559-578, Holland 1995, 555-572 and Hill 2001, 18-38.

⁶⁴ See Common Position 98/240/CFSP of 19 March 1998 and Common Position 98/326/CFSP of 7 May 1998.

⁶⁵ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Santa Maria da Feira 19-20 June 2000, *Annex I-Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy, III-Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management*.

⁶⁶ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Berlin 24-25 March 1999, *Part III- Statements on Kosovo, Statement by the European Council Concerning Kosovo*.

⁶⁷ Neyer 2003, 692.

the use of diplomatic resources in conflict mediation, employment of financial resources in recovery of local administrations and infrastructures, and police activities defined as core functions of the EU security and defence dimension.

The operationalisation of the ESDP through the Headline Goal agreed in 1999, was preceded by convincing argumentation supported by a 'language of values', which reaffirmed the EU commitment in 'building a Common European Security and Defence Policy capable of reinforcing the Union's external action through the development of a military crisis management capability, as well as a civilian one, in full respect of the principles of the United Nations Charter'.⁶⁸ The functions inherent to the civilian aspects of crisis management adjusted well to the less contending profile of European defence, contributing to the re-establishment of disrupted administrative systems, recovery of infrastructures, providing training in penal expertise in cooperation with the UN and OSCE, training of local administration officials in periods of political transition and missions of search and rescue in disaster relief operations. The civilian component of ESDP was reinforced by the provisions suggested in the context of rule of law, where the EU was recognised to have a unique prescriptive approach in post-conflict situation (e.g. in contributing to the creation of provisional legal frameworks in situations of institutional and normative void). The long tested European tradition in law drafting and regulations issuing, combined with a specific concern in conciliating the various constitutional provisions of member states placed it in the forefront of foreign and security tasks that could hardly be overtaken by other international organisations.

In sum, the prominence of the roles prescribed derived more from its appropriateness than consequentiality. The use of normative frames and the focus on non-military security tasks had a mobilising effect among smaller and major member states improving participation for the first and enhancing cooperation among the latter in international initiatives under a CFSP/ESDP label. The primary sources show that the consequential effects, both positive (economic incentives in the pre-accession period and other material rewards) and negative (in delaying or denying membership or by suppressing material rewards), did not impact evenly among member states, applicant members, and third countries. Recognition of prominence of the roles conveyed seemed to result more from domestic resonance of the values disseminated than from

⁶⁸ Tonra 2003, 750. See also European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Santa Maria da Feira, 19-20 June 2000, *I-Preparing the Future*, C. *Common European Security and Defence Policy*.

the consequential reaction of CFSP decision-making organs towards non-compliant behaviour. The long tradition of European law drafting and diplomatic cooperation and coordination gave the CFSP a unique place in the way foreign, security and defence problems are addressed and framed within the EU second pillar.

6.2.3 *Endurance*

The institutionalisation of CFSP instruments opened the possibility to consolidate policy practices leading to common positions and joint actions. The attainment of a common front on policy issues claimed for the setting of institutional conditions of routinisation of policy procedures. The implementation of CFSP instruments improved considerably the routinisation and internalisation of new foreign policy preferences and strengthened imitation of ‘behavioural obligations’ among member states.⁶⁹ The dynamics of European integration called for routinisation of consultation procedures for CFSP involving the Commission, the European Council and the Presidency and for congruity of decisions taken across pillars. This requirement for habitual consultation became a practice as the scope of common positions and joint actions adopted expanded.

The constitution of an autonomous military capability within WEU and the announcement by NATO that its forces could be made available to EU-led operations, provided the material support for a stronger European coordination in security and defence matters, to which routinisation was an essential condition of efficiency, and imitation of behaviour a guarantee of expected behaviour.

The Treaty of Maastricht conveyed the CFSP conceptual and normative focus regarding foreign and security policy, as compared to its modest attempts to set procedural routinisation. The Treaty of Amsterdam improved the conceptual boundaries of the CFSP instruments (common positions), with the aim to ‘define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of geographical or thematic nature’ and the obligations inherent to their adoption, for which member state were to *ensure* that ‘their national policies *conform* to the common positions’.⁷⁰ This introduced a habitual practice of policy consultation adopted regarding joint actions, which addressed ‘specific situations where operational action by the Union was deemed to be required’ and joint actions which committed member states in the positions they adopt and in the ‘con-

⁶⁹ See Smith 2004b, 117-121.

⁷⁰ *EU Treaty* Article 15, former Article J.5. Emphasis added.

duct of their activity'.⁷¹ Member states were to 'inform' and 'consult' one another within the Council on matters of foreign and security policy, ensuring the 'concertation' and 'convergence' of actions. The refinement of procedural guidance defined which actors were involved in decision-making, in the context of CFSP and outlined the contours of future political consultations. The Council was tasked with the definition of principles and general guidelines for CFSP. The Presidency represents the Union, implements the decisions taken and expresses the position of the Union in international organisations and international conferences.⁷² External representation and policy implementation gave member states chairing the Presidency not only considerable visibility, but also broader responsibilities in voicing member states common position in international affairs that is, in representing a European collective position and aggregating dispersed preferences. This reflects more than a simple expression of national preferences.

It is not entirely accurate to hold the Maastricht initiative responsible for short-sighted goals and weak enforcing mechanisms, which are said to affect enduring prescriptions. The literature that points the inability of the EU to solve substantive problems, given its recurrent focus on procedures, forgets that the treaty provisions that defined the scope of policies and the mechanisms to implement and enforce compliance had to be preceded by the identification of aggregative principles leading to an embryonic CFSP agenda and institutional structure.

The condition of *endurance* was also affected by inter-pillar competition, as already referred to, partly due to a situation of shared political representation for CFSP among the Council, the Commission and the Presidency. This hampered the development of a proper routinisation of procedures since e.g. external representation varied on a case by case basis, dependent on the Presidency in office and the policy issue to be addressed.⁷³ This shared representation although beneficial to the internal consistency of aims, hindered the external perception about who represented Europe's voice in foreign and security policy.

The Treaty of Amsterdam institutionalised various initiatives, which contributed to enhance endurance of the roles conveyed. The creation of permanent CFSP organs (policy planning and early warning units) tasked with advisory and evaluation

⁷¹ *EU Treaty* Article 14.1 and 14.3, respectively former Articles J.4.1 and J.4.3. Emphasis added.

⁷² *EU Treaty* Article 18.1 and 18.2, former Articles J.8.1. and J.8.2.

⁷³ Allen 2001, 45-48 and Cameron 2001, 60-61.

functions, the harmonisation of views and policies and the synchronisation of EU/WEU meetings, improved routinisation of common procedures and policy practices, without affecting the specificity of foreign policy preferences of member states.

The new treaty created the possibility to circumvent decisions (*constructive abstention* and invocation of *reasons of national interest*) without blocking implementation or impairing its adoption by the Union as a whole. As foreseen in Article J.13.1, member states 'shall not be obliged to apply the decisions, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union'.⁷⁴ The EU prescriptive function was preserved by the provision that set the integrity of the commitments of the Union *as a whole*. The EU role prescriptions were also reinforced by the dispositions of Article J.1.2. concerning refraining to act in a way contrary to the interests of the Union.⁷⁵

From the conceptual point of view, the Treaty of Amsterdam did not generate a more objective conceptualisation of CFSP instruments, notably of common positions and joint actions nor did it define the 'areas where the Member States had important interests in common', as suggested in Article J.3.2, limiting itself to agree on procedure-related aspects about objectives, duration and the means to be made available for their implementation.⁷⁶ The Council and the Commission were entrusted with ensuring consistency of external policy and the position of the Council was reinforced in terms of recommending and adopting common strategies and common positions. These procedural developments were essential to the consolidation of processes of intra-pillar routinisation of policy practices and fundamental to the maturation of 'automatic reflexes of consultation', which were at the origin of routinisation of procedures and imitation of behaviour.⁷⁷

The decision to improve cooperation between the Council and Secretariat-General of WEU and the Council and General Secretariat of the Council of the Union was a crucial step to the harmonisation of views and routinisation of policies. This aspect of synchronisation of dates and venues of meetings, harmonisation of working methods and Presidencies and closer cooperation between WEU's and EU's decision-making bodies had a far more important role than has been recognised. It enhanced inter-organisational routinisation and improved contacts among representatives of the capitals, national permanent representatives in Brussels and EU and WEU officials.

⁷⁴ EU Treaty Article 23.1, former Article 13.1.

⁷⁵ EU Treaty Article 11.2, former Article J.1.2.

⁷⁶ EU Treaty Article 13.3, former Article J.3.2.

⁷⁷ Nuttall 1992.

The decision to harmonise the WEU and EU Presidencies allowed countries, chairing the respective Presidency, to combine efforts of coordination and consultation, with considerable advantages at the level of agenda setting, inter-institutional consistency and use of experts. This required the institutionalisation of patterns of consultation, information exchange and interface of policy practices essential to endured role prescriptions.⁷⁸

As the CFSP permanent bodies developed, an intensification of international contacts between officials, routinisation of policy practices (e.g. representation role of the Presidency) and consultation among member states can be observed. The Treaty, under Article 25, extended to the Political Committee a security dimension by transforming it into a Political and Security Committee (PSC) composed of national representatives at ambassadorial level, with the aim to ‘monitor the international situation’ in the areas of interest to CFSP and to ‘contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council’ at its request. The PSC was also entrusted with pursuing, under authorisation of the Council, ‘the political control and strategic direction’ of operations in situations of crisis management, which provided better conditions for policy coordination.

The changes introduced at the level of ESDP, with the agreement on the Headline Goal, made available a military capacity for crisis response which pressed for enhanced routinisation of policy guidelines and military procedures from which its operationalisation was dependent.⁷⁹ The agreement between the EU and WEU, on the synchronisation of meetings and harmonisation of working methods, contributed to a better coordination of policy decisions and military activities with implications to the prescriptive effectiveness of CFSP/ESDP.

A last aspect accounts for a stronger observation of endurance of the roles prescribed during early 2000 and is related with a better degree of accountability, involving enhanced cooperation and its implementation by a limited group of member states. Enhanced cooperation, without having direct impact on decisions with military or defence implications improved the operationalisation of CFSP by creating alternative procedures to take forward decisions by a specific group of states. The definition

⁷⁸ As from 1999 the Council of the European Union informally started gathering Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministers, which was not only an unprecedented occasion, but also significant from the perspective of a more coherent and better-articulated European security and defence, see Wessel 2003, 273.

⁷⁹ The goal of a EU military force followed a meticulous inventory of forces (Force Catalogue) based on attribution of national contributions to the EU.

of procedures, guiding the initiation of enhanced cooperation answerable to the Council and scrutinised by the Commission and the European Parliament, made this mechanism of policy implementation accountable to the EU decision-making organs and member states, improving routinisation on this aspect.⁸⁰ The possibility to veto decisions to establish enhanced cooperation was ruled out by the Treaty, which together with the reiteration that abstention by member states would not prevent the adoption of decisions, facilitated reaching limited agreements implemented by smaller groups of member states.

In sum, routinisation of policy practices followed the various phases of institutionalisation observed between the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Nice. Routinised role prescriptions evolved from a simple form of duty of member states to inform on decisions regarding foreign policy, to concert views on common positions and joint actions with topical and geographical focus and to develop common strategies and enhanced cooperation. If the first (inform and concert) sought to generate ‘behavioural obligations’ based on routinisation of policy practices, the latter attempted to create conditional routines that allowed CFSP to move forward, without the need of unanimous agreements, but still accountable to the Council and to the Commission that is, not outside the integrated supervision of EU decision making bodies. Within CFSP/ESDP imitation of policy behaviour is strengthened on the basis of policy precedence and blended mandatory and circumvention mechanisms, which allow member states to incorporate role prescriptions in a compatible way with their preferences and national political traditions. Instead of weakening the endurance of prescriptive roles in the second pillar, this combination made it rather compatible with member states’ own role concepts and with their commitments with other international organisations.

6.2.4 Concordance

The periods that lay between the agreement of member states on the Treaty texts and their ratification are periods of adaptation to the normative and functional

⁸⁰ Initiatives on enhanced cooperation are accountable to the Council therefore they are under direct surveillance of ministers representing member states. Requests regarding enhanced cooperation are to be forward to the Council by those countries which intended to establish enhanced cooperation among them. This request is also forward to the Commission, who gives its opinion and ensure consistency with Union policies and to the European Parliament. The High Representative for CFSP is tasked with guaranteeing that the Council and the European Parliament are properly informed about the implementation process of enhanced cooperation. The Council gives the final authorisation.

conditionalities set forward within CFSP. It was expected that enhanced institutionalisation resultant from the ratification of the Treaty would be followed by significant concordance of national policies with the roles prescribed by the EU. However, the fact that the CFSP is a process in the making, places the observation of concordance in a different dimension. The CFSP produced 'soft laws' with a binding nature.⁸¹ Concordance does not result from implementation of directives or regulations, but rather occurs within the ample space left to member states to decide on what to incorporate and what to exclude on a national basis. However evidence of formal concordance can be traced back to the period immediate to the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, with the approval by member states of common positions and joint actions comprising a wide range of policy issues and regional problems, as described in Chapter 6.1. The mandatory nature of common positions and joint actions did not result from regulative mechanisms to which sanctions are commonly attached, but from a pro-norm approach shared by member states. The proposal for the creation of permanent decision-making bodies for CESDP was followed by the Council's Legal Service assessment on which decisions regarding European security and defence policy could be implemented, without further amendments to the Treaty on European Union.⁸² This meant that ratification by national parliaments was not necessary and that the political and operational process inherent to CESDP could be initiated. The Treaty of Amsterdam restated the condition of flexible participation of member states in CFSP and the preservation of formal concordance with the commitments assumed within other international organisations.

In the later period of this study, the condition of concordance revealed a discreet presence in the policy documents analysed. This is consistent with the low regulative orientation of CFSP/ ESDP. The EU self-enforcing mechanism of role prescription, based on willing compliance, generated a degree of concordant behaviour among member states that allowed moving to the implementation of security and defence capacities, without strict regulatory guidelines.⁸³ Two sets of reasons contributed to improve concordant behaviour, one internal and another external. The internal one concerned member states willing commitments to European security and defence in the

⁸¹ Wessels 1996, 33.

⁸² For a detailed account on aspects of ESDP accountability, see Wagner 2005.

⁸³ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Cologne 3-4 June 1999, *Annex III-European Council Declaration on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence*, Paragraph 3 and 4 and *Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence*, Part 3. Decision Making and 5. Modalities of participation and cooperation.

absence of major external threats, the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the nomination of the High Representative for CFSP, which added consistency to the EU foreign, security and defence dimensions. The external one pertained to the war in the Balkans and to the strengthening of a defence dimension that involved definition of more precise rules of conduct to European forces involved and observation of international law. The crisis caused by the surprising escalation of war in the Balkans, led to the development of ‘efforts to deepen and further institutionalise the internalisation of role expectations’ which common behaviour member states should adopt.⁸⁴

Further evidence of concordance was traced in policy documents that depict initiatives of the EU Presidencies, whose countries had “atypical” positions regarding the second pillar, as already mentioned. The condition of concordance of role prescription was observed in the case of member states with a more recent democratic practice or less experience of integrated policy making. The Portuguese (Lisbon European Council 1992) and the Greek Presidency (Corfu European Council 1994) substantiated considerably the EU’s prescriptive role on matters of foreign and security policy. Their historical past (both former dictatorships), and in the case of Portugal its traditional proximity to NATO and the United States, made them less likely to concord with roles prescribed for foreign, security and defence policy in the European context.⁸⁵ The measures approved by the EU Treaty are the result of the implementation of decisions with operational and military implications adopted during the course of the German, Finnish and the Portuguese presidencies. Formal concordance among those considered to be less pro-European member states was encouraged, as from the moment when these countries chaired the EU Presidency with growing responsibilities in the domain of the Union’s external relations. The same can be said about EU member states with security identities reliant on long established traditions of neutrality (Scandinavian countries) or those like Germany which had, until 1997, constitutional impediments to military involvement in international missions. Under these Presidencies (Cologne European Council in 1999, Helsinki European Council and Feira European Council in 2000) the institutionalisation of various EU and WEU initiatives led to improvements in the security and defence dimensions, which accounts for concordant incidence of EU/CFSP prescriptions. The German Presidency, initiated in March 1999, marked a turning point in European security and defence and under-

⁸⁴ See Tonra 2003, 741.

⁸⁵ Cf. Tonra 2003, 745.

lined a particular concern with civilian, rather than military focus of European crisis management and conflict resolution. The specific nature of CFSP permitted Germany to combine the limitations of its past history, with its new commitments towards integrated security and defence policy.⁸⁶ Finland, traditionally neutral, held its first European Union Presidency in 1999 for which it was in a sensitive position to hinder the dynamics of progressive integration of European security and defence. As a newcomer it had a greater responsibility in showing concordant behaviour with new commitments and in moving forward the European project. Portugal chaired its EU Presidency in the first half of 2000, in a European climate of strengthened trust in European security and defence and supported by its closest European ally, the United Kingdom. A change in the Portuguese position found its origins in a denser socialisation within the Union, which generated a new internal support by national political and military elite toward European security and defence. As Tonra suggests, the CFSP is seen by countries with a colonial history as having a 'positive impact in reshaping their identity' by perceiving themselves within an integrated structure as embodied with a renewed regional or even international responsibility.⁸⁷ Concordant behaviour with new international responsibilities meant undertaking opportunities of international participation, which individually could not be assumed.

The development of a European military capability underlined a new concordant position of member states concerning the Headline Goal, 'reflecting member States' political will and commitment towards these goals' based on 'equal footing in all decisions' and attribution of national assets based on member states 'sovereign decisions'.⁸⁸ The Nice European Council drew important conclusions on the need to establish permanent political and operational organs that could lead to the constitution of a toolbox of military capabilities.⁸⁹ The Nice European Council succeeded in establishing a ESDP, that from the prescriptive point of view, observed various conditions favourable to concordant behaviour from member states: observation of the limitations emanating from national law; respect for the commitments and obligations of

⁸⁶ Germany shared a political culture developed along 'civic lines', defined as 'anti-militaristic' and maintains a far-reaching 'scepticism about any form of military grandeur or nationalism.', see Seidelmann, 1998, 114.

⁸⁷ Tonra 2003, 745.

⁸⁸ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999, *Annex I - Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence – Military capabilities for Petersberg tasks and Decision-making*. See also WEU Council of Ministers, *Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations – Recommendations for strengthening European capabilities for crisis management operations*, Luxembourg, 22-23 November 1999.

⁸⁹ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Nice 7, 8 and 9 December 2000, *Annex VI - Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration*, Paragraph 4 and Howorth 2000.

member states in the framework of other organisations, namely those assumed within NATO; integrity of the opting out clause, enabling member states not to participate without blocking decisions taken in the framework of CFSP/ESDP and the possibility to invoke reasons of national interest in issues with implications on national foreign policy. Wessel points to the oddity of the Treaty in referring to the ‘progressive framing of a common defence’ based on Article 17 after the same policy entered into force.⁹⁰ The arrangements conducive to the ESDP, like CFSP itself, are policy processes that have not achieved a stage of maturity that may lead to formal and mandatory provisions to be incorporated by member states. The type of concordant behaviour observed within CFSP/ESDP reflected flexible modes of agreement and participation in specific functional domains, where the norms conveyed functioned as a ‘template for coordinating joint action’ within supple frames of role prescription.⁹¹ By adding to the instruments of common positions, joint actions, and common strategies, the mechanism of enhanced cooperation, the second pillar benefits from opportunities for a more adjustable form of participation, enabling member states to choose the circumstances in which they wish to engage in new integrated roles.

In sum the early normative guidelines, of the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam based on ‘unreserved support’, ‘spirit of solidarity’ and abstention from impairing actions that could obstruct a cohesive CFSP, are considered as given facts, enabling flexible concordant behaviour and coalescent action. In order to meet the requirements of CFSP/ESDP, including the progressive framing of a defence policy and common defence, decisions were to result in concordant behaviour in agreement with member states’ respective constitutional arrangements, political cultures and traditions. Each treaty revision sought to improve concordance of views, behaviour and policies with the roles prescribed externally. The various revisions have been an effort to conciliate internal diversity into a single frame of agreements, with binding consequences for CFSP/ESDP. This helped to preserve the non-regulative base of concordant behaviour and to accommodate the various role concepts of member states. By safeguarding diversity of national positions, the EU second pillar preserved its prescriptive dimension through a distinct concordant behaviour from the one that emanated from specific regulations, as it can be observed for the first and third pillar.

⁹⁰ Wessel 2003, 274.

⁹¹ Kratochwill 1984, 707.

6.3 Conclusions

Early 1990s marked a period of conceptual and normative consolidation favouring the second pillar international position and prominence of the roles prescribed. Between late 1990s and early 2000 the CFSP initiatives featured in primary sources lead to conclude on a significant development of endurance and concordance of the roles prescribed, partially due to the process of institutionalisation of CFSP and ESDP.

The EU by making use of a broad normative framework in its second pillar, which included issues from human rights to disarmament, set a comprehensive agenda that captured the policy affinities of member states. The intergovernmental decision-making structure for the second pillar, associated with the non-regulative characteristics of its role prescriptions, ensured the compliant behaviour of member states. Its ethical orientation made it particular attractive to member states in a post-Cold War environment, at a time when contending military agendas were less mobilising.

Similarly, the gradual process of institutionalisation of CFSP, with the establishment of specific policy instruments, the creation of autonomous decision-making bodies and entities representing the foreign and security dimension of EU helped to convey and disseminate functional roles. The creation of permanent bodies had a considerable impact on CFSP prescriptions by improving and enabling institutional conditions for better European coordination on foreign, security and defence matters. The CFSP evolved in a consistent and coherent manner by developing core principles that bonded behaviour and helped implementing policy actions based on permanent decision-making instruments.

The presence of a comprehensive normative focus facilitated the position of member states that had long standing commitments with other international organisations in the domain of security and defence, notably with NATO. The CFSP, as a process in the making, evolved at a pace compatible with the commitments and responsibilities assumed by member states in other *forums*. Compatibility and the explicit observation of international commitments assumed by member states, together with the compromise to respect their constitutional traditions, avoided the development of dysfunctional behaviour among member states, whenever pressed to comply with distinct foreign and security policy roles in the European context.

In the policy documents analysed the presence of limited functional roles, as frequently assumed in literature, was not observed. The functional focus of the Treaty of Amsterdam was evident and consistent with the developments that took place with the consolidation of the European economic and monetary union, the enlargement process and its foreign and security dimensions. The consolidation of the EU's prescriptive role on these dimensions encompassed a complementary evolution from normative to functional roles, as institutionalisation of the CFSP progressed. It is largely assumed in literature that the asymmetry between European expectations and capabilities generates weak prescriptive roles for the CFSP. However, the real limitation of the CFSP may lay in the convolutions of the treaties' discourse and the excessive concern of literature with what limits, rather than with what enables prescriptive roles. These misperceptions also result from confusing prescriptive ability with existence of legal and material (e.g. military) instruments that help to enforce behaviour. They result from a feeble analytical connection between the internal procedures and capabilities of organisations and the external opportunities open to them to emerge as prescriptive entities to member states. The CFSP is an ongoing process, whose prescriptive role lies in social interaction, political will, institution building and material resources availability. This study seeks to convey an interpretation about the EU's prescriptive role in foreign and security policy, by finding core conditions that set boundaries guided by institutional frames, values and context related opportunities, which informed the construction of role prescriptions.

Late 1990s is rich in evidence of normative orientation of CFSP/ESDP, even in the unlikely dimension of European defence, with the approval of initiatives that emphasised the observation of 'best practices' and 'behavioural obligations' in dealing with security and defence issues. The emergence of ESDP was, from the very beginning, associated with the idea that it contributed to safeguard the EU core values, not strictly its security and defence goals. The policy outline for the ESDP and its procedural mechanisms were preceded by argumentation on the EU's normative repertoire, based on regional stabilisation and military and non-military arrangements for crisis management, humanitarian relief and nation-building. This normative repertoire was enforced by the EU's singular aptitude to fulfil post-conflict tasks, such as law enforcement, civilian police missions, reconstruction of local administrations and infrastructures and capacity to provide financial aid. The language used within the EU to improve conciliation of preferences and generate consensual positions relied on

expressions like 'commonality', 'shared values', 'moral obligation', 'equality in participation' and 'partnership', which connected member states to a comprehensive valorative community represented by the Union.

Chapter 7

The Prescriptive Impact of NATO and CFSP on Portuguese Foreign, Security and Defence Policy

The chapter addresses the external roles of one small state in the domain of foreign and security policy when in contact with NATO and CFSP role prescriptions. The role conception approach reflects the dynamics established at a 'two level game', between the international (where multilevel role prescriptions occur) and the national level and addresses the issue of continuity and adaptation of national policy. Portugal's external behaviour is analysed in the context of NATO and the EU between 1991 and 2001, a period during which significant international and domestic changes were observed. Also during this period, Portuguese politics witnessed two moments of exception with the presence in power of two majority governments. This allows tracing constancy and variation in conditions of political stability.¹

The chapter analyses the impact of international role prescriptions from the perspective of a small state and answers the sub-questions: *How did the conditions of international role prescriptions, validated for NATO and the CFSP, affect Portugal's external behaviour? How is the impact of prescriptions reflected in a small state political rhetoric, policy planning and policy action? How do role prescriptions based on non-regulative aspects lead to role incorporation and policy action?* The chapter, rather than focusing on the constraining effects of international organisations and on the limitations imposed by their most powerful member states to small states, explores the enabling effects and distinct impact of NATO and EU role prescriptions on Portuguese foreign and security policy.

As Pollock notes, small states through international organisations 'bind larger states into institutional rules that provide systematic voices of opportunity for small states, while at the same time establishing norms against the use of certain types of power.'² The enabling aspects of international organisations are considered under the impact of each of the four selected conditions of international role prescription (*international position, prominence, endurance and concordance*) and respective indica-

¹ Between 1991-1995 a social-democrat majority took the lead in government. Between 1995-2001 the socialists won two subsequent terms in power.

² Pollock 2001, 224.

tors, as detailed in Chapter 3. Impact will be analysed and interpreted by looking at the non-contending aspects of role incorporation neglected in literature and the contending aspects when discourse and action point in different directions.

The study relies mainly on printed official sources (policy statements, policy guidelines, personal accounts of state representatives, ministers' public declarations and reports) and secondary literature. Primary sources are used to trace the narratives conveyed in documents by members of government, diplomats and military authorities regarding role conceptions in foreign and security policy that contribute to distinguish patterns of behaviour.

7.1 International Position

The condition of *international position* concerns the perception of member states about the place attributed to NATO and CFSP/ESDP from a perspective of the capacity to frame and solve foreign and security policy problems, and to mobilise support transforming the various preferences of member states into common interests.

7.1.1 The Long Term Transatlantic Bond

The *international position* recognised to NATO helped to maintain its prescriptive impact on Portuguese foreign policy in the new strategic environment after 1991, due to its ability to adapt functionally to the new security environment and to mobilise its member states to perform alternative security and defence tasks. The positive national perception about NATO's effectiveness as a security organisation in the post-Cold War context, was reinforced by its new normative profile, based on a political agenda that combined aspects related to international security and stability with humanitarian concerns and political accountability. The normative aspects that had no relevance to Portugal at the time of its membership to the Alliance in 1946 were seen in the 1990s as having a broad stabilising function to the new Eastern European democracies.³

The dissipation of traditional military threats to the transatlantic area posed challenges to Portugal, since its privileged geographical location was more relevant in the context of NATO's strategy of forward defence, than in the context of the new

³ Similarly in mid 1970s an European climate which pressed new member states to embrace democratic politics encouraged Portugal's transition to democracy, see Gunther *et al.*, 407.

security scenarios of the post-Cold War.⁴ This strategic location enhanced Portugal's regional position within NATO's collective defence framework in particular and Western European defence in general. From a national point of view, to continue to recognise NATO as the main forum for discussion on matters with implications in the field of defence was also a way to perpetuate Portugal's strategic relevance in the transatlantic context. Evidence of intense participation of Portugal in military missions under NATO's command and control (e.g. in the Balkans), reflected the interest and willingness to remain committed to the Alliance.

Various reasons can be found in accounting for a strong embedding of national foreign, security and defence policy in NATO. From an internal perspective, three main features account for the fact that reliance on NATO remained generally strong throughout the period covered in this study.

The first feature derives from a predominant Atlanticist rhetoric and policy action regarding defence policy and military doctrine among domestic elites.⁵ The Alliance offered a broad, stable and long tested defence framework on the base of which national defence policy strengthened its own material base and consolidated its military culture. This was not an isolated characteristic among NATO members, who were also EU and WEU members, but rather fitted into a general pattern of behaviour which perpetuated transatlantic institutional arrangements after the conditions which gave rise to them had passed.⁶ This is consistent with the Portuguese external policy options, between 1991 and 2001, period during which national military forces participated in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans in the context of IFOR and SFOR under NATO's military command. The persistence of a positive perception of NATO's international position evolved also from a well-established national role conception that Portugal was to remain a *faithful ally* in the transatlantic context that is, its international identity was to stay anchored in the Atlantic sphere, as acknowledged by a former Defence Minister.⁷ For a long time this role conception shaped the perceptions of military experts and political elites ensuring the preservation of the transatlantic dimension of national defence policy. This created resistance to assume new European security and defence commitments and limited the emergence of a renewed discourse on what would best serve Portugal's security and defence interests until 1996.

⁴ Cf. Ferreira 2000, 179-180.

⁵ See Martins 2002 and Couto 1994. See also Duffield 1992, 844-845.

⁶ See McCalla 1996, 456.

⁷ See Vitorino 1996b, 41.

A second feature pertains to a more technical reasoning and contributes to explain the permanence of a positive perception towards NATO. National armed forces had internalised NATO's doctrine for more than five decades and were deeply routinised into its policies and military procedures. This not only embedded the military bureaucracy deeply into NATO military culture, but also created a material dependency of the military apparatus from the Alliance's capabilities and assets and from the United States in terms of procurement of military equipment. For a small country like Portugal, not only reasons of tradition, habit, trust and dependency influenced national priorities in the field of security and defence, but also the fact a simultaneous attribution of military forces to distinct organisations would pose a heavy burden to the national defence budget, limited by the same financial constraints that affected other allied countries.

The third feature results from national perceptions about change in the security environment in the post-Cold War in three ways: the evolution of Europe's security environment and its impact on cooperation with NATO; the Portuguese concerns about Spain's approach to NATO and the position adopted by traditional allies of Portugal (United Kingdom and the Netherlands) towards the Alliance.

The *European security environment after 1991* influenced the way Portugal perceived the Alliance's *international position* mostly due to the uncertainties generated on how a traditional defence organisation would adapt to 'new' security challenges. The approval of *NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe* in June 1991 and *NATO's Strategic Concept*, in November of the same year, generated among allies promising expectations on what would be NATO's role in the future security context. However, the dissipation of threats from the East and the emergence of forms of integration of former enemies into partnership programmes like the PfP, raised questions regarding distribution of security benefits among allies.

Countries like Portugal, that earned its strategic relevance from its geographical location in the context NATO's strategies of forward defence and flexible response, could be affected by the emergence of new strategic goals outside NATO area. The upgrading of NATO strategy and doctrine, after the revision of the NATO's Strategic Concept, urged for institutional adaptation that could affect the strategic relevance of Portugal in the transatlantic security context. As the Defence Minister Nogueira suggested, it was crucial to 'clarify the strategic environment in which Portugal will be positioned' and to develop national defence goals in the light of the new

international challenges.⁸ The agreement reached in 1994 with the endorsement of NATO's CJTF concept and the projection of NATO's missions to out-of-area introduced an important step in the process of NATO's military reform and correspondent adaptation of Portuguese defence policy.⁹ NATO by defining new military missions in out-of-area and by making its own assets and capabilities available to other organisations guaranteed its political status and operational skills that safeguarded its *international position* among member states. In particular for smaller members like Portugal, this was significant since its own geo-strategic salience in the transatlantic context could be preserved in scenarios of force projection.

The professionalisation of the armed forces of allied countries, Portugal included, was a response to the external imperatives to adapt, since lack of adaptation would mean exclusion from participation in new military missions. The process of professionalisation of Portuguese armed forces was not unfamiliar to the demands of NATO's new military missions, to the new emergent political and legal conditionalities regarding the use of military force (e.g. the matter of consent of the parties involved and a mandate from the United Nations authorising intervention), to the Alliance's predominant role in framing member states defence policies and in defining the conditions of future participation in the Euro-Atlantic security context.¹⁰

In the *Iberian context* an improvement of relations between Spain and the United States, as from early 1990s, and its integration into NATO's military structure, as from 1997, had repercussions on the relations between Portugal, NATO and the United States.¹¹ A favourable positioning of Spain in the transatlantic context would pose complex problems concerning the distribution of future NATO's command structure. An enhanced position of Spain in the transatlantic context meant that NATO, in particular the US, could opt for sites of logistic support, strategic mobility, and force projection alternative to the existing facilities in Portuguese territory. This made even more pressing the official claims about the strategic centrality of the terri-

⁸ Nogueira 1995, 189. Intervention of the Defence Minister at the National Assembly on 4 June 1993. See also Barroso 1995a, 81. Intervention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, working meeting at the Minister of Foreign Affairs December 1992.

⁹ Leggold argues that new force concepts, such as the CJTF, opened an unprecedented opportunity to NATO member states to participate in peacekeeping, providing individual incentives in the 'form of valued command responsibilities (...) and overlapping preferences (that) can be identified and realized more easily', see Leggold 1998a, 79. Brackets added. See also Leggold 1998c, 11 and 15.

¹⁰ 'Novo modelo de defesa militar', *Diário de Notícias*, 12 January 2002, p.7. The article elaborates on the Ministerial Directive for Military Defence in the post 9/11 and reflects upon the main aspects of adaptation of national military defence namely the legal ones. See also interview with the Army Chief of Staff, Pinto 2004.

¹¹ This contending aspect of Iberian relations was also addressed by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. See Gama 1997b, 52.

tory, in order to counter balance its periferisation in the Iberian context. Likewise, the growing Europeanisation of Spanish foreign policy in the context of EPC and later CFSP and EDSP was also a matter of concern to national authorities due to the fact that it could limit the efforts of national diplomacy for a more active role in European political and diplomatic circles. Since Portugal was still perceived as sharing an Atlantic preference on its foreign and defence policy, the persistent recognition in discourse of NATO's *international position* was vital to ensure national access to transatlantic allied defence and security goods.

The last aspect concerning national perception of NATO's *international position* regards the *positions adopted by traditional allies like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom*. Both countries shared with Portugal a colonial history and an Atlanticist tradition in the way their foreign and defence policies are framed. The long friendship and close diplomatic ties, especially with Britain, made Portugal responsive to changes in the external behaviour of these two allies. Similarity it led them frequently to form 'coalitions of peripheral nations' to protect their transatlantic interests in the face of emergent new European common foreign, security and defence commitments.¹² Such affinity reinforced and perpetuated significantly the supremacy of NATO and transatlantic relations in Portuguese defence policy. This was also observed in the propensity of national representatives to align within the context of international meetings with the Atlantic positions of those two countries, whenever multilateral diplomacy and institutional developments in the EU/CFSP advised for a pro-European choice.¹³

7.1.2 The European Challenge

The *international position of the EU* was perceived in a slightly different manner, in what Teixeira refers as the recognition of the initial steps to the creation of a new model of foreign policy based on Europeanisation.¹⁴ The international prescriptive role of the Union after Maastricht was perceived as increasingly important due to the institutionalisation of CFSP, based on a stronger normative core and a broader foreign and security agenda, as compared to NATO. The normative language 'spo-

¹² Everts 2001, 160.

¹³ This was frequently observed by the author during meetings of NATO and WEU working groups until mid 1990s.

¹⁴ See Teixeira 2004, 12. Europeanization here is not understood in the sense of legal impact of EU second pillar provisions on national administration, but as the accomplishment of national foreign policy preferences within the European context.

ken' within the EU reinforced the idea that Europe rejected a militaristic approach to international affairs. This was much in line with the political thinking brought back to Portugal by the exiled national political elite after 1974. The exiled leaders of the opposition to the regime renounced the colonial project of the dictatorship and rejected military solutions as a mean to achieve political goals.¹⁵ These political elite understood Europe as a civilian power, which impacted positively on national perception about the EU's *international position* in two ways.

The first found echo in the EU's value-oriented foreign agenda (good governance, human rights and minorities rights and peaceful conflict resolution) consonant with the type of international identity to which Portugal aspired, in particular after the dictatorship and the long period of war in the colonies.

The second resulted from the acknowledgement of how European values could strengthen the humanistic profile of national foreign policy, giving it a distinct profile from the former isolationist and neutral posture imposed by the old regime. The transition to a new international identity was facilitated and protected by the integration of Portugal in Europe. The humanistic focus of this international identity was projected in national policy discourse as a core feature of Portuguese democracy, as a basis for moral reasoning in foreign policy and a justification for the preferences of national diplomacy and military elites for peaceful conflict resolution and humanitarian aspects of crisis management.¹⁶

The political criteria of participation voiced by Brussels was guided by the notions of 'transparency, mutual openness, (and) interdependence' and political accountability within the EU. This offered reassuring messages to small states like Portugal, about broader possibilities to cooperate and to enhance their international activity.¹⁷ These perceptions were also shaped by the historical legacy of the country, which propitiated a high awareness of external opportunity and national commitment to international responsibilities.

¹⁵ Cf. Sablosky 1996, 1014, 1017 and 1019 and Duch and Gibson 1992, 265.

¹⁶ On the relevance of democracy as an inducer of political change in Southern Europe, see Ginsberg 1997b, 17. It is interesting to note that although democracy was perceived as a very important indicator of policy adaptation, the Commission's Opinion on the application of Portugal to the EC only briefly mentions the transition of Portugal to democracy giving much more relevance to the economic and administrative adaptation of the country and their positive implications to the Community. See Sjurson & Smith 2001, 8 ft.18 and EC Commission 'Opinion on Portuguese Application for Membership', EC Bulletin 5/78. The focus on humanistic and moral reasoning in foreign and security policy was also addressed on a public testimony by the former Minister of Defence Antonio Vitorino when underlining the policy reasoning invoked to justify national military participation in former Yugoslavia. Presentation at the Seminar *Ten Years of Portuguese Participation in IFOR*, 5 April 2006, National Defence Institute, Lisbon.

¹⁷ Cooper 1996, 26. Brackets added.

The recognition of the *international position* of the EU was not disclosed from the historical and affective bonds of Portugal with neighbouring countries and former colonies. On the one hand, Portuguese diplomacy followed closely the reposition of Spain in the European context, in particular in the way it sought to use the EU institutions to convey its own foreign agenda towards Latin America and the Mediterranean. On the other, the traditional focus of national foreign relations on bilateralism and the rhetoric of brotherhood with African countries were projected by the Portuguese executive into the European domain.¹⁸ Especially during the first years after integration in the EC, Portugal's participation was never dissociated from the positive impact it had in former colonies, as recognised in the policy record: 'The Portuguese positions in Europe help our African partners; we, on the other hand, have an authorised word on matters that affect Africa below the Sahara region.'¹⁹ The preferential relation with former colonies was presented in European political circles as an added value and a form of historical capital or expertise that would grant Portugal a bridging role between the interests of Europe and Africa and to Europe an improved knowledge about African realities. The fact that Portugal and Spain brought into the EU specific concerns with their former colonies created a mutually reinforcing approach to these matters within the European context. This complemented and helped to reinforce Portugal's position within EU with regard to enhancing external relations between the EU first pillar and the community of Portuguese-speaking countries.²⁰ The national recognition of Europe's *international position* resulted from the understanding that not only the European integration was economically beneficial to Portugal, but also that integration reinforced Portugal's position among an enlarged community of Portuguese-speaking countries.

Evidence of Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy can be found in the support to the EU common positions and joint actions and in the understanding that specific areas of foreign relations could be enhanced at the European level.²¹ If the international position of the EU on security and defence matters remained in a stand still until 1998, the same could not be said about its foreign policy performance,

¹⁸ See Magone 2004c.

¹⁹ Diário da República, *Grandes Opções do Plano 1989*, I Serie, N° 301 (30-12-1988), p. 5146-471, Law n° 115/88, Capítulo IV, § 123. See also Ferreira 1988, 55-56.

²⁰ See Hill & Wallace 1996, 1-18. The presence of various EU member states that were in the past colonial societies enhanced their individual positions within the European political context.

²¹ Europeanisation is used in the sense earlier referred of accomplishment of national foreign policy preferences and goals within the European context.

namely on matters that were of direct interest to Portugal. This was particularly true with regard to the measures adopted by the EU concerning the processes of pacification and national reconciliation in Angola and in the case of Portuguese support to the self-determination of East Timor, which acquired a higher international political visibility through the Union's second pillar.²²

As far as the recognition of *international position* by the national communities of experts is concerned, the early involvement of Portuguese diplomats in EPC resulted in a more rapid familiarisation of experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with European role prescriptions and policy practices, as compared to what could be observed within the Ministry of Defence.²³ Therefore one can hardly ignore the role these experts played in the formation of a new international identity for Portugal, centred on the project of European integration complementary to the Alliance.

The first EU Presidency in 1992 provided the incentive and the opportunity to reform the services in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which took place in 1994, based on 'new functional demarcation of competencies, and reinforcement of internal coordination mechanisms.'²⁴ This reflected the importance recognised to the responsibilities assumed in the European context, especially those deriving from a Presidency in office, which involved a comprehensive approach to external relations, a better coordination of the various ministries and departments involved, a higher level of information fluxes and expertise, and a broader allocation of national resources both internally and in Brussels.

In sum, the national perception about international position in the case of NATO prescriptions is strongly associated with observations of efficiency and cost-benefit of the role prescriptions conveyed. The perpetuation of a key position recognised to the Alliance is related in discourse and policy action with national reliance on NATO, as the main security provider and with the necessity to safeguard Portugal's strategic position in the transatlantic context. This was needed in order to: retain stra-

²² On Angola see common position *Decisions 95/413/CFSP of 2 October 1995, 97/759/CFSP of 30 October 1997, 98/425/CFSP of 3 July 1998, 2000/391/CFSP of 19 June 2000*. One Council Regulation was issued on 28 July 1998 concerning interruption of economic relations with Angola with the aim to force UNITA to fulfil its obligations in the peace process, see Council Regulation n° 1705/98 of 28 July 1998. On Timor see *Common Position 96/407/CFSP of 25 June 1996*. In 1999 Portugal through the EU approved the first common position in the framework of CFSP regulating the position of the Union and its member states towards Indonesia on the East Timor question. See also EPC Bulletin, *Docs.91/358, 91/429 and 92/62*. On the case raised by Portugal regarding the right to self-determination by East Timor, see Escarameia 2001; EPC Bulletin, Doc.91/358, EPC Bulletin, Doc. 91/429 and EPC Bulletin, Doc.96/062 and Wilde 2001.

²³This distinction will be addressed later when analysing the condition of *prominence* of international role prescriptions and their impact on Portuguese foreign and security policy.

²⁴ Correia 2002, 196.

tegic salience in the face of relaxation of relations between East and West; find new roles in the context of post-Cold War missions and balance the peripheral position of the country in the context of the Alliance's strategy.

In the case of the CFSP, the recognition of international position resulted from identification between role concepts in foreign policy with the normative, valorative and political core represented by the EU. This was publicly accepted without the need for immediate assurance about the EU's ability to provide an efficient frame for problem-solving in foreign and security policy and to allocate military means in its support.

7.2 Prominence

In this section prominence is tested from a double stance of *appropriateness* and *consequentiality* helping to infer on how role prescriptions of NATO and the EU are represented in national policy discourse from a perspective of goodness or utility. International socialisation is, in this context, a crucial linking element in the way the roles prescribed are perceived as being more appropriate or consequential, since positive perception on the prominence of prescriptions and their incorporation grows as socialisation develops. The impact of the condition of *prominence* regards how *socialisation* and perceptions on *consequentiality* and *appropriateness* of the roles NATO and the EU/CFSP prescribe and pledge to perform are perceived by national elites.

7.2.1 Portuguese Perspectives about CFSP/ESDP from Estrangement to Conciliation

Two aspects affect national perceptions about the prominence of European roles: firstly, the idea that NATO and the EU are competing projects; secondly that they have an uneven ability to solve foreign and security problems.

The first aspect is frequently addressed in academic literature and policy oriented studies.²⁵ However, competing visions between NATO and EU find little support in the primary sources. The policy documents reflect a general preference among

²⁵ On the competing nature between European and transatlantic security options, see Telo 1995; Couto 1994 and Martins 2002. For approaches that support the existence of a balance between the two, see Almeida 1995; Vitorino 1996d; Vasconcelos 1996; Teixeira 1998; Barroso 1998a; Barroso 1998b; Teixeira 1999; Ferreira 2001 and Teixeira 2002.

member states for a division of strategic labour between military tasks better performed by NATO and the civilian, humanitarian missions and low intensity crisis management better undertaken in a European context. The competing perspective was also present in the national official record, showing that the national views which saw the CFSP/ESDP and NATO as mutually excluding entities tended to shape national perceptions around the paralysing paradigm of Europeanism versus Atlanticism.

These views based on the rivalry of both security projects limited a more active national participation within CFSP and later within the ESDP. Whenever this competing perspective was not prevalent in the public discourse, the international activity of Portugal in both domains increased.²⁶ Initial resilience of Portuguese military elite to a European security and defence project seemed related to the technological dependence of the military apparatus and to traditional working habits within NATO's administration. Functional reasons, rather than matters of principle were at stake. The military elite, with prior contact with NATO in the early stages of military careers, was the one to lead the country to democracy. As Bermeo suggests in the period after the regime change, 'The pivotal elites in Portugal were the moderate military officers, who constituted a majority in the military establishment, and the democratic but not radical civilian politicians who headed political parties and occupied various cabinet positions in the provisional governments.'²⁷ These elites were not averse to the idea of participation in the European project, since it was the transition to democratisation that enabled them to find a 'legitimising formula' consolidated later by the civilian elite in national and international terms.²⁸

The second aspect regards misperceptions about the real focus of CFSP/ESDP that affected perceptions about Europe's ability to solve problems. As Tonra suggests, elites tend to focus on improved problem solving introduced as a goal in public discourse, 'the cult of effectiveness being often invoked' does not necessarily apply evenly to all international initiatives since (CFSP) 'exists not for the purpose of fixing the world but so as to *address* the world.'²⁹ This remained the main impediment to a faster adherence of Portugal to European foreign, security and defence. The Portuguese perception, particularly among military experts, was influenced by the para-

²⁶ Wallace provides an explanation for this resilient behaviour based on the fact that most Western policymakers and bureaucracies had spent their professional lives – and made their careers - within the strategic paradigm of the Cold War, for which such alternative European images were not immediately compelling, see Wallace 2001, 18.

²⁷ Bermeo 1997, 316. See also Cardoso 2001, 137-140.

²⁸ Bermeo 1997, 316. See also Ferreira 1995 and Pevehouse 2002, 612.

²⁹ Tonra 2001, 19.

digm of the ‘best equipped (organisation) to perform (and solve) a certain task’ and to a less extent by the norm-based value of the EU to appropriately address problems.³⁰ This dichotomy is also current in literature that emphasises the relevance of instrumental and self-interested reasons in explaining national preferences’ formation regarding CFSP. As international socialisation within EU institutions evolved, the incorporation of CFSP role prescriptions helped to place national policy preferences at a higher international level, within a more resourceful European institutional setting than the national one.³¹

As the present chapter will show, in the national public discourse the normative and value oriented repertoire of CFSP/ESDP role prescriptions prevailed over self-interested reasons leading to incorporation of European prescriptions and adding a European dimension to national foreign, security and defence policy. The external projection of Portugal’s new international image was anchored in its distinctiveness from the prior experience of the dictatorship (characterised by isolationism) and discursively based on the condemnation of colonialism, on the recognition of the right to self-determination and on the observation of international law.³² This valorative set found ample resonance in the European ideational core, restating the legitimacy of the new political elite through the adherence to a European project, not only in its economic dimension, but also in its political and normative values. Despite the claim of distinct motivations in embracing the European project, Portuguese foreign and security policy stayed connected to two traditional trends: special relations with the maritime power and accentuation of its universal external orientation.³³

The value oriented repertoire of the EU/CFSP enabled national policy discourse to remain anchored to the familiar notions of ‘universalism’ of external relations and to the ‘pluri-continental model’ of national foreign policy.³⁴ These notions were conveyed as part of the historical heritage and national narrative about foreign policy, which helped to maintain Portugal’s individuality as regional bridge builder

³⁰ Smith 2004b, 241. Text in brackets added.

³¹ On arguments that highlight reasons of instrumental preference as determinant to the Portuguese approach to CFSP, see Almeida 1995, 26-27; Teixeira 2000, 126 and Teixeira 2002, 28 and 32. See also Vasconcelos 1996 and Magone 2004c, 241-263.

³² Assembleia da República (2001), *Constituição Portuguesa*, Fifth Revision (Lisbon: AR), Article 7.

³³ Teixeira accounts for the presence of three trends in national foreign policy for the period that preceded transition to democracy: firstly an ambivalent position between Europe and the Atlantic space; secondly predominance of a maritime option away from Europe and thirdly privileged alliances with maritime powers (UK, then US and finally NATO) and sustainability of the colonial project, see Teixeira 2004, 6.

³⁴ Cf. Pinto & Nunez 1997, 180 and 181. See also Almeida 2004.

(e.g. between Africa and Europe) within European diversity.³⁵ This official universalistic claim, which informed national role conceptions, encountered resonance in the valorative core of CFSP.³⁶ Political rhetoric remained, until quite late, embedded in a foreign policy discourse based on preferential external cooperation with former colonies and trust in traditional allies. This is reflected on the governments' strategy to pursue adjustments in external relations, while rooting them in domestic traditions and framing them into familiar assumptions on foreign policy. As it occurred among other European states, the foreign policy discourse conveyed to domestic public was based on different dimensions from the ones agreed in multilateral *fora*, preserving the stability of familiar bases of national foreign policy, while introducing new incremental changes drawn from NATO and EU/CFSP.³⁷

As the perception of competition between the two organisations was replaced by the necessity of a simultaneous commitment of Portugal within NATO and the EU/CFSP, the balance between *appropriateness* and *consequentiality* levelled the arguments about national participation in the Atlantic and European security and defence options. The narrative found in documental sources shows that international socialisation triggered favourable perceptions about compatibility between national roles and international role prescriptions. However, support for a normative core was less significant in times of economic instability, as observed in the official statements in early 1990s or whenever economic issues (e.g. EMU) scored higher in the EU agenda, as referred to further ahead.

In early 1990s, Portuguese defence policy manifested a limited interest in European role prescriptions that did not directly address concrete technical solutions, namely economic aid and development, modernisation of the military apparatus and national defence procurement needs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Deus Pinheiro recognised: 'The European Communities have appeared to our eyes primarily as an economic institution',³⁸ a perception which persisted for some time stressing the national priority in supporting the Single Market and the criteria of the European Monetary System. Only after Portugal chaired its first Presidency and during the ad-

³⁵ See also Reis & Dias 1993, 270-274.

³⁶ Risse observes that political elites select those 'identity constructions among the ones considered legitimate that suit their perceived instrumental needs', see Risse 2001, 203.

³⁷ See Wallace 2001, 285-286 and 269.

³⁸ Pinheiro 1988a, 18.

ministrative reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was possible to notice a deeper involvement in CFSP matters.

A growing recognition of *prominence* of the CFSP was facilitated not only by the existence of a strong valorative core and growing institutionalisation of CFSP through common positions and joint actions, but by the fact that developments within the second pillar were bound by gradualism and complementarity. The non-coercive mode of European cooperation within the second pillar, allowed national authorities to engage in initiatives introduced at the domestic level as being compatible with other international commitments and responsibilities, which helped to underline the non-contending nature of foreign and security projects within the EU and NATO. The Portuguese Presidency during the first semester of 2000 reflected the adoption of a more assertive and pro-active commitment of national diplomacy towards CFSP. Specific proposals about the *Likely Developments of CFSP*, with the aim to identify the EU policy areas in which joint actions could to be taken, were drafted and proposals on future improvements in the domain of CFSP and cooperation between the EU and NATO were addressed. These were particularly sensitive issues for a traditional NATO member and an American ally like Portugal. During its chairmanship of the EU Presidency, Portugal placed CFSP issues at the top of the agenda, which was significant from the perspective of recognition of prominence.

International socialisation contributed to develop processes of identification between national role concepts and the prescriptions anticipated by European institutions, enhancing the international position as member states. The gradual use of EU negotiation instruments by national authorities, in moments of policy bargaining, was particularly significant. During the 1996 IGC, Portugal insisted on the necessity of member states to agree on a clause of constructive abstention that would impede, in case of vital interest, the use of voting prerogatives by member states, delegating the matter to the consideration of the European Council for deliberation by unanimity. Likewise during the 2000 IGC, Portugal supported a proposal on 'enhanced cooperation' with the aim to hold back those who wished to pursue policy actions further, from avoiding the vigilant role-played by the Commission and the control of the Court of Justice.³⁹ This meant that member states could not mobilise at will, limited

³⁹ Costa 2001,47. This view is also supported by Goetschel 2000. The use of these mobilising strategies would be less effective if Portugal would have not held the prior EU Presidency and if national bureaucracy had not been fully socialised into the EU institutions. See also Gama 2001b. Intervention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Assembly of Republic, 27th March 1996 and Vitorino 2001.

coalitions of major states that could marginalise smaller member states nor could a limited coalition operate outside the direct control of European institutions.⁴⁰

Reliance on the Commission to get national proposals through the Council and the use of special relations with officials in the Commission was a recurrent strategy employed by national officials of smaller member states like Portugal.⁴¹ The mechanisms of centrist regulation, in particular those where the Commission play a central role, were perceived by national authorities as protective devices and open paths to international participation of smaller member states.⁴² This was reflected in the words of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gama when referring that the ‘Commission struggle was always considered by the Portuguese government as crucial to guarantee the preservation of the principle of equality among States’.⁴³

This revealed two things. On the one hand, Portuguese positions expressed during the IGCs, reflected the traditional trust of national authorities in centralised decision-making mechanisms, this time transferred into the EU context, recognising the prominence of European institutions whose mode of governance combined centralised decision-making in the first and third pillar, with intergovernmental decision-making in the second pillar.

On the other hand, due to its less strong position to negotiate and influence outside the momentum of the EU Presidency, Portugal used various consequential strategies of mobilisation of smaller member states within the Union. During the Extraordinary European Council of Biarritz in 2000 national representatives intervened actively in the European Parliament and made use of the access to international press in order to stress the opposition of interests that separated small and large states later during the Nice European Council.⁴⁴ Portugal made use of novel forms of sustaining foreign policy positions by recurring to a ‘European argumentation’ that voiced the fairness and appropriateness about the right to equal participation of applicant member states.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ See Gray & Stubb 2001. Gray and Stubb sustain that ‘Bringing enhanced co-operation on to the IGC agenda was a way of discouraging the idea of flexibility outside the Treaty, while also being a way of linking the IGC to the long-term debate. It gave the IGC 2000 a “major idea”, something that appeared to be more than just a rehash of the institutional “leftovers” ’p. 10.

⁴¹ Cf. Thorhallsson 2000, 16.

⁴² Cf. Hirsch, 1976, 115.

⁴³ Interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaime Gama, *Público*, 10 December 2000, p.3

⁴⁴ Cf. Costa 2002, 272-273.

⁴⁵ Costa 2002, 287-288. See also Costa 2001.

In the second half of 1990 more intense socialisation within European institutions accounted for the strengthening of European cooperation in the security dimension.⁴⁶ During the 1995 Portuguese Presidency of WEU a declaration was approved by member states on a *Common Reflection on the New European Security Conditions*, which constituted the basis for the WEU contribution to the 1996 IGC on *European Security: a Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries*. This allowed concluding not only on a change in perception from the point of view of *prominence* of European prescriptive roles, but also on a more autonomous position of Portugal within European security already in mid 1990s.⁴⁷

During the Portuguese EU Presidency in 2000 national elites recognised the higher *prominence* of the security related aspects of the Union more due to the political weight and moral authority of the EU, than due to its operational capability.⁴⁸

During this period, CFSP/ESDP made significant progresses especially with the Feira European Council with the implementation of the agreements reached in the European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki. The operationalisation of the EU Political and Security Committee, of the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff were steps of great significance in coordinating common positions and in developing cooperation initiatives between the EU, NATO and the United States. The national support to the idea of a CESDP, more than reflecting openness of national security identity, it proved a meaningful diversification from its exclusive relations with NATO and the United States, strengthening its own external role performance outside the traditional transatlantic alliance.⁴⁹

Whether or not to belong to this new European dimension of defence became an inclusive criteria and an ultimate sign of recognition of *prominence* of the EU in matters of security and defence.⁵⁰ The national proposal to the 1996 IGC, about the EU defence dimension was that WEU (ambiguously recognised as a ‘component of the European Union’s defence’ and as ‘NATO’s European pillar’) was to remain an autonomous organisation after 1998.⁵¹ The idea of a fourth pillar for defence was

⁴⁶ Cf. Magone 2004b, 187.

⁴⁷ The choice of a Portuguese diplomat Ambassador José Cutileiro, to become WEU’s Secretary-General constituted an incentive to a more active participation of Portugal in the edification of European security.

⁴⁸ Cf. Gama 2001a. Intervention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Seminar ‘The Treaty of Amsterdam and the New European Agenda’ in 1997, Centro Cultural de Belém, Lisbon.

⁴⁹ Cf. Tonra 2001, 14.

⁵⁰ Cf. interview with Director of the National Defence Institute, Nuno Severiano Teixeira, *Público*, 23 July 2000, 10. On the issue of a convergence criteria for European defence, see Heisbourg *et al.* 2000.

⁵¹ Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (1996), *Portugal e a Conferência Intergovernamental...*p. 39.

ruled out by Portuguese diplomacy since NATO would continue to ensure collective defence functions under Article 5. Portugal favoured a WEU that could perform peacekeeping tasks, intervene in low intensity crisis, and support humanitarian actions, as it was later agreed. Security issues were to be limited to the framework of CFSP. The persistence of national support to an intergovernmental CFSP was motivated by the way it levelled participation of member states, allowed diversity of national preferences and maintained a logic of gradual incorporation of policy roles compatible with the obligations assumed in the Atlantic domain.⁵² The national position on this aspect was: 'The foreign and security policy is linked to the essential core of EU member states' sovereignty, for which it should be limited to the intergovernmental framework in which it was created'.⁵³ Not only communitarisation was to be avoided, but also qualified majority in the second pillar framework was unwelcome.⁵⁴ Unanimity was to remain the preferential method of agreement on common actions for the second pillar.

The first Portuguese experience of a joint EU/WEU Presidency in the first semester of 2000, contributed to deepen socialisation into CFSP.⁵⁵ Similarly the enhancement of communication networks among European ministries of defence, political directors, and defence and foreign policy specialists generated common understandings on those policy dimensions.⁵⁶ The WEU's Presidency programme presented by Lisbon, transmitted the preferences of Portuguese diplomacy based on the principle that the 'European Union needs to avail itself of the WEU to conduct crisis management operations'.⁵⁷ The Presidency also endorsed the inclusion of the WEU's mili-

⁵² See Assembleia da República, Parliamentary Review of the Revision of the Treaty on European Union at the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996, Report of the Committee for European Affairs, 16 February 1996, available at <http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/ms-doc/state-pt/rapport.html> (Acceded 12-06-2005). See also Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (1996), *Portugal e a Conferência Intergovernamental...* p. 36.

⁵³ Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (1996), *Portugal e a Conferência Intergovernamental...* p. 36. This concern at the policy making level reflected the same misperception observed in literature. The insistency in keeping the intergovernmental dimension of CFSP had little fundament taking into consideration that the Treaty of Maastricht only foresaw the duty of member states to 'inform and consult' on any matter of foreign and security policy and to ensure that member states policies 'conform to the common positions' (Article J.2). These decisions were complemented by initiatives on the areas of priority for the CFSP identified in the *Report on the Likely Development of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) with a View to Identifying Areas Open to Joint Action vis-à-vis Particular Countries or Groups of Countries*, Lisbon, 26-27 June 1992.

⁵⁴ Portugal sustained that a minimum number of states should be agreed on for the formation of a qualified majority. A similar provision was to be applied to the maximum number of states that could abstain from participating in a EU action or common position. Member states should also define the circumstances under which general financial solidarity would not be applied in sponsoring actions within CFSP.

⁵⁵ Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (2000), *Presidência Portuguesa do Conselho da União Europeia*, 1 January to 30 June 2000, pp.41-43.

⁵⁶ See Smith 2000, 615.

⁵⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement of the Director-General for Multilateral Affairs (1999) Portuguese Presidency of the Western European Union, January/June 2000.

tary functions into the EU and the reinforcement of its operational capability in articulation with NATO, as well as the development of ESDP.

Important evidence of the growing perception of *prominence* of European security and defence prescriptive roles was depicted in the orientation of the Portuguese programme of the WEU Presidency. Contrary to prior WEU Presidencies, whose programmes reflected self-interested preferences and specific security concerns with their neighbouring borders, the programme of the 2000 WEU Presidency illustrated a growing embedding in the European security project, consistent with the positions adopted within foreign policy. The European security discourse focused on the non-military and civilian aspects of cooperation in crisis management and appealed to the commonality of principles, shared values and equality in participation, which helped creating among Portuguese military authorities the perception of complementarity with the Atlantic defence options.⁵⁸ This stance strengthened a comprehensive approach of the Portuguese Presidency to the civilian aspects of crisis management (e.g. police capabilities, rescue operations, refugees and displaced persons assistance, strengthening local rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection) in European security, which helped 'avoid marginalisation, while preserving their traditional security identity.'⁵⁹ These security tasks could extensively contribute to the restoration of disrupted administrative systems, to the recovery of infrastructures and to provide training of local administrations in periods of political transition. This broad scope of missions could be undertaken inside and outside Europe, notably in the context of missions of national reconciliation and national reconstruction in former Portuguese Africa.

This accounts for the recognition that certain foreign policy goals could be more successfully attained by making use of international diplomatic networking and CFSP mechanisms, than on a national base. Most of the EU topical issues discussed in the broad domain of CFSP, from regional crisis management to dual use goods, did not solve specific technical problems that may have been of national interest to a country like Portugal, since these issues were also addressed in the more familiar context of NATO considered to be more efficient. This underlines the importance of a

⁵⁸ Cf. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira 19-20 June 2000, *I-Preparing the Future, C. Common European Security and Defence Policy*. This preference for the civilian aspects of crisis management was also observed by Goetschel as being a determinant factor in the changing nature of international identity among Scandinavian countries, from a traditionally neutral position to a new security identity recognised in CFSP/ESDP, see Goetschel 2000, 83 and Wivel 2005, 395-396. See also Vitorino 1996c, 6.

⁵⁹ Wivel 2005, 397.

European normative basis that became prominent, providing non-rule based incentives to compliance.

7.2.2 Portuguese Change in Security and Defence Policy and Evidence of NATO's Continued Prominence

In the case of NATO, the condition of prominence from a national point of view was clearly driven by motives of consequentiality, technical dependence, trust, and embedded socialisation. Additionally, the narrative implicit in policy documents led to conclude that the positions that favoured the transatlantic Alliance and the recognition of prominence were more evident among the communities of experts (civilian and military) of the Ministry of Defence, than among the diplomatic community of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, government and political parties for the ten years comprised in this study. The preponderance of a NATO military culture within the Ministry of Defence and weaker socialisation of its experts into EU/CFSP affairs account for this difference.

Perception of *prominence* of the roles conveyed by NATO was also related to elements of habit, trust and military efficiency. NATO's intergovernmental feature, its centralised political and military structure and unified command and control, led by one predominant power, was considered to be more efficient, familiar and trustful to the experts of the Ministry of Defence, than the EU's pillarised structure and decentralised decision making, where various major players were perceived as struggling for their own national preferences. The military institution, dependent on technical solutions, continued to consider the Alliance more from a habitual perspective (based on common doctrine, integrated command and control structure and abundant material resources) than from a value oriented dimension. NATO was considered as the main military structure and American leadership was the baseline for collective defence.⁶⁰ This contrasted strongly with the global and value-oriented position of the EU/CFSP, with limited military resources and sources of finance divided between member states and the Communities.

The Portuguese Ministry of Defence and the national armed forces were widely influenced by an 'American-imagined' defence community embedded in a

⁶⁰ Pinheiro 1988b, 34.

NATO culture.⁶¹ This meant that the national military apparatus and the institutional fabric were oriented with priority to the relations with the United States and NATO, despite the loss of strategic relevance of the national territory, affected by the end of the Cold War and the American withdrawal from foreign bases stationed in Europe. NATO was to remain the main centre of consultation and decision making about issues regarding security and defence among political and military elites.⁶²

Throughout the 1990s the perception of Portuguese authorities was that NATO's role had not diminished within the new security environment and that Portugal would continue to hold the same strategic relevance as it had during the Cold War.⁶³ Even at a time when NATO was struggling with the consequences of adaptation from a 'conventional defence posture' into a broader scope of new military missions in out-of-area and implementation of new force concepts, Portuguese authorities hardly ever questioned its ability to adapt.⁶⁴

Another consequential reasoning for the incorporation of new transatlantic role prescriptions resulted from a national need to maintain strategic salience within the Alliance and to preserve strategic options to national defence policy. Two circumstances influenced Portugal's perception of *prominence* of NATO's prescriptive role. The first results from superpowers' withdrawal from areas of traditional strategic interest, which affected Portugal's strategic salience. The second relates to the changes introduced to NATO's defence posture and the moving of transatlantic interests from the European geo-strategic core to out-of-area. The first circumstance meant that the country and the Azores archipelago would no longer be in the strategic crossing of tensions between East and West, since 'the former concept of forward defence no longer applied in continental Europe'.⁶⁵ The second allowed the repositioning of Portugal regarding the role it could play in out-of-area operations and in the setting of the CJTF concept. As underlined by the Defence Minister, Portugal's orientation 'towards the Atlantic and reporting lines to North America' signalled the country's preferential link to the Alliance.⁶⁶ The CJTF concept, although demanding a higher level of collective readiness and availability of national forces, offered broader opportunities to

⁶¹ Wallace 2001, 18. In the Portuguese case preference for NATO was determined by two circumstances: the myth of specialness and the fact the modernisation of national armed forces owe to NATO its technological innovations. See Mojardino 2000, 185-215 and Telo 1997, 671.

⁶² Ministry of Defence (1992) *Participation Portugaise aux Missions de l'UEO*, 24 September 1992.

⁶³ See Vitorino 1996e, 22.

⁶⁴ See *NATO Handbook* 2001, 49.

⁶⁵ See *NATO Handbook* 2001, 250 and 47.

⁶⁶ Vitorino 1996e, 22.

all member states, larger and smaller, to participate in an expanded range of military missions from crisis management and peacekeeping to humanitarian relief operations.

In national terms Portugal's participation in international missions under NATO command and the UN legal framework provided the political opportunity that national diplomacy would later make instrumental use of by mobilising the support of transatlantic allies in favour of the right to self-determination of East Timor. The same international recognition probably weighted on the efforts which later would result in the successful setting up of Joint Command Lisbon Headquarter, as one of the three NATO Joint Headquarters constituted to accommodate NATO Response Forces.⁶⁷ In this case, the perception of collective efficiency and American military superiority filtered national views on the *prominence* of the roles prescribed by NATO in crisis management and conflict resolution. The material capabilities of the Alliance, rather than its normative authority were at the focus of national recognition of *prominence* of the military roles conveyed.

Despite the instrumental focus of NATO a dimension of appropriateness or goodness was not absent from national evaluation on the prominence of the roles conveyed in the transatlantic context. A justification of appropriateness was observed with regard to Portuguese military participation in international missions. Although it is obvious the utilitarian focus of the argumentation used by the Portuguese executive, in justifying attribution of troops to a coalition force in the Balkans (based on reliance on collective assets and capabilities and on a high degree of trust in NATO's political structures), it is interesting to note how this argumentation reflected also specific concerns with appropriateness and legitimacy, namely the existence of a UN mandate.

The period that mediated between NATO's intervention in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999 constituted a period of renewed commitment of Portugal within NATO, parallel to its new European political and diplomatic commitment to European security.⁶⁸ The type of role prescriptions (peacekeeping, re-establishment of internal order, protection of human rights and the rights of minorities and humanitarian relief) involved in these missions had a positive effect on national support due to the motives publicly addressed in explaining the reasons for intervention. A recent study conducted by Matos and Bacalhau about the perception of Portuguese public opinion on the missions undertaken by national armed forces, showed that contributions to

⁶⁷ The other two NATO Joint Force Commands are Brunssum (The Netherlands) and Naples (Italy).

⁶⁸ See Gomes 2000 and Rocha 2000.

new missions was followed by a considerable level of internal support. In 1999, 40% of the people enquired thought that the involvement of Portugal in peacekeeping missions increased the international prestige of Portugal and more than 40% found that it enhanced the prestige of national armed forces.⁶⁹ The results of another study conducted by Carrilho concerning the Portuguese participation in Bosnia in 1996 under NATO command pointed to a favourable opinion of 68.8 % of the people questioned.⁷⁰ In the last case, the survey reveals that NATO was perceived as a non-coercive security organisation, which left its member states ample space for autonomous decision. Despite the fact that both studies showed that Portuguese public opinion tended to favour international participation in situations where Portuguese interests were directly concerned, the support for the Alliance remained high in situations where collective rather than national interest was at stake. National support to security missions like protection of human rights and humanitarian relief scored high in both studies.

From the internal perspective of national armed forces, the study carried out by Carreiras found strong evidence of positive support by the military on their intervention in Bosnia, with 93.5% of the respondents expressing an answer 'favourable' or 'very favourable' related to the intervention in the conflict and 91.7% expressing their willingness to integrate future international missions in which Portugal might take part.⁷¹ When given the possibility to express their preference on the international organisation under which the military felt more confident to participate in peacekeeping missions, the majority of the military choose NATO as their preferred organisation.⁷² This underlined the persistence of a trust factor towards NATO, despite the invocation of normative reasoning.

These results reflect internal consensus about military intervention and offer strong accounts of prominence of the roles prescribed by NATO in situations of conflict. In this case, political consensus and internal support to Portuguese defence policy within the transatlantic context favoured reliance on NATO and highlights the continuation in the official discourse of arguments of appropriateness regarding na-

⁶⁹ Matos 2001, 121. In this study, the question asked regarded international participation from a perspective of national prestige and corporative prestige of the armed forces.

⁷⁰ Carrilho 1998, 30. In this case, the question in the survey addressed the autonomous capacity of the Portuguese state to decide on national participation in international missions under NATO's leadership.

⁷¹ Carreiras 1998, 7 and 8.

⁷² Carreiras 1998, 13.

tional military participation.⁷³ In particular after 1995, the position of the Portuguese military and political authorities balanced between openness to national participation in the construction of a European pillar of the Alliance (NATO's view) and an incremental support to a European armed arm (Union's view).⁷⁴ If the political reaction to the atrocities that took place in Bosnia was voiced through the Union's political channels, the military response to the conflict escalation and attribution of military capabilities were primarily entrusted in the framework of a NATO joint operation. The decision of the Portuguese government to intervene, as the Defence Minister declared, was 'propitiated by a deep consciousness that belonging to an Alliance determines not only solidarity rights, but also the duties of shared responsibilities and risks'.⁷⁵ This highlights the prominence of the role recognised to the Alliance, drawn out of considerations of rightfulness and responsibility. Similarly, the Portuguese participation in IFOR was publicly voiced by the Defence Minister as the completion of a 'cycle of political (not military) restitution of Portugal to the European space'.⁷⁶

Also significant from the perspective of national role performance and realisation of *prominence* was the Defence Minister's recognition that the Portuguese involvement in former Yugoslavia meant a 'rupture with a cultural tradition' of neutrality which lasted for almost eight decades of history.⁷⁷ For the first time since the First World War, Portugal engaged combat units in a real war scenario, in an area which was not of its direct strategic interest. This constituted significant evidence of change in national security identity traditionally prone to neutrality, but also the acknowledgement that international activity could rely beyond strategic relevance of the national territory.

From here two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, a renewed willingness to participate in collective security, in a way not necessarily motivated by self-interested reasons or cost-benefit calculations, since Portugal did not have any direct national interests to defend in the Balkans. This meant that behaviour was pro-norm driven, regardless absence of direct exogenous material benefits or incentives.⁷⁸ Portuguese compliance was in this case based on normative arguments of common responsibility, solidarity and advocacy of the rules of international law.

⁷³ See Chipman 1988, 357.

⁷⁴ Cf. Vitorino 1996d, 89.

⁷⁵ Vitorino 1999, 87.

⁷⁶ Vitorino 1996d, 95. Brackets added.

⁷⁷ Vitorino 1996f, 3.

⁷⁸ Cf. Kelley 2004, 428.

The second results from the first and is related to a more active international participation, discursively justified on the basis of arguments of *appropriateness*, not consequentiality. The domestic official discourse justified external intervention based on a broad internal consensus, consistent with the recognition of *prominence* of NATO role prescriptions in the context of new European security and defence tasks. The official rhetoric followed a logic of *appropriateness* based on the notions of ‘humanitarian security’, ‘protection of human rights’, ‘social and administrative rehabilitation’, ‘just war’ and ‘impartiality in intervention’ and ‘democracy’.⁷⁹

The official record showed that a well-established socialisation within NATO accounted for the way the role played by Portugal was recurrently assumed as a taken for granted position, that not even the Alliance enlargement could affect.⁸⁰ Changes in perception happened as from the moment when national elites realised the complementary nature of the Euro-Atlantic security projects. As the Defence Minister noted, NATO’s ‘Europeanisation’ met the interests of both sides of the Atlantic since the United States could only have a part in European security, if its role in the transatlantic relation would be more equalitarian, since it depended on European will to assume greater responsibilities.⁸¹

One can say that international socialisation contributed to highlight the non-contending aspects between transatlantic and European settings. This added diversification to Portuguese external relations enabled incremental adaptation within NATO and facilitated consistency of national positions towards NATO and CFSP/ESDP. This showed that the *prominence* recognised to NATO was not only high, but considered guaranteed to the extent it did not impede the development of a national preference formation supportive of a European security option, resulting from new institutional commitments, namely the rotating EU and WEU Presidencies. A well entrenched transatlantic socialisation was a relevant social and political asset to Portugal in both contexts. As referred earlier (cf. Chapter 6), when Portugal chaired its second

⁷⁹ On the use of discourse based on the logic of appropriateness, see the positions of the President of Republic and Supreme Head of the Armed Forces Jorge Sampaio and the Minister of Defence António Vitorino at the time. Vitorino 1996d, 90; Vitorino 1998b, 89; Sampaio 2002, 91; Sampaio 2002, 58.

⁸⁰ On the relation between socialisation and the understandings about a taken for granted position occupied by the subject within a specific institutional context, see Johnston 2001, 494. This perception of taken for granted position was also observed concerning the Portuguese positions favourable to NATO’s enlargement. This despite the fact that NATO’s enlargement posed to Portugal the same problems of a broaden distribution of defence goods among new allies, as those pointed out at the economic level in the context of EU enlargement. See also Barroso 1995a, 82; Intergovernmental Conference Task Force, White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Vol. II – Summary of Positions of the Member States of the European Union; Costa 2002, 44, 50 and 53.

⁸¹ Vitorino 1996a, 179. Intervention of the Minister of Defence 8 October 1997. See also Gama 2002. Intervention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Strasbourg 19 January 2000, pp.75-81.

EU Presidency it was entrusted with conveying European perspectives on matters of EU-NATO security and defence cooperation to NATO and the United States.⁸² This would not have been done successfully in a weakly socialised environment. Another consequence of socialisation, with impact on perception of prominence of NATO's roles, had to do with how it influenced the specific attitudes of communities of experts enabling a stronger institutional support for NATO, even after 1998 when the ESDP was set in motion.

In sum, in the case of CFSP/ESDP, Portugal used a normative focus in justifying its adherence to European foreign and security project based on the recognition of prominence of European institutions. At the political level, this relied on a 'language of values' in line with the conciliatory nature of Portuguese policy, providing a relevant normative base to national elites on why to incorporate EU role prescriptions. The value-oriented mode of addressing security problems within the CFSP context and the dynamics of European integration generated by the second pillar created common understandings, with which Portugal tended to comply on a voluntary base, without the incentive of a material reward. The adaptation of Portugal to the process of NATO reform also underlines the presence of compliant behaviour under a non-rule-based conditionality. NATO remained an organisation of enforcement of codes of defence conduct, without specific legal mechanisms of law enforcement over its member states.

In times of transition, as observed in early 1990s, the prominence of the roles prescribed depended more on the symbolic value and standing material capital of NATO, than on any need to reassure membership, to guarantee strategic relevance or to deepen integration, as it was the case with CFSP/ESDP. In the second half of 1990s, incorporation of role prescriptions was perceived as a way to diversify and avoid Portugal's peripherisation in the transatlantic context. Smaller allies like Portugal were able to gain social and political capital within both organisations based on intense international socialisation and limited military participation. This granted Portugal some dividends not only in NATO's renewed command structure, but also in other nationally relevant topics of the foreign policy agenda (e.g. internationalisation of the issue of East Timor right to self-determination). Changes in national position regarding the transatlantic setting resultant from new perception of *prominence*, de-

⁸² See European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira 19-20 June 2000, *Issues and Modalities for the Interim Period*, Appended to the European Council, Presidency Conclusions.

spite enclosing a logic of utility, evolved under new normative labels. If a logic of utility served functional arguments on behalf of efficiency, the normative labels enabled to preserve a domestic discourse that emphasised Portugal's traditional security identity (neutral and humanistic). These interpretations, depicted in the official discourse, constitute evidence of *prominence*. Although maintaining the integrity of material concerns, these evolved to a language of *appropriateness*, as international socialisation consolidated within the security and defence Euro-Atlantic context.

7.3 Endurance

In this section the condition of endurance is validated in order to find out if the indicators of routinisation and imitation of behaviour played an essential role in the process of incorporation of international role prescriptions and role incorporation.

The condition of *endurance* regards incorporation of behaviour through the adoption of routines and practices in national foreign and security policy that indicate acceptance of international role prescriptions. This condition lays beyond the strict limits of administrative reform or formal incorporation of rules, as frequently found in literature e.g. on Europeanisation. This section suggests normative and functional developments based on observations about discourse and behaviour in order to trace changes in the way Portuguese incorporation of role prescriptions occurred. The indicators of *routinisation* and *imitation* used in this study test institutional and behavioural incorporation of roles, not necessarily reflected in formal or administrative adaptation.

Literature regarding Portuguese policy adaptation from a substantive (discourse analysis and meaning) and policy action approach (Portuguese international activity from a role perspective dimension) is very scarce.⁸³ With regard to Portugal in the EU context (CFSP/ESDP) recent contributions have been made concerning the impact of Europeanisation on foreign policy, with a particular emphasis on the reform of national administration from an organisational and procedural perspective.⁸⁴ This section expects to add further contributions beyond formal incorporation of role prescriptions.

⁸³ However there is an important and substantive body of historiography about Portugal's integration in the EC and in the Alliance for the period comprised between 1949 and 1990 and various policy oriented studies on Portugal's participation in NATO. See Maxwell 1984; Maxwell 1999; Pinto & Teixeira 2002; Teixeira 1996; Ferreira 1993 and Ferreira 1999.

⁸⁴ See Vasconcelos & Antunes 1996; Magone 2000; Correia 2002 and Seabra 2003.

The observation of the condition of *endurance* of NATO and CFSP role prescriptions, in Portugal's external relations, depicts different degrees of incidence, which result from the distinctive focus in each of them across time.

7.3.1 Institutional and Behavioural Adaptation to European Role Prescriptions

While NATO had an almost immediate impact on the country's defence, security and foreign policy, the process of European integration being broader involved a more comprehensive process of adaptation across various policy areas. Similarly, the condition of endurance had a distinct impact on the way national administrations formally and informally incorporate role prescriptions. Both the Portuguese Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs underwent different processes of institutional reform in the beginning of 1990s, which reflected a concern with adjusting the military and diplomatic administrations to new external responsibilities.

In the context of the Ministry of Defence the process of reform was less striking and did not give immediately place to the institutionalisation of new departments and support services, as it happened with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the impact of Europeanisation of foreign policy led to an important reform in 1994. The General-Directorate of National Defence Policy (Ministry of Defence) comprised various Departments whose officials acted as standing representatives of the Ministry in the various working groups and negotiations processes in the EU, WEU and NATO.⁸⁵ As already referred most military representatives of the Ministry of Defence attending WEU meetings and meetings with incidence on CFSP aspects were deeply socialised into a NATO culture.⁸⁶ Having relied for years and in experience on the efficiency on NATO's political and military institutions, those officials perceived the Alliance's role prescriptions as predominant and in the national interest, while the idea of a European security and defence identity and a future defence policy appeared to be a tentative project.

⁸⁵ Within the General-Directorate of National Defence Policy the Department of Multilateral Relations has direct responsibilities in fulfilling policy orientations with implications in the domain of security and defence policy, in the context of NATO and WEU, EU/CFSP/CESDP, as well as UN and OSCE.

⁸⁶ The experience of the author of this study, as former representative of the General-Directorate of National Defence Policy at the WEU's Mediterranean Group, Defence Representatives Group and Special Working Group showed that double hated responsibilities are fruitful to the incorporation of a European dimension on security and defence, in terms of exchange and access to information among officials attending NATO and EU/WEU meetings. Conversely, Magone considers the double hated responsibilities (NATO and WEU) of diplomats credited at the Portuguese permanent delegation to NATO headquarters, in Brussels, a sign that WEU was considered a mere European pillar of NATO, dismissing the value of this practical complementarity. See Magone 2000, 166.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs after its reform in 1994 comprised four main General-Directorates with departments with specific focus on European affairs, which contributed to a more dense contact with the EU institutional fabric.⁸⁷ Also among its civil servants and diplomatic personnel accredited at the Portuguese embassies, in London and Brussels, prevailed a supportive perspective, as compared to the view shared by civil servants and military at the Ministry of Defence, on the European capacity to generate an authoritative CSFP and an efficient ESDP. The routinisation of policy practices, imitation of behaviour and the development of an ‘automatic reflex of consultation’ among diplomats and civil servants of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, within European institutions, helped to forge a better knowledge about European policy procedures contributing to foster, among the permanent representatives of delegations attending EPC/CFSP and WEU meetings, an attitude of openness to new European institutional developments.⁸⁸

From an administrative perspective, the reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs improved the level of coordination between the European institutions and national foreign policy, contributing to a clearer dissemination of policy goals, to a better usage of European decision-making bodies, higher representation in EU meetings, more frequent use of European communication system (COREU) and improved coordination between EU foreign policy and national foreign policy. The routinisation of policy practices and frequency of negotiations within European institutions led to the establishment of regular bilateral and multilateral information exchanges among planning staffs, to the creation of specialised parliamentary committees and to the establishment of party advisors dedicated to European foreign, security and defence affairs.⁸⁹

The Ministry of Defence, on the other hand, kept a stable institutional design, but with a more intense and diversified participation of its civil servants in interna-

⁸⁷ These were the General-Directorate of Foreign Policy (which integrates one Direction of Services dedicated to CFSP), the General-Directorate for European Affairs, the General-Directorate for Bilateral Relations (which integrates six regional directions of services among which was dedicated to Europe and another to North America) and the General-Directorate for Multilateral Relations (which included three directions of services of which one regards Organisations of Security and Defence and another International Economic Organisations). For a more detailed account of the formal process of administrative reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Seabra 2003, 358-362 and Correia 2002, 194-198.

⁸⁸ For details on ‘reflex of consultation’ as an observation that foreign policy actors shared views and opinions among integrated political institutions before defining national positions, see Nuttall 1992.

⁸⁹ Cf. Wallace 2001, 6. Notwithstanding the limited intervention of the Portuguese parliament, for instance in European issues, a European Affairs and Foreign Policy Permanent Commission and a National Defence Permanent Commission were created with responsibility for providing advice and specific information about European foreign policy and defence related matters to national political parties and government.

tional meetings and working groups of NATO, WEU and CFSP, as from 1992. Each process of endurance offered distinct characteristics: a formal reform, which led to the development of new General-Directorates, in the case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an enhanced level of specialisation within departments and increased allocation of experts to prepare the country for new commitments in the European and transatlantic contexts, in the case of the Ministry of Defence. Both proved essential to the routinisation of policy practices and incorporation of new prescriptions in those two domains.

Internal policy style seemed to have affected also the endurance of the roles prescribed and their incorporation. National decision-making was traditionally based on weak decentralisation of decision-making, on low concern with consensus-reaching working methods among national departments and ministries (where decisions were bound by a clear-cut authority tradition, between the top and the base) and on modest inter-ministerial coordination at least until mid 1990s.⁹⁰ The limited direct involvement of the executive (mainly the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence) in particular with regard to European security and defence affairs pressed less for incorporation of routinisation of integrated policy practices in particular in the domain of CFSP/ESDP. In contrast, the personal commitment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1992-1995, initially by intensifying multilateral relations with transatlantic allies and later with the EU, encouraged the administrative reform of the Ministry, adjusting the ministerial institutional building to a concept of multilateral and joint political cooperation. As Hanf and Soetendorp suggest ‘small states can only be “effective” at the international level if they are well organised in preparing and presenting their position on issues’.⁹¹ Both authors consider that in general terms the existence of some degree of centralisation of external relations at the level of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet is relevant to the process of endurance of role prescriptions. This could be observed during the 2000 EU Presidency, when the direct involvement of the Prime Minister António Guterres in coordinating work jointly with the Secretary of State for European Affairs led to an enhancement of routinisation of national policy practices in particular towards European affairs.

As Hanf and Soetendorp noted, it cannot be assumed that political actors adapt to changes to a more complex external environment, because adjustment to external

⁹⁰ Cf. Seabra 2003, 363.

⁹¹ Hanf & Soetendorp 1998, 4-5.

developments is not a simple stimulus-response reaction, but rather a long process of adaptation to emergent security realities and necessities.⁹² In the European domain this complexity is more evident. The national permeability to incorporate routines associated with new roles (e.g. chairing a EU Presidency) increased proportionally to the learning process to which Portuguese diplomacy had been exposed to more intensively after 1992. The task of a EU Presidency-in-office put the national administration more closely in contact with the demands of intergovernmental coordination, integrated information management and multilateral negotiation skills. During the 1992 EU Presidency, two aspects conditioned *endurance* in the domain of CFSP. Firstly, Portugal had no prior experience from which lessons could be drawn, so routinisation was progressive. Secondly, the Presidency was held at a time when Portugal's main objective was the attainment of the convergence criteria for entering the third stage of the European Monetary Union, and coordination efforts were almost limited to the services and Ministries with responsibilities in the process (Secretariat of State for European Affairs and Ministries of Finance, Interior, and Social Affairs) for which incorporation of routinisation was for some time less comprehensive.⁹³ The dimensions of foreign and security policy were therefore overshadowed by the imperatives of economic and monetary integration.

The agreements reached within WEU in early 1990s, such as the synchronisation of dates and venues of meetings, and harmonisation of working methods between WEU and NATO and those adopted in 2000, during the EU Portuguese Presidency, facilitated the setting up of common procedures with positive implications for the routinisation of ESDP mode of operation, whenever cooperation with NATO was involved.⁹⁴ This was publicly conveyed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs when referring to a specific responsibility of the Portuguese Presidency in introducing qualitative contributions to the institutionalisation of political dialogue and military cooperation between NATO and the EU.⁹⁵ Such articulation facilitated the EU's access to NATO's military assets and capabilities, politically supported by EU-NATO consultations and militarily operationalised through the use of NATO CJTF. This facilitated

⁹² Hanf & Soetendorp 1998, 7.

⁹³ See Azevedo 1997; Wessels & Rometsch 1996, 333 and Magone 2004a, 139-141.

⁹⁴ Cf. Gama 1997b, 51. It was during the Portuguese Presidency of WEU that the first WEU/NATO Joint Crisis Management Exercise was held in 2000, which was an important test to ESDP-related concepts and arrangements for handling WEU-led operations making use of NATO assets and capabilities. This had an overall significance from the point of view of routinisation of practices of coordination between the two organisations. See WEU Council of Ministers, *Porto Declaration*, Porto 15-16 May 2000.

⁹⁵ Gama 2000a, 4.

the routinisation of policy practices and military cooperation by countries like Portugal, who had a favourable position in the context of NATO regional commands, in the framework of which CJTF could be activated.⁹⁶

Consequently, Portuguese international participation in the field of security and defence was preserved under a non-contending Euro-Atlantic frame of cooperation, benefiting from a long tradition of routinisation and imitation of behaviour, without the need of immediate and formal incorporation of roles. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated ‘we have proved (during the 2000 EU/WEU Presidency) that it is possible to conjugate NATO’s strategic concept with the common defence and security policy of the EU’.⁹⁷ To this one must add the fact that Portuguese elites shared global views on foreign policy, triggered by the country’s historical past, high predisposition to internalise behaviour within regional and international organisations and a good record of compliance. This set of features contributed to overcome the material limitations of its administration in adapting to routinisation of policy practices and procedures.⁹⁸

The second EU Presidency in 2000 took place during a different phase of political integration giving to national foreign policy new incentives to international participation. Portuguese foreign policy became more multilateralised and proactive. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sub-policy areas were created and formally networked with the EU institutions and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of other EU members, rather than relying on personal contacts or on contingent individual networks of diplomats and civil servants.⁹⁹ As the former Secretary of State for European Affairs accounted, the European impact on the global coherence of Portuguese diplomatic culture was significant as compared with the prior dispersed bilateral dossiers, which subtracted consistency to external relations.¹⁰⁰ This contributed to set new internal conditions that enabled the adoption of policy procedures within CFSP and within the future ESDP.

⁹⁶ European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira 19-20 June 2000, Annex I *Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy, II-Military aspects of Crisis Management*, Paragraph J.

⁹⁷ Gama 2000a, 4. Brackets added. Gama 2000b, 7.

⁹⁸ On this see Cameron 1998, 61-62. See also Edwards and Wiessala 2001, 43-46.

⁹⁹ Cf. Correia 2002.

¹⁰⁰ Costa 2002, 58.

7.3.2 Evidence of Endured Transatlantic Role Prescriptions in Portuguese Security and Defence Policy

In the case of NATO, national evidence of routinisation of role prescriptions benefited from a longer membership with more structural consequences at the political and military level. The nature of the problems and issues NATO addressed pressed for earlier (Portugal was a NATO's founding member) and long lasting conformant behaviour with the Alliance's policy prescriptions. NATO's military reform introduced new technical, doctrinal and training routines destined to answer a broader range of international missions.¹⁰¹ The process of national adaptation to new forms of routinisation can be traced throughout the period between 1995 and March 2001 characterised by one of the most active contribution of national contingents in international missions, in particular in the Balkans (IFOR, SFOR and Kosovo). This is in itself significant from the perspective of behavioural adaptation and routinisation of new military functions (with the involvement of combat units) in crisis management and conflict resolution. The adaptation of national armed forces to NATO's reform reflected the general understanding that the new security challenges claimed for better prepared military, and smaller and highly mobile units (as defined by the London Declaration in 1990), with a higher level of expertise, with multinational and multi-functional profile operating in a new international legal framework.

Adaptation to NATO's military reform had a decisive and positive impact on Portugal's repositioning within NATO's new military functions, allowing the country to recover the eminent loss of strategic salience of early 1990s. As from mid 1990s, defence policy became more aligned with the international responsibilities prescribed within the Alliance assuming a proactive form, which contrasted with its prior reactive posture. In the external domain, the pluri-continental position of defence policy was mainly reflected on the bilateral relations with the United States (mostly focused on the negotiations between Portugal and the United States about the American air-base in Azores) and on the technical and military cooperation with former colonies (which occupied a substantial part of the material and human resources of the General-Directorate of National Defence), as compared to the limited investment in early

¹⁰¹ NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe, 6-7 June 1991 , Press Communiqué M-1(91) 44.

European security and defence initiatives, among which a culture of security was not entirely recognised by military elites.¹⁰²

Despite the generalised reserve towards European security and defence among national military experts (for most of the period considered in this study), the Europeanisation of national defence policy did not show any significant delay, as compared to other European NATO allies, since there was no significant institutionalised dimension of European defence prior to 1998. Likewise, only after Nice, the Council of the European Union started to informally gather Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, only after Nice the EU reached the institutional conditions to set forward the aims comprised in the *Headline Goal*, to define a *Capabilities Commitment Force* in 2000 and to draw a *Force Catalogue* for a European force. Until then, defence related matters were not addressed in Council meetings or in meetings of the Council working groups, nor were they dealt with by the Commission's expert committees in Brussels.

The official discourse, in the context of domestic justification for national participation in peacekeeping operations, displayed ambiguous signs of imitation of behaviour within the Euro-Atlantic context.

The strategic salience of NATO (under whose command most national contingents were placed in international missions in Europe) was strongly embedded in functional reasoning based on highly routinised military practices and military might. The political justification for the Portuguese involvement in the Balkans replicated a normative argumentation in line with what was conveyed to the public, as fulfilling European core values. Whereas in the transatlantic context, Portugal has held a status of security receiver, in the European domain the discourse underpinning involvement in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans was of Portugal as a provider of stability.¹⁰³ One can say that the normative approach conveyed in the official speech as from 1995, namely by the Defence Minister and the President of Republic (also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces) is driven by the idea of commitment to European interests on behalf of regional peace and stability. A matter of practical nature and military responsibility was publicly represented as a matter of principle.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Pinto 2000, 427.

¹⁰³ Cf. Interview with former Director of the National Defence Institute, Nuno Severiano Teixeira, *Público*, 23 July 2000, p.10.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Thorhallsson 2000, 6.

The logic involving international participation was therefore discursively distinct in meaning and purpose. In the case of NATO, the issue of problem-solving and efficiency played a crucial role in the justification to comply with transatlantic roles and responsibilities. In this case endurance relied on material adaptation. In the case of CFSP/ESDP, the normative aspects of solidarity, good governance and respect for minority rights and human rights became a part of the official discourse, as institutionalisation took place. These aspects were perceived as more compelling in the European domain than in the transatlantic context, due to the non-military tradition underlining CFSP. Increasing endurance of European roles by national authorities was seen as an opportunity, not as a limiting factor, that would open Portugal to a new international identity without hindering national participation in NATO.¹⁰⁵ One can say that the reference to international security and defence issues in the domestic political discourse, reflected non-contending views regarding to European and transatlantic security and defence projects and signalled a deeper involvement in European institutions. In this case, recognition of normative authority and the use of moral justification bounded the degree to which *endurance* of the roles incorporated occurred.

A change in discourse was also observed regarding the strategic value of the national territory in the transatlantic context. The strategic salience of the national territory was centred on an equation, which fitted NATO's strategic power position during the Cold War. This equation was traditionally based on official notions of 'functional power', associated with the concepts of 'spinning platform' (through which Portugal connected the strategic interests of NATO with Europe) and the military concept of 'strategic triangle' (formed by continental Portugal and the archipelagos of Madeira and Azores). Images of the Portuguese territory as a multi-directional (Portugal-Africa; Portugal-US and Portugal-Europe) 'spinning platform' in the context of the Alliance and the EU have been recurrently used in political discourse to counter-balance the peripherisation of the country. It is also used to support claims about the universal orientation of national foreign policy and to sustain the idea that due to its geographical location Portugal has a connecting function between 'cultures, people and regions'.¹⁰⁶ As from late 1991, this discourse previously anchored in the notions of territorial defence and privileged relations with NATO and the United States,

¹⁰⁵ For a similar view, see Wivel 2005, 395. Wivel argues that small states' participation in the security and defence dimensions of the EU gives them opportunities to influence and voice security concerns, enabling the institutionalisation of new means to solve security problems.

¹⁰⁶ On this last aspect, see Telo 1997, 649.

started to evolve to a notion of defence reliant on the internationalisation and Europeanisation of national commitments.¹⁰⁷

The prior status of national defence policy based on preferential bilateral relations with the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Spain was also gradually combined with a more multilateralised position, reoriented to a global scale from the Atlantic and Europe, to the Mediterranean and Africa, diversified in scope and in institutional context, within which external relations and international commitments were to be sustained. Policy practices that had been highly routinised within traditional bilateral and transatlantic arrangements had to be complemented by new policy practices.

At the European level, institutional and operational conditionalities limited the formation of a condition of necessity (fulfilled in NATO's context) to articulate and fully routinise Portuguese defence policy with ESPD, giving way to Europeanisation in the sense of letting national defence policy immediately open to a 'European way'. This lack of immediacy is also confirmed in the country studies developed by Hanf and Soetendorp on the various processes of adaptation of small states to European integration.¹⁰⁸ One can say that institutional adaptation of defence policy, although it did not occur immediately, was preceded by a change in domestic perceptions. *Endurance* of the roles prescribed within CFSP/ESDP, at a national level, could not only improve the international and European position of the country, but was also understood as reflecting role conceptions familiar to national foreign policy.

In sum, the *endurance* of the roles prescribed by NATO benefited from a longer membership and long-standing routinisation of Portuguese representatives and military elites within a transatlantic framework of political and security relations, for which no major adjustments were introduced to national foreign, security and defence policy. In the case of the EU, the observation of *endurance* of role prescriptions depended on the assumption of new responsibilities assumed in the context of the second pillar, compatible with the developments that occurred within the Alliance and with the progress of CFSP and ESDP. For this reason, formal impact was more evident as the foreign, security and defence process progressed. However, policy action

¹⁰⁷ Vasconcelos 1999, 10-13. Magone 2004c,247. Magone sustains that the European integration helped the country to overcome the 'nationalist position' of foreign and security policy. See also Ferreira 1999, 75-91.

¹⁰⁸ Hanf & Soetendorp 1998, 186.

was stimulated by the existence of informal mechanisms that generated policy precedence, which favoured imitation of behaviour within the second pillar.

At the ministerial level and from the administrative point of view, *endured* role prescriptions followed the process of national adaptation to European integration and to NATO's military reform. In the case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was a process of institutional reform and formal administrative adaptation to European affairs, which reflected new forms of routinisation of integrated decision-making in foreign and security policy. Whereas in the Ministry of Defence the process of adaptation did not result in the creation of new services, but rather in the assumption of broader responsibilities added to the traditional areas of transatlantic relations and defence policy.

From the point of view of the official discourse, domestic justification used to explain international participation in new missions was instrumentally anchored in NATO's military efficiency and normatively supported in the EU's moral and political authority.

7.4 Concordance

In this section, national *concordance* with international role prescriptions is analysed from a perspective of reproduction of practical gestures of international commitment reflected in formal and informal adaptation to external prescriptions. Literature tends to point to formal *concordance* (materialisation of prescriptions through compliance with the treaties or mandatory declarations) as an essential condition for observation of concordant behaviour. The evidence found in the primary sources indicates that this was not always the case.

The primary sources showed that *concordance* did not necessarily imply the emergence of new institutions or the constitution of a new legal base. *Concordance* may substantiate an incremental process of transformation of behaviour and adaptation through the adoption of new discourse based on claims of international affinity and resonance between the roles internationally prescribed and the national roles member states set for themselves.¹⁰⁹ As this section will show further ahead, discourse and action can precede formal change, rather than being a mere consequence of it.

¹⁰⁹ Wessels and Rometsch sustain that changes in the politico-constitutional systems of the member states, are also accompanied very often by a new discourse on European integration, see Wessels & Rometsch 1996, 357.

The primary sources showed evidence of policy behaviour conformant with international role prescriptions in foreign, security and defence policy, which blended perception of the hierarchical position occupied by Portugal in the transatlantic domain and an acquired leverage position in the European context. The EU/CFSP and NATO offered different role prescriptions. In the case of the EU the roles prescribed within CFSP are strongly embedded with a valorative discourse nationally recognised as *appropriate* and legitimate. While in the case of NATO, the roles prescribed relied on functional power and on the material basis of its military might. Both enabled pursuing global roles that could not be achieved individually, by a small state like Portugal.

The fact the CFSP called upon itself a security and defence dimension, while NATO politicised and added a civilian perspective to its military functions, had a positive impact on concordant behaviour of Portugal for practical and substantive reasons. From a practical point of view, it diversified the type of tasks Portugal could perform internationally and improved articulation of national capabilities with collective responsibilities. From a substantive perspective, it offered the normative justification that best conformed to national role conceptions on international identity i.e., fulfilling the role of faithful ally and inducing support for a more international foreign agenda and for non-military dimensions of security.¹¹⁰

In early 1990s *concordance* with EU role prescriptions was strictly bound by an external position that would not affect relations with NATO ‘including any weakening in the role of NATO and any restriction on the right of Member States to conduct their own foreign policies’ along ‘existing lines’ without any alignment with the EC mechanisms and procedures.¹¹¹ The official record for the period 1991-1995 showed an emphasis on national interest as compared to references to ‘collective security’ or ‘common interest’.¹¹² As it was observed, claims about the need to protect and preserve the national identity and special interest on national foreign policy projects (e.g. with former colonies) prevailed over statements regarding collective responsibility and support for international participation in collective foreign and secu-

¹¹⁰ Hirsch notes the enabling power of Europe to small states’ foreign policies, since membership is interpreted by small states as enhancing their potential external role. Cf. Hirsch 1976, 114.

¹¹¹ Nuttall 2000, 115 and 150. The United Kingdom and Denmark also shared this position regarding the setting of a common foreign and security policy.

¹¹² See for instance, Diário da República, *Grandes Opções do Plano 1990*, I-A Serie, N° 298 (29-12-1989), p. 5638-(225), Law n° 100/89, Paragraph 48 and Diário da República, *Grandes Opções do Plano 1994*, I-A Serie, N° 295 (20-12-1993), p.7080-(2), Law n° 74/93, Article 4°.

riety policy initiatives. Atlanticism and limited concordance with a European dimension of foreign and security policy evolved in the measure they enabled to compensate the peripherisation of the country in the diplomatic and military domain.

As from mid 1995, the policy documents indicate some changes in Portuguese external behaviour. It is not entirely conclusive if changes in *concordance* with external prescriptions derived from ideological preference or from the impact of international role prescriptions.¹¹³ The official record seems to indicate that differences in ideological preference between socialists and social democrats weighted less than context related prescriptions, emanating from NATO and the EU. Broader evidence of *concordant* behaviour beyond rule-based compliance was observed. Throughout the first years of the socialist legislature (1995-1999) the idea of ‘humanistic culture’ and a ‘universal vocation’ of Portuguese foreign policy were recurrently associated with ‘European values’ and ‘European humanistic culture’.¹¹⁴ The socialist government benefited from the prior experience drawn from the 1992 EU Presidency, from the integration process in the EMU, from improvements in the efficiency of the national administrative and bureaucratic apparatus in dealing with integrated policies and from gradual socialisation of diplomatic and military communities of national experts. These conditionalities offered an important incentive to further integration of other policy domains (namely those of security and defence), which may also account for a more frequent observation of *concordant* behaviour with European role prescriptions.

In the ten year period studied *concordance* between national role conceptions and international role prescriptions presented variations. These variations resulted from a combination of: salience of the policy issues addressed, familiarisation with policy issues in question and the position held by Portugal in the international context at the time. At a first glance this could hinder the argument that the present study conveys, on the positive prescriptive impact of organisations on smaller member states, by leading to conclude that *concordance* was circumstantial and domestically motivated. However, the illustrations of *concordance* that follow reveal evidence of change in policy behaviour, even in circumstances of less permeability to prescriptions, for the policy domains considered in this study. In the case of the social-

¹¹³ Exogenous and endogenous elements may explain changes in discourse and policy behaviour notably the unavoidable dynamics of European integration, internal pressure for adaptation and enhanced positioning within NATO.

¹¹⁴ Diário da República, *Grandes Opções do Plano 1997*, I-A Serie, N° 71 (23-03-1996), p. 584-(24), Law n° 10-A/96, 1st Option.

democratic government (internationally less socialised, lacking prior experience in European affairs and weaker relations with NATO and the United States), *concordance* was closely related with the chairmanship of the EU Presidency and the participation of Portugal in the EMU.¹¹⁵ This meant that resilient behaviour among the social democrats gave place to a more *concordant* behaviour after prolonged contact with European institutions and decision-making bodies had occurred. Unexpectedly, until 1995 no significant *concordance* with NATO's prescriptions could be drawn from the policy documents analysed.

After the accession of the socialists to power in 1995, the government benefited from a balance between transatlantic and European commitments. This was due to a more extensive network of contacts, a better understanding of European decision-making structures and negotiation processes and to the positive impact of the administrative reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this case *concordance* appears to have been less directly related to specific external performance (e.g. during the EU Presidency), than it was to the process of international socialisation of diplomats and military elites and the salience of the policy issues endorsed, whether one refers to EU/CFSP or to NATO's military reform.

7.4.1 Portuguese Concordance with CFSP and ESDP

During the social democrat term the position of the government towards CFSP evolved from minimal concordance to full support and contribution to the development of a future European security and defence identity. With the EU Presidency in 1992, the CFSP became a matter of 'concertation' and 'convergence' of national policy with European common guidelines and common positions, which meant incorporation of new roles and responsibilities.¹¹⁶

The official record of early 1990s showed that *concordance* with European prescriptions depended on the development of a defence component that would reinforce the European pillar of the Alliance, a position which characterised national preferences throughout the period under study. Likewise, the Portuguese position about the scope of missions, that a European security and defence component was to operationalise, was limited to humanitarian actions and peacekeeping operations. Thus con-

¹¹⁵ On the aspect of weak socialisation during this period, see Maxwell 1999, 199.

¹¹⁶ Diário da República, *Grandes Opções do Plano 1993*, I-A Serie, N° 57 (9-03-1992), p.1214-(8) and (10), Law n° 1/92, Part 3,§ 26.

cordance with new military missions was kept within the boundaries of national traditional security identity.

This minimal commitment to the security dimension of CFSP could be noted in the way the Portuguese Strategic Concept of National Defence was revised in 1994.¹¹⁷ The final document did not upgrade Portugal's position towards European security and defence policy foreseen in the Treaty of Maastricht. Most of the guidelines set forward were centred on a national security and defence project aimed at defending 'Portugal's individuality in the context of international society' and participating in NATO's new conceptual reformulation, limiting itself to 'follow-up' the developments regarding the European components of security and defence.¹¹⁸ Hence the new Strategic Concept was oriented to aspects of territorial defence without reflecting formal commitment to CFSP. The document was based on a discourse reliant on the notions of individuality and national independence, based on the country's historical legacy, detached from notions of collective identity, common interest, and national participation in international missions. These official claims contrasted with the policy actions undertaken in the context of peacekeeping operations. Since 1991, Portugal had been taking part in various international missions in Angola, in the framework of the United Nations Verification Mission (UNAVEM); on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ); on the EC Monitoring Mission in former Yugoslavia and on the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).¹¹⁹ Despite the evident evolution depicted in later primary sources, the position of the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1997 was still of caution: 'It is imperious to note that the external policy of the Union, as compared with the internal dimension of European integration, is something of embryonic.'¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ The Strategic Concept of National Defence is a policy framing document that guides the general strategy adopted by the Portuguese state in the pursue of its national defence goals.

¹¹⁸ Conselho de Ministros (1994), *Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional*, Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n°9/94, 13 January 1994, p.2, <http://www.mdn.gov.pt> (Acceded 25-05-2004).

¹¹⁹ The views conveyed in policy documents were however conformant with the elites perspectives, adopted within the Ministry of Defence, which dismissed the opportunities offered by the CFSP and were doubtful about a future European defence.

For a detailed account of Portuguese capabilities and commitment of resources to international missions see *Military Balance 1992-1993*, *Military Balance 1994-1995*, *Military Balance 1995-1996*. The *concordant* behaviour with international roles regarding former colonies was motivated by national conceptions about an 'imagined community' which united Portugal by historical, political and affective bonds to its former colonies, rather than driven by notions of collective security. This is confirmed by survey data referred to earlier in this chapter, which accounts for the elements of national prestige and feeling of proximity with African countries, as main driving motives for public support to these missions.

¹²⁰ Gama 1997a,2.

The *concordant* behaviour with international roles regarding former colonies was motivated by national conceptions constructed around a notion of ‘imagined community’, which united Portugal by historical, political and affective bonds to its former colonies, rather than driven by utilitarian considerations. This is confirmed by survey data referred earlier in this chapter, which accounts for the elements of national prestige and feeling of proximity with African countries, as the main driving motives for national public support to peacekeeping missions in the continent.

It is interesting to note that policy action was ahead of policy discourse, if one takes into consideration the commitment of Portuguese armed forces in international missions in Europe (e.g. former Yugoslavia). This constitutes evidence of incorporation of international role prescriptions, concerning participation in international initiatives, regardless the fact that policy discourse and formal role incorporation denoted low permeability to external role prescriptions. Therefore a clear consistency between discourse and policy action was not found.

After Portugal held its first EU Presidency, a more favourable position towards CFSP was adopted by national authorities as a fundamental ‘instrument of external affirmation of the Community’, giving it ‘one single voice in international *fora*’ and providing ways to overcome the peripheral position of Portugal in international affairs.¹²¹ Consequently continentalisation of foreign and security policy served both self-interested reasons in re-centring the country in the European context and a normative motivation to help consolidate CFSP understood as a value-oriented policy.

In the second half of 1990s CFSP was formally incorporated in policy documents, which constituted an advancement and explicit evidence of *concordance*, between national external behaviour and European role prescriptions on common approaches to foreign and security issues.¹²² *Concordant* behaviour resultant from external prescriptions can be found in the assumption of broader responsibilities by national diplomacy.¹²³ The national position in the field of European security and defence became more consistent with the developments within Europe, which led the

¹²¹ Diário da República, *Grandes Opções do Plano 1994*, I-A Serie, N° 295 (20-12-1993), p. 7080(43) and (44), Law n° 74/93, 1st Option.

¹²² Diário da República, *Grandes Opções do Plano 1995*, I-A Serie, N°298 (27-12-1994), p.7380- (54) , Law n° 39-A/94 1st Option.

¹²³ Between 1995-1998 Portuguese diplomacy benefited from various advantages. The WEU’s post of Secretary General was filled by a Portuguese diplomat; for the occasion of the 50th Session of the UN General Assembly a Portuguese politician and scholar was appointed to chair the Presidency of the General Assembly and during the period between 1997/1998 Portugal held a non-permanent member seat at the UN Security Council. This external representation in international posts was favourable to Portuguese diplomacy and foreign policy.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Durão Barroso to acknowledge the operational development of WEU as the main priority of the WEU Portuguese Presidency.¹²⁴

The incorporation of role prescriptions followed the incorporation of 'Europe' into national policy discourse, based on its significant valorative and normative authority that emanated from the EU. The consolidation of regional economic and social integration of Portugal in Europe was no longer perceived as a source of defiance to the 'national heritage', but as an opportunity to project Portugal's foreign and security policy. The country adopted a European option that concurred 'to the deepening of the great European ideals', contributed (rather than 'follow-on') 'to the definition of a CFSP according to parameters of efficiency, the interests of member states and the respect for human rights'.¹²⁵ The development of the CFSP was referred in the official record as contributing to the reinforcement of a common European frame of political, cultural and ethical values, leaving aside the security and military aspects of the future ESDP. It is interesting to note that despite the general European support towards a future European defence, following the Saint Malo Summit immediate formal *concordance* of national policy options with the new developments in the second pillar was not observed, as would have been expected.

The EU Portuguese Presidency in 2000 pressed for further adaptation of the government's position in supporting the idea of institutionalisation and operationalisation of the ESDP, in articulation with NATO and subordinated to the political orientation of the Union. This impacted on concordant behaviour with European role prescriptions, concerning a stronger commitment of military forces to European security related missions, but also in terms of the national efforts to modernise and adapt national defence industry in the framework of the European defence industry. The report approved during the 2000 European Council of Lisbon on the *Reinforcement of Common Foreign and Security Policy* showed permeability of the Presidency agenda to the strengthening of CFSP. A national preference for the humanitarian aspects of crisis management was also reflected at the European level and was consonant with European policy orientations and national role concepts. The focus of national representatives on the humanitarian aspects of security, which pressed for the creation of a

¹²⁴ See Barroso 1995b, 4.

¹²⁵ Diário da República, *Grandes Opções do Plano 1997*, I-A Serie, N°299 (27-12-1996), p.4684 - (139) and (140), Law n° 52-B/96, 1st Option. Text in brackets added.

Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management during the Portuguese Presidency, was in full concordance with European prescriptions.¹²⁶

7.4.2 Variations in National Concordance with NATO Conceptual and Military Reform

The evidence of concordance in the case of Portuguese military policy and NATO's reform was more subtle than the one observed regarding CFSP, due to a long standing membership, more intense international socialisation and higher level of routinised habits and practices within the organisation.

In the first years of the social-democrat legislature, the official discourse about NATO was limited to restating Portugal's loyalty to the Alliance as the main forum of debate in the domain of defence. The National Strategic Defence Concept despite acknowledging that Portugal should participate in NATO's military reform, continued to focus on the idea that the Alliance contributed to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, rather than contributing to develop new military functions and to project the Alliance to out-of-area.¹²⁷ The national role conceptions on security and defence policy in early 1990s sought to preserve the universalistic vocation of Portuguese policy, fundamentally centred in former colonies, and special relations with the United States based on long standing defence agreements.¹²⁸ During early 1990s national authorities frequently saw concordant behaviour with NATO's roles as an extension of the special relations with Washington.

Regardless the fact that the London and Rome Declarations and the new NATO's Strategic Concept had been approved by member states, there was a moderate impact of new military tasks on Portuguese defence policy.¹²⁹ However, this lack of formal immediacy can be explained by reliance of member states on a long established tradition of concordant behaviour with NATO prescriptions.

The reform of NATO's command and force structure was of crucial importance to Portugal due to the fact that the country hosted a NATO regional command

¹²⁶ European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira 19-20 June 2000, Annex I *Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy*, Introduction, Paragraph 5.

¹²⁷ Conselho de Ministros (1994), *Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional*, Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n°9/94.

¹²⁸ Diário da República, *Grandes Opções do Plano 1997*, I-A Serie, N°298 (29-12-1996), p.5638 - (222) and (223), Law n° 100/89, 1st Option.

¹²⁹ Of course there was a ongoing plan of restructuration and modernisation of the national armed forces, but further research would have to be conducted in order to find out the extent to which this plan resulted from specific NATO role prescriptions.

on its territory.¹³⁰ In spite of this, formal incorporation of new roles in domestic policy instruments was slower than expected. However as from 1995, changes in the Euro-Atlantic context and the gradual withdrawal of the United States forces stationed in Europe (which included reduction of its military presence in the Azores Islands), pressed for a faster implementation of NATO role prescriptions in the defence field.

From the perspective of military policy, formal *concordance* with transatlantic role prescriptions urged for consonant behaviour reflected on the process of modernisation of the armed forces.¹³¹ Evidence of formal impact of NATO's role prescriptions was also found on the adoption of measures aiming at improving harmonisation of national force planning with NATO's defence planning. Similarly evidence of impact could be observed regarding integration and coordination among the various services of national armed forces in the preparation for future participation in military operations, under the Alliance's CJTF concept. In terms of policy action, the participation of Portuguese military in IFOR and SFOR constituted prove of formal *concordant* behaviour consistent with the growing commitment to NATO missions. As the Defence Minister noted 'at a time when NATO takes forward its first military land operation (...) the Portuguese government understood that its solidarity had to be unequivocally expressed (...) Solidarity and credibility are therefore, the two key roles to understand the Portuguese military presence in IFOR'.¹³² The statement blends normative and functional claims in the justification of concordant behaviour. It invokes simultaneously the responsibilities that derived from international commitments and reliance on NATO's efficiency to guarantee international security.

The approval of a new legal frame regarding participation in international missions was significant from a perspective of *concordance*, since it reflects formal institutional and legal adaptation to new international roles. After 1997 substantive administrative and legal adaptation to new set of roles, complementary to the provisions adopted within organisations, was observed with the adoption of measures intended to optimise the professionalisation of the armed forces.¹³³ Also specific regulations were adopted with regard to the involvement of national contingents in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian missions, crisis management and crisis response.

¹³⁰ See Vitorino 1996g, 8. See also Gama 2001c, 139 and Vitorino 1998a.

¹³¹ On the process of modernisation of the Armed Forces see Ministério da Defesa Nacional (1999) *Portugal e a Defesa Nacional* (Lisboa: MDN).

¹³² Vitorino 1996c, 6. Brackets added.

¹³³ On the legislative reform see Diário da República, *Grandes Opções do Plano 1997*, I-A Serie, N°299 (27-12-1996), p.4684 - (137), Law n° 52-B/96, 1st Option.

The period between 1998 and 2001 was characterised by a broader concern with material and legal adaptation to international prescriptions in the domain of defence policy (e.g. full professionalisation of the armed forces; initiation of a national debate on the revision of the Strategic Concept of National Defence; completion of harmonisation of national force planning cycle with NATO's, approval of the new national Military Budget Plan (Lei de Programação Militar) and development of infrastructures in the context of national defence industry.¹³⁴ The adaptation of the legal and material bases of defence policy aimed at adapting policy action to international prescriptions, in the field of security and defence, was a strong indication of *concordance*. An aspect worth noting concerns the absence of a revised Strategic Concept of National Defence since its last approval in 1994. Regardless the various claims on the need to revise the document, despite the growing national involvement in international missions and the approval of NATO's new Strategic Concept, the revision of the Strategic Concept of National Defence (preceded since 1998 by a long lasting debate among experts) would only be approved in 2002.¹³⁵ Although significant from the point of view of formal *concordance*, between international role prescriptions and national legal implementation, the absence of formal concordance of this specific guiding document did not seem to have affected the international profile of Portuguese defence policy under NATO auspices, considering the increase in its international activity after 1995.

At the discourse level these policy measures persisted, associated to the idea that they contributed to ensure the 'defence of national integrity' and 'national independence' when in fact they aimed at enhancing the inter-face between Portugal and other NATO members, as well as improving national performance in international peacekeeping and crisis management in order to meet security challenges in the far border. As it was observed for the other conditions of role prescriptions, there are evident variations among policy discourse, policy planning and policy action, the latter being much more in the forefront of concordant behaviour than what discourse makes one perceive.

¹³⁴ See Diário da República, *Grandes Opções do Plano 1999*, I-A Serie, N°301 (31-12-1998), p.7384-(47)and (48), Law n° 82-A/98, III- 1st Option. The *Lei de Programação Militar* (Military Budget Plan) is a pluri-annual legal guideline designed to incorporate and develop the application of investment programmes on military expenses, re-equipment of the armed forces and defence infrastructures. See also 'O que diz o novo conceito estratégico' *Público* 13 May 1999, p.5.

¹³⁵ Ministério da Defesa Nacional (2002), *Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional*, 22 December 2002, see <http://www.mdn.gov.pt> (Acceded 5-12-2004).

In sum, the absence of formal *concordance* between international prescriptions and national policy guidelines does not seem to have affected the ability of Portugal to cooperate and participate in international missions in the field of security and defence. Formal *concordance* with CFSP prescriptions was significant more from a symbolic perspective, since it constituted a legitimate and authoritative way to justify adaptation of policy behaviour, than from a practical dimension. In the case of NATO, formal *concordance* was not a condition for international participation, since long-standing membership and an endured process of routinisation of NATO policy practices and military doctrine made adaptation of national legal instruments and policy guidelines less pressing. As in the case of *prominence* and *endurance* the fulfilment of special tasks within international settings (e.g. chairing EU Presidency or holding a NATO's regional command) seemed to have improved permeability of national diplomacy and military elites to *concordance* with role prescriptions.

Differences between discourse and policy action were again observed. Attachment to historical foreign relations and claims of uniqueness in the external relations with traditional allies were invoked (which reflects a more traditional approach to policy making) to justify continuity of policy decisions, whereas informal *concordant* behaviour with multilateral commitments and international role prescriptions was clearly reflected in national external behaviour and foreign and security policy actions. This resulted in the fact that policy action was developed further than discourse in terms of concordant behaviour.

7.5 Conclusions

In the 1990s diverse and new national role conceptions emerged as a consequence of a new political and economic context of opportunities with Portugal's European membership and the echo domestic elites found in the European project. Some of the existent role conceptions prior to the period under study, namely isolationism, resistance to multilateralism and propensity to neutrality, gave slowly way to growing participation in international organisations and to multilateralisation of external relations, intensification of international socialisation and broadened external activity. The membership to the European Community was perceived as an incentive to the economic development of the country, but also as a sign of commitment to a

European valorative portfolio based on humanistic values, democracy and universal rights.

The multilevel roles that derived from exposure to multilateral organisations were analysed from contending and non-contending perspectives. The diversity of external roles observed could have posed problems of role conflict, due to traditional policy claims about Portuguese international identity being more permeable to Atlantic than to European role prescriptions. The empirical evidence found proved that this competing character seems to be an argument, which is more constructed within the realm of academic literature and policy analysis than in the domain of policy action or policy making. The case study showed that transatlantic and European role prescriptions, rather than generating tensions between *position roles* (formal guidelines of action) and *preference roles* (informal and personal interpretations) stimulated adaptation of national role conceptions, contributed to the development of international identity and improved Portugal's external performance, strengthening its international participation.

For the period under study, incorporation of international role prescriptions on policy behaviour reflected a significant rupture with prior national role conceptions reliant on isolationism from multilateral settings, selective bilateralism with former maritime powers and integrity of the colonial empire. From the symbolic standpoint, the EU offered a non-contending and valorative agenda, much in line with national role conceptions about external relations.¹³⁶ Similarly, the Alliance of the post-Cold War acquired a political dimension, which perpetuated national preferences for NATO, as the main collective defence forum and a normative framework complementary to the EU set, beyond the strict military aspects of defence.

Different motivations moved national preferences in the context of each international organisation, which underlines the complementary rather than opposing nature of the roles incorporated. In the case of NATO, efficiency appears to be the driving force for incorporation of prescriptions, while in the case of the EU, normative and value-oriented motives come forward as the main reason for incorporation of new roles. The convergence of prescriptive roles of NATO and CFSP (since NATO be-

¹³⁶ This was extensively reflected in national cooperation programmes with the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) formed by former colonies (Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe Islands, Cape Verde Islands, Guinea-Bissau and East Timor). In particular regarding Africa and East Timor, Portugal tends to develop cooperative initiatives that support emergent democratisation processes in those countries, such as monitoring elections, military training military and police forces and participation in local institution-building.

came more political, while the EU acquired security and defence dimension) seem to have solved problems of role taking for Portugal. Contending aspects were found in the national rhetoric used to justify international participation without hindering actual policy action.

National perception of the *international position* occupied by NATO and CFSP/ESDP showed differences that resulted from the views of Portuguese authorities about international purpose. Each organisation was perceived as fulfilling a different role. In the case of NATO, matters of functional efficiency and long established international socialisation produced perceptions based on utility and trust generated by habit. The necessity to perpetuate the strategic salience of Portugal's territory in the transatlantic context and a deep entrenchment of NATO culture at the doctrinal, operational and procurement level did not create immediate need to adhere to a European common foreign and security project.

National perceptions about CFSP/ESDP international position revealed findings consonant with sociological institutionalist perspectives. The humanistic tradition of national politics and the external goals of the democratic regime echoed into the EU normative core about rightfulness and goodness. This process of identification enabled overcoming the political peripherisation of the country from the European debate and European policies. It also helped maintaining the continuity of a national foreign policy agenda, based on 'humanistic vocation' manifested through a broader European foreign agenda. An intensification of formal support of Portugal to European common positions and joint actions was the result of recognition that specific policy areas and the resolution of certain contending policy issues could be better addressed at the European level.

The condition of *prominence* was the one to offer more abundant evidence regarding role incorporation. Changes in the recognition of *prominence* of European and transatlantic role prescriptions were proportional to international socialisation of national epistemic communities, national representatives and political elites. The empirical evidence showed that in this case, socialisation has strong explanatory value in accounting for the differences encountered between national foreign and defence communities of experts, in particular in the European domain.

The policy documents reflected a concern with *appropriateness* conformant with the assumptions of sociological institutionalist literature on normative action,

according to which principles of conduct justify and prescribe action in terms of something more than ‘expected consequences’.

The issue of ‘problem-fixing’ and consequentiality were tightly connected with concerns with *appropriateness* and ‘problem-addressing’, showing conformity with an international identity and national role conceptions, based on claims of humanistic vocation and ‘ecumenical’ orientation of Portuguese external relations. The official discourse blended efficiency and self-interested preferences with alternative legitimate ways to address collective problems. The Portuguese participation in the Balkans offered solid evidence of this understanding.

Appropriateness was better observed in relation to the EU/CFSP than to NATO. NATO’s *prominence* remained high in solving military contingencies, when collective rather than national interests were at stake. While in CFSP, Portugal found a way to politically voice its concerns and affirm its international identity, the military response to situations of regional crisis and war escalation was better met in the Alliance framework.

Recognition of *prominence* of the roles to be incorporated was also related to resonance of the values voiced within the EU second pillar oriented to good governance, to the humanitarian dimension of security and to non-military aspects of crisis management. These found ample support among national elite’s discourse.

The existence of a strict rule-baseline or formal legal implementation is frequently addressed in literature as an indicator of *prominence* of prescriptions and evidence of compliant behaviour, since it enables the perpetuation of rules. The present study allowed concluding differently. The normative and value oriented repertoire of the EU second pillar was a strong driving condition for political elites to recognise *prominence* of the roles prescribed, despite absence of juridical binding norms, directives or specific rule enforcement mechanisms. In the context of CFSP, member states were merely urged to *inform* and *coordinate* policy positions and actions, not to introduce major changes in their legal instruments regulating foreign, security and defence policy. This willing rather than coercive compliance constitutes manifestation of adaptation of international identity to a new international frame considered as proper and rightful.

The case study provided interesting evidence of *endurance* on the basis of willing compliance that is, a type of role incorporation that rested beyond strict administrative reform and formal legal-based incorporation. The indicator of *routinisa-*

tion of policy practices appears to be stronger in the policy documents, than *imitation* of policy behaviour and it occurred more intensively within NATO structures than within implementation of CFSP provisions. It was not possible to find clear evidence about whether routinisation was ruled by informal incorporation (for instance, long lasting adoption of values, principles and procedures as it is the case for NATO) or if prior administrative reform played a determinant part in the process of *endurance* of the roles prescribed.

The evidence found in the case of *endurance* of the roles prescribed by NATO appears to suggest that formal incorporation was not crucial, since there was a political and operational precedence of routinised prescriptions. New external roles were adopted without immediate formal or legal incorporation. This was evident in the initial low formal incorporation of NATO prescriptions (e.g. lack of formal and immediate adaptation of the Strategic Concept of National Defence to the revised NATO's Strategic Concept of 1999) into national framing policy documents, despite intensified military participation in international missions under NATO command.

The differences found between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (where administrative reform was observed after intense contact with EU institutions and routinisation of policy practices) and the Ministry of Defence (where an increased level of specialisation took place, without significant administrative adaptation) led to conclude on the presence of two distinct domestic processes of incorporation of role prescriptions closely related with international socialisation. In the case of NATO, the new roles incorporated benefited from routinisation associated with policy precedence and long lasting institutional learning. In the case of European role prescriptions, Portuguese authorities adapted national role conceptions to a European level, followed by 'automatic reflexes of consultation' and adopted a 'European way' of policy making, transferring to the EU intergovernmental level, its preference for centralised mechanisms of decision-making (special interest in the Commission and the role of commissioners), which made new role incorporation a less unsettling process.

The case study is significant from the perspective of *concordance* with international role prescriptions based on transformation of national gestures of international commitment (formal and informal) into policy action. The study showed that role prescriptions occurred and gave place to policy action regardless absence of rule-based prescriptions and formal role incorporation. The analysis of the official record proved that *concordant* behaviour followed material and substantive motives. This

was evident in the adaptation of national capabilities to collective responsibilities and in the incorporation of normative prescriptions conformant with national role concepts and domestic perceptions of international identity. The primary sources analysed led to the conclusion that international socialisation and the salience of the policy issues addressed at the international level, weighted also strongly on the validation of the condition of concordance.

Concordant behaviour was observed both in situations of permeability to role incorporation and in conditions of less permeability to international prescriptions, notably when international socialisation, institutionalisation of policy practices, and national elevation of foreign and security policy to a EU level were weaker, as it was the case in the early 1990s. The external impact of chairing the EU Presidency and further integration within the first pillar level appeared to have been as consequential during the social-democrat legislature, as during the second EU Presidency at a time when the socialists were in power. Ideological preference was less significant than context related motivations (e.g. better institutional embeddedment and routinisation) for incorporation of role prescriptions.

Regarding national *concordant* behaviour in security and defence policy, incorporation of NATO roles reflected a higher degree of institutionalisation, specific concerns with functional legal adaptation (e.g. professionalisation of the armed forces and advancements in the legal setting regulating international participation of national military contingents) and development of material assets and capabilities that enabled Portugal to assume and participate actively in new international missions.

Part III – Conclusions

The present study answers the question how do international organisations' role prescriptions impact on smaller member states' foreign and security policy. The theoretical insights and the findings encountered through empirical research confirm that *non-rule base role prescriptions emanated from NATO and CFSP led to role incorporation* by Portugal. The empirical findings allow concluding that *external behaviour*, shaped by frames of *best argument* underlining role prescriptions, is reflected in rhetoric by *arguments of best practices* and *best fitted organisation* in the way roles are conveyed as solving common concerns within integrated foreign and security policy settings.

The perspective on role analysis adopted in the study constitutes a useful tool of research to capture the dynamics of change in foreign policy roles in diverse multi-level environments of policy making. It detangles the questions of: *How are roles perceived? Which prescriptions or expectations are associated with them? Why and when policy roles are incorporated?* This frees the investigation from recurrent either/or analytical labels, enabling inferences that blend complementary theoretical approaches and broaden the scope of analysis. Role theory offers a method of investigation that can be combined with other approaches, because it is not concerned with dismissing established scholarship.

The study contributes to theory building on foreign and security policy-making of small states. This research shows that role theory, although rarely interested in small states, provides a novel approach to the study of small states in integrated policy contexts, as diverse as NATO and CFSP. Role theory enables producing interpretations about small states beyond the contending interests of major states, apart from the strict regulative aspects of rule conformance and away from a pure logic of consequentiality on matters of preference formation. The study uses a role analysis approach to validate conditions of role prescription (international position, prominence, endurance and concordance). The results obtained from the case study suggest its possible application to other international organisations and international regimes. This wider application is possible from the perspective of the role prescriptions generated about external behaviour, without a specific concern with compliance based on legal and formal rules. Role analysis offers resourceful examination tools to

support empirically oriented research about willing compliance in foreign and security policy.

The use of role concepts and insights from sociological institutionalism enables to overcome explanations nested in deterministic assessments about small states' external behaviour. These assessments are commonly based on the assumption that small states are pressured by major states to conform with their own policy interests, that small states follow a logic of consequentiality when defining their preferences (due to their less favourable position in the international system their choices are bound by strict cost-benefit evaluations) and that the external policy of small states is always dependent and circumstantial. The study reflects concerns with appropriateness, which supports the assumptions of sociological institutionalist literature on normative action, according to which principles of conduct justify and prescribe action in terms of something more than 'expected consequences'. Subjective conditions of role prescription proved to be crucial to explain variation and change in the roles prescribed and adopted. The focus on subjective conditions surmounts strict utilitarian or functional logics, which dismiss the value of role conceptions, perception of the political environment and envisaged external opportunities in the account of external policy behaviour.

Sociological institutionalism provides insights that help to overcome the determinism of legalist inferences, which tend to characterise the studies concerned with prescriptive functions. Sociological views help to retain essential elements to explain why small states comply with non-rule based prescriptions. An analytical view that preserves the value of socialisation, identity, meaning, institutional learning and common understandings is able to find significant links between national role concepts shared by member states, and those conveyed by international organisations. The tendency to insist on the existence of formally agreed and incorporated set of laws, directives or other legal formulas in explaining compliance generates analytical constraints, which this study sought to vanquish. This is obvious both in the case of NATO where such mechanisms are absent and in the case of CFSP where 'legally binding' provisions and mechanisms of role enforcement assume singular characteristics. The use of role concepts solves this problem by looking into similarities in both international sets, rather than seeking for differences with the aim to explain a member state's preferences for one in detriment of the other or to justify inadequacy in problem-solving for each of them. Investigating the official discourse and interna-

tional non-rule based injunctions adds a fruitful dimension to the study of compliance with international role prescriptions and role incorporation.

Still in the domain of theoretical contributions, the role concepts adopted in the study can provide better insights about the agency/structure debate from a mutually constitutive perspective. The study moves away from the question about *which* relevant actors and *sites* of decision-making influence the process of foreign policy behaviour. The investigation, by using a testable set of conditions of role prescriptions, identifies possible ways through which prescriptive roles influence the behaviour of member states and are influenced by their behaviour and actions, beyond concerns with consequential logic and regulative prescriptive order. This approach helps to focus on international opportunities, as a source of change and as an incentive to compliance, rather than on the constraining effects of the structure.

The analytical advantage obtained by using concepts of role theory is also reflected in the way the impact of conditions of international role prescription on a small state behaviour is observed. The examination of the narrative contained in primary sources, which reflected the official political rhetoric, enabled the observation of contending and non-contending aspects pertaining to differences within domestic rhetoric, external behaviour and policy action of a small state. On this point, further research should be conducted in order to find out if the political rhetoric conveyed domestically, about foreign and security policy, is similarly addressed by Portugal in international processes of negotiation. This could shed some light on how states engage in two-level game strategies. In other words how domestic politics and international diplomacy interact and how governments in the domestic realm favour the international expectations about policy behaviour.

The *pitfalls* found in literature were overcome by the theoretical and empirical research conducted in the study. Firstly, the study places one small state foreign and security policy in policy integrated environments and examines empirical material to address new foreign policy situations in the post-Cold War, in terms of the actors and the locations involved. These new foreign policy situations comprised forms of role prescription based on ordering principles and role expectations inherent to integrated policies. The evidence found in policy documents and policy statements shows that valorative role sets convey persuasive argumentation about appropriate behaviour beyond conceptions of national interest, enmity and survival.

Furthermore, the excessive focus on domestic sources of role conception was solved by investigating the impact of prescriptions on a small state from diverse enabling international conditions. These conditions resulted from evolving normative roles, defined as standards of appropriate behaviour, instead of considering the unchangeable character of national role conceptions and the static nature of role preferences of decision-makers in international affairs.

Finally, the recognition of international organisations as purposive entities moved the study beyond concerns with relative power position, military superiority and competitive nature of role players. In this study role concepts are defined, framed and prescribed to member states under conditionalities of role prescription and role incorporation, as explained in the framework of analysis (*international position, prominence, endurance and concordance*). The indicators selected for the framework are observed in the case study including: evidence of dense international socialisation, change in perception and preferences, accentuation of pro-norm behaviour informed by appropriateness, and willing compliance towards non-regulative prescriptions. The primacy of persuasion about goodness and rightfulness in role-taking is inferred from the primary sources through policy statements publicly addressed (e.g. by members of government which stressed arguments based on values to justify decision-taking) and largely shared by those directly involved in the implementation of policy decisions (e.g. by the national military engaged in peacekeeping, which tended to invoke the same valorative arguments). The impact of routines and forms of ritualised conduct (promoted by international organisations) on the endurance of the roles prescribed was also observed, explaining the lack of change in policy behaviour and action due to long term routinisation of policy practices within organisations. The international institutional fabric, not individual domestic decision-makers operating in isolated policy environments, appears to be an important source of collective representation about role concepts and expected external policy behaviour.

From the empirical findings in the study the following general conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, international organisations sustain prescriptive abilities through *normative, argumentative* and *material conditionalities*, which result from perceptions of adequacy and efficiency to address and solve common concerns.

Secondly, Portugal as a small state incorporates the prescribed roles that *enable its international identity*, based on perceptions of *ethical responsibility* and of the

universal motivation of its foreign policy, instead of accommodating to the roles conveyed by major states or their coercive action, as frequently stated in literature.

Normative conditionality in the incorporation of foreign and security roles prevails over strict regulative conditionality. Non-rule based prescriptions have a compelling effect on member states' support if one considers the scope of issues covered for instance by CFSP common positions and joint actions, and the obligation of member states to consult and inform each other on matters of foreign and security policy before acting. This means that the robustness of national institutional adaptation, understood as a sign of legal formal implementation, is neither a strong indicator of prescriptive power nor a determinant enforcing mechanism for willing compliance with the roles prescribed. The emphasis on valorative sets of appropriate behaviour, (such as human rights, minorities rights and democracy) regarding CFSP common positions and joint actions, together with concerns about non-military aspects of crisis management and conflict resolution, pursued by CFSP dispositions, mirrored and reinforced the non-contending nature of Portuguese foreign and security policy. In the case of NATO, this normative conditionality is more subtle, but far from absent. Changes in NATO's identity, around new paradigms concerning security enmity, partnership and civilisational purpose of the Alliance have a positive impact on changes in the security identity of smaller member states. In the case of Portugal, NATO's military shift impacted on security identity, i.e. perceptions of the strategic salience of the country varied across time. These perceptions evolved from a dysfunctional situation between a domestic security discourse about the sustainability of the strategic value of the territory (when this value was decreasing) to a new appraisal of strategic salience encountered in NATO's new out-of-area missions.

The *argumentative conditionality* fostered by NATO and CFSP and incorporated by Portuguese authorities is anchored in arguments about appropriateness (rightfulness) and universality (non-self-interested and broad purpose related to universal ethical responsibility) of the values claimed or on altruistic policy positions (in support of other member states or nations affected by insecurity and war), regarding participation in international peacekeeping missions. CFSP and NATO role prescriptions are perceived as value-based formulas. Although the empirical study in general proved the assumptions regarding the relevance of role prescriptions, based on arguments about appropriateness, the results for NATO were less conclusive. National reasoning about efficiency associated with *best fitted* organisation prevailed occasion-

ally in the domestic policy discourse. This was again observed in specific situations regarding conflict resolution. In these situations, while normative concerns were voiced by Portugal by using a CFSP valorative frame, the way to solve technical/military problems was found in the functional alternatives and assets offered by NATO.

The representation of *material incentives* presents different observations for NATO and CFSP dependent on the type of source being used. Part of the secondary literature does not reflect the narrative observed in primary sources about the material independency of the prescriptive power of NATO and the EU, in particular in the foreign and security domain. This is consequential to perceptions about prescriptive power, both at the international and domestic level. It is not possible to state in absolute terms whether or not theory has informed policy-making. The findings in the study based on primary sources lead to conclude that NATO and CFSP have been consistent with the role prescriptions they claim. NATO performs political and military functions perceived as highly routinised and militarily efficient. The CFSP performs political, diplomatic and security functions, later supplemented by a defence component, strongly embedded in policy precedence, supported by declaratory diplomacy and moral authority. The narrative of the primary sources tells that neither aimed at overtaking each others roles, while the secondary literature focuses frequently on the contending aspects between the two. The fact that member states like Portugal gradually 'adopted' a policy behaviour closer to the 'narrative' found in the primary sources, regardless of domestic contending positions about the two international domains, shows that such contending aspects either are non-existent or fade as international socialisation progresses and state representatives and bureaucracies become more knowledgeable about CFSP. It can be said that these contending aspects are the product of constructions, rather than based on actual policy making.

The impact of *context related aspects of the political and security environment* on prescriptive roles could only be aprioristically confirmed as relevant, on the basis of the dynamics and events reported by primary sources and policy oriented studies. On this issue further empirical validation is needed. In the case of NATO, reliance on functional efficiency conditioned positively the prescriptive role of the Alliance, since the goals of democratic and lawful behaviour and political control of the military apparatus had already been achieved by older member states before the end of the Cold War. The impact of these normative prescriptions is, however, more significant

among new applicant countries. In the case of CFSP/ESDP, the prescriptive roles are based on valorative incentives that support the coordination of positions and the development of EU external actions with a strong focus on normative impel. The soft mandatory mechanisms in both domains are complemented with the development of common agreements and the consolidation of a broad prescriptive agenda. NATO draws its prescriptive strength from efficient coordination, material distribution of security goods and shared responsibility. The CFSP draws its prescriptive power from its comprehensive agenda and its moral and political authority.

The analysis of the part played in role prescriptions by *formal and informal institutional design* indicates a balance between informal aspects (normative repertoire and adoption of a common language) and formal ones (fulfilment of responsibilities and rights pertaining to membership). The role prescriptions that resulted from coordination and cooperation can not be dissociated from the CFSP's normative repertoire that set commonality of views, define ways to express common positions and to adopt joint actions. In this particular case, its comprehensive agenda led to the generation of common meanings and persuasive argumentation about the prescriptive roles needed to convey it. To member states, small and major, failure to act in conformity with prescriptions involved a costly loss of credibility and trust, which is seldom if ever imposed by formal sanctioning mechanisms.

The empirical evidence concerning incorporation of international role prescriptions in Portugal's external relations meet the expectations regarding role prescription and willing compliance. However, the indicators of international prescription show uneven impact on role performance within both organisations, stressing the impact of the functional focus of NATO and of the normative guidance of CFSP.

Based on these findings, it is possible to conclude as follows on the *validation of the conditions of role prescription* and their *impact on Portuguese foreign and security policy*. Significant changes in Portuguese perceptions are more evident in the case of CFSP than in the case of NATO. The condition of *international position* observed in the case of NATO changed from a perception of NATO as a 'site' of collective defence to an 'agent' of collective security. The CFSP, contrary to NATO, evolved from an advantageous international position as intervening and purposive entity in normative terms. Variations in the Portuguese perception of its international position evolve, as socialisation of national experts and representatives within the two organisations progresses and the opportunities to play significant external roles un-

folded (e.g. rotative presidencies). Portugal, although perceiving these opportunities of representation as a form to shape the EU's political agenda, expressed from an early stage a strong support for European ideals, supporting and leading initiatives crucial to the consolidation of a European foreign and security policy. Portugal's national perceptions, policy preferences and actions evolved while chairing the EU and WEU Presidencies, especially on what concerned the internationalisation of its foreign and security policy. This is particularly significant for a small country with a traditional transatlantic culture in defence and foreign relations. To Portugal, the CFSP ability to address policy situations was complemented by NATO's ability to solve problems.

Prominence of the roles prescribed by NATO and CFSP, based on the indicators of international socialisation, appropriateness and consequentiality, displayed some degree of differentiation between the two policy processes and in domestic terms across time. Both NATO and the EU disseminated representations based on a liberal Western model of behaviour, which conveyed the appropriateness of preserving democracy, political pluralism, individual freedom and subordination of military to civilian power, presenting these values as universal. However, a functional logic deriving from 'accreditation of competence', and access to technical expertise and material resources is more evident in the national discourse regarding the Alliance. In contrast, a logic of appropriateness can be found in the national foreign policy behaviour conducted in accordance to CFSP role prescriptions. This conformity allowed to level foreign policy issues at a higher scale (although in the self-interest of Portugal e.g. regarding former colonies) by addressing them through European frames of appropriate conduct. This confirms an embedded perception of European community of values of which Portugal is part. Portuguese policy discourse, based on traditional national role conceptions and centred on historical specificity and preservation of territorial integrity, was later replaced by adherence to arguments based on international responsibility, partnership in collective security, and European cooperation. International socialisation, in both transatlantic and European contexts, generates forms of social and political capital essential to the constitution of commonly shared views about international cooperation.

In the case study, the condition of *endurance* of the roles prescribed presents resemblances that result from institutionalisation and incremental routinisation, and from the dynamics of imitation of policy behaviour. The differences in the endurance

of the roles observed in national policy behaviour are due to length of membership. The long-standing membership in NATO led to longer routinisation in NATO's military doctrine and policy practices. This conduced to an entrenched perception of commonality of goals and identities. The endurance of the roles convey within CFSP (as part of a process in the making) evolved along lines of duty to inform, and the obligation to concert positions and actions on foreign and security policy among member states. Policy precedence and soft mandatory mechanisms of compliance, compatible with national constitutional traditions, led to gradual incorporation of CFSP role prescriptions. In this case, international socialisation also accounts for differences among national bureaucracies and state representatives, in the way new roles were incorporated pressing for institutional adaptations within the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. This is manifested through the creation of new services, higher specialisation of national public servants and support to new European and transatlantic initiatives in the field of security and defence.

The observation of impact of the condition of *concordance* with international prescriptions offered interesting empirical evidence. The study showed that national concordance does not necessarily involve formal incorporation of prescriptive roles into national policy guidelines and legal instruments. The observation of informal concordance, in line with the principles of unreserved support in a spirit of solidarity, framed Portuguese policy behaviour in both international settings. In the transatlantic context, habitualization and long-term internalisation of roles facilitated behaviour, independently from formal incorporation. In the case of CFSP, the practice of declaratory diplomacy, gradual concertation of policies and policy precedence enabled national concordance independently of internalisation of rule formulations. Willing compliance permits to underline the existence of a non-regulative basis of concordant behaviour, which safeguarded the specificities of national foreign and security policy. Observation of policy action, in the absence of formal incorporation of role prescriptions, reinforces the argument that has been conveyed in the study about the strength of non-rule based prescriptions.

As Goetschel argues 'preferences are still shaped by acts' and as Neumann notes 'discourse refers to preconditions for action'.¹ The Portuguese case shows that, while at the discourse level statements tend to be less conformant with international

¹ Goetschel 2001, 11 and Neumann 2002, 631.

prescriptions (since they were often anchored in invocation of special relations with traditional allies or based on policy references familiar to domestic audiences), policy behaviour manifested permeability and high compliance with international role prescriptions.

Based on these preceding reflections conclusions can be stated as follows. First, *national role conceptions based on normative rather than utilitarian motives shape Portuguese international behaviour*. The role concepts found in the study regarding the perception of Portugal's place in international affairs reveals findings consonant with sociological institutionalist perspectives. The humanistic tradition of national foreign policy and the external goals of the democratic regime echoed the international normative core arguments about rightfulness and goodness in external. NATO and CFSP are seen as enabling agencies that do not conflict with traditional national role conceptions (i.e. propensity to neutrality) and help to project affinities and self-conceptions about international placement (international identity) in the European and Atlantic domains. This identity is anchored in *preference roles* based on national conceptions about valorative and humanistic aspects of foreign and security policy, and in *position roles* based on preference for tasks involving monitoring of good governance, humanitarian and civil aspects of crisis management, crisis response and conflict resolution.

Second, *international socialisation* (within NATO, but in particular within CFSP) *played a crucial part in how policy behaviour was internalised* (and conciliated with other member states). Incorporation of role prescriptions is a consequence of international socialisation and policy adaptation, not the result of coercive action by leading states. One can suggest a socialisation argument by stating that after international contact, policy actions conformed more evidently to the Atlantic and EU's norms. In both contexts, normative roles supported the validity of discursive claims about 'good' and generally acceptable values, while functional roles provided convincing frames that led national policy action and international activity.

Third, *differences between discourse and policy action reflect issues of motivation and behaviour* in domestic adaptation related to a self-interested logic. This results more from a need to preserve familiar frames of foreign policy among domestic audiences than from a feeble impact of international role prescriptions. Political discourse on foreign and security policy is domestically associated to national historical narratives, familiar to domestic audiences in order to ensure acceptance. However,

discourse did not constitute an impediment to active international participation. This shows the prescriptive drive caused by the two international settings in which Portugal is embedded. Policy behaviour confirms the impact of international prescriptions on role incorporation.

Fourth, *national role conceptions about universalistic and ethical dimension of external relations shape the international identity of Portugal*. The study suggests interesting observations on conditions of role prescription associated with a positive impact of international role prescriptions on Portuguese external relations. This positive impact evolved from a national perspective about the enabling effects of international organisations in the fulfilment of external roles. The discourse conveyed by the national elite showed that ideological preference is less relevant than international context related developments, because international role prescriptions allowed the reappraisal of a new international identity in broader politically integrated contexts.

Fifth, the *evidence found in the case study dismisses positions that argue that contending prescriptions emanate from the transatlantic and the European context*. The case study found little evidence of conflicting role incorporation in the discourse of the national elite as well as in policy action. This non-contending view is better observed in CFSP policy documents than in the transatlantic case due to references in NATO's policy documents to European foreign and security as an 'identity', not as a policy. Policy adaptation and role incorporation of transatlantic and European prescriptions derive from the understanding that the CFSP does not aim at replacing foreign and security functions aimed at by the Alliance. Nor did NATO perform the broader scope of diplomatic and non-military CFSP's tasks. Hence, contending views are more a consequence of constructed expectations than based on empirical observations about policy action.

The methodological contribution of the study lays in its qualitative approach to external relations. It combines a conceptual template, drawn from role theory, with a framework of analysis based on conditions of international role prescription and national role incorporation for foreign and security policy. The reconstruction of the narratives present in primary sources proves to be as important as the insights of theory and the findings of secondary literature. It unveils the relations between actors and the connections between role concepts and policy behaviour of small states within international organisations.

Future research on the theme(s) comprehended in the study should be further developed by both theoretical and empirically oriented studies. This will contribute to broaden the field of research to other research topics that can offer sociological interpretations, namely those that result from the study of small states' international behaviour. Likewise, the conceptual and analytical tools of role theory when combined with sociological institutionalist insights, can further developed studies about compliance and international cooperation, with a specific outlook on foreign and security policy. This approach contributes to the analysis of conditions of normative expectations, endured prescriptions and concordant behaviour, on the basis of willing compliance among participants. These insights could thus be generalised to other international organisations, regimes and small states.

Role concepts work as resourceful analytical tools that inform analysis about policy behaviour and reveal themes about the place perceived by state and non-state actors in the international context, beyond the contending and hierarchic aspects of traditional theory. How a state behaves in foreign and security policy depends on how it perceives its role in the international scenario.

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Annex I – Concise overview of literature, pitfalls and prescriptive reasoning

Scholarship	Unit level and pitfalls	Interactions generated between national and international level	Actors and roles	Motivations
Neorealist tradition Waltz (1979, 1993); Gilpin(1984); Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990); Mearsheimer (1990,1994/95); Wohlforth (1994-1995) and Schweller and Priess (1997)	State centric <i>First pitfall</i>	Anarchy Power Competition	Hegemonic states National interest Functional roles	Rationalist (security and power)
Foreign Policy Analysis (Hermann (1990); Hudson <i>et al.</i> (1995); Hermann and Hermann (1989); Hagan (1995); Allison and Zelikow (1999); Brecher <i>et al.</i> (1969); Putnam (1988) and Herrman (1997)	State centric <i>Second pitfall</i>	National policy formulation, decision making and implementation	Individual decision-makers Functional roles (interpretative /decisional)	Rationalist (maximisations of gains)
Neo-liberal institutionalism Keohane (1988,1989); Keohane and Nye (2001) Keohane and Martin (1995); Katzenstein <i>et al.</i> (1998); Martin (1992a,1992b); Martin and Simmons (1998); Botcheva and Martin(2001) and Kato (1996) English School (Bull 2002), (Dunne 2001) Regimes literature Krasner (1982); Jervis (1982); Haggard and Simmons (1987); Young (1989) and Hasenclever <i>et al.</i> (1996) Intergovernmental perspective (Moravcsik 1997, 1991)	Hybrid state/non-state centric <i>Third pitfall</i>	Cooperation Collaboration Collective action Compliance	Organizations International society Regimes Member states Functional and normative roles (cooperative/coordinative/national role preferences/)	Rationalist (efficiency, cost-benefit relations, monitoring, information)
Bureaucratic politics Haas, E. (1976, 1987); Epistemic communities Haas, P.(1992) and Adler and Haas (1992)	Non-state centric <i>Third pitfall</i>	Knowledge Information Communities	Bureaucracies Expert groups Functional roles (learning/diffusion)	Rationalist and normative (knowledge/ possession of complete information/ learning)
Sociological approaches Barnett and Finnemore(1999); Kratochwill and Ruggie(1986); Wendt and Duvall(1989); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and Legro (1997) Communicative action Risse (2000); Sjursen (2004); Romsloe (2004) and Müller (2004) Security communities Adler (1997); Adler and Barnett (1998)	State/ organisations/ individual <i>Third pitfall</i> and overcoming the limits of it	Identity Normative concerns Communities	Individuals Small groups Normative roles (ideational/behavioural)	Normative (appropriateness/ socialisation/ identity)

The bodies of literature comprised in the first column of the table evolve from state centric perspectives (on the top) to individual approaches (on the bottom). The second column considers the levels of analysis and the correspondent pitfalls found in the literature reviewed. The third column identifies the interactions that occur between international and national domains progressing from concerns with power and national interest of dominant states and material conditions of the international structure; to preferences, knowledge, learning, identity and normative and ideational conditions of role prescription and role incorporation. The fourth column identifies the main actors and the type of roles implicated. The fifth refers to the motivational reasoning that actors adopt when incorporating role prescriptions.

Summary

This study examines the impact of role prescriptions by international organisations on small state foreign and security policies. Focusing on Portugal, NATO and the EU, the study analyses primary sources (official documents) and blends role theory with insights of sociological institutionalism, finding empirical evidence of policy roles informed by prescribed appropriate standards of behaviour. The study uses a) sociological institutionalist views about the logic of appropriateness as a guiding frame, and b) international socialisation to account for internalisation of policy behaviour. This approach helps to validate a general set of conditions selected from the literature on international role prescriptions, in relation to NATO and the EU's CFSP (i.e., *international position* of these organisations, and *prominence*, *endurance* and *concordance* of the roles prescribed), and in relation to national role incorporation (*national political rhetoric*, *policy planning* and *policy action*).

The study contributes to understand the conditions in which the impact of international role prescriptions occurs from the perspective of a small member state and answers the following question: *How do international role prescriptions impact on the external behaviour of a small state?* In order to answer it, sub-questions are specified: *How are the prescriptive role sets of NATO and the EU/CFSP influenced by the security-related context? How does the institutional design of both international organisations affect role prescriptions? How do the indicators of role prescription impact across the four selected conditions of validation of prescriptions (international position, prominence, concordance and endurance)? How do role prescriptions based on non-regulative aspects lead to prescriptive roles?* These sub-questions are answered on the basis of analysis and interpretation of the narrative conveyed in the official sources of both NATO and EU/CFSP/ESDP.

In the case of Portugal the impact of international role prescriptions is validated from the perspective of a small state, answering the sub-questions: *How do conditions of international role prescriptions, validated for NATO and the CFSP, affect Portugal's external behaviour? How is the impact of prescriptions reflected in a small state's political rhetoric, policy planning and policy action? How do role prescriptions based on non-regulative aspects lead to role incorporation and policy action?*

The study tests two hypotheses. Firstly, it investigates the hypothesis that role prescriptions can be conveyed by international organisations and incorporated by member states in conditions of 'soft' enforcement or rule-base. 'Soft' enforcement in this context means that member states may comply with prescriptions in the absence of directives or other regulative sanctioning mechanisms. Compliance here results from voluntary adoption of role prescriptions or willing compliance, independently from formal rules and sanctions. Secondly, it tests the validity of the theoretical framework specified in Chapter 2.

States share national role conceptions conveyed through political speech to domestic audiences framing international identity. Likewise, international organisations disseminate role prescriptions to their member states by using discursive strategies, convincing participants of the moral quality or legitimacy of their arguments and of the existence or need to build up material resources that enable the fulfillment of these roles. These rhetorical elements are both translated into prescriptive scripts within the EU and NATO and reflected in member states policy action. By examining the dominant discourse in international and national policy documents, the study unfolds motivational reasoning underlining policy discourse and external activity of a

small state, i.e. Portugal. This is observed in situations of non-coercive power, in the presence of intersubjective understandings about commonality of goals, and perceptions of appropriateness or rightfulness in the way collective problems are addressed and solved within international organisations. The study observes that international socialisation enhances resonance between international expectations about member state behaviour and national role concepts. Endured practices and routines within international organisations facilitate processes of change and adaptation of member state policies, making formal concordance less compelling. Concordance occurs even in situations of 'soft' rule enforcement, leading to incorporation of roles that ultimately shape policy action and international activity of small states. The study shows that willing compliance and concordant behaviour are visible even in situations of low formal incorporation of the roles prescribed.

The roles conveyed by NATO and CFSP are based on prescriptions that blend appropriate ways to address policy issues (involving political and moral authority) with efficient means to solve collective problems by adequate use of material resources. International role prescriptions alter the behaviour of a small state as a result of the normative expectations they raise. As collective actors/policies, NATO and CFSP enable the development and sustainability of a small state's international identity, based on universal claims of ethical responsibility and increase its activity within international organisations. The study provides empirical evidence of behavioural change, including a strengthening of international activity through the incorporation of external role prescriptions crafted by NATO and CFSP. The study contributes to unravel advancement about international participation of a small state through incorporation of role prescriptions, subtracting it to the traditional limits of interests and coercive power of major players.

The *first part* of the study introduces the research goal and research questions. The core goal regards the impact of international role prescriptions by NATO and CFSP on the national role conceptions of a small state. It explores alternative conceptualisations to the study of multilevel roles in foreign and security policy within international organisations. Literature reviews on international organisations and small states were conducted from a role concept perspective benefiting from cross-pollination of insights about foreign and security policy. Conceptualisations of foreign policy roles are drawn from role theory, while accounts about the prescriptive impact of international organisations and role incorporation are nested in sociological institutionalist views. The study identifies three pitfalls in traditional literature about foreign policy. The first pitfall regards the dominant focus on major states (material conditions of power and military balance), which dismisses small states and non-material conditions of role prescription. The second refers to the dominant concern with domestic decision-making processes with little interest for the impact of transgovernmental policies on policy behaviour. The third relates to the lack of focus of state-centric lines of inquiry on international organisations as prescriptive entities and socialising agencies. The study suggests ways to overcome these pitfalls through the operationalisation of role concepts borrowed from role theory and approaches lent from sociological institutionalism.

Additionally, a framework for analysis is proposed, designed to validate conditions of role prescription and role performance (*international position, prominence, endurance and concordance*). These conditions are tested for Portugal's external role incorporation and performance, based on *political rhetoric, policy planning* and *policy action* from a discursive perspective. Content analysis of policy documents is used to trace the narratives that reflect role incorporation, i.e. the process that evolves from

role prescriptive policy statements to foreign policy actions under enabling international conditions.

The empirical study in the *second part* tests the theoretical insights addressed in the first part. Chapter 4 observes the impact of the transformations that occurred in the Euro-Atlantic context on the prescriptive ability of NATO and CFSP, and on the international activity of small states. Chapters 5 and 6 analyse primary sources and secondary literature about the prescriptive role of NATO and CFSP. The chapters address specific role prescriptions and the ways in which prescriptions diverge and converge. The operationalisation suggested in the study considers the EU and NATO as multilevel contexts of role prescription in which small states benefit from broader conditions to enhance their external performance. Based on Chapters 4-6, Chapter 7 focuses on the Portuguese case and on concrete behavioural and policy effects of role prescriptions (degree of integration and international socialisation, strength of the arguments involved in prescription and international identity). The study shows that role incorporation does not reflect immediate administrative adaptation or legal implementation of prescriptions, but a transformation of perceptions about international identity and external behaviour.

In the *third part* the study draws conclusions about the impact of role prescriptions of international organisations on national role incorporation, and how incorporation of new roles is prompt by logic of appropriateness. Further, it looks at the extent to which non-regulative aspects of role prescription lead to role incorporation, policy action and more active international participation.

The theoretical insights and findings encountered through empirical research confirm that *non-rule based role prescriptions emanated from NATO and CFSP led to role incorporation* by Portugal and to changes in its international identity. The study contributes to *theory building on foreign and security policy of small states* and shows that role theory, although rarely interested in small states, provides a novel approach to their study in integrated policy contexts, as diverse as NATO and CFSP. Role theory enables *interpretations about small states beyond the contending interests of major states, apart from observations about the strict regulative aspects of rule compliance, and away from a pure logic of consequentiality on matters of preference formation*. The study overcomes concerns with formally incorporated sets of law, directives or other legal formulas, which generate analytical constraints when explaining compliance with international prescriptions. The policy documents and policy statements show that valorative role sets convey persuasive argumentation about appropriate behaviour beyond conceptions of national interest, enmity and survival. Role analysis offers resourceful examination tools to support empirically oriented research about willing compliance in foreign and security policy.

The empirical findings in the study allow two main conclusions. Firstly, international organisations sustain prescriptive abilities through *normative* (valorative guidelines binding policy behaviour), *argumentative* (choices in foreign and security policy based on appropriateness, universality and altruistic policy positions) and *material* (material resources and material incentives) *conditionalities*, which result from perceptions of adequacy and efficiency to address common preferences and solve common problems. Secondly, Portugal as a small state incorporates the prescriptive roles that *enable its international identity*, based on perceptions of external *ethical responsibility* and *universal character of its foreign policy*, instead of accommodating the roles conveyed by major states or to abide their coercive action, as frequently stated in literature.

Dutch Summary

Deze studie onderzoekt de invloed van gedragsvoorschriften (*role prescriptions*) door internationale organisaties op het buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid van kleine staten. Gericht op Portugal, de NAVO en de EU, worden primaire bronnen (officiële stukken) geanalyseerd, waarbij roltheorie (*role theory*) gecombineerd wordt met inzichten uit sociologisch institutionalisme, en waarbij gezocht wordt naar empirisch bewijs van rolpatronen in beleid die gebaseerd zijn op voorgeschreven normen voor gepast gedrag. De analyse maakt gebruik van a) sociologisch institutionele inzichten in de logica van gepastheid (*appropriateness*), and b) internationale socialisatie om de internalisering van beleidsgedrag inzichtelijk te maken. Deze benadering dient ter beoordeling van uit de literatuur over internationale gedragsvoorschriften geselecteerde algemene voorwaarden in relatie tot de NAVO en het GBVB van de EU (te weten: de *internationale positie* van deze organisaties, en *prominentie*, *volharding* en *overeenstemming* van de gedragsvoorschriften) en in relatie tot de nationale integratie (*incorporation*) van rolpatronen (*nationale politieke retoriek*, *beleidsplanning* en *beleidsuitvoering*).

Deze studie draagt bij aan inzicht in de condities waaronder de invloed van internationale gedragsvoorschriften op kleine lidstaten zichtbaar is en beantwoordt de volgende onderzoeksvraag: *Hoe hebben internationale gedragsvoorschriften invloed op het externe gedrag van een kleine staat?* Ter beantwoording zijn de volgende deelvragen geformuleerd: *Op welke wijze worden de clusters gedragsvoorschriften van NAVO en GBVB beïnvloed door de veiligheidsomstandigheden? Hoe werkt de institutionele structuur van beide door op gedragsvoorschriften? Welke invloed vertonen de indicatoren van gedragsvoorschriften op elk van de vier geselecteerde variabelen (internationale positie, prominentie, volharding en overeenstemming)? Hoe leiden niet-regulatieve aspecten van gedragsvoorschriften tot voorgeschreven gedrag?* Deze deelvragen zijn beantwoord door analyse en interpretatie van de officiële bronnen van zowel de NAVO als de EU/GBVB/EVDB.

Voor de casus Portugal is de invloed van gedragsvoorschriften bepaald op basis van de volgende deelvragen: *Hoe beïnvloeden de voorwaarden van internationale gedragsvoorschriften, zoals gevalideerd voor NAVO en GBVB, het externe gedrag van Portugal? Op welke wijze komt de invloed van voorschriften aan het licht in de politieke retoriek, de beleidsplanning en de beleidsuitvoering van een kleine staat? Hoe leiden op niet-regulatieve aspecten gebaseerde gedragsvoorschriften tot incorporatie van rolpatronen en beleidsinitiatieven?*

Hierbij worden twee hypothesen getest. Ten eerste wordt de hypothese onderzocht die stelt dat gedragsvoorschriften van internationale organisaties door kleine staten geïncorporeerd kunnen worden in weinig dwingende omstandigheden (*soft enforcement*). ‘Weinig dwingend’ betekent in deze context dat lidstaten gehoor geven aan voorschriften ook als officiële richtlijnen of andere sanctionerende mechanismen ontbreken. Toegeeflijkheid is dan het gevolg van vrijwillige overname van gedragsvoorschriften, los van formele regels en sancties. Ten tweede wordt de bruikbaarheid van het theoretische kader, zoals ontwikkeld in Hoofdstuk 2, getest.

In algemene zin kennen alle staten nationale rolpatronen (*role conceptions*), die tot uitdrukking komen in het politieke discours in eigen land dat hun internationale identiteit vorm geeft. Internationale organisaties verspreiden hun gedragsvoorschriften op vergelijkbare wijze via discursieve strategieën, bedoeld om hun leden te overtuigen van de overtuigingskracht of legitimiteit van hun argumenten,

alsook van de noodzaak materiële invulling te geven aan het gewenste gedrag. Deze retorische aspecten zijn te vertalen in scripten ontstaan binnen EU en NAVO en gereflecteerd in beleidsinitiatieven van de lidstaten. Door het dominante discours in internationale en nationale beleidsdocumenten te traceren, legt deze studie de motiveringsbronnen bloot die ten grondslag liggen aan het politieke discours en het externe beleid van een kleine staat, in casu Portugal. Daarbij gaat het om situaties waarin geen dwang is uitgevoerd en waarin sprake is van intersubjectieve overeenstemming over beleidsdoelen en over de wijze waarop internationale organisaties geacht worden collectieve vraagstukken aan te pakken. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat internationale socialisatie tot harmonie tussen internationale verwachtingen van staatsgedrag en de inhoud van nationale rolpatronen leidt. Indien internationale organisaties volharden in bepaalde praktijken en routines, stimuleren zij aanpassingsprocessen in de lidstaten die formele overeenstemming minder noodzakelijk maken. Overeenstemming (*concordance*) ontstaat zelfs in weinig dwingende omstandigheden en leidt tot incorporatie van gedrag dat uiteindelijk vorm geeft aan de beleidsinitiatieven en internationale activiteiten van kleine staten. Het onderzoek toont aan dat vrijwillige inschikkelijkheid (*willing compliance*) en overeenkomstig gedrag zelfs zichtbaar zijn als de formele incorporatie van voorgeschreven gedrag laag is.

De rollen die NAVO en GBVB uitdragen zijn gebaseerd op een mengeling van gepast geachte manieren om beleidskwesties aan te pakken (waarbij politiek en moreel gezag van belang zijn) en efficiënt geachte materiële middelen om collectieve vraagstukken aan te pakken. Internationale gedragsvoorschriften veranderen het gedrag van een kleine staat vanwege de normatieve verwachtingen die ermee gewekt worden. In hun hoedanigheid van collectieve actor, respectievelijk gezamenlijk beleid, maken NAVO en GBVB de ontwikkeling mogelijk van een internationale identiteit van een kleine staat die gebaseerd is op een universele aanspraak van ethische verantwoordelijkheid, waarmee de inspanning van die staat binnen internationale organisaties groter wordt. Het onderzoek geeft empirisch bewijs van gedragsveranderingen, waaronder een versterking van internationale inspanningen door incorporatie van externe gedragsvoorschriften die wortelen in NAVO en GBVB. Door te kijken naar de incorporatie van gedragsvoorschriften, zonder deze te herleiden tot de traditionele limiteringen van nationaal belang en dwang van grootmachten, draagt het onderzoek draagt bij aan het ontrafelen van de motieven voor kleine staten om hun internationale participatie te vergroten.

Het eerste deel van het onderzoek introduceert de onderzoeksopzet en de doelstelling. Hoofddoel is het vaststellen van de invloed van internationale gedragsvoorschriften van NAVO en GBVB op de nationale rolopvattingen van een kleine staat. Er wordt ingegaan op alternatieve benaderingen van de bestudering van *multilevel roles* in buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid binnen internationale organisaties. De literatuur over internationale organisaties en kleine staten is geanalyseerd met het oog op inzicht in rolconcepten, gebruikmakend van de kruisbestuiving tussen inzichten in buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid. De conceptualisering van rolpatronen in buitenlands beleid zijn ontleend aan roltheorie, en de rekenschap die gegeven wordt van de prescriptieve invloed van internationale organisaties en rolincorporatie wortelt in sociologisch institutionele inzichten. De analyse legt drie valkuilen bloot die te vinden zijn in de literatuur over buitenlands beleid. De eerste valkuil betreft de overheersende aandacht voor grootmachten (in termen van hun materiële macht en militaire machtsevenwichten), waardoor de betekenis van kleine staten en niet-materiële aspecten van gedragsvoorschriften over het hoofd gezien worden. De

tweede valkuil betreft de overheersende aandacht voor binnenlandse besluitvormingsprocessen, waardoor de invloed van transgouvernementele processen onderbelicht blijft. De derde valkuil betreft de veel te beperkte aandacht in staatscentrisch onderzoek voor de prescriptieve en socialiserende betekenis van internationale organisaties. In dit onderzoek wordt een uitweg gezocht door de operationalisering van rolpatronen te ontleen aan roltheorie en benaderingen binnen het sociologisch institutionalisme.

Vervolgens wordt een analysekader ontwikkeld om de voorwaarden (*internationale positie, prominentie, volharding en overeenstemming*) voor vorming van gedragsvoorschriften en hun uitvoering te valideren. Deze voorwaarden worden getest voor de externe rolincorporatie en uitvoering door Portugal aan de hand van een discoursanalyse van *politieke retoriek, beleidsplanning en beleidsuitvoering*. Door inhoudsanalyse van beleidsdocumenten wordt een geschiedenis van de rolincorporatie gereconstrueerd, dat wil zeggen het ontwikkelingsproces van gedragsvoorschrijvende beleidsvoornemens tot buitenlands politieke initiatieven onder bevorderende internationale omstandigheden.

Het empirisch onderzoek in Deel 2 test de theoretische inzichten uit Deel 1. Hoofdstuk 4 bespreekt de invloed van de veranderingen in de Euro-Atlantische context op het prescriptieve vermogen van NAVO en GBVB en op de internationale inspanningen van kleine staten. In hoofdstuk 5 en 6 worden primaire bronnen en secundaire literatuur over de prescriptieve rol van NAVO en GBVB geanalyseerd. Deze hoofdstukken gaan in op specifieke gedragsvoorschriften en hoe zij uiteenlopen of samenvallen. De naar vorengebrachte operationalisering beschouwt de EU en NAVO als een *multilevel* verband waarin gedragsvoorschriften ontstaan. Kleine staten kunnen van die bredere context profiteren om hun externe prestaties te verhogen. Op basis van Hoofdstuk 4-6 gaat Hoofdstuk 7 in op de casus Portugal en concrete gedrags- en beleidseffecten van gedragsvoorschriften (mate van integratie en internationale socialisatie, de kracht van de argumenten achter de voorschriften, en internationale identiteit). Het onderzoek toont aan dat rolincorporatie niet blijkt uit directe bestuurlijke inpassing of juridische uitvoering van de voorschriften, maar uit een verandering van percepties over de internationale identiteit en extern gedrag.

In Deel 3 worden conclusies getrokken over de invloed van gedragsvoorschriften van internationale organisaties op nationale rolincorporatie, en over hoe incorporatie van nieuwe rollen gedreven wordt door denken in termen van gepastheid. Voorts wordt gekeken naar de mate waarin niet-regulatieve aspecten van gedragsvoorschriften tot rolincorporatie, beleidsuitvoering en grotere internationale inspanningen leiden.

Zowel de theoretische inzichten als de resultaten van het empirisch onderzoek bevestigen dat *niet-regulatieve gedragsvoorschriften voortkomend uit NAVO en GBVB leiden tot rolincorporatie* door Portugal en tot veranderingen in zijn internationale identiteit. Het onderzoek draagt bij tot *theorievorming over buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid van kleine staten* en toont aan dat roltheorie, ondanks de geringe interesse in kleine staten, een nieuwe benadering oplevert van hun bestudering in geïntegreerde beleidscontexten, zo uiteenlopend als NAVO en GBVB. Roltheorie maakt het mogelijk *het gedrag van kleine landen te interpreteren los van belangentegenstellingen tussen grootmachten, los van uitsluitend strikt regulatieve aspecten van rolacceptatie en los van een strikt consequentiële logica over preferentievorming*. Het onderzoek maakt een einde aan de problemen met formeel geïncorporeerde wetgeving, richtlijnen of andere juridische formules die analytische beperkingen opleveren bij de verklaring van toegeeflijkheid met internationale

voorschriften. De beleidsdocumenten en beleidsverklaringen tonen dat een kwalitatieve operationalisering van *role sets* overtuigende argumenten oplevert over wenselijk gedrag los van conceptualisering van nationaal belang, vijandschap en overlevingsdrang. Rolanalyse biedt een rijk onderzoeksinstrumentarium voor empirisch gericht onderzoek naar vrijwillige volgzzaamheid in buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid.

De empirische resultaten staan twee algemene conclusies toe. Ten eerste: internationale organisaties ondersteunen prescriptieve vermogens door *normatieve* (inhoudelijke richtlijnen die politiek gedrag binden), *polemische* (keuzes in buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid op basis van wenselijkheid, universaliteit en altruïstische beleidsstandpunten) en *materiële* (materiële bronnen en prikkels) *conditioneringen*, die voortvloeien uit percepties over hun geschiktheid en efficiëntie om gemeenschappelijke vraagstukken aan te pakken. Ten tweede: Portugal incorporeert als kleine staat de voorgeschreven rollen om *zijn internationale identiteit helpen vorm te geven*, op basis van een gepercipieerde externe *ethische verantwoordelijkheid* en een *universeel karakter van zijn buitenlands beleid*, in plaats van aanpassingsgedrag bij grootmachten te vertonen of te gehoorzamen vanwege dwang, zoals vaak in de literatuur gesteld wordt.